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1. Introduction 
Business news tickers announce strategic alliances almost on a daily basis. Only in the 
Western European mobile communication industry, incumbents formed three substantial 
alliances within 10 days at the beginning of April 2003:  
 
‘Vodafone and Orange invest In U.S. Start-Up to avoid dependence on suppliers’ (The Wall 
Street Journal Europe, 28.3.2003)  
 
Vodafone and Orange aim to lower dependency from Nokia and Intel in mobile handset 
software. 
 
‘T-Mobile, Telefonica Moviles, and TIM form alliance’ (vwd, 7.4.2003)  
 
The three MNOs1 aim to strengthen their global market position by developing joint 
products and services, thereby capitalizing on economies of scale based on 162 Mio. 
subscribers served worldwide. 
 
‘Seal set on partnership: Vodafone D2 cooperates with Fujitsu Siemens Computers and 
Toshiba’ (Vodafone, 8.4.2003) 
 
The three companies form a joint marketing initiative ‘Connected by Vodafone’ to sell 
products and services enabling mobile data communication for corporate clients. In the 
related press release, Vodafone explicitly states that: ‘Further partnerships are already 
planned’ (Vodafone, 2003) 
Similar trends can be observed in other high technology industries such as Pharma and 
Biotech, semi-conductors and software. Windhover (Windhover, 1999; Windhover, 2002) 
reported 782 newly formed Pharma- and 699 Biotech-alliances in 2001, these numbers grew 
from 311 new Pharma- and 156 Biotech-alliances in 1991 over 414 and 313 in 1995. A few 
of these alliances deals reach sizes up to $ 2.8 bn as Novartis’ investment in Roche. Philips 
Semiconductors is exemplary in the semi-conductor industry; for its Bluetooth technology it 
started to form an R&D alliance with Ericsson in December 1999 (Philips, 1999), followed 
by similar strategic cooperations with the communication solution provider Addvalue 
                                                 
1  Mobile Network Operator 
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Communications form Singapore in May 2000, with the US based WIDCOMM⎯a pioneer 
in Bluetooth software⎯in October 2000, and with the French Software provider Inventel 
Systemes in December 2000 (Philips, 2000a; Philips, 2000b; Philips, 2000c). In the 
beginning of 2001, Philips Semiconductors started to build up distribution alliances with 
companies such as the American Bluetooth specialist Stonestreet One and sourcing alliances 
with the Swedish Allagon (antennas) and the Californian Tality (reference modules) (Philips, 
2001a; Philips, 2001b; Philips, 2001c). For other products such as mobile handset chipsets 
(cooperations among others with Datang Mobile and Samsung Electronics) or platforms for 
audio and video players (cooperations among other with Hitachi, Moxi Digital, NEC, 
STMiccroelectonics, and TiVo), Philips Semiconductors follows the same alliance strategy 
(Philips, 2002; RealNetworks, 2002). 
These activities are part of a trend, which started already in the nineties. Since then, the 
formation rate of interfirm collaboration, such as strategic alliances, has increased 
dramatically (Dyer, et al., 2001), especially in high technology industries. High technology 
industries, which Eisenhardt (2000) termed high velocity industries, are the arenas in which 
alliance activity has been most intensive in the recent past (Hagedoorn, 1993). Scholars as 
Doz and Hamel trace this trend to the fact that:  
 
‘…strategic alliances are a logical and timely response to intense and rapid changes in 
economic activities, technology, and globalization.’ (Doz, et al., 1998, p. XIII) 
 
New high technology industries are a special showcase for alliance activities. All three 
drivers occur in an intense fashion: (1) New industries still have fluctuating structures, 
therefore, change in economic activities happens frequently. (2) Based on its definition, 
technological change is high and fast as above-mentioned in Eisenhardt’s high velocity 
notion, and (3) last but not least technological fields as biotechnology, mobile 
communication, multi-media, or material science, which are perceived as high tech, are 
global. 
Analyzing the reasons to form alliances, Doz and Hamel captured the different motivation in 
a framework, which they called: Logics of alliance value creation (Doz, et al., 1998, p. 36). 
Alliances are motivated by (1) the companies’ need for: ”Racing for the world” (getting a 
foothold in markets) and (2) their need for: “Racing for the future” (embracing new 
technologies). Both needs can be broken down into different drivers. Racing for the World 
comprises the three drivers building: critical mass; reaching, accessing new markets; 
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plugging skill gaps. Racing for the future combines: building nodal positions in coalitions, 
hedging with technological innovations; creating new opportunities; building new 
competences. 
Doz and Hamel’s framework is clearly focusing on the output / sales side of an organization 
(i.e., reaching new markets, building nodal positions, and creating opportunities) and on 
organizational as well as on technological skills (i.e., plugging skill gaps, building new 
competencies). In my opinion, the supply side of this organization is missing. So I claim that 
accessing superior supply is an additional driver for alliances, which can for example be 
seen in the partnership between DaimlerChrysler and Bosch. This partnership enabled 
DaimlerChrysler to market innovations such as ABS systems or Common Rail diesel 
engines, which helped DaimlerChrysler to earn superior returns by building up the brand of 
Mercedes as a car with superior technology. 
In addition to the intense alliance formation, which is motivated by different drivers, firms 
within new high technology industries (NTBF’s)2 change their alliance portfolio over time. 
NTBF’s are constantly adding or removing partners over time. They are changing their 
behavior toward their partners in terms of resource contribution and management. Therefore, 
the firm’s position in the industry network is constantly in flux (Parise, et al., 2001). 
Exemplary Sun Microsystems shifted its alliance portfolio drastically comparing the period 
from 1990 to mid-1994 with the period from mid-1994 to 1998. The emergence of the 
Internet in the latter half of the 1990s let Sun Microsystems drop-off alliances with 
competitors and let largely increase alliances with complementors (Parise, et al., 2001). 
These shifts are consistent with Knoke’s et al. (2002) results from analyzing dynamics of 
strategic alliance networks in the global information sector. They found substantial changes 
in network size, partner types, alliance types and network intensity. 
Figure 1 illustrates these two characteristics in the Mobile Internet industry. The alliance 
portfolios are large and they change significantly over time. 
Without discussing the details⎯which will follow in chapter 3⎯the two effects are obvious. 
Already in their first years NTBFs as YellowMap and 12snap form many alliances, despite 
their limited size with 20 employees in the case of YellowMap and 70 in the case of 12snap. 
                                                 
2  Further referred to as new technology-based firms (NTBF’s). The definition of NTBF used in 
this study is consistent with the definition provided by Yli-Renko and Autio (1998). The term 
“new technology-based firm” is used to refer to independent entrepreneurial firms, which 
develop, transfer, and or commercialize advanced technology. 
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Alliance portfolio are intense and rapidly changing
Source: Author
YellowMap's alliance portfolio (02.2003) after 4 years
1999
2001
2000
2002
12snap's alliance history  (1999-2002)
In addition, these alliance portfolios pass through a significant structural change in terms of 
with whom and in which way NTBFs partner.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1   Alliance portfolios in the Mobile Internet industry 
At first glance, allying seems to be a strategically important problem, which industry studies 
(i.e. Booz Allen Hamilton, 2001b) confirm. But not a lot is known on the alliance portfolio 
dynamics. As Gulati stated: 
 
‘Important questions remain about the growth and development of interorganizational 
alliance networks. … It would be fruitful to assess the performance effects of these 
[dynamic] networks.’ (Gulati, 1998) 
 
As Yli-Renko (2001) states, that this is especially the case for NTBFs. And Knoke (2002) 
even explicitly asks for further research analyzing the strategic consequences of dynamics in 
strategic alliances for organizational performances: growth, profits, and innovation. To start 
a further investigation of the performance implications, the quite broadly discussed term 
performance first has to be defined and specified. 
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Performance dimensions and parameters 
Different scholars have discussed new venture performance based on various criteria. I.e., 
Mowery (1996) assessed case study based on their sales and employee growth. Eisenhardt 
(1990) measured venture profitability and Baum (2000) observed their innovativeness. Up to 
now, no single performance indicator could demonstrate its superiority. Therefore a multi 
dimension approach is chosen for this study similar to a balanced scorecard. 
Reasons for superior performance are discussed in the field of strategic management under 
the label of competitive advantage. Different approaches, explaining competitive advantage, 
have been developed over time. Early strategic economists as Porter (1977; 1980); Scherer 
and Ross (1990) assessed industry structures. The position of the firm within this structure is 
a source of competitive advantage. The next group of researchers analyzed structural 
conditions of industries over time. Industry evolutionists as Rumelt (1984) and Utterback 
(1975) described this industry development process and critical factors along its line; 
Klepper (1990; 2000) determined the influence of prior capabilities (pre adaptation). The 
next school of researchers focused on internal parameters as skill and capabilities (Chandler, 
1992; Nelson, et al., 1982) on strategic assets and resources (Barney, 1986; 1991; Dierickx, 
et al., 1989; Wernerfelt, 1984), and on organizational learning, organizational knowledge 
and innovation (Adler, 1993; Brown, et al., 1991; Gavetti, et al., 2000; Henderson, et al., 
1990). In the 1990s, new cooperation forms gained importance in the discussion on 
competitive advantage. The impact of organizational boundaries and networks on company 
performance were discussed in i.e., Williamson (1981; 1999) and Zenger, et al. (1997). 
 
To fill this gap, this study asks: Why do small firms create these intense alliance portfolios, 
can they create competitive advantage? What are the consequences for growth and 
organizational development? Which processes support NTBFs to build up and manage these 
portfolios? What drives alliance portfolio dynamics? 
Despite the immense body of literature on alliance and networks⎯this topic is en vogue 
since the beginning of the nineties⎯, which has been summarized by Auster (1994) and 
Gulati (1998), the literature of alliance portfolio dynamics is rather thin (see Hite, et al., 
2001; Koza, et al., 1998). Two reasons can be quoted: (1) Analyzing network dynamics 
requires a longitudinal research design, which is difficult to set-up and time consuming to 
conduct. (2) Networks are hard to measure, analyze, and compare due to their multi 
dimensions, and supporting software has just been developed recently.  
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Different scholars have pointed on this research requirement as (i.e., Baum, et al., 2000; 
Eisenhardt, et al., 1990; Gulati, 1998; Stuart, 2000; Yli-Renko, et al., 1998; Yli-Renko, et 
al., 2001). Hite and Hesterly also emphasize the importance of the alliance portfolio 
dynamics and support the need for further research in this context: 
 
‘… future work [has to focus on] the examination of how and why firm networks evolve, 
particularly in different industries and contexts.’ (Hite, et al., 2001) 
 
After setting forth the general necessity for analyzing alliance portfolio changes in high 
technology industries, two questions arise: (1) Why is it necessary to focus on alliance 
portfolio issues in the Mobile Internet industry? (2) What contributions can this analysis 
make to the topic on network dynamics and alliance - organization co-evolution?  
The Mobile Internet industry has two decisive features, which predestinates it for this 
analysis. Its basic technologies were developed in the mid nineties, thus out of the 
mentioned-above high-technology industries, it is with nano-technology one of the 
youngest. Consequently, alliance portfolio changes in early stages can by analyzed while 
they occur. A second issue is its embeddedness in the mobile communication value chain. 
This structure creates high resource dependencies and interactions with communication 
industry players, which additionally increases alliance activities. Therefore in an extreme 
case study setting, dynamic alliance portfolios can be analyzed real-time. 
Since very little is known about dynamics in strategic alliance networks and the 
interdependence between these networks and organizational change in entrepreneurial high 
velocity industries, a considerably detailed approach gathering a broad area of data over 
several years is required. Hence, the research approach selected for the purpose of this study 
is descriptive and longitudinal. However, it is even more than that, because this study is also 
analytic in nature. It does not only ask ‘what’ questions, it especially asks ‘why’ and ‘how’ 
questions. Multi case study research⎯collecting qualitative and quantitative data⎯is the 
appropriate research methodology for a study that attempts to extend existing literature on 
alliance portfolio and organization interdependences by description and analyses of 
comparative cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). This brief introduction of the methodological 
foundation may suffice at this point, since Chapter 2 contains a profound discussion of the 
methodology selection and the application of the comparative case study methodology in a 
nine-step research process.  
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Furthermore, one other topic must be considered in the course of this introductory chapter. It 
is the inevitable topic of terminology, which will be limited to a short, yet concise, 
explanation of some key terms. In this section, however, neither industry specific terms, nor 
extensively theoretical terms will be introduced, the relevant definition will be provided in 
the particular chapters. Instead, this part will now focus on strategic alliances, alliance 
portfolios, organizational change, and co-evolution. 
An alliance is an arrangement between at least two firms to govern an incomplete contract in 
which each partner has limited control. These arrangements can take different forms – from 
joint ventures, to joint R&D programs, to cooperative marketing arrangements – but each 
aims to govern joint decision making among partners. Therefore, alliances are boundary 
spanning external organizational links in a hybrid form. Between a market based transaction 
and firm integration, they are characterized through market as well has hierarchy aspects 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1997; Gulati, 1998). 
Alliance networks will be conceived and defined as a set of firms, generally characterized by 
different preferences and resources, coordinated through a mix of mechanisms not limited to 
price, exit and background regulation (Grandori, 1999). Therefore, a network is a set of 
alliances linking more than two companies together.  
Often the term network implies a tightly knit form with a strong focal player. In this study, 
the case study firms did not build up tightly knitted networks, but either participate through 
links in different networks or had dyadic alliances to different firms. Therefore, the term 
alliance portfolio characterizes best the kind of loosely knit alliance network, which are 
analyzed in this study. Also other scholars (i.e., Bamford, et al., 2002; Stuart, 2000) used the 
term alliance portfolio to describe this kind of alliance network – which frequently occur in 
high technology settings. 
Organizational change comprises processes or sequences of events that unfold changes such 
as the transitions in individual jobs and careers, group formation and development, and 
organizational innovation, growth, etc. This change manifests in shifting characteristics as 
organizational structure, culture, etc. and is induced through changing environments, 
organizational growth, or further change motors (Van de Ven, et al., 1995). 
Co-evolution between alliance portfolio and organization means that the alliance network of 
emerging firms evolves in response to changing organizational characteristics of the firm, 
which are induced through organizational change (Koza, et al., 1998). 
At this point of the introduction⎯after having dealt with the most fundamental 
terminological issues⎯one might typically expect a section that deals with an overview of 
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the existing literature. However, in the context of an exploratory study – like this – the 
recommendations of leading case study methodologists are different. They favor an ideal of 
theory free research (Eisenhardt, 1989). Due to this recommendation, the subsequent chapter 
on research methodology leads directly to the description of the Mobile Internet industry, its 
segments and the nine case studies (chapter 3). 
The focus of this study was chosen to better understand why and how NTBFs form so many 
alliances, what their performance implications are and what the change in alliance portfolio 
structure steers. Analyzing alliance portfolio and organizational change involves a lot of 
time and energy, and also requires attention to detail. This study leads to a co-evolution 
framework between alliance portfolio and organization for NTBFs in high velocity 
industries and insight into problems concerning processes to manage this dynamic 
specifically in alliance portfolios. 
This study is organized as follows: after this introduction, which has motivated the research 
project, posed the research question, and defined key terminology, the research methodology 
is presented and discussed in chapter 2. This discussion is focused around two questions: (1) 
Which is the best suitable research methodology to answer the research question? And after 
picking Eisenhardt’s (1989) case study methodology, (2) how to proceed step by step to 
answer the research question (compare figure 2). 
Chapter 3 presents the case studies. It starts with an introductory presentation of the industry 
to foster the under-standing of 
the context, in which the case 
study firm’s are embedded. 
Three with-in segment analyses 
follow which introduce the nine 
case study firms and compares 
them with their peers. Chapter 3 
culminates in a cross segment 
analysis from which the co-
evolution argument between 
alliance portfolio and 
organization is derived, and 
which is broken down into 
hypothesis. 
Figure 2   Structure of research study 
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These hypotheses are confronted in chapter 4 with extant literature on alliances and 
networks, resource based theories in strategic management, and models on organizational 
change. This partly iterative procedure of enfolding literature and confronting case study 
data will lead to the extension of theory and contribute to the construction of a co-evolution 
framework for NTBFs in chapter 5. This last chapter closes with the model’s limitations and 
implications for further research and with the implication for management and practitioners. 
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2. Research methodology 
This study analyzes alliance portfolios and organizational change of new technology based 
firms (NTBF) in the first years after their foundation, with the aim to generate hypotheses, 
which link and extend theories in the fields of alliance/network theory, organizational 
development and strategy. Several strict specifications apply to the selection of an 
appropriate research methodology. In the first part of this chapter (2.1) the case study 
approach proposed by Eisenhardt (1989) is selected as the most suitable methodology. The 
selection is based on the research methodology framework of Yin (1984). In the latter part 
of this chapter (2.2), a detailed description of the research process is given that explains the 
relevant steps of case study research and the specific activities conducted in this project. 
2.1 Research question and methodology 
In the current literature on strategic management and organizational theory, different 
research methods have been discussed and criticized. In this section, it is argued that the 
case study approach is the most suitable research methodology for this research project. In 
addition, the spectrum of case study approaches is presented and a precise specification is 
selected depending on the structure of the analyzed data. This chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the critique of case study approach and its unique advantages. 
2.1.1 Research strategy 
The appropriate research methodology is defined by specifications of the observed 
phenomena. In 1984, Yin designed a framework supporting the selection of one of the five 
known research methods in social science: experiment, survey, archival analysis, history and 
case study. Three conditions determine the selection of an appropriate research study 
methodology (Yin, 1984, chapter 1): 
1. The type of research question 
2. The control an investigator has over actual behavioral events, and 
3. The focus on contemporary as opposed to historical phenomena 
Table 1 presents Yin’s framework. 
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Strategy Form of research 
question 
Requires control over 
behavioral events? 
Focuses on 
contemporary events? 
Experiment How, why Yes Yes 
Survey How, what, where, how 
many, how much 
No Yes 
Archival analysis (i.e., 
economic study) 
How, what, where, how 
many, how much 
No Yes/no 
History How, why No No 
Case study How, why No Yes 
Table 1   Relevant situations for different research strategies 
Applying Yin’s framwork, the presented study analyzes (1) if and why alliance portfolios 
can accelerate the growth of NTBFs and how organizational changes shape the alliance 
portfolio. Thus, why and how questions are included. In the presented study (2) the 
investigator had no control over actual behavioral events. He could not influence the 
analyzed developments such as alliance formation and management processes, portfolio 
dynamics as well as organizational change. Furthermore, many events had already taken 
place before the study started (3) as most developments took place from 1999 to 2002. Thus, 
the study is concerned with contemporary events. Based on Yin’s (1984) framework, the 
case study methodology is best suited to analyze the researched phenomena (highlighted in 
table 1). 
2.1.2 Spectrum of case study approaches 
The case study approache can be generally characterized as an empirical inquiry that (1) 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within a real life context, when (2) the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not evident, and in which (3) multiple sources of 
evidence are used (Pettigrew, 1990). 
Depending on (1) the breadth of the variables to be examined, (2) the extent to which 
quantification occurs, and (3) the sample size, several different types of case studies can be 
applied (Rumpf, et al., 1997). Furthermore, case study approaches can be distinguished 
according their theoretical foundation before entering the field and the generalizability of 
their results. Table 2 presents the characteristics of the three most widely applied case study 
approaches: Single case study (Harvard Business School tradition), Eisenhardt’s open multi 
case study approach, and Yin’s theory-based multi case study approach. 
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                    Approach  
                 \ 
Characteristics 
Single case (Harvard 
Business School 
tradition) 
Eisenhardt’s open 
multi case study 
approach 
Yin’s theory based 
multi case study 
approach 
Aim Detecting contiguity Theory building Theory enhancing 
Number of variables Many Several Limited set 
Level of detail Deep open analysis, 
mainly qualitative data 
Detailed open analysis, 
qualitative and 
quantitative data 
Specific, focused 
analysis, qualitative and 
quantitative data 
Number of cases 1 Approximately 4-11 Not specified 
Theoretical foundation Ex ante not existing Ex ante mostly not 
existing 
Ex ante already analyzed 
Generalization Not feasible Feasible Feasible 
Researchers i.e., Dyer (1991), 
Harvard Business School 
case tradition 
i.e., Eisenhardt (1989), 
Pettigrew (1990) 
i.e., Yin (1984) 
Table 2   Characteristics of different case study approaches 
Eisenhardt’s approach is the most appropriate based on two criteria. First, the analyzed 
phenomenon was fairly unstructured and the applicability of specific theories could not be 
easily deduced beforehand; therefore an open approach was required. Second, several other 
scholars have been working on related topics, which allows for the narrowing down of the 
amount of relevant variables and of appropriate fields of theory. In this setting, the aim of 
the research project was to build theory, which allows generalization based on multiple 
observations.  
Of special note is the combination of qualitative with quantitative evidence. Although the 
terms qualitative and case study are often used interchangeably, case study research can 
involve either qualitative data only, quantitative data only, or both (Yin, 1984). Moreover, 
the combination of data types can be highly synergistic. Quantitative evidence can reveal 
relationships that may not be salient to researchers. It also prevent researchers them from 
being carried away by vivid, but false, impressions in qualitative data, and it can bolster 
findings when it corroborates those findings from qualitative evidence. Qualitative data are 
useful for understanding the rationale or theory underlying relationships revealed in the 
quantitative data or may suggest directly a theory which can then be strengthened by 
quantitative support (Jick, 1979). Mintzberg (1979) described these synergies as follows: 
 
‘For while systematic data create the foundation for our theories, it is the anecdotal data 
that enables us to do the building. Theory building seems to require rich description, the 
richness that comes from anecdotes. We uncover all kinds of relationships in our hard data, 
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but it is only through the use of this soft data that we are able to explain them.’ (Mintzberg, 
1979, p. 587) 
 
Another crucial issue is sample size, which means choosing the right number of case studies. 
According to Eisenhardt (1991), the appropriate number of cases depends upon how much is 
known and how much new information is likely to be learned from incremental cases (p. 
622). In a previous work she stated as a rule of thumb: 
 
‘A number of 4 to 10 usually works well. With fewer than 4 cases, it is often difficult to 
generate theory with much complexity, and its empirical grounding is likely to be 
unconvincing.’ (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 545) 
 
Thus, in the trade-off between more cases and richer context, the number of cases chosen for 
this study was influenced by Pettigrew (1990) who emphasized: 
 
‘… that only contextual research is capable of capturing the embeddedness and temporal 
interconnectedness of corporate change processes. Here, context refers to both, outer 
context, especially the emerging industry-level environment, and to inner context, i.e. the 
firm level structural and cultural environment.’ (Pettigrew, 1990) 
 
Longitudinal research enables us to obtain a sounder understanding of organizations. It puts 
us in a better position to establish causal relationships, to take into account the most 
important variables, and to ensure that we do not over-generalize by lumping very different 
organizations together (Miller, et al., 1982, p. 1014). 
 
Given that the aim of this research project as to develop a comprehensive model on the 
interdependencies of alliance portfolios and NTBF’s organizational development, this 
research project bases on a longitudinal, multi-case approach, using qualitative and 
quantitative data. Nine cases representing three segments in the mobile Internet Industry 
have been chosen. 
2.1.3  Critique on case study research 
Although the case study is a distinctive form of empirical inquiry, many investigators 
nevertheless criticize the approach (Yin, 1984). Perhaps the greatest concern has been over 
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the lack of rigor of case study research. Often, the case study investigator has been sloppy 
and allowed equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the direction of the findings 
and conclusions. 
A second common concern about case studies is that they provide very little basis for 
scientific generalization and produce theories that are narrow and idiosyncratic. Another 
frequent concern is about the efficiency of this methodology. Case studies take too long and 
result in massive unreadable documents and overly complex theories (Eisenhardt, 1989). A 
few researchers even doubt its potential to significantly contribute to the set of theories by 
other than modest advancement of existing theories (i.e., Dyer, et al., 1991, p. 617) 
The comparison with other research strategies and improvements of techniques and software 
tools, such as QSR NUD*IST3 used for case study research, relativize these concerns. Bias 
can also be entered into experiments (see Rosenthal, 1966), in designing surveys (Sudman, 
et al., 1982), or in historical research (Gottschalk, 1969). In case study research bias has 
been less frequently documented and addressed (Yin, 1984). Case studies are generalizable 
to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. In this sense, case studies do 
not represent a sample; the investigator’s goal is to expand and generalize theories (analytic 
generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization).  
Alternatives to the traditional lengthy narrative way of writing case studies can reduce the 
amount of documents. And the amount of time spent collecting data depends on the studied 
phenomenon. Ethnographic studies usually require long periods of time in the field because 
changes take place gradually. Organizational changes in NTBF can be observed in less time, 
because changes occur faster and are more radical. 
In addition to the relativized concerns, the case study approach has clear strengths. One 
strength of the case study approach is that it is contextual. Only contextual research is 
capable of capturing the embeddedness and temporal interconnectedness of corporate 
change processes, and thereby generate novel theories. Here, context refers to both outer 
context, especially the emerging industry-level environment, and to inner context, such as 
the firm level structural and cultural environment (Pettigrew, 1990; Quinn, et al., 1988). A 
second strength is that the emergent theory is likely to be testable with constructs that can be 
readily measured and hypotheses that can be proven false (Eisenhardt, 1989). A third 
strength is that the resultant theory is likely to be empirically valid. The likelihood of a valid 
                                                 
3  QSR NUD*IST is the world’s leading software for code-based qualitative analysis. It manages 
non-numerical unstructured data and provides processes as indexing and searching to build 
theory. More information at www.qsr.com.au 
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theory is high because the theory-building process is so intimately tied with evidence that it 
is very likely that the resultant theory will be consistent with empirical observation. 
These strength may underly zu Knyphausen-Aufseß’s (1995) discussion of a renaissance of 
case study research. He also provided two reasons why large-sample cross-sectional research 
is coming under pressure from case study research: (1) increasing awareness that the 
contingency-based approaches in strategic management need to be mirrored by contingency 
approaches in empirical research, and (2) because of the influence of ‘new’ Industrial 
Organization research with its focus on the firm rather than on the industry.  
Given these arguments, it is not surprising that alliance research has been unaffected by the 
increasing acceptance of case study work in the general disciplines of organizational 
behavior and strategic management. Case study research has been well-established in the 
field of alliance research since the middle 1980s. Some prominent examples of case study 
research on alliances include the following studies shown in table 3. Miles and Huberman 
(1994) provide additional examples of qualitative research projects. 
Study Author Content 
Alliances of small firms (Gomes-
Casseres, 
1997) 
Analysis of alliance strategies of small firms based on 4 cases in 
the US computer industry. Gomes-Casseres found, that small 
firms tend to use alliances to gain economies of scale, when 
they are small relative to their rivals and to their market; they 
avoid alliances, when they are large in relative terms. 
Network dyads in 
entrepreneurial settings: A 
study of the governance of 
exchange relations 
Larson 
(1992) 
Analysis of social control mechanisms in networks from 7 high-
growth entrepreneurial firms in telephone equipment, clothing, 
computer hardware, and environmental services. According to 
Larson, the network formation process depends on trust, 
reciprocity, and mutual interdependence. 
Social structure and 
competition in interfirm 
networks: The pradox of 
embeddedness 
Uzzi 
(1997) 
Analysis of embeddedness and organization networks of 23 
entrepreneurial firms in New York’s apparel industry. 
According to Uzzi, embeddedness shapes organizational and 
economic outcomes. It promotes economies of time, integrative 
agreements, Pareto improvements in allocative efficiency, and 
complex adaptation. 
The network embeddedness 
of new technology-based 
firms: Developing a 
systemic evolution model 
(Yli-
Renko, et 
al., 1998) 
Analysis of interactive relationship between NTBFs and their 
network environment based on 5 cases in Finish high-tech 
industries. Yli-Renko and Autio show, how NTBFs become 
immersed in innovation and manufacturing networks. 
Table 3   Case study research on alliances 
Although table 3 is not a comprehensive list, it clearly points out that other scholars selected 
the case study approach as the best suitable methodology for their research on alliances as 
well. 
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2.2 Research process 
Following the research approach proposed by Eisenhardt (1989), this project comprises 
eight steps. This section gives a general overview of the proposed procedure as well as of 
the specific activities conducted in each step. Figure 3 provides an overview of this process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3   Case study research process 
2.2.1 Preparation 
The preparation of this research project had two aspects – the first empirical and the second 
theoretical, which were iteratively interlinked. Thoughts of a research project came up in 
1999, when the author took an investment in a mobile Internet venture. Playing an active 
role by giving feedback on the venture’s strategy, the author soon realized the importance of 
partnerships. Thereby motivated to screen the literature on alliance portfolios, the author 
realized the lack of studies comprehensively explaining the transition of alliance networks 
and portfolio as NTBFs develop and grow.  
In 2001, the author intensified discussion on alliances in the mobile Internet industry with 
industry experts (such as network operators and industry consultants). He visited 
conferences on alliances and the telecommunication industry and intensified the screening of 
relevant literature on entrepreneurship, strategic management focusing on alliances, and 
organizational development theories such as life cycle concepts. These preparations led to 
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the formulation of the stated research project at the end of 2001 and the search for cases to 
analyze. 
2.2.2 Selection of cases 
The sampling in case study research is different from those in large-scale empirical research. 
In large-sample quantitative research, random sampling is used to overcome the problem of 
bias. In case study research, the population and the sample are deliberately selected through 
theoretical sampling by researchers in a process best characterized as ‘planned opportunism’ 
(Glaser, et al., 1967; Pettigrew, 1990). Based on Pettigrew’s (1979) recommendations on 
case study triangulation, Eisenhardt (1989) advises choosing cases that are extreme 
situations and polar types in which the process of interest is transparently observable (p. 
537). Hence, the objective is to select sites with the highest possible potential for meaningful 
study of the phenomena of interest. 
In selecting nine cases from the mobile Internet industry, an effort has been made to identify 
industry segments that are well documented and observable and to select⎯depending on the 
size and variety within the segment⎯at least one prospering company and one that was not 
known for being successful. The two major criteria for segment observability were its age 
and media coverage. Thus, these segments need to have been in existence since 1999 and 
investment banks, consulting, and research companies need to have ranked their 
attractiveness (measured in growth potential) as high and written reports on the segments. 
Indicators for the company’s success were the prominent reference in segment reports, 
industry awards, and⎯in this fairly new industry still important⎯word of mouth. 
This procedure resulted in the selection of three clusters of 2 – 4 companies. Analytical 
instruments had to be crafted to analyze them. The detailed selection of segments and 
companies is described in section 3.1. 
2.2.3 Crafting instruments 
Researchers building theory typically combine multiple data collection methods. While 
interviews, observations, and archival sources are particularly common, inductive 
researchers are not confined to these choices. Some investigators only employ a subset of 
these data collection methods, or they may add others. The rationale is the same as in 
hypothesis-testing research. That is, the triangulation made possible by multiple data 
collection methods provides stronger substantiation of constructs and hypotheses 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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To have a broader view of the case settings and to capture qualitative as well as quantitative 
data, a sequential procedure was designed to craft the instruments before entering the field 
(shown in figure 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4   Crafting instruments for data collection 
This process started after preliminary thoughts on the research question and the sampling. 
First, secondary data were studied to see which information was already available. This 
secondary data included industry reports from research companies (i.e., Gartner, Forrester, 
and Durlacher) and consulting companies (i.e., A.T. Kearney, BCG, and Booz Allen 
Hamilton), press clippings from homepages and news services (i.e., Hoover’s4, Factiva5 and 
OneSource6), and annual reports, to name a few. By comparing the information from 
secondary data with the information requirements of the study, the questions for the survey 
were derived. Second, these questions were structured into three clusters: questions on (1) 
the development of the company, (2) the partnership portfolio, and (3) on partnership 
processes. Third, the questionnaire was tested in a trial interview. Shortcomings, which 
became obvious during the interview, or which were realized later transcribing the interview 
and analyzing the data, were noted and used to refine they survey before entering the field. 
The survey was also enriched by additional questions and two preparational forms that 
covered the company’s business model and its development (including the formation of 
important alliances) to facilitate the discussion on their development. 
With a broad understanding of the industry, a detailed preparation of every case study 
company and a tailored and tested questionnaire the field was entered. 
                                                 
4  Hoover’s is an information provider that delivers company, industry, and market data. Further 
information at www.hoovers.com/hoov/about/index.html 
5  Factiva is the newly launched business news and information service of Reuters and Dow 
Jones. Further information at: www.factiva.com/about/index.asp 
6 OneSource is a business information provider for sales, marketing, finance, and general 
management topics. Further information at: www.onesource.com/about/content63.asp 
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2.2.4 Data collection 
A striking feature of research to build theory from case studies is the frequent overlap of 
data analysis with data collection. For example, Glaser and Strauss (1967) argue for joint 
collection, coding, and analysis of data. While many researchers do not achieve this degree 
of overlap, most maintain some overlap, which is also shown in figure 4. 
Overlapping data analysis with data collection not only gives the researcher a head start in 
analysis but, more important, allows researchers to take advantage of flexible data 
collection. Indeed, a key feature of theory-building case research is the freedom to make 
adjustments during the data collection process. These adjustments can be the addition of 
cases to probe particular themes that may emerge.  
Additional adjustments can be made to data collection instruments, such as adding questions 
to an interview protocol or to a questionnaire (Harris, et al., 1986). These adjustments allow 
researchers to probe emergent themes or to take advantage of special opportunities that may 
be present in a given situation. In other situations adjustments can include the addition of 
data sources in selected cases. 
These alterations raise an important question: Is it legitimate to alter and even add data 
collection methods during a study? For theory-building research, the answer is “yes”, 
because investigators are trying to understand each case individually, and in as much depth 
as is feasible. The goal is not to produce summary statistics about a set of observations. 
Thus, if a new data collection opportunity arises or if a new line of thinking emerges during 
the research, it makes sense to take advantage by altering data collection, if such an 
alteration is likely to better ground the theory or to provide new theoretical insight. This 
flexibility is not a license to be unsystematic. Rather, this flexibility is controlled 
opportunism in which researchers take advantage of the uniqueness of a specific case to 
improve resultant theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
This study is based on primary and secondary data. Internet searches were used to gather 
secondary data (i.e., press clippings, annual reports, and product information). In addition, 
press search on every case company was conducted within the databases of Factiva, 
Hoover’s and OneSource. 
The primary data were gathered by ‘face to face’ interviews (with one exception via 
telephone), follow-up telephone-calls, and e-mails. Interviewees were searched and selected 
based on three criteria: they had to be high level to answer the strategic questions; they had 
to be involved in the alliance activities, and they had to be with the firm for more than two 
years to be knowledgeable about its development. In addition, the author tried to get more 
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than one interview where feasible. The final interview sample (a detailed list is enclosed in 
the appendix) looks as follows: 
 
Position in Firm CEO CFO Business development 
/ managing directors 
Marketing and sales 
Number of 
interviewees  
5 2 2 2 
Thereof founders  4 2 - - 
Table 4   Interview sample 
Close to 70% of the interviewees were on a board level and more than 50% were founders of 
the case study firms. The other interviewees were all second level, thus it was a high level 
interview panel. In two companies two people were interviewed, two check for consistency. 
In the other firms only one employee was interviewed. Not being the ideal case, this 
procedure is justifiable for three reasons. First, the collected data is largely objective. 
Performance data as revenues, employees etc, alliance data as formation and termination 
dates and data on the organizational change as the organizational structure or compensation 
and reward systems are non interpretative. Second, detailed and excellent secondary data 
sources helped to validate the data. And third, the interviews of the other two case studies 
were very consistent. In addition, this procedure was ‘as good as it gets’ because in many 
firms only the CEO was knowledgeable about the alliances, their integration into the 
corporate strategy, and the processes how the portfolio changed its structure. 
The initial interviews usually lasted 2-3 hours and were structured in three sections. The first 
part covered the general development of the case study firm to understand how the 
organizational characteristics and the resource requirements changed over time. The second 
part covered structural aspects of the alliance portfolio enclosing the questions such as with 
whom, why, when, how intensive. The last part analyzed the alliance process to understand 
how alliances are formed and managed. Every section started with open question to 
understand the general settings. The core elements in each section were covered a second 
time with closed questions to assure that these aspects are enclosed in all case studies and 
thus comparable. In these closed section the interviewees had to clearly specify the 
development steps of their firm in terms of date, their characteristics, and resource 
requirements. The dimension to evaluate the organizational characteristics reached from the 
organizational structure, over the management focus, the communication style, and the 
flexibility of strategy, to the compensation and reward systems. These dimensions have been 
selected by referring to the current practice in organizational theory (i.e., Block, et al., 1985; 
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Alliance database structure 
Case study firm 
Name 
Industry segment 
Foundation date 
Country 
Address 
Domain 
Partners 
Name 
Industry 
Company type
1  :  n Partnership
Formation date
Termination date
Motivation
Governance stru-
cture
Intensity stage 1
:
Intensity stage x
1  :  1
Greiner, 1972; Kazanjian, et al., 1989). The seven resource categories, for which 
requirements were collected, comprised technological know-how, reputation, access to 
markets and to supply, financial and human resources as well as organizational skills. The 
selected categories have also been used in other research studies focusing on company 
resources (i.e., Barney, 1991). To indicate the organizational characteristics and resource 
requirements four and five point scales were used. The detailed definitions of every category 
and the scales to measure these categories are provided on the basis of the first case study in 
section 3.2.  
Collection alliance data was an iterative process based on archival data and interviews. 
Archival data has been used to gather information on the partners and the dyadic 
relationships. Partners are characterized by their name, the industry they belong to, and their 
type (start-up, mid-cap, large firms). Foundation date, and contingently termination date, 
motivation, the governance structure, and the intensity over time describe partnerships. 
Industry reports, company home pages, and business databases as Factiva were used as data 
sources. The relevant information was stored in a database, which structure is depicted in 
figure 5.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5   Alliance database structure 
Database reports were used to discuss the alliance portfolios with the case studies’ 
management teams, who confirmed or completed the data during the interviews and made 
changes, where needed. After the interviews, the database was updated. For 
comprehensibility reasons, the documentation of the networks is explained on the basis of 
the first case study. 
The interviews were taped and fully transcribed and are attached in the appendix. This 
procedure of full transcription is imperative for reasons of internal validity and reliability. In 
their authoritative work on the methods of data collection, Bortz and Döring (1995) state:  
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‘If an interview also contains open questions and narrative parts, an audio recording is 
unavoidable.’ (Bortz, et al., 1995, p. 230, 231)7  
 
All transcripts are included as part of the case study database. Similar to the well-established 
Harvard Business School case research approach, all interviewees were granted anonymity, 
in that nothing they said was attributed to them personally until and unless they approved of 
the transcript (Leonard-Barton, 1990).8 
2.2.5 Analyzing data 
Analyzing data is the heart of building theory from case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989), but it is 
the most difficult and the least codified part of the process. Since published studies generally 
describe research types and data collection methods but give little space to discussion of 
analysis, a huge chasm often separates data from conclusions. As Miles and Huberman 
wrote: 
 
‘One cannot ordinarily follow how a researcher got from 3600 pages of field notes to the 
final conclusions, sprinkled with vivid quotes though they may be.’ (Miles, et al., 1994, p. 
16) 
 
However, a few key features of analysis can be identified. One key step is the within-case 
analysis; the other is searching for cross-case patterns. Within-case analysis typically 
involves detailed case study write-ups for each site. These write-ups are often simply pure 
descriptions, but they are central to the generation of insight (Gersick, 1988; Pettigrew, 
1988) because they help researchers to cope with the often enormous volume of data early in 
the analysis process. However, there is no standard format for such analysis. Different 
scholars have used different processes. Quinn (1980) developed teaching cases for each. 
                                                 
7  In addition to the added rigor and internal validity, one of the main benefits of taping and 
transcribing interviews is that the interviewer can concentrate on what is being said, rather than 
being continuously distracted by note-taking. 
8  Interviewees received copies of the transcripts with requests for approval. If they objected to 
certain parts of the transcripts they were asked to mark the parts, which were then omitted from 
the final transcript. This occurred in three instances where a few sentences were omitted by 
request of the interviewee. Interviewees were also asked to make additions or clarifications, 
which were then integrated into the final transcript version. Such additions were made in two 
transcripts. One interviewee submitted a clarification for a single term. With the exception of 
this clarification, which was transmitted via telephone, the three other requests for changes were 
transmitted via e-mail and were marked by the interviewees directly in the original transcript 
data file.  
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Mintzberg and McHugh (1985) compiled a case history from their set of cases, Leonard-
Barton (1988) used tabular displays and graphs of information about each case, and Abbott 
(1988) suggested using sequence analysis to organize longitudinal data. However, the 
overall idea is to become intimately familiar with each case as a stand-alone entity. This 
process allows the unique patterns of each case to emerge before investigators push to 
generalize patterns across cases. In addition, it gives investigators a rich familiarity with 
each case, which, in turn, accelerates cross-case comparison. 
Coupled with within-case analysis is cross-case search for patterns. The tactics here are 
driven by the reality that people are notoriously poor processors of information. Different 
scholars have pointed out their weaknesses: 
• leaping to conclusions based on limited data (Kahnemann, et al., 1973) 
• being overly influenced by vividness (Nisbett, et al., 1980), or  
•  by more elite respondents (Miles, et al., 1994) 
• ignoring basic statistical properties (Kahnemann, et al., 1973), or 
• dropping disconfirming evidence (Nisbett, et al., 1980) 
Thus, the key to good cross-case comparison is counteracting these tendencies by looking at 
the data in many divergent ways. One tactic is to select categories or dimensions, and then to 
look at within group similarities coupled with intergroup differences. A second tactic is to 
select pairs of cases and list the similarities and differences between each pair. This tactic 
forces researchers to look for the subtle similarities and differences between cases. The 
juxtaposition of seemingly similar cases can break overly simplistic frames. An extension of 
this tactic is to group cases into threes or fours for comparison (cluster analyses). The third 
strategy is to divide the data according to data sources. This tactic exploits the unique 
insights possible from different types of data collection. When a pattern from one data 
source is corroborated by evidence from another, the finding is stronger and better grounded. 
When evidence conflicts, the researcher can sometimes reconcile the evidence through 
deeper probing of the meaning of the differences. 
Overall, the idea behind these cross-case searching tactics is to force investigators to go 
beyond initial impressions by using structured and diverse lenses of accurate and reliable 
theory⎯that is, a theory with a close fit to the data. Also, cross-case searching tactics 
enhance the probability that the investigators will capture novel findings that may exist in 
the data. 
The data analysis in this study is based on three methods: within case analysis, cross-case 
analysis within the three segments, and cross-segment analysis. The two cross-case analysis 
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methods build on the within-case analysis framework. This framework is a mixture of the 
processes proposed by Leonard-Barton (1988) and Abbott (1988). Following the 
recommendations of Leonard-Barton, the case findings in the three chapters (firm 
development, alliance portfolio, and alliance processes) were categorized in tabular displays 
and the quantitative data were graphed. Following the recommendations of Abbott, the 
longitudinal data were allocated to development stages. These stages were displayed as 
sequential events.  
To note is the network analysis, because the alliance data was broad, more-dimensional, and 
at the heart of this research study. Starting point for the network analysis was an alliance 
database, which was filled out during the data collection. This database comprises data on 
the case study, its partners, and the characteristics of their cooperation over time. Due to the 
complex data structure, a special software tools was employed. Pajek9 (de Nooy, et al., 
2003) was the software package of choice for the representation of network dynamics; a 
selection, other scholars recently did as well (i.e. Powell, et al., 2002; Uzzi, et al., 2002). 
Pajek allows to analyze extended networks and to identify subsets such as multi-connected 
component and clusters (White, et al., 2001). In addition, Pajek can expose the network’s 
emergent structure as organizations enter and exist with one another over time (Uzzi, et al., 
2002). The visualized networks are presented in chapter 3 to highlight both the process by 
which new ties and organizations are added to the network and how the network structure 
evolved. A detailed description how the networks were graphed and which algorithms were 
used is provided for comprehensibility reasons in section 3.2 together with the first network 
graphs. This proceeding contradicts the classical division of methodological aspects from 
the empirical findings but⎯hopefully⎯supports the readability of this study through 
providing methodological details where the subsequent application illustrates the 
methodology. 
 
Alliances: research methodology, the network analysis is based on two layers. Its general 
structure is analyzed mainly based on quantitative data as the network size (number of 
partners), network quality (intensity of links) and its center of gravity (characteristic of 
partners). Qualitative data⎯especially narratives on partnerships⎯help to understand how 
ties are changing and how the process of partnership formation, intensification, 
restructuring, and termination work. 
                                                 
9  Pajek is a software package for large network analyses. Further information at 
 http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/pajek/ 
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This study is based on three different performance dimensions: growth, profitability, and 
innovation. Several indicators measure these dimensions. These indicators are weighted and 
integrated into one single balanced performance index, which is depicted in table 14. This 
sub-section motivates the different dimension and explains the different indicators and its 
weighting.  
All case studies started as technology growth ventures. The archetypes for these companies 
are Microsoft, Sun Microsystems and Cisco Systems. The value of these companies is 
determined through their growth. Therefore, growth is a key performance indicator. Growth 
can refer to organizational growth and economic growth, which are normally strongly 
correlated. Economic growth is measured in absolute sales of their last fiscal year10 and the 
growth rate of the last years, which is used as a short to mid-term growth perspective. The 
organizational growth is measured analogous in number of employees at the beginning of 
2002 and the growth rate of employees. Additionally, reorganizations and lay-offs have been 
accounted for negatively. 
The profitability is the next dimension. Its importance grew constantly over the evolution of 
that industry. After the capital markets turned bad, all case studies had to focus on internal 
growth. Profitability secures survival and further growth. The profitability is measured by 
two indicators: the bottom line profit and the date the break-even point has been reached or 
is planned to be reached. In finance literature, many profitability measures have been 
developed. Cash flow based performance measures, as the CFROI11, are more accurate to 
measure performance, because they are not distorted by depreciation. But they have not been 
used for simplicity and data availability reasons. 
Innovation is the third performance dimension. It measures the distinctiveness of the 
companies’ technology. The case studies’ growth perspective mainly depends on their 
unique technologies and services. The innovation is measured in awards obtained. Relevant 
awards are multi-media, start-up, and new media awards. 
 
From the within-case analysis plus the two cross-case findings and overall impressions, 
tentative themes, concepts, and relationships between variables begin to emerge. The next 
step of this iterative process is to compare systematically the emergent frame with the 
evidence from each case in order to assess how well or poorly it fits with case data. 
                                                 
10  In most cases the year 2001 
11  Cash flow based return on investment 
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2.2.6 Shaping hypothesis 
The central idea of shaping hypotheses is that researchers constantly compare theory and 
data⎯iterating towards a theory that closely fits the data. A close fit is important to build 
good theory because it takes advantage of the possible insights from the data and yields an 
empirically valid theory. 
One step in shaping hypotheses is the sharpening of constructs. This is a two-part process 
involving (1) refining the definition of the construct and (2) building evidence in each case. 
This occurs through constant comparison between data and construct so that accumulating 
evidence from diverse sources converges on a single, well-defined construct. 
This process is similar to developing a single construct measure from multiple indicators in 
hypothesis testing. That is, researchers use multiple sources of evidence to build construct 
measures that define the construct and distinguish it from other constructs. In effect, the 
researcher is attempting to establish construct validity. The difference is that the construct, 
its definition, and measurement often emerge from the analysis itself, rather than specified a 
priori. A second difference is that no technique like factor analysis is available to merge 
multiple indicators into a single construct measure. This is because indicators may vary 
across cases (i.e., not all cases may have all measures) and because qualitative evidence 
(which is common in theory-building research) is difficult to collapse. Thus many 
researchers rely on tables that summarize and tabulate the evidence underlying the construct 
(Miles, et al., 1994; Sutton, et al., 1987). 
A second step in shaping hypotheses is verifying that the emergent relationships between 
constructs fit with the evidence in each case. Sometimes a relationship is confirmed by the 
case evidence, while other times it is revised, disconfirmed, or thrown out for insufficient 
evidence. This verification process is similar to that in traditional hypothesis testing 
research. The key difference is that each hypothesis is examined for each case, not for the 
aggregate cases. Thus, the underlying logic is replication. That is, a series of cases is treated 
as a series of experiments; each case serves to confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses (Yin, 
1984). Cases that disconfirm the relationships often can provide an opportunity to refine and 
extend the theory. At this point, qualitative data are particularly useful for understanding 
why or why not emergent relationships hold.  
Overall, shaping hypotheses in theory building research involves measuring constructs and 
verifying relationships. These processes are similar to traditional hypothesis-testing 
research. However, these processes are more judgmental in the theory-building research 
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because researchers cannot apply statistical tests. The researcher must judge the strength and 
consistency of relationships within and across cases. 
In this research project, the process of shaping hypotheses was highly iterative. Coherent 
patterns from cross-segment analysis were broken into logical relationships, which were 
formulated as preliminary hypotheses. In the next step, the tabular displays from the within-
case analysis were screened, and relevant quotes were copied into tabular display for each 
hypothesis. After revising the preliminary hypotheses, all case study interviews were 
checked for contradicting or supporting quotes, which were also added to the tabular 
displays. These tables were used to formulate the first draft of tentative hypotheses, which 
was subsequently sent out and discussed with the managers who were interviewed. After 
this feedback loop, the final set of tentative hypotheses was formulated.  
Confronting these empirical findings with the current body of literature on alliances and 
networks, theories on competitive advantage, and organizational theory is the next step. 
2.2.7 Enfolding literature 
An essential feature of theory building is the comparison of the emergent concepts, theory, 
or hypotheses with the existing literature. This involves looking for similarities and 
contradictions, and investigating why. A key to this process is to consider a broad range of 
literature. 
Examining literature that conflicts with the emergent theory is important for two reasons. 
First, if researchers ignore conflicting findings, confidence in the findings is reduced. 
Second, conflicting literature represents an opportunity. The juxtaposition of conflicting 
results forces researchers into a more creative, frame-breaking mode of thinking than they 
might otherwise be able to achieve. The result can be deeper insight into both, the emergent 
theory and the conflicting literature, as well as a sharpening of the limits to generalizability 
of the focal research. 
Literature discussing similar findings is important as well, because it ties together 
underlying similarities in phenomena normally not associated with each other. The result is 
often a theory with stronger internal validity, wider generalizability, and a higher conceptual 
level. 
Overall, tying the emergent theory to existing literature enhances the internal validity, 
generalizability, and theoretical level of theory building from case study research. While 
linking results to the literature is important in most research, it is particular for case study 
research because the findings are often based on a limited number of cases. In this situation, 
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any further corroboration of internal validity or generalizability is an important improvement 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In this study, three bodies of literature are enfolded. The case studies are compared with 
writings on alliances and networks, resources and their strategic importance, and on 
organizational development. In the part covering alliances and networks, articles on social 
network theory and resource dependency theory were most relevant. Resource aspects are 
compared with the literature on the Resource Based View and its adaptations as the 
relational view and dynamic capabilities. Development issues are compared with theories on 
organizational change and life-cycle models. Due to the immense amount of articles 
particularly on alliances and networks, only peer reviewed articles and well-known books 
were included in the literature review.  
2.2.8 Reaching closure and validity of data 
Two issues are important in reaching closure: when to stop adding cases, and when to stop 
iterating between theory and data. For the first issue, ideally, researchers should stop adding 
cases when theoretical saturation is reached (Glaser, et al., 1967). In practice, theoretical 
saturation is often combined with pragmatic considerations such as the amount of time and 
money in dictating when case collection ends. In fact, it is not uncommon for researchers to 
plan the number of cases in advance (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
For the second closure issue, when to stop iterating between theory and data, saturation is 
again the key idea. That is, the iteration process stops when the incremental improvement to 
theory is minimal. The final product of building theory from case studies may be concepts, a 
conceptual framework, or propositions, or possibly a midrange theory. 
In this study, reaching closure in terms of adding cases was very simple. The number of 
cases was planned in advance. With nine case studies, this project was on the upper end of 
the range proposed by Eisenhardt (1989) and, therefore as hoped, on the ‘safe side’. The 
iteration process between theory and data was terminated after the most powerful articles in 
the above-mentioned areas were included in this study and further articles provided only 
marginal insight. 
Finally, a few remarks on validity are warranted, since the standard criticism confronting 
case studies usually focuses on validity. Yin (1984) describes four standard tests of validity: 
construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability. In this study, validity 
has been addressed in a number of ways. Triangulation, for example, was used to increase 
construct validity; multiple iterations and follow-ups were conducted during analyses to 
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increase internal validity; and adhering to the strict documentation and transcription 
standards heightened reliability and repeatability. The results of this rigorous methodology 
are summarized in the next chapter⎯the description of case studies. 
 
3. Case studies on alliance portfolios and organizational change 
The objective of this chapter has been outlined in the introduction. At the heart of this 
chapter are the case studies of nine firms within the Mobile Internet industry taken from 
three industry segments: 
• two provide mobile location services (MLS)12, 
• four offer mobile content services (MCS), and 
• three create and sell mobile marketing campaigns.  
The number of case studies corresponds to the size and the diversity of the industry segment. 
The goal of the case study analyses is to understand the benefits from alliance portfolios, the 
processes of their formation and management, and their interrelatedness with organizational 
change. Therefore, a longitudinal research design has been chosen, which analyzes the 
firm’s development (general characteristics and resource needs), changes in the alliance 
portfolio structure and processes, and the link between alliance portfolio and company 
performance.  
To describe the results of these analyses, this chapter is structured into four sections. The 
first section (3.1) focuses on the industry context and describes the emerging mobile Internet 
industry. It contains an industry segmentation and describes the selection of MLS, MCS, and 
Mobile Marketing as the most promising industry segments from which to pick the case 
studies. The aim of this section is to provide the appropriate setting to examine the different 
case studies.  
In the next section (3.2), alliance portfolios of MLS firms are described and analyzed. After 
introducing the industry segment, case-by-case a short company profile is provided, 
pinpointing the development from its foundation until spring 2002 and its current business 
model. These profiles are followed by a detailed segment analysis focusing on the common 
development of these companies and explaining their differences. This segment analysis 
consists of five parts, describing: 
1. Organizational development (organization structure, management style etc.) from 
foundation on. From this analysis, development stages are derived. 
                                                 
12 Detailed definition and segment explanations will be given in chapter 3.2-3.4 
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2. Critical resources for the development stages 
3. Alliance portfolio structure and its changes 
4. Processes and skills to form and manage the alliance portfolio 
5. Firm performance 
Within-case and within-segment analyses concludes the segment studies, which can be 
considered as being one of the most crucial steps in building theory from case studies. The 
two following segments, mobile content services (3.3) and mobile marketing (3.4), are 
presented in the same way: descriptions of the segments and their firms are concluded by 
within-case and within-segment analyses. 
Chapter 3 ends with a cross segment analysis (3.5). This analysis aims to find similar and 
diverging patterns of alliance portfolios, their dynamics, and their processes. Tentative 
hypotheses are formulated based on these findings. The resulting set of hypotheses, the goal 
of this longitudinal research study on alliance portfolios, is consolidated in a preliminary 
model on alliance portfolio dynamics and organizational change. 
3.1 Building industry context: Mobile Internet industry 
This section will analyze the development of the mobile Internet industry and the role that 
NTBFs play. The aim is to (1) provide a general overview of the industry, (2) explain the 
specific industry configuration that make alliances such a common strategic move in this 
industry, and (3) select the most interesting segments in terms of future relevance and 
alliance activities, thereby depicting the peculiarities of this industry and its segments. These 
three steps lay out the basics for understanding the development of the case study companies 
and for analyzing their alliance portfolios. 
3.1.1 Industry overview 
Three aspects of the Mobile Internet industry are introduced below. First, the industry and 
its boundaries are defined; second, the value chain is explained and the different business 
models are pinpointed; third, recent developments in this industry, which are mainly 
technology driven, are covered. 
Mobile Internet industry and its boundary 
In this study, the mobile Internet industry is defined as all companies developing data-
applications and data-services for mobile devices such as cellular phones, personal digital 
assistants (PDAs) and pocket PCs. The mobile Internet industry is part of the mobile 
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communication industry, which comprises terminal equipment and customer premise 
equipment (CPE) manufacturers, as well as network operators and mobile service providers, 
including customer care and billing companies. 
Mobile Internet companies develop solutions for enabling platforms (e.g., WAP-browsers by 
Openwave) and for hosting and gateway provisioning (e.g., the SMS-gateway by Materna); 
they integrate systems and adapt applications to mobile standards (e.g., mobile news portal 
by BeMobile). They develop mobile applications (e.g., a mobile brokerage tool by 
Multichart) and mobile content (e.g., fuel prices of nearby filling stations by 
Clever.Tanken), or they bundle content and service applications (e.g., the mobile general-
purpose portal by Jamba!).  
Figure 6 illustrates the mobile communication value chain and the part that is considered the 
Mobile Internet industry for this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6   Mobile communication value chain 
A more detailed documentation of this value chain, a description of the steps, and the 
underlying business models are provided in the study by Booz Allen Hamilton (2001b).  
History 
The development of the mobile Internet industry depended and still depends on the 
development of the mobile communication industry because of its embeddedness in the 
mobile communication value chain. The mass-market rollout of this industry started in 
Europe in the mid 1980s when the third generation of mobile analog networks (c-networks) 
were introduced. For the first time, these networks enabled data communication via faxes. 
Their coverage went up to approximately 100% of the surface area and several million 
subscribers signed up this service in Europe (850.000 in Germany in 1993) (Nokia, 2002).  
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Mobile communication industry development (Germany)
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The industry took off with the introduction of digital standards in the beginning of the 1990s 
(1991-1992). Figure 7 illustrates the development of the mobile communication industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7   History of mobile communication  
In 1991, GSM13 900 was introduced as the first digital mobile communication standard. Due 
to its bandwidth of 9.6 kbit/s, limited data communication was feasible and a limited amount 
of services could be transmitted (short message services [SMS], ring tones, logos, etc.). 
Business opportunities in the Mobile Internet market arose from the mid 1990s (Nokia 
launched its first SMS compatible phone Nokia 2110 in 1994) for two reasons, (1) 
subscriber growth of mobile communication companies and (2) development of data 
bandwidth, provided by new technologies like WAP, HSCSD, and GPRS. To take 
advantage of these opportunities, companies invented new applications and services. Table 5 
provides an overview of data application and services: 
Service / 
application 
Launch 
date 
Description Companies 
SMS 1995 Short message service. Service through which users 
can send simple text-based messages from one 
device to another – generally up to 160 characters. 
(19 cents a message) 
All MNO operators and 
service provider 
Ring tones 1998 Sounds and melodies to personalize ring tones of 
the mobile phones. 
(0.59-1.99 cents a tone per download) 
Operators (e.g., T-
mobile, portals (e.g., 
Jamba!), and startups 
Logos 1999 Basic graphics to personalize display of mobile 
phones 
(approx. 0.59 cents per download) 
Operators (e.g., T-
mobile, portals (e.g., 
Jamba!), and startups 
 
                                                 
13  Global system for mobile communication 
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Mobile communication industry sales (IDC, 2002)
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Service / 
application 
Launch 
date 
Description Companies 
Information 
services 
(WAP) 
2000 Weather, traffic, politics etc. information based on 
WAP standard. 
(0.50 – 2 € per month for the news service plus 
approx. 4 cents per usage) 
Operator portals (e.g., 
Vizzavi, news 
publishers (e.g., 
kicker), startups (e.g., 
Airweb) 
Transaction 
(WAP) 
2000 The variety of transactions reaches from financial 
transaction as buying and selling stocks over 
booking hotel rooms or buying railway tickets to m-
commerce transaction as buying Bayern München 
merchandise. 
(approx. 1 € per transaction)  
Banks (e.g., Deutsche 
Bank), transportation 
companies (e.g., 
Lufthansa, Deutsche 
Bahn), Hotels, etc.  
Table 5   Data services and application in the 1990s 
These new services and applications gained a fair amount of the communication industry 
sales. For example, in Germany, sales in 2002 totaled to € 3 bn. This corresponds to a 15% 
share of the market, with some MNOs14 generating up to 18% of their sales through data 
communication. The sales distribution and its forecast are shown in figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8   Mobile communication sales (Germany)  
Data sales are expected to grow up to a share of 34% in 2005. This further growth is based 
on two widely accepted propositions. (1) Declining voice sales: the mobile voice 
communication prices are expected to fall substantially and the limited volume increase in 
this saturated market cannot compensate for this. (2) Growing data sales: the forecasted 
growth in data communication assumes that new standards facilitate more sophisticated 
services. After network operators upgrad their networks, the equipment manufacturers will 
                                                 
14  Mobile network operator 
CASE STUDIES 34 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Mobile internet users by bearer service (EITO, 2002)
0
50
100
150
200
250
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
U
se
rs
 [m
io
.]
SMS-only Circuit switched GPRS EDGE UMTS
start to ship handsets based on EDGE technology in 2003, and UMTS technology in late 
2003 or early 2004 (EITO, 2002). 
Industry experts predict that new technologies will challenge the behavior of mobile 
communication users (Durlacher, 1999). The number of data users is expected to grow only 
slightly, because the use of SMS-based data communication is already widely spread in 
Europe. However, this basic technology is expected to be substituted by more advanced 
technologies by 2006, which will allow for more advanced services and applications. This 
trend is shown in figure 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9   Usage of mobile standards  
The new technologies offer more bandwidth for data communication, thereby enabling new 
and interesting end-user applications and services. The available bandwidth grew from 9.6 
kbps for the first handsets in GSM 900 networks to 28.8 to 56 kbps for HSCSD – the most 
advanced data circuit switch transmission standard. The first package switched standard, 
GPRS, currently has a bandwidth of between 40 to 50 kbps (Gartner, 2002b) in a separated 
data channel, which is always on. The next generation of package switched technology, 
EDGE, is expected to have a bandwidth of 384 kbps and UMTS to offer a bandwidth of up 
to 2 Mbps depending on the distance from the antenna. Over the last years, equipment 
manufacturers were capable of providing the mobile communication industry with 
equipment with a bandwidth that grew annually by 70 % (CAGR). 
Service-segments 
The increase in bandwidth facilitates the innovation of mobile applications and services. 
Starting with basic services (described in table 5), the mobile Internet industry developed a 
number of services and is expected to continue to do so in the future. These services address 
different consumer needs, from entertainment and information services over advanced 
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Wireless data evolution – potential service roll-out
Wireless Data Services
Mobile entertainment
Mobile information
Mobile communication
Mobile commerce
Business to consumer
Employee services
Technological milestones
Phase I
Launch GPRS
mobile music
mobile games
entertainment information
Location based services e.g. news, guides, directory listings
Yellow pages
e-mail
unified messaging
mobile auctions
mobile ticketing
mobile reservation
Launch GPRS
Phase II
Expand GPRS/Prepare UMTS
mobile video
lotteries/gambling
Still-image transfer
mobile chat
mobile instant messaging
mobile shopping
mobile banking 
mobile advertising
mobile CRM
Mobile medical records
mobile office
field force automation & fleet mgmt.
Launch EDGE
Launch UMTS 
Phase III
Launch UMTS
video telephony
mobile passports
2002 2003 2004
Source: Author, based on Booz, Allan, Hamilton (2002) 
communication applications and mobile commerce solutions to business to consumer (B2C) 
systems such as mobile CRM and employee services (B2E) as mobile office solutions. 
Figure 10 gives an overview of the wireless data evolution and the potential service rollout 
dates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10   Wireless Data Evolution  
Different industry experts such as consultancy companies (i.e., Booz Allen Hamilton, 2001a; 
Booz Allen Hamilton, 2001b) and research companies (i.e., Gartner, 2002b) have discussed 
the attractiveness of different services and applications. Booz Allen Hamilton (2001a, p.14) 
provided a framework to rank services based on their market attractiveness (measured in 
future revenue potential) and their realization complexity. They found that the most 
interesting applications were (1) communication services such as peer-to-peer SMS, EMS, 
and MMS; (2) entertainment such as games on demand, music and sport services; (3) 
business services such as e-mail, yellow-pages, and mobile marketing campaigns; and (4) 
transaction services such as mobile brokerage and account transactions.  
Similar findings are reflected in the mobile communication industry sales forecast of IDC 
(2002), which has been shown above in figure 8, and in the sales forecast for the mobile 
Internet industry as shown in figure 11. 
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Mobile service and content revenues (EITO, 2002)
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Figure 11   European mobile service and content revenue forecast 
In conclusion, the industry is facing an annual growth rate of approximately 50%, which 
makes it one of the most promising industries in the whole economy. Eisenhardt and 
Schonhooven (1996) classified this type of industry as high velocity. 
Integration of value creation 
This significant growth can only be achieved if the promising new applications and services 
can be integrated throughout the whole value chain (shown in figure 6). The network 
equipment manufacturers have to develop and test new technologies, based on which they 
have to design and produce network equipment, which has to be bought and set up by the 
network operators. Platforms (comparable to an operating system in the PC world) have to 
be adjusted or updated for the new technology, and application developers and service 
providers have to redesign or upgrade their products and services so that a bundle consisting 
of new equipment, new services, and new applications can be marketed and sold. 
This described dependency is presented through the integrated mobile communication value 
chain. However, the complexity of these interactions not only depends on the value chain 
dependencies but also on the immense time pressure in this industry. This pressure is created 
through a highly fixed cost structure and short technology life cycles (which can be seen in 
figure 7 – ‘Wireless data evolution’). The high fixed cost structure is driven by two forces: 
costly network equipment and even more costly operator licenses. In the case of UMTS 
technology, these fixed costs can exceed € 20 bn per operator the bigger European countries 
like the UK and Germany (UBS-Warburg, 2002).  
This time pressure forces the industry to reduce time to market by integrating technologies 
in parallel rather than step-by-step throughout the value chain so that, the above-mentioned 
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Mobile Internet value web
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bundle of mobile devices, applications, and services can generate revenues as soon as 
possible. This pressure created an integrated mobile data value net (EITO, 2002), which is 
shown in figure 12. Its implication on the alliance intensity will be discussed after the next 
part in sub-section 3.1.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12   Mobile Internet value web 
Pressure on industry 
Apart from positive aspects such as interesting growth prospects and an alliance stimulating 
environment, the mobile Internet industry faces high pressure through: (1) difficult 
economic perspectives of partners in the mobile communication industry, and (2) limited 
customer acceptance of new services. 
The mobile communication industry suffers from unfulfilled expectations, which were 
created at the end of the 1990s. The incumbent segments in particular⎯network equipment 
manufacturing, CPE manufacturing, and network operating⎯suffer from failures to meet 
sales targets or even declines in sales for some. The investors’ perspective on the segment 
outlook has changed dramatically. Figure 13 shows the market capitalization of three 
representative companies: Nortel as a network equipment manufacturer, Nokia as a CPE 
manufacturer15, and Vodafone as a network operator. 
                                                 
15  Nokia earns approx. 80 % of its revenues with mobile devices. Nokia’s annual report of 2001 
stated that over € 23 bn. of its total sales of € 30 bn. were sales from its mobile phone business. 
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Market capitalization of representative incumbents (Comdirect, 30.9.2002)
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Figure 13   Market capitalization of important segment players 
There may be a number of reasons why the market capitalization of these companies 
declined dramatically. The most commonly cited reason for network equipment 
manufacturers is unsustainable sales growth, induced by the Internet and the mobile 
communication boom. Even new technologies like UMTS cannot compensate for the fact 
that at the end of the 1990s the investments in network infrastructure were extraordinary 
high. 
For CPE manufacturers, the logic is similar. After annual sales increased about 50% from 
1994 to 1999, market growth declined to less than 10%. Nokia as the market leader grew by 
6% in 2001. Despite the fact that Nokia reduced its personnel by 10%, its profits declined by 
40%. 
Network operators did not suffer from a reduction in industry sales. Sales (as shown in 
figure 5 ‘Mobile communication industry sales’) did grow by 20% in 2001 and by 6% in 
2002; and are expected to continue to grow by a CAGR of 7% by 2006 (EITO, 2002, p. 
223). Nevertheless, a reduction in ARPU16 of 17% over the last two years from € 39.9 to € 
33.3 (EITO, 2002, p. 222) is affecting the perspective of network operators as well as 
causing severe problems in their capital structure. High capital expenditures⎯affordable due 
to high stock prices during the industry’s hype⎯led to a dramatic increase in the debt 
positions of the industry players.  
Most of the money was spent on (1) acquiring companies for a high premium and (2) on 
licenses. (1) The value of intangible assets for European operators totaled as much as 200% 
of their equity in the case of France Telecom and to approximately 100% for companies 
such as KPN, Deutsche Telekom, Telecom Italia, and mmO2 (UBS-Warburg, 2002). (2) 
European network operators bought UMTS licenses for € 109.8 bn (UBS-Warburg, 2002).  
                                                 
16  Average revenue per user 
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Mobile data ARPUs - Vodafone (UBS Warburg, 2002)
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The reduction in ARPU and the increase in debt had negative implications on the stock 
price, which had in turn a negative implication on the companies’ debt to equity ratios17. 
Therefore, credit ratings declined as drastically as in the case of KPN from AA in September 
1999 to BBB- in September 2002, leaving the companies with very limited financing 
opportunities, and putting much pressure on increasing their profitability margin and 
restructuring their businesses. 
In addition, the customers did not accept new technologies and services as quickly as the 
industry expected. For example, Vodafone had to revise its mobile data ARPU forecast as 
shown in figure 14. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14   Mobile data ARPUs of Vodafone  
In conclusion, mobile Internet companies face interesting opportunities in a fast growing 
market with high-speed innovation. However, they have to face hard competition for 
industry earnings and profits due to struggling incumbents in their value chain. In addition, 
like the whole industry, they have to focus on the end customer by creating customer 
friendly applications. The success of the new technologies finally depends on their 
adaptation by the end customer.  
Scholars (i.e., Doz, et al., 1998; Eisenhardt, et al., 1996) have shown, that companies often 
respond to such uncertain industry settings by building up alliances. An intense alliance 
activity is very apparent in the mobile Internet industry (i.e., Booz Allen Hamilton, 2001b). 
Therefore, the next section will discuss the main drivers for forming alliances and give some 
empirical evidence for the importance of alliances in this industry. 
                                                 
17 Most MNO’s hold stocks from publicly traded subsidiaries (Deutsche Telekom from T-online) 
or foreign operations (KPN – eplus or France Telekom – Mobilcom) 
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3.1.2 The need to partner 
In discussing the need to partner, this section addresses the reasons for forming alliances, 
which have been initially laid out in the introduction. In the first part, the previously 
introduced and expanded framework of Doz and Hamel (1998) is used to evaluate the 
alliance intensity and the relevance of specific alliance drivers in the Mobile Internet 
industry. The second part provides some empirical evidence for the intensity and importance 
of alliances in this industry. 
Relevance of alliance formation drivers 
In the introduction, seven reasons to form alliances were presented. Starting with short-term 
targets such as building critical mass, accessing new markets, and plugging skill gaps over 
mid-term targets such as building nodal positions in coalitions⎯hedging with technological 
innovations, creating new opportunities, and building new competences to the general 
efficiency target accessing superior supply. These seven alliance formation drivers are 
subsequently assessed with respect to their importance in the mobile Internet industry. For 
each evaluation a short reasoning is provided. 
(1) Building critical mass is a less important driver. Not a lot of alliances could be observed  
that focus on higher asset utilization. One reason for that could have been the early stage of 
the mobile Internet industry, where no clear standards were set. According to the research 
done by Utterback and Abernathy (1975), in young industries, product innovations are more 
important than process innovations. Furthermore, as long as clear product or service features 
are not defined and standardization has not taken place, improvement of production 
processes will be of minor importance. Building critical mass and capitalizing on economies 
of scale can be subsumed under this process improvement category. 
March’s framework on exploration/exploitation (March, 1991) follows a similar logic. 
Building critical mass to obtain economies of scale is a clear exploitation strategy, which is 
valuable in later stages of an industry. However, in the early stages of industry, exploration 
is far more important. 
(2) Reaching new markets is of medium importance. To argue this point, the term ‘new 
markets’ must be clearly defined. There are two kinds of market entry that can be supported 
by alliances: internationalization and product diversification.  
In this industry, not a lot of product differentiation can be seen. Therefore, alliance activities 
to support those are very small. Again, one reason for this could be that the industry is at a 
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relatively early stage. As Rumelt (1981) explains with his model ‘towards a strategic theory 
of the firm’: 
 
‘Interestingly this perspective provides a theory of firm size that does not depend upon 
diseconomies of scale or control loss and is only tangentially related to the notion of a fixed 
entrepreneurial factor. In addition it explains why diversification, which reduces the risk of 
bankruptcy, is rarely undertaken by those facing the greatest risk – entrepreneurs entering 
and creating new markets.’ (Rumelt, 1981, p. 566) 
 
Internationalization is a relevant topic (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2001b, p. 28) in this industry 
and its supporting alliance activities are medium intense. Major drivers for 
internationalization are global technology standards such as GSM and UMTS, and pan-
European players in the mobile communication value chain such as for example Vodafone 
(MNO), Nokia (CPE), and Ericsson (networks). However, by far not all NTBFs go abroad, 
usually because they face resource constraints or do not want to bear additional market risks. 
(3) The need to plug the skill gaps is one of the most relevant drivers of alliances in the 
mobile Internet industry. The relevant skills can be divided into product or technological 
skills and process or organizational skills (this terminology can be referred to in Utterback 
and Abernathy, (1975). The need for additional technological skills is very high, because the 
company’s skill base has to be constantly updated and extended as technology standards 
change (e.g., from enhanced GSM to UMTS) and new technologies arise (e.g., text-to-
speech software reaches the sophistication to be commercially utilized). Additionally 
process or organizational skills are required as well, as the companies grow and industry 
culture and boundaries shift. The entry of new players into the communication industry (e.g., 
Virgin Mobile) and the back or forward integration of others (e.g., Vivendi – Universal; 
Telefonica – Endemol) are changing the competitive landscape. Yet organizational skills to 
manage that change are rarely acquired or learned via alliances. 
(4) The next driver⎯building nodal positions in coalitions, hedging with technological 
innovations⎯is closely related to driver three and is also of high importance. Its separation 
is motivated by Doz and Hamel’s (1998) model, which uses two different perspectives – 
today’s sales and future potential. However, the adaptation of new technologies will remain 
as important as it is today. Thus, new technological standards (e.g., WLAN, Bluetooth, i-
mode, EDGE, UMTS) will create high technological and development risks, which will 
continue to create the need for intense partnering. 
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(5) Creating new opportunities is of medium importance, which may be surprising. 
However, from the perspective of NTBFs, the creation of new opportunities is very similar 
to a diversification, which is not the most promising strategy (as discussed in point 3). This 
driver is important when we analyze the reasons, why other industry players partner with 
NTBFs. In particular, the behavior of MNOs⎯with their high capital expenditures during 
the last years⎯is highly motivated by this driver when they create partnerships with NTBFs 
to create services and solutions that have the potential to reimburse them. 
(6) The need to build new competencies is also high. The reasoning is identical to point 4. 
(7) Accessing superior supply is again a crucial driver for the alliance intensity. The 
reasoning depends on two arguments. First, functioning supply markets are restrained by 
oligopolistic supply structure, especially in content industries (i.e., in Germany Bertelsmann, 
Kirch Media, Burda, and Springer control the information sector). Second, limited financial 
resources of NTBFs make cooperative structures as co-development partnerships more 
attractive. Both drivers make complex cooperation structures (as alliances based on revenue 
sharing models) more attractive. 
In summary, keeping up with technological innovations, and accessing superior supply are 
the most important drivers in the mobile Internet industry. Industry insiders share this 
assessment: 
 
‘We have three types of partnerships. All partnerships are concerned with our ‘whole 
product’18. On the one hand we create content partnerships … The second partnership type 
are distribution and co-development partnerships, and the third partnership type are 
technology partnerships’ (Michael Halbherr, CEO Gate5, 2002) 
 
Further empirical evidence is provided in the next paragraphs. 
Empirical evidence of the alliance intensity 
Different researchers have emphasized the attractiveness of NTBFs for analyzing networks. 
For example, Stuart (2000) and Eisenhardt et al. (1996) examined alliances of NTBFs in the 
semi-conductor industry; Stuart et al.(1999), Baum et al. (2000) and Powell (Powell, et al., 
2002) analyzed bio-technology networks, and Yli-Renko and Autio assessed 180 NTBFs in 
                                                 
18  The expression ‘whole product’ is used to differentiate the complete product package, which is 
marketed to the customer, from ‘product’, which is only the own value creation. 
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Strategic priorities for mobile Internet companies
What are your four most important strategic priorities?
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% of companies
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Developing business plans
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Merging with/acquiring companies
Establishing a brand
Raising finance
Identifying / developing 
revenue streams
International expansion
Innovating new products
Creating a product portfolio
Developing / testing products
Developing alliances
Acquiring customers
Source: Author, based on Booz Allen Hamilton (2001) 
the UK (1998) and 5 cases in Finland (Yli-Renko, et al., 2001, partly in the communication 
industry). A few of these scholars, namely Gulati and Eisenhardt, recently shifted their 
industry focus towards the communication industry. 
The high importance of alliances is also supported by an industry survey carried out by Booz 
Allen Hamilton (2001b). Developing alliances is the second most important objective of 
NTBFs in the mobile Internet industry (75%) (figure 15) after the acquisition of customers 
(79%). Booz Allen Hamilton (2001b) relates this to the companies’ need to establish 
themselves in a growing industry.  
Another obvious result of this survey is, that companies favor looser connections as 
alliances (75%) over mergers and acquisitions (12%). One of the main reasons for this might 
be the higher flexibility afforded with alliances. Given the fast innovation cycles and the 
changing industry structure, alliances might be a more suitable form of cooperation in 
uncertain industry settings. A detailed analysis of this pattern will follow in the case 
analyses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15   Strategic priorities of mobile Internet companies 
In the next sections, the most suitable industry segments are selected for analyzing alliance 
activities. This selection is based on the intensity of the underlying drivers mentioned in 
3.1.2 and the segment prospects discussed in sub-section 3.1.1. 
3.1.3 Segment and case selection 
This section discusses (1) the selection of ‘mobile location service (MLS)’, ‘mobile content 
services’, and ‘mobile marketing’ as the most promising segments for studying alliances. In 
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addition, it is argued that (2) the selection of nine cases⎯two cases in the narrow field of 
MLS and up to four cases in the broad field of mobile information services⎯is the most 
reasonable research strategy. 
Segment selection 
The selection of industry segments is based on two criteria: (1) the alliance activity and (2) 
the segment attractiveness. The first criterion is motivated by Eisenhardt’s argument (1989) 
that we learn more from extreme settings. As such, alliance portfolios can be better observed 
in a segment that has a high alliance intensity. When many alliances are developed, the 
alliance portfolio of every company must be constantly restructured. And given the fact that 
companies⎯especially small ones⎯are only capable of interacting with a limited number of 
partners at any one time, it necessary follows that many alliances will have to be terminated.  
The second criterion⎯segment attractiveness⎯will affect the generalizability and 
importance of the study’s results. Two different arguments support this criterion. (1) 
Promising segments will have higher future sales and, therefore, a higher proportion of 
industry sales in the future. Their characteristics will have a higher impact on the 
characteristics of the overall industry. (2) Promising segments often are pushed by very 
promising companies, which are recognized as ‘stars’ in the industry. Other companies tend 
to copy the structures and processes of these ‘stars’ and thereby adapt their own business 
model to the most popular business model in the promising segment. In other words, other 
segments will tend to follow the most promising segments. Both arguments lead to the point, 
that studying the most promising segments has the highest generalizability and importance.  
Figure 16 shows the industry segments mapped by their alliance activity and their mid-range 
prospects. The alliance activity is measured in importance of the weighted drivers mentioned 
in chapter 3.1 (results are shown in appendix 2); the mid-range prospects are measured in 
revenue growth rates (2002-2005) by adjusting for growth rates of segments, which were 
nearly irrelevant in 2002. The latter segments were taken out of the sample because no 
sufficient alliance history could be tracked. The growth results are based on the data 
provided in figure 11 ‘European mobile service and content revenue forecast’. A detailed 
table is provided in appendix 3. 
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Research attractiveness of different industry segments
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Figure 16   Mobile Internet segment portfolio 
Based on this mapping, ‘location-based-service (LBS)’, ‘mobile information services’, and 
‘mobile marketing’ are picked as most promising segments. A detailed description of each 
of the analyzed segments is provided as an introduction in each of the particular sections 
(sections 3.2 - 3.4).  
Case selection 
As previously described in the research methodology in sub-section 2.2.3, the selection of 
the number of cases is based on two criteria: (1) size of the segment and (2) diversity of the 
segment. In addition, a minimum of two cases is required from each segment. 
The argument for the size criterion is similar to the argument for growth in the segment 
selection and is motivated by the goals of generalization and significance. The size of a 
segment is measured in forecasted industry sales in 2005. The diversity criterion attempts to 
control for differences in business models within a segment. Heterogeneous business models 
are likely to cause differences in performance. Thus, more cases are selected in 
heterogeneous segments to understand the performance differences created from efficient 
alliance portfolio management and to distinguish them from performance differences caused 
by differences in business models⎯especially due to different value chains. Segment 
diversity is measured by the variance of business models.  
The minimum requirement of two cases per segment was set to facilitate within-segment 
comparisons. In each segment, a company that is well known and rewarded, and a company 
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that is not known for being successful have been selected. Table 6 shows the assessment of 
the target segments. 
Segment Segment size 
and growth 
rate 
Evaluation of 
segment diversity 
Reasoning19 
MLS Large segment, 
medium high 
growth 
Medium low 
variety 
Only partly established segment, due to technical 
requirements (location data). No industry association 
installed yet, but different industry forums as OGIS 
Similar value prepositions of companies, limited 
differences in business models. 
MCS Large segment 
medium high 
growth 
Large variety Established but diverse segment (many different 
services as traffic, sports, financial data, etc.), No 
industry association established. Different value 
prepositions: integrated content creation (such as 
Clever.Tanken or Airweb) to pure content enabling 
for stock quotes. Differences in the business model 
easily observable 
Mobile 
marketing 
services 
Small segment 
but fast 
growing 
Medium variety Fast established segment, Industry associations exist 
Similar value prepositions between YOC, 12snap, 
mindmatics …etc.. Differences to ApollisInteractive 
due to the technology employed 
Table 6   Segment evaluation, author 
Based on this segment evaluation, nine cases were selected with the following distribution: 
- two cases in the LBS segment: Gate5 and YellowMap 
- four cases in the mobile information service segment: Airweb, Clever.Tanken, e-
hotel, and Multichart 
- three cases in the mobile marketing segment: 12snap, mindmatics, and 
ApollisInteractive 
Figure 16 captures the segment and case selection criteria and provides the company names 
of the selected case studies. The following sections will give an overview of these segments 
and an introduction to the selected cases. It should be noted that the selection of cases was 
not made according to the proposed ideal way (Eisenhardt, 1989), that is, by stopping after 
the incremental learning of the last case study was below a certain threshold. Instead the 
selection of the number of case studies was based on Eisenhardt’s rule of thumb: 
 
‘Finally, while there is no ideal number of cases, a number between 4 and 10 cases usually 
works well.’ (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 545) 
 
Although it is not the ideal procedure, it is a practical one, and is used by many researchers. 
Eisenhardt (1989) supports this procedure as well. 
                                                 
19  A more thorough view of the business model complexity is the introduction of the chapter 3.2-
3.4 
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‘In practice, theoretical saturation often combines with pragmatic considerations such as 
time and money to dictate when case collection ends. In fact, it is not uncommon for 
researchers to plan the number of cases in advance.’ (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 545) 
 
3.2 Mobile Location Services 
After providing a general introduction of the Mobile Internet industry and the selection of 
the most promising segments for this research project, this section begins with the core of 
the case study analysis. The objective of this segment analysis is to describe and assess the 
strategic importance of alliance portfolios in the mobile location service industry. To obtain 
this target, first, a brief general segment overview is provided to explain the overall segment 
settings. This is followed by the two case profiles of Gate5 and YellowMap with a specific 
focus on their company development and current business model. Third, the segment 
analyses will focus on the detailed assessment of the companies’ organizational 
development, their resource requirements and alliance portfolios over time, processes to 
form and manage the alliances, and, finally, firm performance. The fourth part, within-case 
and within-segment analyses, conclude this section.  
3.2.1 Segment overview 
To understand the context of the following two case studies, this section provides basic 
information on Mobile Location Services. After segmenting the different MLS services, 
their revenue forecasts are provided. The third part sets the growth prospects in context with 
existing barriers to mass marketing. The last part closes this section with a discussion of the 
status quo and future perspective of MLS in Western Europe. 
Segmentation 
MLS (also known as Location Based Services [LBS]) include different applications and 
services, which use location information of mobile devices. According to a segmentation 
provided by Gartner Dataquest (2002a), the market can be divided into the following four 
segments: 
Information services: This is an already established market, with information directory 
companies such as yellow pages (e.g., YellowMap). Up until now, most of these types of 
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services are either voice activated or require users to dial a service area code or type in a 
postal code. 
Emergency and security: This includes the emergency services plus security-type 
applications for motorists such as roadside assistance, automatic vehicle location services, 
navigation, and route guidance.  
Tracking: An established, albeit small market, tracking involves the use of GPS devices for 
mainly vertical market applications, such as mobile workforce and fleet management. 
Consumer applications include the tracking of people and assets.  
Zone-based billing: This form of billing is attractive for mobile operators that want to 
capture wire-line minutes by offering less-expensive rates (e.g., the Genion20 service from 
O2, former Viag Interkom). Zone-based billing can be used to promote off-peak traffic and 
will benefit from improved accuracy, enabling mobile operators to target subscribers outside 
regions with the densest cell sites. Zone-based billing offers an additional form of price 
differentiation. Most opportunities are likely to be in the corporate sector.  
The following table summarizes the segmentation: 
Segment Applications Customers 
Business traveler Information services Restaurants, ATMs, weather, traffic 
information, entertainment, and 
advertising Tourist 
Emergency and security Emergency 112, roadside assistance, 
automatic vehicle location, automatic 
crash notification, and navigation, and 
routing 
All 
Verticals Tracking Mobile workforce management, 
elderly, children, friend finding, fleet 
management, asset tracking, and 
location-based games 
Consumer 
Corporate Zone-based billing Home zone, shared zone (e.g., offices) 
and other zones (e.g., airports and 
stadiums) Consumer 
Source: Gartner (2001) 
Table 7   Segmentation of mobile location services 
MLS Revenue Forecast 
Business analysts forecast approximately 103 million MLS subscribers in Western Europe 
by the end of 2006, representing a 31% penetration of the mobile subscriber installed base. 
An MLS subscriber is defined as any mobile subscriber that uses MLS services at least once 
per month. Revenue from MLS is forecasted to reach € 12.2 billion by the end of 2006 (see 
                                                 
20  Home zone tariff from O2 
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Western European MLS Revenue, 2006
Source: Gartner (2001a)
Billing
Informati
on
Tracking
Emer-
gency & 
security
Total MLS revenues, Western Europe, 2006
€ 12.2 billion
16%
40%
26%
18%
figure 17). The forecast includes both, business and consumer segments. In both segments, 
the highest revenue segment will be the emergency and security market segment (Gartner, et 
al., 2002a). 
Although the business segment will comprise only approximately 14% of the totally 
installed base of MLS subscribers by the end 
of 2006, revenue from this segment is 
expected to account for almost 32% of the 
total MLS revenue forecast. 
Mass adoption of MLS will not occur before 
2007 because of the lack of adequate terminals 
and high-accuracy location technology in the 
networks (Gartner, et al., 2002a). 
Figure 17   MLS sales forecast 2006 
Barriers to Mass Marketing 
Although the first location-based services were launched in Europe more than two years 
ago, very few have lived up to expectations. Early services have been limited to local 
information and mobile workforce management-type services, and are based on SIM Tool 
Kit (STK) and WAP over circuit-switched data links. During the past year, many of the 
trials carried out by operators had mixed results and subscriber acquisitions of the few 
available commercial services have been moderate, if not disappointing (Gartner, et al., 
2002a). 
Industry analysts believe that many of the prerequisites for mass-market adoption of mobile 
location services are not yet in place, which will inhibit market growth in Europe for another 
two to three years. To succeed with MLS, operators must be able to offer a broad portfolio 
of services with compelling applications and content that is attractively priced. Presently, 
there is a shortage of applications and content, particularly local and business content, 
although this should change with the recent release of the Mobile Location Protocol (MLP). 
MLP established an open application-programming interface and should also result in a 
reduction of development time for applications.  
Apart from applications and content, other factors that will inhibit market growth over the 
next two to three years include the following: 
• Unavailability of terminals: the market for MLS in Europe will not develop until 
GPRS terminals become widely available. Industry analysts believe that GPRS 
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handsets will not be available in commercial quantities until the middle of 2003 
(EITO, 2002, p. 197). The availability of handsets with large color screens will 
enhance user experience, for example, through the ability to download color maps. 
Such handsets have already been available in Japan since mid-2000. A stable, 
reliable packet data network is also essential. It is the ‘always-on’ feature that is 
important, rather than the bandwidth, although many vertical applications will need 
higher bandwidths.  
• Unavailability of high-accuracy terminals capable of providing location accuracy of 
less than 50 meters: although many services can be offered using basic cell-sector 
accuracy (approximately 300 meters in city centers), other applications (particularly 
those involving car navigation and security) will require much higher accuracy. An 
accuracy of 10 km to 20 km, which is typical for cell-sector in a rural environment, 
is practically useless for the aforementioned applications. Industry experts believe 
that EOTD21 and A-GPS22 phones will not become available in commercial 
quantities until the end of 2003 (Gartner, et al., 2002b).  
• Lack of ubiquitous service: subscribers will expect to be able to access location-
based services wherever they go. In particular, business subscribers are most likely 
to use location-based services when traveling, that is, while roaming other networks, 
rather than in the office. As such, operators must solve numerous technical issues 
concerning the interoperability of location-based services on different networks. 
Interoperability issues regarding roaming between GPRS and UMTS will also need 
to be resolved as 3G handsets start to become available in 2004. However, given the 
fact that the major European MNOs operate in multiple markets, this issue is likely 
to be resolved. 
• High prices: services need to be attractively priced. In general, mobile data services 
in Europe are more expensive than similar services in Japan. For example, for 
yellow pages directory-type applications, the cost per request in Europe varies 
between € 0.45 and € 1.00 (see table 5) compared with prices from € 0.18 to € 0.30 
in Japan. New terminals will need to be heavily subsidized (Gartner, et al., 2002c). 
• Poorly designed applications: applications should be dynamic enough to respond to 
the needs of the user at different times and locations, and must be easy to use, 
bearing in mind the limitations of small screens. Subscribers should be able to 
                                                 
21  Enhanced observed time difference 
22  Assisted global positioning system 
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request the desired information in a maximum of five ‘clicks’ of their mobile phone, 
and should receive the requested information from the network within five to seven 
seconds (Gartner, et al., 2002a).  
• Privacy and security concerns: subscribers need to be assured that privacy and 
security (for m-commerce transactions) are guaranteed. However, industry experts 
believe that the privacy issue is being exaggerated. This belief is supported by early 
operator experiences indicating that subscribers are not particularly concerned about 
the privacy issue. This may change as the accuracy of position determination 
improves (to less than 10 meters) or if operators start to sell the location information 
to third parties. Nevertheless, it is believed that subscribers will ultimately want to 
have full control of the location finding capability, and will prefer to buy handsets 
where this facility can be switched on or off at will.  
Mobile location-based services have great potential to be successful in the future. Location 
services may help to overcome the greatest limitation of mobile services—the lack of user-
friendliness. Depending on the user's geographical location, mobile services can be highly 
personalized, greatly reducing the need for users to interact with small mobile devices and 
giving them immediacy of use. The mobile market players are aware of this and have started 
to develop mobile location services.  
Status quo and outlook 
More than 50 mobile operators worldwide, with more than 300 million subscribers in total, 
are offering preliminary MLS or testing deployment in target markets. More than 2 million 
users are estimated to be using MLS already (Gartner, et al., 2002b). In Europe, commercial 
testing and trials of MLS have been ongoing since 2000. For example, E-plus and Sonera 
are offering informational MLS to their clients, mainly to test market interest and reactions 
(Gartner, et al., 2002a). In general, all market surveys on MLS performed since 2000 have 
generated encouraging results concerning the positive attitude of mobile users toward MLS. 
In 2001, a focus-group survey performed by Gartner (Gartner, et al., 2001) in the United 
States indicated that more than 30% of all subscribers are willing to receive location-based 
advertising messages in exchange for coupons or discounts (compare chapter 3.4). 
Because of the continuous evolution of wireless technologies, location sensing and 
awareness are expected to become common capabilities in all future devices, applications, 
and services. This will enable new processes and businesses and be widely adopted by 
mobile users. 
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Mobile devices will acquire the capability to sense geographical location with increasing 
accuracy. Devices will include not only PCs, mobile phones, and PDAs, but also game 
consoles, hi-fi devices, home devices, medical monitoring equipment, and on-board car 
equipment. By 2008, any device enabled for wireless communication will sense location and 
be traceable within 20 meters. 
The number of MLS subscribers is expected to increase during the next few years. Among 
the 1.5 billions mobile subscriptions predicted worldwide by 2005, almost 40 percent will 
also include MLS. Location sensing will also spread to many machines and other physical 
objects with wireless communications capability (Gartner, et al., 2002a).  
Thanks to this progressive adoption of location, the emerging ‘always on’ society will also 
become a ‘location-aware’ society. A new generation of location-aware applications and 
mobile services will appear, improving users' experience and minimizing the inconvenience 
of interacting with small devices while on the move. The need for location-based services 
will grow quickly, as soon as more people start using mobile devices to access information 
and data services. Combining location-aware applications with user preferences, it will be 
possible to personalize access for end users and optimize user experience. 
Many different forces are driving the creation of the MLS market. Some are ‘push’ drivers, 
forcing the deployment and adoption of such services; others are ‘pull’ drivers, arising from 
the needs of end users or environmental conditions. 
Competition: The mobile voice market is approaching saturation. Operators have to reduce 
prices to decrease ‘churn’ (the turnover of customers). This lowers the average revenue per 
user. Differentiation through new compelling services, such as MLS, is vital.  
Technology: Mobile networks are evolving to a packet-based paradigm, moving from 
positioning to pinpointing. Multimedia messaging, Java 2 Micro Edition (J2ME) devices, 
body-heat batteries, fuel cells, and implants from Digital Angels are emerging. These 
technologies are basic enablers for the take-off of MLS.  
Social trends: Mobile phones have become a mandatory lifestyle accessory in many 
societies, especially among young people. MLS enables new mobile communication and 
entertainment styles.  
Security: Ongoing threats have increased anxiety about personal safety, as well as the 
security of personal belongings and corporate assets. For safety, people are willing to restrict 
privacy boundaries. This is pushing emergency and enhanced surveillance services.  
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INDUSTRY SEGMENT: MOBILE LOCATION SERVICES
Sales, industry rules, deal structure and user penetration
Connecting location information (POIs, business 
addresses ...) with actual information (events, 
weather, special offers ...) and user location and 
preferences (hobbies, age ...) to create highly 
customized and integrated services as:
- Mobile information services (i.e., yellow-
pages, mobile travel and city guide)
- Emergency and security services
- Tracking and navigation
- Zone-based billing
Services can be offered as:
• pay per use services
• premium services for a flat fee
More than 40% of Germans are willing to pay
> € 14/month for location based services(2)
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Business: Poor economic conditions and increasing competition force enterprises to seek 
solutions that increase profitability and service quality, improve customer relationships and 
business process efficiency, and reduce costs.  
In summary, operators will have to solve their international roaming issues if they are to 
offer high-value services to business travelers, particularly if they own networks in several 
countries. Enterprises should start examining where opportunities as well as possible threats 
for their businesses are, in relation to MLS adoption. When planning their mobile strategy, 
they should definitely include location as medium-term priority, to be tackled by 2004. 
The following figure summarizes the key issues of the MLS segment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 18   Segment overview mobile location services  
In conclusion, this market segment offers excellent growth opportunities. Despite limited 
industry sales in the short term and technical obstacles such as the introduction of new 
communication standards and the limited availability of suitable handsets, barriers to mass 
marketing are only temporary and can be solved within the next 12 – 24 months. Already 
high interest in location services of more than 60% should let the market penetration rise up 
to 40% by 2006 and revenues up to more than € 12 billion. This offers an interesting market 
perspective for the case-study companies, even when they have to cope with technical and 
sales problems in the short run. How the two case study firms manage these challenges is 
covered in the next section. 
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3.2.2 Case history 
Following the introduction of the MLS segment, which sets the general settings for both 
case study firms, this section gives a brief overview over the histories of Gate5 and 
YellowMap and sketches their business model. Both aspects, which are subsequently 
presented for each company, are important for understanding the firm’s alliance activities. 
The firm’s development depicts when the company did which strategic moves. The business 
model illustrates the firm’s value chain and shows with whom it interacts. This defines with 
which group of firms the case study firms could possibly ally. 
Gate5’s development 
Gate5 was founded in April 1999 in Berlin, Germany. The founders, technologists formerly 
employed by an internet start-up (Arclund.com), aimed to develop an innovative city portal. 
The first CEO, Christophe Maire, got managerial support from Andreas Steinhäuser as CTO 
and Frank Rieger as CIO. In the seed phase, the company was organized in a team structure 
and was a typical ‘.com start-up’. 
 
‘It was a hybrid between a creative think tank and anarchy!’ (Michael Halbherr, CEO 
Gate5, 2002) 
 
Gate5 received its first external financing in October 1999. After an additional eight months 
of development work, Europatweb, a French VC company, invested € 1.5 million in 
Gate523. Tbg acted as a co-investor by also providing € 1.5 million; the VCs took a 30% 
share in the company. The investment decision was based mainly on the evaluation of 
Gate5’s business ideas, not on initial revenues from its service. In addition to the financial 
investment, Europatweb provided managerial support and one of its investment managers, 
Michael Halbherr, joined Gate5’s management team. 
In the following months, their first service⎯the innovative, mobile city portal⎯was 
completed. The development took longer than expected. Yet Gate5 faced a more severe 
problem after the completion⎯as a small company it could not operate such a complex 
service. It required too many resources, especially for editing the content. 
                                                 
23 The deal was discussed with a co-investment from tbg. After initial problems, tbg was part of 
the deal and also financed € 1.5 Mio. The cash inflow took place 5 months later. 
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‘When we finished the development, we realized, that we couldn’t operate this service. We 
had not spend any thought on what our core competency is⎯what we want to do in-house 
and what we have to source from outside vendors.’ (Michael Halbherr, CEO Gate5, 2002) 
 
In addition, the economic risks were too high: there were acquisition risks for buying 
external content, branding risks to market the new service competing with incumbents like 
city magazines such as Prince, Zitty, and Tip, and technology risks developing mapping 
engines and routing solutions among others. 
After realizing that the initial business model was too broad in scope, Gate5 started to focus 
on the development of a mobile location services platform, which then could be used and 
licensed by multi-access portals or location application providers. A prototype for such a 
multi-access portal was Zoomland, which Gate5 realized with T-motion. Zoomland was a 
mobile enabled city map including points of interest (POI) and a zoom-in functionality. 
The platform was a failure commercially as well. The differentiability using WAP-
technology was limited and not enough applications that could run on Gate5’s platform were 
available. As a result, Gate5 enlarged the scope of its business model again by adding the 
development of applications. A new manager⎯Christof Hellmis⎯was hired to guide the 
application development team. 
Starting in summer 2001, Gate5’s business model was set up to provide vertical solutions 
for MLS. Two parallel R&D teams, heavy technology based platform development and 
business oriented application development, were teamed with a small sales force and 
administrational staff. In mid-2001, Gate5 had 60 employees. At that time, basic financial 
controlling systems were already in place by almost a year and key employees were enrolled 
in stock option programs. 
After setting up this structure in mid 2001, Gate5 started to build co-development 
partnerships with companies in its target markets such as DaimlerChrysler for in-car 
systems, Mair Verlag24 for mobile city and travel guides, and Ipublish25 for event guides. 
Together with these partners, it developed prototypes for vertical solutions26, which were 
presented at CeBIT 2002. In addition to these products, Gate5 started to partner with ERP-
system developers such as SAP and public sector software developer such as ESRI to license 
                                                 
24  Publisher of Merian and owner of Falk 
25  Online publishing operation of AOL Time Warner, which owns Prinz 
26  Demo versions of Gate5 solutions as city5, map5, or peoplefinder5 can be seen and tested at 
http://www.gate5.de/english/products/demos.html (11.2002) 
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GATE5 – COMPANY DEVELOPMENT
Company Name
Business model / 
products
Technology
Financing
Important
Cooperations
Board
Employees
Others
Gate5
1999 20022000 2001
Jul Oct Jan AprApr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul
60
E-conomy award
tel.con award
CEO: Christophe 
Maire
CEO: Michael 
Halbherr
1. VC financing
Europatweb 30%
tbg € 1.5 M
Super Nova
country finalist
Stock option
program
Andreas Steinhauser
Frank Rieger
Ursula Gronemeier left
Seed and 
start-up
financing
CSO: Michael 
Halbherr
Siemens mobile
ESRI
PR: MMK
Mair
DaimlerChrysler
ipublish SAP
Integrated city portal
Mobile city-, travel-
and event-guides
Yellow
pages
Zoomland People
finder
MLS platform Vertical solutions (platform and application)
5510 35 65
Head of Applications:
Christof Hellmis
WAP
Source: Author
its products into the corporate and public MLS market. Understanding this business model is 
necessary for understanding Gate5’s alliance activities. 
For their innovative products and services, Gate5 was rewarded as country finalist in the 
Super Nova Start-Up Competition27 2001, received the E-conomy award28 2001 and the 
tel.con award29. 
The development of Gate5 is summarized in a standardized timeline as shown in figure 19, 
which will be provided subsequently for all case study companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19   Company development: Gate5 
Gate5’s business model 
As mentioned above, Gate5 develops vertical solutions for MLS; thereby it focuses on five 
markets: in-car-solutions, yellow pages, travel guides, event and city guides, and MLS 
solutions for corporations and government agencies. 
                                                 
27  Tornado inside annually awards Europe-wide high-tech ventures. Tornado inside is an 
Amsterdam based media company covering Europe's entrepreneurial economy. It provides 
industry watchers and information on entrepreneurial Europe with local-country primary 
research and European technology reviews (further information: http://www.tornado-
insider.com/info/aboutus.asp). 
28  WirtschaftsWoche annually confers the ‘e-conomy’-award in Germany for innovative business 
ideas in the ‘networked economy’ (Internet, telecommunications, etc.). In addition to the news 
magazine, partners for this award are Concept! AG, Deutsche Bank, Hanover Matrix 
International, The Boston Consulting Group, BBDO Group Germany, and Sun Microsystems. 
29  The Institute for International Research (IIR; Vienna, Austria) grants the tel.con award to 
successful TIMES services ranging from private messaging solutions, location based or value 
added services, over customized industry solutions to products securing corporate 
communication (further information: http://www.iir.at/telcon_award.cfm). 
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BUSINESS MODEL
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For every market, Gate5 has teamed up with a development partner, which has access to 
distribution. In these partnerships, Gate5 develops showcase solutions and debugs them in a 
trial phase.  
For every market, Gate5 designs tailored applications like Yellow5 for the yellow page 
market and City5 for the city guide market. These applications are based on Gate5’s MLS 
platform and combine common functionality (such as mapping) with application-unique 
features (such as a cultural event database for city and event guides or a detailed business 
database for the yellow page product). 
The MLS platform comprises different modules, which are only partly developed in-house. 
Partners such as ESRI and Location.net supply other aspects, like billing, mapping, and 
routing. 
Direct competitors of Gate5 are Webraska, a French MLS provider, MapInfo and, especially 
in the yellow page segment, YellowMap. In a broader sense, Gate5 competes against city 
and mobile portals like Berlin.de and Jamba!, as well as against the printers and publishers 
of travel guides, city magazines, and yellow pages. Its business model is summarized in 
figure 20. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20   Business model: Gate5 
YellowMap 
CAS Software, a Karlsruhe, Germany, based software company, founded YellowMap in 
September 1999. This corporate venture was located in Munich. The management team 
consisted of M. Hubschneider, also CEO of CAS Software, and a lateral hire - B. Bauer - , 
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who formerly managed a PC-retail business. The initial business idea was to build up a 
mobile marketing platform. CAS Software provided the initial funding. 
From the outset, YellowMap partnered with Schober, a company that provided one of the 
most substantial German business databases30 and Map&Guide which provided digital 
maps. YellowMap developed its MLS platform in Karlsruhe also using some software 
modules written and developed by CAS Software. Administration and distribution was 
located in Munich. 
YellowMap started to expand into the Austrian and Swiss market in the beginning of 2000. 
In these countries, sales offices were set up. In both countries, YellowMap build up 
partnerships to get access to business databases like the Wirtschaftskammer Austria 
(Austrian Chamber of Commerce) in Vienna. The financial resources for the expansion were 
provided by SAP ventures, which invested in August 2000. 
By that time, YellowMap had 35 employees (60% in sales) and earned € 1.5 million in 
revenues (fiscal year 2000). However, it was still unprofitable due to very high sales 
expenses. In summer 2001, the sales team was restructured and B. Bauer left the 
management team. 
Product-wise, step-by-step the marketing platform was turned into a mobile and online 
yellow page business, providing roughly 4 million business addresses⎯segmented by 
different criteria. The online service was based on standard web-technology and the mobile 
service was based on WAP. The service attracted a reasonable amount of side traffic 
(already 538 k PI31 per month in mid 2000), and YellowMap started to sell premium pages32 
in its directory. In addition, the database was enlarged by event data provided by partners 
like Bewegungsmelder.de, Web to go and by e- and m-commerce data, including 10,000 
online shops and 200,000 used car offers. 
Due to ongoing difficulties in the sales organization, YellowMap restructured the sales 
department in 2001 a second time and finally centralized its operations in Karlsruhe. At the 
beginning of 2002, YellowMap’s service had close to 4 million PI a month. The venture 
employed 20 people and was expected to break even in mid 2002. 
                                                 
30 Schober Information Group is Europe´s market leader for qualified marketing information for 
all kinds of business. Qualified consumer and business addresses from all over Europe and the 
USA are available through them. In Germany for example Schober has 3,780,000 business 
addresses, knows 3,180,000 of its decision makers and 3,430,000 phone numbers (further 
information: http://www.schober.de) 
31  Page impressions 
32  Premium pages are edited entries in the database, which pop up preferred. Depending on the 
size and the preference, they are sold for up to € 200 a year. This business logic is similar to the 
logic of Yahoo! and the traditional yellow page business. 
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YELLOWMAP – COMPANY DEVELOPMENT
YellowMap
1999 20022000 2001
Company name
Business model
/ revenues
Technology
Financing
Important
Cooperations
Board
employees
Site traffic
Jul Oct Jan AprApr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul
WAP
177 K pi 528 K pi 3.405 K pi
€ 1.5 M
1. VC: SAP
ventures
Founding operations in
Switzerland, Austria
Hubschneider
Bauer
18 
Porak
Exit Bauer
Marketing
platform
Segment guide 4 M addresses
Event guide 50 K events
Shopping guide 10 K online shops
200 K used cars
Schober
CAS 
Map & Guide
Wirtschafts-
kammer A
Faircar
Web.de
Msn
Meine Stadt.de
Further portals as:
Altavista ...
Bewegungs-
melder
Apotheken
Web to go
Seed and Start-up
financing by 
CAS-Software
6 25 40 22 18 
The company development is summarized in figure 21. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21   Company development: Yellowmap 
Business model 
YellowMap offers location services to corporations and the mobile community. Two 
different business services are sold, an MLS called Filialfinder and premium entries in its 
database. 
The Filialfinder is capable of finding the nearest outlet of a company, mapping it, and 
routing the customer to that place. The software, servers, and mapping technology could 
have been sold to companies; instead, YellowMap acts as ASP33 and operates this service for 
companies. Retail companies and financial institutions like banks were among the primary 
subscriber groups for this service. Filialfinder is either sold directly by YellowMap or by 
web design and marketing agencies. Often it is tailored to fit the look and feel of the 
particular companies. 
The selling proposition of the premium pages in the yellow page business is different from 
that of Filialfinder. YellowMap sells exposure and companies’ addresses. High numbers of 
page impressions are reached by partnering with different portals. In these partnerships, 
YellowMap provides portals its industry segmentation und the underlying address database 
and the portals generate the traffic. YellowMap partners with different types of portals such 
                                                 
33 Application service provider 
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as general purpose portals (i.e., Altavista), community and city portals (i.e., berlin.de), 
special purpose portals (i.e., gesundheitspilot), and mobile portals (i.e., Vizzavi). In addition 
to these businesses, YellowMap is planning to capitalize on their database and capabilities by 
offering location-based mobile marketing concepts and travel guides. 
All services and applications run on YellowMap’s location-based services platform, which 
comprises mapping, routing, and billing functionality. To develop and improve its 
technology, YellowMaps works together with CAS-Software and PTV34, which provide 
mapping and routing technology, Cocomore, which provides content management, and 
Nokia, which provides new handset technology such as its new operating system EPOC. 
YellowMap uses three different types of content as key supplies. The two most important are 
maps and business address databases. YellowMap partners with Map&Guide to access 
updated digital maps. Its business address database is updated with the help of Schober, 
Wirtschaftskammer Austria, and different publishers, among others. In addition, YellowMap 
receives event and travel content for its travel and city guide. This content is obtained from 
companies like Getgo, an online ticket box, Bewegungsmelder, an online event portal, and 
the Varta Führer35, a hotel and restaurant guide. 
YellowMap competes with two company types: other MLS firms and firms offering yellow 
page products like Gelbe Seiten Verlag or Zebra. These companies are in the process of 
digitally enabling their offerings. After developing web front ends, their next step is mobile 
services. YellowMap competes with its products such as mobile travel guide with other MLS 
firms such as MapInfo. Its business model is summarized in figure 22. 
                                                 
34 PTV, CAS Software and Map&Guide are closely related. Map&Guide, which provides maps to 
YellowMap, has been a joint venture of PTV and CAS Software. In a recent restructuring, CAS 
Software swapped its stake in Map&Guide with a stake in PTV. 
35  CAS Software and PTV also hold a stake in Varta Führer, which offers hotel and restaurant 
reviews and compete with the Michelin Guide 
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Figure 22   Business model: YellowMap 
After providing a short case study introduction, the next section takes an in-depth look into 
the technological and institutional changes of these organizations and examines the role of 
alliance portfolios in improving company development and performance. 
3.2.3 Within segment analysis 
In the previous section, three aspects of the case analysis have been presented. A broad 
description of the Mobile Internet industry has been followed by a more detailed description 
of the MLS segment and a detailed characterization of the case study companies. The focus 
of the subsequent analyses is specifically on the alliance portfolios of the two cases. The 
intention is to understand how they influence firm performance over time (part 5). 
Therefore, changes in the alliance portfolio (part 3,) as well as the processes and skills (part 
4) that are needed to form and manage those, are tracked over time. To understand the 
overall development of each case study and the co-evolution between the organization and 
its alliance network, this section begins with an analysis of its organizational development 
(part 1) and its resource structure (part 2). The analysis of resource structures and 
requirements is particularly important because⎯as discussed in chapter 3.1.2 (The need to 
partner)⎯getting access to technologies, superior supply, and distribution channels are 
crucial in this industry; it is thus these requirements that trigger alliance activities. 
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The same analysis structure is used for all subsequently analyzed industry segments as well, 
which are presented in the sections 3.3 and 3.4. The cross-segment analysis (section 3.5) 
follows this same pattern. 
Company development 
Two questions are addressed in this sub-section. Do different developmental stages exist? 
And how can they be characterized? In the first part, the stages are named and classified; in 
the latter part, different organizational characteristics (e.g., organizational structure and 
communication style) are described and the developmental stages are characterized 
accordingly. 
Development stages 
Both organizations went through four development stages. Every step can be characterized 
as a period in which the companies developed smoothly, without severe strategic changes or 
reorganizations. Between these smooth periods, the companies went through reorganizations 
and strategic changes that were not planned as formulated by YellowMap’s business 
developer: 
 
‘We went through several periods. I don’t think, they were planned, they arose as the 
company developed.’ (Bernhard Kölmel, Chief of Business Development YellowMap, 2002) 
 
The development stages of both organizations are listed in table 8. The interviewed 
managers provided the period names and durations. 
Company Gate5 YellowMap 
Phase 1 Research laboratory 
9.1999 – 6.2000 
Development of market opportunities 
9.1999 – 7.2000 
Phase 2 Prototype and platform development 
7.2000 – 6.2001 
Build up of sales organization 
7.2000 – 6.2001 
Phase 3 Application development 
7.2001 – 3.2002 
Consolidation of activities and cost reduction
7.2001 – 2.2002 
Phase 4 Product trial phase 
From 4.2002 on 
Centralization and restart in Karlsruhe 
From 3.2002 on 
Table 8   Stage description of companies in the MLS segment 
Both organizations started with an exploration stage, in which they built up technological 
capabilities. As phrased by YellowMap’s business developer: 
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‘In the beginning, it was all about building up our technology, hence the distribution side 
was of no importance in the first phase.’ (Bernhard Kölmel, Head of Business Development 
YellowMap, 2002) 
 
In the next two steps the case study firms developed differently. In step two, Gate5 focused 
its resources on the development of complex mobile technologies and YellowMap started to 
push the commercialization of its initial products.  
 
‘From phase two on, the importance of sales and distribution grew significantly. From the 
day we had developed our first prototype, we focused on selling our solutions.’ (Bernhard 
Kölmel, Head of Business Development YellowMap, 2002) 
 
In mid 2001, both organizations realized, that their initial strategies were only partly 
successful and subsequently adjusted their strategies. Gate5 enlarged its development scope 
from pure platform by adding applications. YellowMap started to cut back its enormous sales 
expenses by streamlining its processes.  
At the beginning of 2002, both organizations entered a period of financial stabilization and 
organic growth. Gate5 earned its first service revenues after launching four prototypes at the 
CEBIT 2002. In a trial phase, Gate5 had tested its applications and platform together with 
services partners. YellowMap started to build up additional sales capacity after centralizing 
its business in Karlsruhe. 
Organizational dimensions 
These four development steps can be analyzed in a more structured way by assessing 
different characteristics and dimensions of the organizations. Five dimensions have been 
applied, which have been previously introduced in sub-section 2.2.4 (research 
methodology). The dimensions are listed and described below: 
Management focus: The degree to which management is involved in the technological 
development of the product and the day-to-day business. The characteristics range from 
technically or entrepreneurial managers (entirely focused on making and selling a new 
product [grade 1]) over business managers (focus on running the company [grade 2]) to 
holding managers (managing by exceptions [grade 3]). 
Organizational structure: How the company is organized. The characteristics range from a 
team structure (grade 1) over a functional organization structure (introduced to separate 
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development form marketing activities [grade 2]) and business unit organization (introduced 
to separate different businesses [grade 3]) to matrix organizations [grade 4]. 
Communication style: The form, information is distributed within the organization. The 
characteristics range from frequent and informal communication (grade 1) over more formal 
and impersonal communication as hierarchy of titles and positions grow (grade 2), to 
infrequent communication from the top, which usually occurs by memos, telephone, or brief 
visits to business units (grade 3). 
Flexibility of management on market changes: Degree to which strategies shift. The 
characteristics range from decisions highly sensitive to market place feedback, management 
acts as customer reacts (within 3 month [grade 1]) over mid-term strategy (2 years) with 
slight short-term adjustments every 6 months (grade 2) up to a clear long-term strategy (3 to 
5 years) with rarely any adjustments (grade 3). 
Compensation and reward systems: The way employees are reimbursed. The 
characteristics range from long hours of work, which are rewarded by modest salaries and 
the promise of ownership benefits (grade 1) over monthly payments with individual bonus 
(grade 2) and profit sharing or stock options programs (grade 3) up to team compensation 
(grade 4). 
Stage characteristics 
his section describes the organizational development of both case studies through their 
development stages, using the organizational dimensions described above. The results are 
summarized in figure 23. The different axes correspond to the various dimensions. The 
grading scale ranges from 1 (simple structure such as team organizations or informal 
communication) to 4 (complex structure such as matrix organizations or team bonus based 
reward systems). The different grades are explained in the paragraphs above. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23   Company development in the MLS segment 
First stage: Both organizations started with identical characteristics. An entrepreneurial 
management led a team of employees. The communication was informal. Strategic shifts 
due to market developments were frequent. Salaries were modest and key employees had 
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ownership. In literature and business press, this characteristic is often described as typical 
for start-up organizations. 
Second stage: The organizations gained complexity. The management focus shifted toward 
managing the business in terms of coordinating and controlling tasks and employees to 
ensure efficiency. New functions were introduced to cope with the organizational growth. 
The build-up of new functions like marketing and sales, human resources and finance (in the 
case of YellowMap) led to the build-up of a functional organization. The local separation of 
functions between Karlsruhe (R&D) and Munich (Marketing and Sales) additionally favored 
this organizational structure. In contrast, Gate5 kept a team-based organization because the 
company was centralized in Berlin and no significant sales function was built up at that 
point.  
There were also slight differences in communication style and planning horizon. YellowMap 
had already slightly formalized its communication in period two. Thereby the separation of 
functions between Munich and Karlsruhe was a main driver as well, which forced the 
organization to rely more on written communication. In contrast, Gate5’s heavy investment 
in technology marked the beginning of mid-term planning. Development projects of nearly a 
year reduced its management’s flexibility to respond to market changes. YellowMaps 
planning was still more flexible. Its service development projects were shorter term and its 
sales force got constant feedback from the market place. 
Both organizations built up stock-option programs to motivate and compensate their 
employees. 
Third stage: Both organizations still adhere to the same management style but they updated 
their organization to a business unit structure. The communication structure, the flexibility 
of management on market changes and the compensation systems have remained 
unchanged. 
Fourth Stage: Both organizations again have identical characteristics. The management 
focus is on running the company⎯internally, by developing the products and increasing 
efficiency, and externally by, selling the products and building up partnerships. The 
companies are organized in business units and communicate more formally than in the first 
days, but still personally. Mid-term strategies (approximately 2 years) are slightly adjusted 
every 6 months and the incentive and reward systems are based on stock options.  
In conclusion, both organizations develop stepwise. New challenges led the case study firms 
to update their organizations and change their characteristics. The initial, very flexible, 
entrepreneurial team organizations from stage one were soon no longer suitable to cope with 
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arising tasks and challenges. Therefore, organizations added complexity in a stepwise 
manner. Moreover, both firms developed fairly similarly. Their characteristics in two of the 
four stages are identical and the two firms never differed more than one degree of 
complexity.  
After finding that firms developed almost in parallel from an organizational point of view, 
the next section asks whether resource requirements evolved within these development steps 
in parallel as well. 
Resource requirements 
Resource requirements have been analyzed for every developmental step to understand the 
relevant drivers for the foundation of alliances. Different resource categories have been used 
to assess resource requirements. This section (1) defines these categories and (2) analyses 
the development of the case study companies according to these categories. (3) A 
conclusion, which discusses which resources types depend on stage developments, 
terminates this section. 
Resource types 
Seven different types of resources have been used for this study, which have been explained 
and justified in the research methodology (sub-section 2.2.4). The resources types can be 
described as follows:  
Reputation: Reputation in the industry, provided by awards, partnerships with well-known 
companies, well known products or services, for example. 
Technological know-how: Technological expertise and skills such as knowledge of 
different computer languages, proprietary platforms and products36 
Access to superior supply: Access to scarce resources of other companies, which were 
used and transformed in the value creation process of the company, such as news, stock 
quotes for mobile content service companies, maps and business directories for MLS 
companies. 
Market access: Access to distribution channels and / or directly to a customer base 
Human capital: Skills and knowledge of the employees as experience and personal 
networks in the relevant industry, technological or managerial skills, etc. 
                                                 
36 The protection and the ability to protect know-how would be another resource. But the 
case studies have shown, that filing patents and other IP protection activities are very 
uncommon in this industry 
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Organizational skills: Skills and processes letting the organization work more efficiently 
like decision making skills, accounting and controlling processes, etc. 
Financial resources: External capital to finance growth and assure company’s survival 
 
To evaluate the importance of a specific resource, a scale from 1 (low) to 5 (high) has been 
used. The managers or the management teams of every case study company did the 
evaluation on their own. They calibrated their evaluation by comparing the importance of 
one resource type in relation to the importance of others. 
Stage characteristics 
According the procedure analyzing organizational characteristics over time, the resource 
requirement were mapped and analyzed. The evaluations are graphed in figure 24. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24   Resource requirements in the MLS segment 
Three types of resources can be distinguished: segment dependent resources, development 
dependent resources, and other resources. 
Segment dependent resources: The requirements for two resources depend on the industry 
segment respectively the firm’s business model. Both companies constantly evaluate 
technological know-how and reputation on a very high level. Technological know-how is 
crucial for NTBFs in a technologically complex niche market, comprising different complex 
technologies as mapping, routing, etc. In addition, both companies earn their money by 
working with large incumbents. To contact and contract with them, reputation is needed as 
an ‘entry ticket’. 
Development dependent resources: The second group of resources depends on the 
development cycle. In this category are the access to superior supply, market access, human 
resources and organizational skills. For both companies, the access to supply was in the 
beginning low to medium. But already at the end of the first period, the importance grew 
when software prototypes had to be linked to location data as maps and other content as 
business addresses or event data. In period two, the importance of this resource grew very 
CASE STUDIES 68 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
high as Gate5 built its city portal and YellowMap started to commercialize its products (i.e., 
Filialfinder, electronic yellow pages), which were based on maps and business directories, 
both sourced by different partners. In period three, these sourcing relationships were 
standardized and the access to resources slightly lost its importance, which continued in 
stage four. 
Market access gained importance in the degree that access to resources lost it. With almost 
no direct implication in the prototyping phase, market access gained importance when the 
first products were marketed in period two. With increasing needs of internal financing, 
market access became one of the most required resources in the final stages. 
The requirement for organizational skills and specific human resources grew over time as 
well. Both companies had fairly unstructured start-up teams in period one. Over time, 
organizational growth and tight financial resources increased the need for organization 
efficiency. Therefore, both organizations reported about problems to build up organizational 
processes and improve their internal routines and processes as accounting procedures, 
meeting efficiency and decision making skills. Parallel to this development, the management 
team increasingly became aware of deficits in human resources. Both organizations started 
to specifically expand its staff, by hiring employees with more and more defined profiles. 
Only YellowMap’s human resource requirements exhibit an interesting deviation form this 
trend in period four. By that time, YellowMap experienced only small problems to find 
suitable employees. Its management provided three reasons for this evaluation. (1) The 
company is located in Karlsruhe close to Universität Karlsruhe with one of Germany’s best 
computer science and industrial engineering schools. Due to the fact that many students like 
to stay in Karlsruhe, YellowMap can hire very good technical and sales staff. (2) In addition, 
YellowMap employee-wise grew very limited in the later periods, because its first strategy 
target was to break even and grow only organically afterwards. (3) And finally, due to the 
weak economic development in Germany in 2001 and 2002, hiring well-educated and well 
trained people at large has become easier compared to 1999 and 2000. 
Other resources: The requirements for other resources depend on events, which are not 
directly linked to the stage development. The need of financial resources is the difference 
between the demand for funds to finance the companies’ growth and survival and the 
available funds. This availability mainly depends on VC financing rounds, which are only 
indirectly linked to the development stages.  
Gate5’s need for external financing grew over time. In the first period, it had enough funds 
through a private start-up financing. In the second phase, new funds were needed to finance 
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its platform development. Europatweb and tbg provided the capital. In stage three, new 
development programs were started, because Gate5 could not capitalize its platform without 
available application. Negligibly small internal finance capabilities let the need for financial 
resources increase. In stage four, internal financing improved by launching prototypes with 
partners, but additional capital is needed to roll out Gate5’s products. Therefore, financial 
resource requirements are still ranked very high. 
YellowMap’s financing requirement shifted over time. It did not have financial constraints in 
the beginning, because it was completely financed by its parent company⎯CAS Software. 
After developing the first prototypes, YellowMap started to sell its products. To build up a 
sales force and open up offices in Austria and Switzerland, additional funds were required. 
Therefore the need for financial resources went up. After SAP Ventures invested in 
YellowMap, financial resources were available. The need for external financing did not 
vanish in the unprofitable year 2001. In stage four, the ‘nest egg’37 is reduced in comparison 
to stage three, but better internal financing opportunities kept the need for external financing 
on the same low level. 
Concluding, the most resource requirements shift significantly over time. Moreover for 
certain resources, these shifts happen step-wise triggered by the occurrence of new 
organizational problems and new strategies. Thereby, market access and organizational 
skills steadily gain weight, access to supply gains importance over the first two development 
stages and looses it again in the later stages. These resource requirement shifts come about 
parallel in the two analyzed organizations. 
As described in chapter 3.1.2 ‘the need to partner’, access to different resources is a main 
driver for alliances. Therefore, the analytical step is to examine whether similar resource 
requirements lead to similar structures in the firm’s alliance portfolios. 
Alliance networks 
To examine alliance portfolios and their dynamics, firm networks are analyzed using a 
longitudinal design. This setup is required to understand network dynamics over time. The 
aim of this sub-section is to document these portfolios and their changes by using Pajek, 
analyzing them step-by-step and summarizing the findings in a conclusion.  
                                                 
37  Remaining VC funding 
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Documentation 
Alliance documentation faces two major problems: timing issues and its multiple 
dimensions. The alliance portfolio is constantly changing over time with the formation of 
new alliances, the termination of alliances, or shifts in alliance structures and intensities. 
Therefore, alliance portfolios can only be exactly described at a specific point in time. 
However, a point-of-time documentation is not practical for two reasons: compatibility with 
organizational development stages, and data volume due to timing considerations. 
Analysis on organizational change provides some evidence that the two organizations 
develop stage-wise. Longer periods of time follow the same characteristics. These stages are 
interrupted by crises, during which the company characteristics change significantly. A 
comparison between the organizational development and the alliance portfolio requires a 
stage-compatible alliance documentation. This documentation is not trivial, because there is 
no obvious answer for a specific point in time within every stage that best characterizes the 
stage alliance portfolio. Some researchers might argue, that the alliance portfolio at the end 
of the stage is the most characteristic. However, this description excludes all alliances that 
have been terminated within that period. An alternative would be, to document the alliance 
portfolio in the beginning, in the middle and at the end. The alliance portfolio could then be 
analyzed more accurately within every stage, but the data volume would increase by a factor 
of three.  
In this study, a practical solution has been chosen. Alliance portfolios are documented for 
entire stages. These alliance portfolios contain all alliances that existed in the relevant stage. 
The indicated alliance intensity is the average intensity over this period. Given the fact that 
the periods are not too long – on average between one and two years – and that the portfolio 
is fairly constant within these periods the allowed potential for error is limited. 
The second documentation problem is the multidimensionality of alliance data. Alliances 
differ in numerous dimensions, which are not easy to analyze and document. Recently, 
researchers have developed specialized software for this task. An often-used software tool is 
Pajek, which has been introduced earlier in the research methodology (section 2.2). 
Pajek draws networks and calculates network measures. For that, networks have to be 
specified by who participates (characteristic of network vertices) and how it participates 
(characteristics of links). Pajek offers different dimensions regarding how vertices and links 
can be adjusted such as the vertex size and color, the link size and color, and the vertex 
position. The following tables specify each dimension (Brunninge, 2000; Conway, et al., 
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1988; Jansen, 1999; Wassermann, et al., 1994a; Wassermann, et al., 1994b). Each 
characteristic is explained by a definition and an example. 
The vertex size corresponds to the size of the companies in the network. This characteristic 
is important to analyze, whether the alliance portfolio shifts toward bigger partners as large 
incumbents over the developmental stages or not. 
Vertex size Definition Example 
Large box Large incumbents, sales > € 1Bn MNOs as T-Mobile and Vodafone 
Technology provider as Nokia and Siemens 
Medium box Mid-caps; sales > € 50 Mio CAS Software, Quam, Schober, Mairs 
Geographischer Verlag 
Small box Small start-ups, small enterprises  Internet portals as Firewall, Berlin.de 
Table 9   Alliance networks: vertex size 
The color of vertices indicates the industry affiliation of each of the companies. This 
dimension facilitates analyses concerning shifts in the industry structure of the portfolios. 
Vertex color Definition Example 
Blue Technology provider as network infra-
structure or CPE manufacturer, software 
developer and technology conglomerates 
Network infrastructure companies (e.g., Ericsson, 
Alcatel); CPE manufacturer (e.g., Nokia, Sharp); 
Software developer (e.g., CAS-Software, 
SemanticEdge, SAP); Technology conglomerates 
(e.g., IBM, HP, Siemens) 
Yellow Content provider for news, geographic 
data such as maps, financial data such as 
stock quotes, and event data such as 
concert tours 
News providers as DPA and Focus; Geographic 
data providers as Map&Guide; Financial service 
companies as B.I.S. Börsen-Informations-Service; 
Event Data providers as Getgo, World-Wild-Web 
Red Mobile network operator, mobile virtual 
network operators and mobile service 
provider 
MNO (e.g., T-mobile, D2 Vodafone ); MVNO 
(e.g., Quam in Germany); mobile service 
provider (e.g., Debitel and Mobilcom) 
Orange Mobile and online portals offering general 
purpose or specialized information 
Mobile portals (e.g., Jamba!, Wap me and 
Vizzavi); Online general purpose portals (e.g., 
Freenet, Web.de, and Dino); Online special 
purpose portals (e.g., Berlin.de, Docaid, 
Anwaltssuchservice, and Faircar) 
Gray Financial services companies such as 
banks, VCs and insurance companies 
Sparda Bank, Viventures, Nokia Ventures, Atex, 
Alliance 
White Trade and industry associations that take 
care of standardization, PR, and lobbying  
DDV, Innitiative Mobiles Netz, Marketing Club, 
OGIS 
Light 
Orange 
Marketing agencies and designers of 
advertising campaigns, corporate 
identities, and web pages 
Traditional agencies (e.g., BBDO, Grey, BBH) 
Internet agencies such (e.g., Adlink, Double-
click) 
Green Others, which comprises companies that 
could not be grouped in one of the above 
categories. Case study firms partner rarely 
with firms outside of these industries. 
Therefore, defining specific categories was 
not worthwhile. 
Branded consumer goods (e.g., Wrigley’s, 
DaimlerChrysler) retail (e.g., Karstadt Quelle) 
Consulting (e.g., McKinsey) 
Table 10   Alliance networks: vertex colors 
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The link width specifies how intensely resources are exchanged. The provided data are 
based on the assessment of the case study partners. The width indicates their perspective on 
how crucial each link was for each stage. These assessments most likely do not hold true for 
the assessment of their partners. This classification is needed because research has shown 
that intensive relationships, which are nearer to ‘hierarchy’ in the ‘market-hierarchy’ 
continuum, outperform alternative interfirm linkages in supporting resource exchange and 
interfirm learning (Mowery, et al., 1996). 
Link width Definition Example 
Thin Arm’s length cooperation without strategic 
implications 
In the case of YellowMap: YellowMap swaps 
location data and maps for event data of 
entertainment portals as WildWildWeb, which is 
no market transaction. The event data is 
strategically not crucial for YellowMap and the 
maps are not crucial for WildWildWeb.  
Medium Important partnership, with exchange of 
medium crucial resource such as alliances 
with technology partner for subsystems or 
second tire distribution partner 
In the case of Gate5: Gate5’s applications are 
voice enabled. This feature is developed in 
partnership with SemanticEdge. Due to the fact, 
that this feature is an add-on and that other 
providers can also deliver voice-enabling 
software, this partnership is of medium important 
for Gate5 and not crucial. 
Thick Key strategic alliance as sourcing of 
critical content, co-development of 
products or crucial distribution channel 
In the case of Airweb: Airweb launches all new 
services in France with Orange; in addition it 
generates >80% of its French revenues through 
this alliance. 
In the case of YellowMap: YellowMap’s product 
is based on a comprehensive business directory 
and good maps. YellowMap does not have the 
internal resources to build up this content; in 
addition, only a few companies own this content. 
Therefore, the alliances with Schober and 
Map&Guide, who provided a business directory 
and maps, are crucial. 
Table 11   Alliance networks: link width 
The link color represents the kind of resources that are exchanged. The color indicates the 
motivation of the case study companies to form an alliance. This dimension facilitates the 
analysis, if the exchanged resource mix shifts over time. 
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Link color Definition Example 
Blue Access to technology. The case study 
companies assess through these links 
software systems such as billing engines or 
routing machines, handset specifications 
such as screen design, operation systems, 
and other technology specifications, or 
updates of technology standards 
In the case of Gate5: Gate5 cooperates with ESRI 
to access routing capabilities
In the Case of Airweb: Airweb cooperates with 
Dialogic to enable its platform for voice services.
In the case of Multichart: Multichart cooperates 
with Motorola to preferably access new specs of 
handsets to customize its applications.  
Yellow Access to content. The case studies access 
information such as political or sport news 
(including pictures); maps; stock quotes; 
etc. through these links 
In the case of Clever.Tanken: Clever.Tanken 
obtains fuel prices from 15,000 filling stations 
through the link to its fuel price pilots. 
In the case of e-hotel: e-hotel accesses cheap 
hotel room contingents through its connection to 
Radius 
Red Access to markets. The case study 
companies access distribution channels. 
They link themselves to mobile portals; in-
car computers companies; software system 
integrators; etc. 
In the case of Gate5: Gate5 enters the in car MLS 
market through its cooperation with 
DaimlerChrylser. 
In the case of 12snap: 12snap leverages its 
knowledge of designing and delivering mobile ad 
campaigns through its cooperation with 
marketing agencies such as BBDO. 
Gray Access to financial resources. Through 
these links, the case study companies 
receive external financing. 
In the case of Mindmatics: Mindmatics received 
external financing in their first round by Best 
Practice Venture and in their second round by T-
ventures, Holtzbrinck Networxs, and WestLB 
Black Reputation. Through these links, the case 
study companies attain recognition and 
reputation. 
In the case of ApollisInteractive: Apollis-
Interactive receives reputation through its link to 
well-regarded industry associations such as the 
German direct marketing association (DDV), 
where it actively participates in working groups. 
Table 12   Alliance networks: link color 
Each case study is positioned in the middle of its networks as focal company because the 
network is strictly analyzed from the case study perspective. The position of partners 
depends on (1) link intensity, (2) links to other partners, and (3) affiliation to industry 
sectors.  
(1) The more intense the link between the case study company and its partner, the closer to 
the center it is located. To illustrate, thick links are shorter than medium links, and medium 
links are shorter than thin links. 
(2) Partners who work together are co-located, because a link ties them together. These links 
are included in the data set (i.e., the close cooperation between the Tour de France and the 
UCI⎯the International Cycling Union⎯in Airweb’s network), but, for clarity reasons, are 
not graphed in the networks. 
(3) Partners within one industry are clustered together. These clusters are based on both 
textual and practical considerations. These companies tend to have at least weak ties. For 
CASE STUDIES 74 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
example, they work together on industry standards, are members in the same industry 
associations, and attend the same conferences. In addition, the network graphs are easier to 
read when similar companies are co-located on the network charts.  
Energy level calculation based on Kamada and Kawai’s (1989)38 layout algorithm comprises 
all three factors. This calculation determines the network position of every partner. 
Additionally, the author slightly edited the graphs to improve their clarity and readability. 
Analytical steps 
As described in the research methodology, the network analysis is based on two layers. Its 
general structure is analyzed based mainly on quantitative data as the network size (number 
of partners), network quality (intensity of links), and its center of gravity (characteristic of 
partners). Qualitative data⎯particularly narratives about partnerships⎯help to understand 
how ties change and how the process of partnership formation, intensification, restructuring, 
and termination works. 
The alliance analysis is an iterative process. For every case, alliance networks are mapped 
for every development stage using Pajek. These stage alliance portfolios are confronted with 
each other, and structural patterns are worked out. In a next step, these structural quantitative 
patterns are confronted with the interview write-ups and the tabular displays of the case 
study results. This richer qualitative data was particularly helpful for understanding the 
alliance portfolio change processes. 
Stage portfolios 
The alliance portfolios of Gate5 and YellowMap have been drawn for every developmental 
stage according the structure described above. Figure 25 depicts all graphs. 
                                                 
38  Kamada and Kawai’s (1989) layout algorithm combines the vertices, their distance is 
reciprocally proportional to their partnership intensity 
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Alliance portfolios
Gate5
YellowMap
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4
Source: Author, based on case study results
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25   Alliance portfolios in the MLS segment 
Stage one: Both companies have small networks in their start-up period with five or less 
partners. The networks are focused on the exchange of content and technology. In their first 
stage, both companies develop prototypes and partner with two content providers to ‘feed‘ 
their applications. These content providers are important, but not crucial for the case studies, 
because they only support the ventures to develop showcase applications. Neither Gate5 nor 
YellowMap sell their applications and services in this stage. 
In addition to its content partnerships (accessing a business directory and maps), YellowMap 
also has technology partnerships. Its mother⎯CAS Software⎯and PTV supported 
YellowMap to build up its technology (mapping, routing, etc). In comparison to Gate5, it 
was easier for YellowMap to build up those technology partnerships, because they were 
embedded through ownership rights and personal contacts of former CAS Software 
employees. The risk of loosing its core technology by partnering was very limited. 
Stage two: The partnership networks grew drastically in period two. In both cases, the 
number of partners rose by a factor of approximately seven. Both companies attained 
external financing through a venture capitalist (Europatweb and SAP Ventures) and used the 
funds to build up their application and service. The content and technology partnerships 
were built up and intensified.  
Gate5’s key product in stage two was its mobile city portal. Gate5 acquired the required 
content through partnerships. Therefore, it intensified its cooperation with the two 
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publishing houses Mairs and Ipublish39. In addition, it built new partnerships with event 
portals such as WildWildWeb and news providers such as Tomorrow – Focus. Most of the 
content providers were mid-caps or small start-ups. 
In terms of technology, Gate5 started to build up two different types of partnerships. 
Common software projects were developed in medium-intense partnerships, such as the 
adaptation of SemanticEdge’s voice software and the cooperation with Siemens concerning 
mobile technologies as J2EE. Gate5 built up weak ties with CPE manufacturers, to adapt its 
software to their handsets and systems. Gate5 did not sell any services in stage two. Its only 
sales activity was to create a partnership with DaimlerChrysler. The two companies set up a 
project to develop a solution for the mobile community. Similar talks with Falk started at the 
end of this period. 
YellowMap’s partnership approach towards content and technology partners was similar. It 
intensified its content cooperation with Schober and Map&Guide, built up partnerships with 
Zet.net40 (content) and specialized software developers such as Cocomore41, and entered into 
weak ties with CPE manufacturers such as Nokia and HP. However, it pushed its sales 
activities much more. YellowMap started to market its yellow page service toward online 
portals. It could attract general-purpose portals such as Freenet and Altavista and regional 
portals such as Berlin.de and Baynet. These portals increased the usage of YellowMap’s 
services, which made every directory entry more valuable. In addition, their partners sold 
entries in YellowMap’s business directory on a provision basis42. Besides the portals, 
YellowMap started to contract with MNOs for distributing its mobile yellow page 
application. 
Stage three: Period three is characterized by an intensified build up of sales activities. Both 
companies neither added critical content nor technology partners. Gate5 just added weak ties 
to additional CPE manufacturers for whom it customized the applications (HP, Ericsson, 
Sharp, and Sony) and it started to participate in industry associations like OGIS43 and LIF44 
to work on industry standards. YellowMap added weak ties to event portals and swapped 
location versus event data, which is useful for mobile city guide applications. Additionally, 
                                                 
39  IPublish was the electronic publishing division of AOL Time Warner, which published city 
journals like Prinz etc. 
40  Zet.net has been a cooperative project of the Bavarian newspaper publisher. Zet.net filed for 
chapter 11 in April 2002. 
41  Cocomore develops content management systems 
42  Share your profit principle (also called Yahoo! principle); up to 50% of the subscription fee is 
earned by the sales organization. 
43  Open Geodata Interoperability Specification project to standardize geo-data formats 
44  Location Interoperability Forum (http:www.openmobilealliance.org/lif) 
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it started to diversify its business directory sourcing to reduce its dependency on Schober. A 
milestone was the alliance with the publisher Huss Verlag. Huss publishes magazines 
targeted to mechanics and craftsmen, where it has a very high coverage. Through this link, 
YellowMap got access to Huss’ client directories. 
On the sales side Gate5 allied with three strong partners to build up pilot application based 
on its MLS platform. It intensified its cooperation with DaimlerChrysler and started to 
cooperate with its former content partners Mairs and Ipublish, with whom it developed 
mobile travel, city and event guides. 
YellowMap continued with its sales strategy based on numerous weak ties. Besides its links 
to general-purpose and regional portals, it intensified its cooperation with MNOs by building 
up alliances with Viag Interkom, Sonera, and Quam. Additionally, it built up partnerships 
with two new groups: mobile portals and special purpose online portals. The special purpose 
portals had two additional advantages. Apart from increasing the number of requests on 
YellowMap’s business directory database, they were good at selling directory entries to its 
homogenous community and its client database was good at for updating the addresses of its 
members (similar to the partnership with the Huss Verlag). 
Stage four: The alliance portfolios in stage four can only be analyzed preliminary. Both 
companies had just entered this stage when the data were collected. This stage is far from 
being terminated. Therefore, the alliance portfolios are very similar to the portfolios at the 
end of period three. 
Besides minor changes, because a few partners went out of business as Quam and Zet.net, 
both companies added a new distribution channel. YellowMap partnered with marketing and 
web agencies, which started to integrate its new service Filialfinder45 into client web pages. 
Gate5 began to cooperate with software system developers and system integrators like SAP 
and ESRI. Projects were set up to integrate Gate5’s applications in corporate ERP-systems 
from SAP or in huge governmental systems from ESRI. 
The structure of the alliance portfolios is summarized in table 13. 
                                                 
45  The Filialfinder service locates the next company outlet, maps it and routes the user to this 
location 
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  Gate5 YellowMap 
 Alliance 
category 
Alliance 
portfolio 
Reasoning Alliance 
portfolio 
Reasoning 
Technology ↓↓ No ties ↑ 1 strong, 1 medium tie  
Supply ↓ 2 weak ties • 2 medium ties Stage 1 
Markets ↓↓ No tie ↓↓ No tie 
Technology ↑ 1 strong, 2 medium, 
and 3 weak ties 
↑↑ 1 strong, 1 medium, 3 
weak ties• 
Supply ↑ 2 medium, 5 weak ties ↑↑ 2 strong, 2 weak ties Stage 2 
Markets ↓ 2 medium ties • 4 groups with 16 weak ties 
Technology ↑↑ 3 medium ties, 7 (+2) 
weak ties 
↑ 1 strong, 1 medium, 3 
weak ties 
Supply ↓ 5 weak ties ↑ 2 strong, 1 medium, 6 
weak ties 
Stage 3 
Markets • 3 medium ties ↑↑ 5 groups with five or more 
ties per group 
Technology ↑↑ 2 strong ties, 4 medium 
ties, 7 (+3) weak ties 
↑ 1 strong, 1 medium, 3 
weak ties 
Supply ↓ 5 weak ties • 1 strong, 3 medium, 8 
weak ties Stage 4 
Markets ↑↑ 5 strong ties 
1 medium tie 
↑↑ 5 groups with five or more 
ties per group 
 
Legend 
↑↑ 
Strong 
↑ 
Medium 
strong 
• 
Medium 
↓ 
Medium 
weak 
↓↓  
Weak 
Table 13   Alliance portfolio structure (MLS) 
In the first stage, the firms started to build alliances with content providers to link their 
prototypes with information and maps. YellowMap even managed to build its first 
technology partnerships, benefiting from its parent company CAS Software. In the first 
stage, when the alliance activities started, an alliance portfolio was not yet in place. 
In stage two, the firms intensified their existing content partnerships and added new 
partners. In addition, both firms started to add technology alliances and formed the first 
weak distribution partnerships. Both alliance portfolios were supply and technology focused. 
In stage three, distribution partnerships gained importance. Whereas sourcing partnerships 
were decentralized to reduce dependencies, and technology partnerships were, for the most 
part, stable, both firms added new distribution partners. Gate5 built up co-development 
partnerships with DaimlerChrysler, Mair, and Ipublish; YellowMap started to cooperate 
with different portals and MNOs. 
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Formation phaseStrategy pre-phase
a) Strategy 
review
b)Resource 
require-
ments
c) Alliance 
needs
Allying process
Management phase
a) Partner 
search & 
screening
b) Partner 
contacting
c) Alliance 
realization
a) Opera-
ting & em-
bedding
b) Partner-
ship
controlling
c) Realign-
ment or 
termination
Source: Author
Unplanned
alliance 
opportu-
nities
In stage 4, the trends of stage three continued. The alliance portfolio drifted more towards 
the sales side. New distribution channels were added and cooperation to existing partners 
andgroups intensified by embedding the link or by adding partners to each group. In 
contrast, sourcing alliances were further decentralized or kept stable and technology 
partnership were only very selectively formed. 
Underlying processes support these structural changes. This process layer comprises 
activities such as the partner search and selection, partnership contracting, and alliance 
controlling. These processes are described and analyzed in the next section. 
Alliance processes 
In response to questions about the alliance process, both companies reported a three-step 
procedure, which is structured fairly similarly within the two case study companies. In a 
strategic pre-phase, alliance needs are derived from corporate strategy. In the next step, the 
alliances are formed. The final step covers the alliance management as formulated by 
YellowMap’s business developer: 
 
‘We have a process with a strategic phase, a formation phase and an operative phase. In 
addition, business opportunities get around, which cannot be planned for.’ (Bernhard 
Kölmel, Head of Business Development YellowMap, 2002) 
 
The companies only differ in the tasks performed in each step, but not in particular steps or 
their sequence. The matching alliance process is depicted in figure 26. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26   Allying process 
Strategic pre-phase: Most alliance activities are kicked off by corporate strategy. In 
strategic reviews, corporate strategies are decided upon or adjusted. These strategy changes 
cause resource requirements to change. In a next step the firms decide on how to source 
these resources. Either they produce them in-house, access them from outside vendors when 
efficient markets exist, or build up more complex interfirm relations such as strategic 
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alliances. This last decision defines the alliance needs, specifying which type of company 
should provide which kind of resource, and how the resource exchange should be structured. 
Formation phase: The alliance formation phase can also be broken down into three steps: 
search and screening, partner contacting, and alliance realization. In the first steps, potential 
partners are sought out according the requirement specified in the alliance needs and 
screened with respect to how beneficial a partnership would be. The result of this step is a 
shortlist of potential partners. On this point, YellowMap reports of a very structured 
approach: 
 
‘We proceed very structured. To select fitting partners, we use market reviews and reports 
from analysts and research companies. Based on these data, we position the potential firms 
in the market and prioritize them… 
We definitely evaluate the strategic fit. We analyze, whether the potential partner cooperates 
with competitors. In addition, we use a few other criteria, but excluding competitors and 
firms linked to competitors is most important’ (Bernhard Kölmel, Head of Business 
Development YellowMap, 2002) 
 
Contacting the potential partners is the second step. Getting access to incumbents is a 
particularly difficult challenge. Gate5 thereby stresses the importance of agents for 
contacting potential partners, as its CEO stated: 
 
‘Directorates are extremely important for contacting potential partners. Our board 
members are today Hagen Hultzsch, ex-CTO of Deutsche Telekom; Charles Franklin, head 
of M-Commerce from Vodafone; Hans Huber, CEO of Lucent Europe; Greg Papdopoulos, 
CTO of Sun; Knut Voeckler from Microsoft Networks; and Prodomschef from Sat1. This is 
an excellent board. We try to recruit two additional members, a top manager from the 
automobile industry and someone from the media industry in UK.  
You can imagine how helpful these people are. Hagen Hultzsch opens us any door at 
Deutsche Telekom. I have to say, Hagen Hultzsch is extremely good. He helps me a lot. We 
e-mail almost every day …’ (Michael Halbherr, CEO Gate5, 2002)  
 
Contacting can also be initiated via unplanned alliance opportunities. The number of these 
opportunities is very small in the beginning as long as the firms are unknown and have no 
partners. However, in the later periods, when reputation and existing partnership portfolio 
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increased, opportunities arose. Gate5’s entry into the business and government software 
market provides a good example as Gate5’s CEO reports:  
 
‘These alliances [with SAP and ESRI] came much earlier than we thought. We set a course 
in the consumer market. But in the business market, the partners came to us and were 
impressed. SAP came to us and not vice versa.’ (Michael Halbherr, CEO Gate5, 2002)  
 
When mutual interest exists, the deal is negotiated, structured, and closed in the realization 
step. The period beginning from the strategic considerations, through searching, evaluating, 
and contacting the partner, and up to structuring the alliance takes 6 weeks in the case of 
Gate5. YellowMap completes the process over a somewhat longer time period; for important 
alliances, the process requires approximately 3 months. 
Management phase: The last phase also comprises three steps: operating and embedding 
partnerships, partnership controlling, and partnership restructuring (i.e., realignment or 
termination). 
In the operating phase, communication is very important to embed and intensify the 
cooperation and to build trust. The CEO of Gate5 phrased the importance of engaging 
communication as follows: 
 
‘… alliances are people business, which requires communication skills. You have to be 
capable to communicate clearly, in partnership (partnerschaftlich) and strategic. When you 
do so, your partnership is working.’ (Michael Halbherr, CEO Gate5, 2002) 
 
The next step is alliance controlling. In particular, in the dynamic industry setting of the 
Mobile Internet industry, firms must evaluate whether their resource input into different 
alliances is worthwhile. In addition, this analysis reduces and even discourages abuse in 
alliances. YellowMap devotes a fair amount of time to monitor its alliances, as its business 
developer reports: 
 
‘We analyze our alliance portfolio every three months. The alliance managers report how 
things are going. After that, we set new targets and agree on critical issues for the next few 
months. This takes place in a 2-3 day workshop’ (Bernhard Kölmel, Head of Business 
Development YellowMap, 2002) 
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In cases where the alliance performance for the case study firm is not sufficient, options are 
discussed as to how alliances can be rearranged. Hence, flexible alliance contracts are 
important to maintain mutually beneficial arrangements. In cases, where alliances cannot be 
rearranged or the parties cannot agree on a new arrangement, the partnerships are 
terminated. 
In summary, both case study firms have set up a structured alliance process. These two 
processes are very similar and comprise a strategic pre-phase, an alliance formation phase, 
and an alliance management phase. Each phase can be broken down into three steps. In the 
alliance formation step, supportive agents such as high-level directorates and firm reputation 
are especially useful. In the alliance management phase, communication skills for 
intensifying and maintaining the partnership and evaluation skills are required. 
The next step examines if and how this process and the structural changes of the alliance 
portfolio influence the firms’ performance. 
Performance 
The link between different influencing factors and the performance of a company is very 
complex and difficult to establish. Different reasons determine this complexity, such as the 
multiple dimensions of performance and its numerous parameters. Nevertheless, it is crucial 
for research in strategic entrepreneurship46. Hence, this study accounts for different 
performance dimensions. First, it describes the different performance dimensions and their 
underlying drivers, which are aggregated to a balanced score card. Second, the case data of 
Gate5 and YellowMap are presented and discussed. The results are summarized in the third 
part, the conclusion. 
Performance criteria 
As presented in the introduction (chapter 1), this study is based on three different 
performance dimensions: growth, profitability, and innovation. Several indicators measure 
these dimensions. These indicators are weighted and integrated into one single balanced 
performance index, which is depicted in table 14. This sub-section gives reasons for the 
different dimension and explains the different indicators and their weighting.  
All case studies started as technology growth ventures. The archetypes for these companies 
are Microsoft, Sun Microsystems, and Cisco Systems. The value of these companies is 
determined through their growth. Therefore, growth is a key performance indicator. Growth 
                                                 
46  Strategic entrepreneurship is the integration of entrepreneurial and strategic perspectives to 
examine entrepreneurial strategies and wealth (Hite, et al., 2001) 
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can refer to organizational growth and economic growth, which are usually strongly 
correlated. Economic growth is measured in absolute sales of the last fiscal year47 and the 
growth rate of the past years, which is used as a short- to mid-term growth perspective. The 
organizational growth measures are the number of employees at the beginning of 2002 and 
the growth rate of employees. Additionally, reorganizations and lay-offs have been 
accounted for negatively. 
Profitability is the next dimension. Its importance grew constantly over the evolution of the 
industry. After the capital markets turned bad, all case study companies had to focus on 
internal growth. Profitability secures survival and further growth. Profitability is measured 
by two indicators: the bottom line profit and the date the break-even point has been reached 
or is expected to be reached. Many profitability measures have been developed in the 
finance literature. Cash flow based performance measures, such as the CFROI48, measure 
performance more accurately because they are not distorted by depreciation. However, for 
simplicity and data availability reasons, they have not been applied. 
Innovation is the third performance dimension. It measures the distinctiveness of the 
companies’ technology. The growth perspective of the case study companies mainly 
depends on their unique technologies and services. The innovation is measured in awards 
obtained. Relevant awards are multi-media, start-up, and new media awards. 
Every case study is ranked along these indicators. The scales for applied grades range from 
1 (worst) to 5 (best) and are shown in table 14. The scale is the same as in resource 
evaluation. The borders and intermediate stages have been chosen so that the case study 
companies differ along every dimension. The indicators are weighted to allow a simple 
comparison. Based on industry interviews, entrepreneurial research, and the author’s 
industry assesment, growth is weighted 50%, profitability is weighted 40% and innovation is 
weighted 10%. The relatively low weight on innovation is due to its fuzzy measurability. 
Awards are not a very precise indicator. The detailed weights are provided with the scales in 
table 14.  
                                                 
47  In most cases the year 2001 
48  Cash flow based return on investment 
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Table 14   Company performance scales 
As described previously in the research methodology (sub-section 2.2.4), the relevant data 
were gathered through different sources, such as secondary data and interviews. Basic 
information was gathered through archival data such as the number of awards won, the 
number of employees, and, in some occasions, sales data such as yearly sales or number of 
campaigns sold. This data set was verified and completed during the interviews, where 
questions specifically addressing the development of sales, employees, profits figures, and 
the time to break even were asked. Not every question was answered due to company 
regulations or confidentiality agreements with VC’s, which restrict the public reporting of 
these companies. However, all companies indicated the development of their sales and their 
staff size; in addition, they provided their break-even forecasts.  
The author estimated the remaining data –mainly the bottom-line profits. The calculations 
are based on the revenue data, from cost estimates were subtracted. For the cost estimates, 
the average number of employees per year was multiplied by the average total cost per 
employee. The average cost per employee ratio is the average total cost per employee ratio 
from all case studies that provided profitability data (i.e., Airweb, Multichart, and 
YellowMap). The calculation is imperfect because it does not account for different location 
costs and assumes similar cost structures. However, it provides a basic indication with a 
estimated failure range from +/- 30%, which is sufficient for this study.  
In addition, the financial data are displayed only in an aggregated form, because most case 
study companies did not allow publishing of the precise and detailed data. 
Grades 1 2 3 4 5 Relative weight Absolut weight
Growth  50%
Revenues 35%
Sum 2001 [000 €] 100 500 1.000 3.000 5.000 80% 28%
Growth rate [CAGR] -10% 20% 50% 100% 200% 20% 7%
Employees 15%
Sum 2001 5 10 15 35 75 40% 6%
Growth rate [CAGR] -10% 20% 50% 100% 200% 40% 6%
emp. laid off yes nein nein nein no 20% 3%
Profitability 40%
Sum 2001 [000 €] -2.000 -1.000 -500 0 1.000 40% 16%
Break even Apr 04 Aug 03 Dez 02 Dez 01 Dez 00 60% 24%
Innovation 10%
Awards no ja 1 ja >1 100% 10%
100% 100%
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YellowMap performed better than Gate5, because its sales grew significantly faster and its 
profitability was better. Gate5 is only a notch above YellowMap concerning organizational 
size and technological innovations. The results of the performance evaluation are depicted in 
figure 27. 
Gate5’s revenues developed very slowly. 
From 1999 to 2001, Gate5 had no 
significant sales. Its first two product 
strategies⎯mobile city portal and location 
based service platform⎯were commer-
cially unsuccessful. In 2002, Gate5 realized 
its first projects. It co-developed ab 
application with sales partners on its MLS 
platform such as electronic city guides 
together with Falk. Gate5 was very 
unprofitable. Its small revenues faced costs 
of an organization with 50+ employees. 
Figure 27   Performance of MLS case studies 
Gate5 performs better in terms of organizational size and innovation. It scaled up its 
organization from 10 employees at the end of 1999 to 65 at the end of 2000. From 2001 on, 
it consistently had 55-60 employees. With its very technology-based approach, Gate5 
became country finalist of the Super Nova competition and won the e-conomy and the 
tel.con awards.  
By comparison, YellowMap’s financials developed better. By 2000, its sales were already 
above € 1 miollion and the forecast for 2002 expected to surpass the € 2 million border and 
break even. From an organizational point of view, YellowMap went through a severe 
reorganization. Its sales office in Munich was closed, activities centralized in Karlsruhe, and 
the organization was scaled down from 40 to 18 employees. Its technology is innovative and 
very interesting for industry players suchas the Gelben Seiten Verlag, but YellowMap could 
not win as many awards as Gate5. 
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3.2.4 Segment conclusion 
This section has provided background information covering the general case study settings 
of the two firms, summarized characteristics of the two case study firms, and detailed 
analyses of organizational change, resource requirements, alliance portfolios, the processes 
to manage alliance portfolios, and company performance. What conclusion can be drawn? 
What pattern can be detected? 
The two firms in the MLS segment developed stage-wise from typical entrepreneurial start-
ups in the first stage to ventures guided by business managers in the second stage, to firms 
organized according business units in stage three and, finally, stable (mid-term strategy) 
organizations in stage four. The firms are focused on internal growth and have lost all 
characteristics specific start-up such as team structures, strictly informal communication, 
and technical-entrepreneurial top management from the beginning of their life cycle. 
Along with the organizational change, firm resource needs shifted significantly. Despite the 
fact that the two resources, technological know-how and reputation, were always important 
due to the firm’s business model, five out of seven measured resource types show significant 
changes. Of these five resource types, four consistently shift with the stage development. 
Requirements for organizational skills, human resources and access to markets grow step-
by-step. The need for access to supply grows in the first two phases and loses importance in 
the later two phases. Only the need for financial resources cannot be integrated into the stage 
structure, because the financing rounds of the two ventures took place very differently. 
According to resource needs, partnerships have been built up. Starting with less than five 
alliances in stage one, the alliances were intensified and new alliances were built up in the 
following stages. In the end, the alliances portfolios of both firms comprised more than 50 
partly very intensive alliances. Thereby, shifts in resource requirements lead to changes in 
alliance portfolios. In the first two stages, the alliance portfolios are centered on technology 
and sourcing alliances; in the later two periods, distribution partnerships gain significant 
importance and the portfolio’s center of gravity shifts. 
These structural changes are facilitated through an allying process. This process is fairly 
similar in both case study firms and has three steps. A strategic pre-phase, from which 
alliance needs are derived, an alliance formation phase, in which potential partners are 
sought, screened, and contacted, and in which the partnership contracts are negotiated, and 
an alliance management phase, in which partnerships are operated, intensified and 
embedded, monitored, realigned, and terminated.  
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The alliance portfolio and the underlying allying process have implications on company 
performance; the faster the alliance portfolio is adjusted to the requirement of every stage, 
the better the performance. As in the case of YellowMap, the early creation of sales 
partnerships increased its revenues by forcing the company to develop products closer to 
customer needs. In contrast, Gate5⎯with no distribution partnerships⎯realized twice, that 
nobody was buying its product.  
In addition, alliances help to lower development costs on the technology side. Gate5’s 
alliance with location.net lowers development costs and time to market without losing 
strategic flexibility or fearing its strategic positioning. These technology alliances in 
particular require trust. Thus, the trust between YellowMap and CAS Software and PTV gave 
YellowMap a quick start on the technology side as well. It could build its prototype 
applications quickly and efficiently through cooperating with CAS Software and PTV. 
Therefore, alliances have been important for past performance and will be for future 
performance of both firms as well. 
3.3 Mobile Content Services 
This section analyzes alliance portfolios in the Mobile Content Service (MCS) industry and 
follows the same structure applied in the MLS segment in section 3.2. The segment is 
introduced by a segment overview, which specifies the offered services, their revenue 
potentials and main obstacles to mass marketing. The second part provides a short 
description of the case study companies: Airweb, Clever.Tanken, e-hotel, and Multichart. 
Their organizational change and alliance portfolios are assessed in the third part. The section 
concludes with the within-segment analysis. 
3.3.1 Segment overview 
Mobile Content Services deliver information, such as traffic news to mobile devices (cell 
phones and PDAs), or enable the exchange of content via mobile applications such as 
mobile brokerage. This segment overview first provides a short definition or examples for 
all services that are subsumed in this segment and, second, gives a revenue-forecast for 
them. The third part states the main barriers and obstacles for mass marketing. The fourth 
and last part concludes this sub-section with a picture of the current status and an outlook for 
these services. 
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Segmentation 
Mobile Content Services include numerous services and applications. The segmentation on 
which this study is based refers to a study of the German Institute for Future Studies and 
Technology Assessment (IZT, et al., 2002) on mobile multimedia services. These services 
deliver information to mobile devices from different areas such as political and business 
news, weather, sports, travel, erotic, and others. Financial services are subsumed in this 
segment. These services range from financial news such as stock quotes over mobile bank 
transfers to mobile brokerage. These services can be described as follows: 
Political and business news: Current news edited in a short format. Services resemble 
scaled down versions of online news-pages such as CNN.com or Spiegel.de. 
Weather: Basic services such as current weather conditions and weather forecasts for 
numerous locations. Additional services are wind speed, water temperature, snow height, 
and quality as well as likelihood of avalanches, and other weather events. 
Sports: Scores and live reporting of sport events, up-to-date league tables, sport news, and 
the like. 
Travel: Traffic and transportation related services such as news on road conditions, traffic 
jams, fuel prices of filling stations nearby located, routing, schedules for trains and airline 
flights, delays and check-in functionality of flights; hotel and rental car information, and 
booking services. 
Erotic: Erotic pictures, stories, and erotic city guides. Scaled down versions of erotic 
Internet portals. 
Financial news: Quotes and charts from stocks, funds and indices as well as market news, 
such as from Bloomberg. 
Mobile bank transfers: Mobile-enabled online banking such as account balance enquiry, 
SMS-based account transactions reporting, and mobile bank transfers. 
Mobile brokerage: Buying and selling stocks via cell phone or PDA, portfolio 
management, for example , by mobile executing a stop-loss functionality. 
Other services: Niche and special purpose services such as horoscopes, music, hobby, and 
youth channels, to name a few. 
Some information services have already been mentioned in the chapter on Mobile Location 
Services. The boundary between these two industry segments is fuzzy. In the case of 
financial services the distinction is obvious: the delivery of stock quotes is a clear 
information service; the routing to the closest ATM is a clear location service. The case of a 
weather forecast for, for example, Berlin, is not as clear. In this study, all services using 
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specifically location information such as routing services, city guides are assigned to Mobile 
Location Services; all others are part of the Mobile Content Service segment. 
Revenue forecast 
Business analysts forecast for the end of 2005 approximately 150 million Mobile Content 
Service subscribers in Western Europe, representing >40% penetration of the mobile 
subscriber installed base. Analogous to an MLS user, an MCS subscriber is defined as any 
mobile subscriber who uses Mobile Content Services at least once a month. Revenues are 
forecasted to reach € 3.2 billion in 2005 (see figure 28). Mobile banking and erotic services 
will generate the highest revenues. 
The British market analyst Datamonitor (2002) estimates that by 2005 21.5 million 
subscribers in Europe will use their cell phones and 
PDAs to do bank transactions. Revenues from 
mobile banking are estimated to be above € 1 
billion 49. Sapient (2002) estimates that erotic 
services will generate sales of € 750 million by 
2005. Durlacher (1999) forecasts that information 
provisioning for political and business news, sport, 
weather and other content account together for 
twice as much sales revenue (€1.5 billion). 
Figure 28   Mobile Content Sales Forecast 2005  
Barriers to mass marketing 
The first Mobile Content Services were launched in 1998. However, only a few of them 
have lived up to expectations. Industry analysts believe that many of the prerequisites of 
mass-market adoption of Mobile Content Services are not yet in place. The data 
communication bandwidth and screen quality of mobile devices are not sufficient. Analysts 
forecast that theses services will benefit from the recent generation of color display mobile 
devices and bandwidth increases through GPRS, EDGE, and UMTS technology. In addition, 
the success of Mobile Content Services depends on: 
• The degree to which services will be customized and personalized, to enable ease of 
use and a high speed with which information is accessed. 
                                                 
49  Connecting fee and provisions on transaction (approx. 0.5%) on a volume that is estimated to 
exceed € 50 billion. 
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• The availability of user’s selection choice of anonymous services usage. The user 
should have control over his or her identification. Many users fear loss of privacy, 
when their usage data will be stored and analyzed. 
• ‘Socialization’ of users to pay for content. Their unreadiness to pay for content 
services is rooted in complex causes: 
− Mobile content users are very likely experienced online users. As online 
users, they access a broad range of information for free. Therefore, charging 
fees for content services will be difficult in the beginning. However, the 
current trend to charge for Internet content might support its introduction. 
− Limited tolerance toward add-financing, especially in Europe. Banners, pop-
up advertisements, and offers financed by advertisement are black marked in 
Europe in comparison to the US, where a tolerance toward this financing 
method is considerable higher (IZT, et al., 2002, p. 25). 
− Low quality of mobile content. Up until now, information has often been 
unattractively edited and delivered with longer time lags. The improvement 
of information services is an essential challenge for content service providers 
(Boston Consulting Group, 2001). 
For mobile finance services, additional requirements will have to be fulfilled. As with most 
markets, the growth of the m-finance market will not take place in a vacuum. There will be 
many factors that will contribute to how rapidly people adopt the use of m-finance. 
However, the most important drivers will be the international adoption of wireless data 
services and network tolerance. 
International adoption of wireless data services: During the past two years, a great deal of 
optimism has been expressed about the adoption of wireless financial services such as the 
use of m-banking. There are several forces that drive the international adoption of wireless 
data services: 
• Availability of data-capable wireless devices: Data-enabled wireless devices must be 
widely available at a cost low enough to make their use ubiquitous; in addition, they 
should be easy to use. Again, the importance of color displays has already been 
mentioned above. 
• Availability of compelling wireless content and applications: Although the novelty 
of wireless data services can attract new users, it will not see long-lived acceptance 
unless it can deliver true value and perceived benefit. Therefore, m-brokerage and 
mobile money transfer services have to be easy to use. 
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• Security in data transmission and user identification: New encryption standards, 
digital signature, and cell phones with biometric user identification (e.g., finger scan) 
and integrated payment function (e.g., via Bluetooth) will increase users’ confidence 
in new systems. 
Network tolerance: The frequency with which a data communication is disrupted or fails to 
reach completion will continue to have a direct impact on customers’ willingness to embrace 
m-finance solutions. They may be willing to put up with occasional lapses in coverage and 
completion with wireless voice calls, but when dealing with the transmission of a financial 
transaction, such as buying securities, leniency is unlikely.  
In 1998, an average of 10 percent of all wireless calls in the United States were accidentally 
dropped; by 2002, that average had decreases to approximately 5 percent. In Western 
Europe and Japan, the 2002 average remained around 4 percent (Gartner, 2002a). Although 
this represents a significant improvement, it still falls short of the needed mark. 
Before mass adoption of m-finance systems, vendors and carriers will need to make sure that 
lapses in communication are very infrequent and, in the event communication is disrupted 
during a transaction, the underlying infrastructure and applications are resilient enough to 
‘rebuild’ the entire transaction once the connection is re-established. Of course, the vendors 
and carriers must also ensure that this resiliency completely eliminates the possibility of 
double charging for those transactions.  
Status quo and outlook 
Already today, more than 100 mobile information and finance services are offered in 
Western Europe. Furthermore, a few of them are already well established, such as Dynetic or 
Mobileway (Mobile Metrix, 2002). These content services can be subscribed to as packages 
(e.g., a push SMS info package for the World Soccer Championship, or a pull WAP package 
Bundesliga life) or offered for free on various portals (e.g., T-info, the information portal of 
T-mobile, offers travel, weather, and business directory services). Moreover, despite the 
above mentioned security concerns, different companies offer m-banking services often in 
cooperation with retail banks such as Fun Communications with Sparkassen and Fiducia50 
and Multichart with Sparda Bank and other banks in Germany. Similar services can be 
found all over Europe51.  
                                                 
50  Data processing center of 600 Volks- und Raiffeisenbanken 
51  Mobile Pay in Finland, Móvipago in Spain, Lloyds in UK, Metax in Denmark, Telia Payit in 
Sweden, as examples. 
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The main challenge for MCS providers is to educate mobile service subscribers to pay for 
content and services, which, in the past, have been available for free on mobile portals are 
still partly available for free on the Internet. Thereby, improved handsets (bigger screens and 
color displays) and improved data communication standards (i.e., MMS, GPRS, UMTS) are 
expected to improve the level of service and boost sales. A prominent example is the 
cooperation of T-mobile and Deutsche Fußball Liga. T-mobile covers every Bundesliga 
game and sends out an MMS for every goal, red card, or penalty, and a summary MMS at 
the end of each game. The service costs €2.40 per game. This service is in line with the 
current development in billing mechanisms. Industry experts have observed that billing 
mechanisms are in the process of changing from pay per use (e.g., first WAP services) to 
package prices (like many SMS services) to subscriptions (VDZ, et al., 2003). 
In addition to the pure content services, M-banking is one of the most prosperous mobile 
content applications (IZT, et al., 2002). M-banking is expected to gain attractiveness during 
‘small breaks in the course of the day’ like waiting for public transportation and thereby 
achieve a high acceptance. However, thoroughness of carrier network coverage and 
difficulty of overcoming geographic differences within Western Europe will continue to be 
daunting. Interoperability between the many carrier networks will be a paramount concern; 
however, the continued emergence of a variety of mediated delivery models will drive this 
market toward its full potential by 2007 (Gartner, 2002a).  
This segment introduction is summarized in figure 29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29   Segment overview Mobile Content Services  
CASE STUDIES 93 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
AIRWEB – COMPANY DEVELOPMENT
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3.3.2 Case history 
This sub-section gives a brief overview of the development and business models of the four 
case studies: Airweb, Clever.Tanken, e-hotel and Multichart. The companies’ development 
is a summary of the technological, financial, and organizational aspects of each case study 
history. The business model describes the value chain from the supply side to the down-
stream activities. 
Airweb’s development 
Airweb was founded in August 1999 with a French operation in Paris and a German 
operation in Mönchengladbach. Three of the founders were formerly employed by the 
information and communication division of Siemens France. The forth founder had 
previously worked for Kienbaum, a German consulting company. Airweb’s development is 
summarized in figure 30. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30   Company development: Airweb 
Airweb started to develop WAP solutions for information services and launched its first 
service in January 2000, a WAP service for the Rallye Paris-Dakar. In spring 2001, Airweb 
began to broaden its technology platform and launched SMS services (e.g., goals and scores 
of Bundesliga games), and in the fall of that year it added voice services such as sport news 
on 0190-numbers. In 2002, WAP-Push services and J2EE services such as picture messages 
and color WAP pages (e.g., pictures of soccer goals) completed its technology portfolio. 
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Airweb received its seed financing from its founders in August 1999. In January 2000, its 
start-up financing round was closed with € 350.000 from ‘family and fools’. The first VC 
financing round took place in August 2001. Viventures, the corporate VC unit of the French 
conglomerate Vivendi, bought a 20% stake of Airweb for € 3 million After the market turned 
down in 2001, Airweb stopped talks concerning a second VC-financing round and started to 
focus on its bottom line and organic growth. 
To develop and sell its services, Airweb partnered with different companies and 
organizations. In the beginning, it formed partnerships to create reputation and to build up 
its technology through working with well-known incumbents such as Siemens and Alcatel 
and technology leaders such as Openwave (former Phone.com). As a show-case service, it 
launched the first WAP service in France in cooperation with the Rallye Paris-Dakar.  
In 2000, additional services were launched such as a Tour de France service, a tennis 
service with the ATP, and soccer services in Germany and France. With this service 
portfolio, Airweb started to build up its distribution network by cooperating with MNOs in 
France, Germany, and Belgium such as Cegetel, D2 Vodafone, Bouygues, among others and 
with portals such as AOL in France. This cooperation with portals continued in 2001, when 
Airweb initiated an alliance with Jamba!, a mobile portal, which is the standard portal of 
Germany’s largest mobile service provider, Debitel, that has 7 million clients in Germany. 
In 2001, it switched its content strategy. After creating their own sport content and 
cooperating with sport marketing companies or directly with associations, Airweb started to 
partner with sport content companies. In Summer 2001, it closed a deal with L’equipe, 
France’s biggest sports magazine. In the beginning of 2002, it started to work with the 
Rheinische Post, one of Germany’s biggest regional newspaper publishers. A detailed 
analysis of its alliance portfolio is provided in the next section. 
During the period from 1999 to 2002, the management team did not change and the 
organization grew from the four founders in 1999 to 20 employees in 2002. Airweb did not 
win any start-up, new economy, or multimedia awards. 
Airwebs business model 
Airweb offers mainly sport information services. These services are based on different 
bearer technologies. As mentioned above, Airweb started with WAP services and broadened 
its portfolio by adding SMS and voice services. For multi-media capable devices, Airweb 
started at the end of 2002 to develop Java (J2EE) services. Airweb’s business model is 
summarized in figure 31. 
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Figure 31   Business model: Airweb 
These services are distributed and marketed with three different kinds of partners: MNOs, 
independent mobile portals, and strong content partners. Airweb cooperates with MNOs that 
run their own mobile portals such as Orange, T-mobile, and Vodafone (including Vizzavi) by 
providing sport news services under their own brand or under the operator’s brand. Its 
cooperative relationship with independent mobile portals such as AOL and Jamba! are very 
similar. The third kind of distribution partnership is with strong content providers, which use 
Airweb’s technology to build up a third distribution channel in addition to regular print and 
online news. 
To deliver these services, Airweb packages client specific products, which are determined by 
the bearer technology and the covered content. All services are based on Airweb’s content 
database and its mobile information platform.  
The content database is serviced by the company’s editorial office, which updates league 
tables and results in the main sport leagues (i.e., soccer, basketball, ice hockey, formula 1 
racing), writes news, and delivers live reports from sporting events. Content partners support 
a couple of these activities. In particular, pictures for MMS are sourced from partners that 
own the necessary copyrights such as SID52. Due to economic considerations, Airweb tries to 
intensify these relations to save money still spent on in-house editorial activities. 
                                                 
52  Sport Informations Dienst, Germany largest sport information agency 
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CLEVER-TANKEN – COMPANY DEVELOPMENT
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Airweb’s mobile information platform allows sending out information in different designs, 
using different bearer services to different devices. The core of this platform is developed in-
house. However, peripheral features such as text-to-speech functionality are developed with 
partners (i.e., Dialogic). Airweb also cooperates with device manufacturers (Alcatel, Nokia, 
etc.) to adjust its services on their new devices (screen size, browser technology, etc.). 
With its value creation, Airweb competes against two types of companies. Direct 
competitors are other mobile content services companies such as Bemobile, Phonevalley, 
Dynetic, and Materna). Indirect competitors are sport content companies with their own 
mobile services such as Eurosport, dpa and sports.com. 
Clever.Tanken’s development 
The Clever.Tanken service was initiated in August 1999 as a new business of a Nuremberg-
based new media consulting company, sbcon Consulting. The management team of sbcon 
Consulting, Steffen Block and Michael Feldmüller, started to develop a special purpose 
portal centered around road traffic, primarily filling stations and fuel prices. The basic idea 
of this service is to create unique content by motivating thousands of drivers to report fuel 
prices (so called ‘fuel price pilots’) and to sell this content to mobile portals, local radio 
stations, and telematic service providers. Its development is summarized in figure 32. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32   Company Development: Clever.Tanken 
In 1999, the Clever.Tanken service was still web-based, but with the introduction of the first 
WAP-phone, Nokia’s 7110, in December 1999, sbcon Consulting started its WAP-service. 
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After the first successful steps, the company focused on mobile services and changed the 
company’s name into its service name. Clever.Tanken added SMS as a third bearer service 
in 2001, after the big success of SMS in Europe, and started to enable its platform for 
Location Based Services53. 
Due to its corporate past, Clever.Tanken did not need seed and start-up financing rounds. 
But when the services started to grow, external money was needed. In March 2001, 
Fortknox Ventures together with tbg as a co-investor bought a stake in Clever.Tanken. A 
second VC-financing round with the same investor was closed in August 2001. 
To develop and sell its services, Clever.Tanken partnered from the beginning on with MNOs 
such as D2 Vodafone and T-online. They were important for launching its service and 
managing the connection between the company and its ‘fuel price pilots’54. An incentive 
system for these pilots was built in 2001, together with Webmiles. After the technological 
part of the service was established and connectivity to different mobile Networks was set up, 
Clever.Tanken started to market its service to regional radio stations, in car computer 
manufacturers and telematic service providers as well as to Internet and mobile portals. 
Beginning with 1,500 visits per day on its web page one month after launching the Internet 
portal in September 1999 and 100 WAP users a day one month after launching the WAP 
service in February 2000, the service grew continuously. In 2002, more than 43,000 people 
regularly reported fuel prices for more than 15,000 filling stations in Germany, which 
constitutes a penetration of more than 90%. 
During the period from 1999 to 2002, the management team did not change and the 
organization stayed fairly stable with 5 to 7 employees and 10 to 12 additional freelancer 
workers. Clever.Tanken won the WAP developer award in 2000 for its innovative service.  
Clever.Tanken’s business model 
Clever.Tanken offers the mobile community information on filling stations. The content is 
distributed using three channels: first, via Internet portals such as Clever.Tanken’s own page 
and general purpose portals such as MSN and T-online, second, via mobile portals such as 
Vodafone with its Vizzavi portal or operator independent portals as mobile.de, and, third, via 
in-car computer systems, which are linked to telematic systems provided, for example, by 
Gedas. Clever.Tanken’s business model is summarized in figure 33. 
                                                 
53  Therefore it cooperated with Map&Guide, which provided maps and routing 
54  Drivers, who report fuel prices 
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Figure 33   Business model: Clever.Tanken 
To package its content for the distribution channels, Clever.Tanken uses different standards. 
Its Internet service uses common html and xml technology. For the mobile services, SMS 
and WAP technology is used. To manage the SMS traffic, Clever.Tanken cooperates with 
Materna. For in-car solutions, standards of car PC platforms (such as i-drive from BMW) are 
used. All products are based on Clever.Tanken’s database and its content management 
system, whose development has been supported by technology partners such as Proxemo. 
The content compilation that transforms messages from more than 40,000 fuel price pilots 
into a single database format is a particularly critical step. 
These fuel price pilots generate the most important of the three content types used by 
Clever.Tanken: fuel prices from more than 15,000 filling stations. This content is unique in 
Germany. The ‘pilots’ are rewarded with bonus points, which are provided by Webmiles. 
The system is similar to airline bonus programs like Miles&More. The other two content 
types are traffic information (speeding control points, traffic jams and road conditions), 
which are exchanged with radio stations, and maps, which are critical to build-up a location-
sensitive service. 
For its core service, Clever.Tanken has no competitor. As mentioned above, its fuel price 
content is unique. However, in the segment of road traffic portals, Clever.Tanken competes 
with various portals and telematic service providers such as Passo and Teragon. The ADAC 
with its travel information service is also a competitor. 
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ehotel AG (49% I:FAO, 40% Bedhunter)
E-HOTEL – COMPANY DEVELOPMENT
1999 20022000 2001
Company Name
Technology
Financing
Important
Cooperations
Hotels 200 40.000
5.400 51.000
Board
Employees
Awards
bedhunter
Jul Oct Jan AprApr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul
3. VC Financing
tbg (18%)
35
1. VC Financing
Fortknox
T-mobile
Toll-free
numberSoftware
package
WAP
Sixt
content
TISS.com
IMN
Lufthansa
infogate
Internet
2. Financing
integrated in merger
with ehotel services
D2 Vodafone
e-sixt Lufthansa
PegasusINNIXS
Radius
6 18+5-7 FL
M. Kose, M. Garke
E-hotel’s development 
The e-hotel AG was created in a merger of the e-hotel division of I:FAO55 and 
bedhunter.com in September 2000. In the merger, the management team of bedhunter.com 
took over the management in the newly formed e-hotel AG. Bedhunter.com was founded in 
September 1999 by a former management consultant from A.T. Kearney and a former hotel 
manager. Its development is summarized in figure 34. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34   Company development: e-hotel 
The company first developed a software tool to book hotel rooms with the aim to develop a 
mobile hotel booking service. After the backend application was built in fall 1999, 
Bedhunter.com offered its service initially through a toll free number (January 2000) and 
then (in March 2000) through a web-based solution. In May 2000, the WAP- and SMS-
based services were completed. After May 2000, no new distribution channel was added. 
Therefore, no additional communication technology was introduced. 
After the seed investment by its two founders in September 2000, e-hotel financed its 
growth from the beginning of 2000 on through its first VC financing round, which was 
closed with Fortknox Ventures. In October 2000, the above-mentioned merger took place. 
The merger was motivated by Bedhunter.com’s wish to grow externally and I:FAO’s wish to 
deconsolidate its e-hotel service. The loss making service burdened its IPO prospects. This 
also explains why a second financing round was integrated in this merger. I:FAO provided 
                                                 
55  I:FAO develops e-procurement software for the booking and management of business travel 
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additional funds for the new e-hotel AG. In January 2002, a third financing round was closed 
with tbg, which took an 18% share of the company. 
E-hotel built different alliances on its front-end to sell its services and on its back-end to 
source hotel room contingents, rental cars, and other travel services. Its most important 
partner was Radius, for hotel rooms and Lufthansa and Sixt for flights and rental cars. D2 
Vodafone and T-mobile were important distribution partners, who integrated e-hotel’s 
service into their portals. At the end of 2000, the business logic of e-hotel changed from 
being a mobile travel agency to a hotel room specialist. Content partnerships with Sixt and 
Lufthansa were obsolete, but contacts to these companies could be used to integrate e-hotel 
service in e-sixt’s and Lufthansa’s travel portals. In addition to these sourcing and 
distribution partners, e-hotel cooperated with international electronic hotel room directories 
such as INNXS.com and later with Pegasus to link its service to international booking 
machines and with I:FAO and Nokia to build up its own technology platform. 
Through its network, e-hotel built up a service that grew up to 51,000+ hotel rooms from 
October 2000 on. During that time the organization grew from 6 employees in 1999 to 35 
toward the end of 2000. Due to the downturn of the multi media industry and limited new 
financing opportunities, the organization had to be scaled back to 18 employees by the end 
of 2001. The same management team has been running the organization since its foundation. 
E-hotel did not win any start-up, new economy or multimedia awards.  
E-hotel’s business model 
E-hotel offers hotel-booking services to the private travel community and to corporations, 
which are served as large accounts. Large accounts are targeted with integrated offers that 
comprise mobile, online and toll free hotline services. E-hotel’s business model is 
summarized in figure 35. 
The private travel community can access e-hotel’s service via four different channels. In 
cooperation with iobox, e-hotel offers its booking service via SMS technology. The booking 
service is also distributed using WAP technology. Partners such as MNOs and independent 
portals offer their users this service either under the e-hotel brand or under their own brand. 
When marketing under their brand, e-hotel customizes its front-end to the cooperation 
partner’s look and feel. The third kind of cooperation is structured similarly. Allied Internet 
portals offer e-hotel’s service either branded or under their own brand. Integrated travel 
agencies are the last distribution channel. Lufthansa and e-sixt offer their services by using a 
variety of media (e.g., call centers, online, and mobile). 
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Figure 35   Business model: e-hotel 
In the case of e-hotel, the packaging of its services is not very complex. All services are 
based on the same database of hotel room. e-hotel edits its content and adjusts the design 
sheets in its content management system to deliver tailored hotel information depending on 
the data capacities of the bearer service and the screen size of the CPE. 
E-hotel’s core resource is its booking engine together with its hotel-room contingents and 
hotel room database. Its booking engine was developed mainly in-house. Two partners 
supported the development of e-hotel’s technology. I:FAO, as the largest shareholder, 
helped e-hotel with its knowledge as developer of e-procurement software for booking and 
managing business travels. Nokia, through its developing program, gave support for the 
mobile adaptation of e-hotel’s service.  
On the upstream side of its value chain, e-hotel established cooperation for accessing hotel 
room contingents with two purposes. First e-hotel partners with Radius to access hotel room 
contingents with large discounts to be competitive in tourist and business “hot spots”. 
Second, e-hotel signed up hotel room database services provided by INNXS.com (a service 
of Trust International) and Pegasus. These providers collect and standardize hotel offers 
from all over the world. As a result of these alliances, e-hotel was able to broaden its service 
offer to 51,000 hotels to fulfill almost every client request. 
E-hotel competes with its service with other independent hotel booking services like HRS, 
Cordia, Hotel.de, and Check-In.com, and with older booking systems such as Fidelio, for 
which online and mobile front-ends have been developed. 
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Multichart
MULTICHART – COMPANY DEVELOPMENT
1990 20022000 2001
Company Name
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Thomas 
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Multichart’s company history 
Multichart is in two ways an exception in comparison with the other case studies. Multichart 
was founded in 1985 in Kassel (Germany) and, from that time, grew organically without any 
venture capital. The founder, Thomas Brandenburger, started this venture to support 
financial institutions such as banks and Sparkassen56 with software that graphed the 
development of securities such as stocks and bonds. Despite the availability of computer 
systems in the mid 1980s, brokers still graphed the development with pencils on paper. 
Multichart’s first software tool, Multichart2000, targeted those brokers. Using this software, 
they could manage, control, and analyze their clients’ portfolios. Multichart’s development 
is summarized in figure 36: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36   Company development: Multichart 
In the early 1990s, Multichart began to integrate its business from graphing financial content 
into the transport of financial content. It offered real-time stock quotes to financial 
institutions and financially interested people via satellite technology. When GSM networks 
were introduced in Europe in 1992/1993, Multichart adopted this technology and delivered 
real-time stock quotes from the German stock exchange over GSM. In 1996, Multichart 
launched its first SMS service. The KISS(me) Broker was the first mobile data dialog system 
in Germany. It replied with the real-time stock quote after receiving the name of the 
                                                 
56 Trustee savings banks 
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securities via SMS. The presentation of this service at the CeBIT in 1996 marks Multichart’s 
entry in the mobile Internet industry. 
In the four years that followed, it improved its service by additional functionality and 
additional accessibility. To enhance its product, Multichart added, step-by-step, a mobile 
cash function, m-brokerage, mobile info services and an application to manage bank 
accounts and transfer money via cell phone or PDA. To increase its usage, Multichart 
adapted its service to different technologies like WAP and GPRS.  
In late 2001, Multichart built up its online services by offering tickers and security charts to 
companies for investor relations purposes, and updated its first product, Multichart2000, in a 
web-enabled tool called Aktiensignale. 
These developments were mainly financed internally. Multichart grew organically from 
1985 without venture capital. External capital was only accessed by regular bank loans or by 
selling minority stakes of the company to important partners like Distefora. 
To develop and sell its service, Multichart cooperated with different companies. Its most 
important cooperation partner on the supply side is Deutsche Börse57, with whom Multichart 
has cooperated since 1986. With its entry into the Mobile Internet industry, Multichart 
started to partner with technology providers and CPE manufactures. Through IC3S and 
Distefora Mobile, it connected its service to the new digital communication channels using 
their SMS centers. CPE manufacturers provided Multichart with the latest handset 
technology so that it could adapt its service. Four types of partners cooperated with 
Multichart on sales and distribution: MNOs such as e-plus and T-mobile; financial content 
providers such as Focus money and N-TV; internet agencies and other communication 
companies such as envigo and CompuTel; and financial system integrators as data 
processing centers of banks (e.g., DVG Hannover, ITZ, etc.). 
Thomas Brandenburger has lead Multichart as CEO since 1985. In 1999, Stefan Pietsch 
joined as second chairman focusing on mobile services. The organization grew steadily with 
an average of one employee per year from 1986 to 13 employees in 1998. From 1999 to 
2001, the organization grew to up to 21 employees. In the beginning of 2002, it had to be cut 
back and operated with 17 employees in mid 2002. Multichart won the Special Award of 
Financial Institutions in Hesse 2000 for its KISS(me) service. 
                                                 
57  German Stock Exchange 
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Multichart’s business model 
Multichart sells two different types of products: mobile and online finance services and 
banking software. Its finance services are sold to the financially interested community, 
finance-oriented content providers such as NTV, N 24, and 3sat Börse, and publicly traded 
companies like Gardena and Karstadt Quelle for their investor relations. WAP and GPRS 
services are sold exclusively under the KISS(me) brand; SMS and online services such as 
web-charts and stock quote tickers are also customized to the look and feel of the customer. 
Multichart either sells its banking software directly to banks, or uses financial software 
service companies as data processing centers. These companies integrate Multichart’s 
software as one component in their full size banking software package. Multicharts business 
model is summarized in figure 37. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37   Business model: Multichart 
Multichart sells different services in every product category. Mobile services include m-
brokerage, m-payment, m-banking, and mobile financial information services. These 
services are available through different bearer services (i.e., WAP, SMS, and GPRS). Online 
products are web charts⎯both simple and animated⎯and the online portfolio management 
program Aktiensignale. Multichart’s banking products are the portfolio management 
program for brokers, Multichart2000, and stock quote real-time provision through 
mcRealtime. 
All products are based on three components: real-time content, chart capability in different 
designs, and good connectivity with various media. Real-time content is acquired through 
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cooperation with Deutsche Börse and Börse Stuttgart and accessed through the network of 
BIS Börseninformationssysteme. Additional content like financial and general news is 
accessed through co-operations with dpa and VDW. Multichart’s chart capabilities have 
been developed in-house since 1985. No external co-operations are needed for its online 
services and software products. However, for its mobile services, Multichart cooperates with 
CPE manufacturers to adapt its solutions (especially the design sheets) to new handsets. 
IC3S is Multichart’s most important partner in terms of connectivity; it manages 
Multichart’s SMS traffic. 
With its mobile services, Multichart competes with Fun Communications and tecways. Its 
m-cash service competes indirectly with the PayBox service.  
Now that MCS case studies have been introduced, their alliance portfolios and 
organizational change will be examined in detail in the next section. This examination is 
guided by the following questions: How important are alliance portfolios from a strategic 
point of view? How and why do they change over time? How do they influence the 
development of the case study firms? 
3.3.3 Within segment analysis 
The cases in the Mobile Content Service segment are analyzed according to the structure 
used in the MLS segment analysis. To understand the longitudinal dynamics of alliance 
portfolios, their implications on company performance, and their interdependence with 
organizational change, the first two parts of the analysis cover each firms’ development and 
resource requirements. The third part describes the alliance portfolio structure over the 
development of the case studies. The analysis of relevant processes to form and manage 
partnerships follows in the fourth. The fifth part describes the alliance portfolios’ 
implications on firm performance. The section is summarized with a conclusion. 
Company development 
Two questions are answered in this section: Did different development stages exist? And 
how can they be characterized? Therefore, in the first section, the development steps are 
identified and classified. In the latter section, different organizational characteristics (such as 
the organizational structure and the communication style) are described and the development 
stages are characterized accordingly. 
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Development stages 
Since their foundation, all four organizations have gone through longer periods during which 
they developed smoothly, and shorter problematic periods during which they had to adjust 
their structure. Thus, these companies went through different life cycle stages. Table 15 lists 
the stages, which have been identified and labeled by the managers who where interviewed. 
This also explains, why these stages are not characterized using a consistent criterion. Some 
managers used strategic growth targets, while others used changes in the product portfolio to 
characterize the company’s development. 
Company Airweb Clever.Tanken e-hotel Multichart 
Phase 1 Growth oriented 
start-up venture 
9.1999 – 1.2001 
Service development
 
8.1999 – 12.2000 
Start-up period 
 
9.1999 – 12.2000 
Banking software 
developer 
8.1985 – 2.1996 
Phase 2 Organic growth 
 
1.2001 – 2.2002 
Service marketing 
and consolidation 
1.2001 – 5.2002 
Professionalization 
period 
1.2001 – 5.2002 
M-finance service 
provider 
3.1996 – 2.2001 
Phase 3 Multi product 
provider 
From 2.2002 on 
 
 
Not yet 
 
 
Not yet 
Multi-media finance 
service provider 
From 3.2001 on 
Table 15   Stage description of companies in the MLS segment 
All ventures started with an exploration phase, during which they generated the technology, 
screened the market, and developed prototypes. Airweb launched different services that were 
sold to operators for free to increase its user base. Clever.Tanken built up its database and 
fuel price pilot community, for which it iteratively developed an incentive scheme. E-hotel 
developed its booking engine, integrated its system into existing travel computer systems 
and struggled with its business model scope (i.e., between being a broad mobile travel 
agency or a specialized multi-access hotel room booking service). In its initial years, 
Multichart developed its portfolio management software for brokers. Step-by-step features 
were added after testing the software and receiving market feedback. 
At the end of stage one, the case study companies faced similar problems. Their market 
niche was either not big or not profitable enough to earn solid revenues and the grown up 
organization required better processes and more structure to operate efficiently. Therefore, 
the second stage can be best characterized by the term professionalization. All companies 
began to focus more on sales and streamlined their business model on core capabilities. 
According to March’s (1991) framework, the case study companies began to exploit their 
technology. Airweb cancelled all contracts with insufficient revenue models and increased 
its prices, Clever.Tanken started to work with radio stations to push its marketing, and e-
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Company development
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airweb
Clever-Tanken
ehotel
Multichart
hotel focused on its hotel room booking service and abandoned its project to build a mobile 
travel portal. Only Multichart’s case is a slightly different. The company had grown slowly 
but profitably. However, in the middle of the 1990s, it realized that its niche was not big 
enough, so it started to transfer its capabilities into a new mobile business. 
Clever.Tanken and e-hotel are still in the professionalization period. Airweb and Multichart 
in 2001 and 2002 progressed to the third stage. Both organizations broadened their product 
portfolios to increase sales. In both cases, this step was combined with the consolidating and 
streamlining of current activities. Multichart cut back its Marketing and PR expenses by 
downsizing its marketing department. Airweb consolidated its content activities by building 
up alliances with strong content partners. 
To compare the development steps of the case studies, the organizations were analyzed 
according to the organizational dimensions that were introduced in sub-section 3.2.3 
‘Company development’. 
Stage characteristics 
The four MCS companies were assessed over their development stages according to five 
dimensions: management focus, organizational structure, communication style, 
management’s flexibility to market changes, and the structure of compensation and reward 
systems. The characteristics and their development over time are summarized in figure 38. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38   Company development in the Mobile Content Service segment 
First stage: All four companies had typical start-up characteristics. Team-based 
organizations were led by an entrepreneurial manager or an entrepreneurial management 
team. Their in-house communication was very frequent and informal. In their exploration 
phase, the companies quickly reacted to market feedback by adjusting products and services. 
Long working hours were compensated with modest salaries and key employees had 
ownership. 
Second stage: This stage is characterized by professionalization. In each company, the 
management focus shifted from developing new services and products to selling these 
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products and improving the efficiency of their processes by introducing a functional 
organization. 
Most companies kept their informal communication style. With 15 or less employees, there 
was no need to develop more formalized communication. Only e-hotel changed the 
communication style by developing, for example, rules for meetings. The exception was 
motivated through its organizational growth. E-hotel had 35 employees at the end of 2000 
when its professionalization stage started. 
The case studies differed in the last two dimensions: planning horizon (i.e., management’s 
flexibility to market changes) and compensation structure. Airweb and Clever.Tanken 
frequently continued to repackage their services. They shifted their business models and 
strategies every 3 to 6 months depending on market response. E-hotel and Multichart were 
already more confident in their market niche. Both companies developed mid-term strategies 
of 2 to 3 years, which were slightly adjusted every 6 months. 
In terms of compensation structure, only Airweb started to develop more complex incentive 
systems by introducing individual bonus systems and a stock option program. All the other 
case study companies adhered to simple flat salaries to compensate their employees. 
Third stage: As described above, only Airweb and Multichart entered a third stage. In this 
stage, key dimensions such as the management focus and the organization structure 
remained unchanged. However, because the organizations grew to 20 employees and above, 
both companies adjusted their communication style.  
In terms of flexibility, Airweb gained confidence in its market and prolonged its planning 
horizon to a mid-term planning of 2 years. Its client relationship developed steadily, and 
numerous competitors dropped out of the market.  
Resource requirements 
Alliances are built partly to access external resources. Therefore, the documentation of 
resource requirements is a prerequisite for analyzing the influence of resource needs on 
alliance formation. These requirements have been assessed for every case study company 
over its development stages. The resource categories applied are identical to the MLS 
segment analysis, and the rationale for their selection is presented in the research 
methodology chapter. 
The analyzed resources can be grouped into four categories, three of which are directly 
linked to the companies’ development stages: resources with fading importance, resources 
with changing importance, and resources with growing importance. The last group 
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Resource requirements
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comprises resources that are not directly linked to development steps. The development of 
the resource requirements is summarized in figure 39. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39   Resource requirement s in the Mobile Content Service segment 
Development dependent resources: Resource categories with fading importance include 
reputation and technological know-how. All four ventures were founded as technology-
based start-ups that in their first period focused on developing services and products in new 
technology fields. Their technological skills played a major role and were consistently 
ranked very high. However, beginning with the second period, two factors led to the 
decrease of importance of this resource to a medium evaluation. On the one hand, 
companies had built up the major part of their service technology. The core features of the 
services were up and running and the next development steps were less crucial. On the other 
hand, the companies realized that their clients were not embracing the new technology as 
fast as had been forecasted. Given that, the industry was less about a technology race but 
rather a question of customizing and marketing the product. Yet, even in the later periods, 
technological skills are ranked medium importance. 
In addition to a solid technology, the companies required reputation, particularly directly 
after their foundation. The companies needed a kind of legitimacy to contact other 
companies, sell their products and services, and to be noticed. After jumping a certain hurdle 
of reputation, the requirement of ‘additional reputation and publicity’ dropped to only 
medium level importance. The companies were established enough to be recognized and to 
receive an invitation when asking for a meeting. However, the reputation resource did not 
completely diminish in importance. As a software-developer or mobile service provider, a 
respectable level of reputation is always required to stay above the hurdle. 
The next group of resources is characterized by alternating importance evaluations. 
Access to other supply and human resources show this pattern of alternating importance. In 
the case of access to other supply, all companies start with a medium to low requirement for 
this resource. The importance grew in stage two. However, in stage three, the resource again 
CASE STUDIES 110 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
lost some importance. For example, Airweb had developed its content service platform in 
stage one. To sell a service, Airweb needed sport news and sport events to cover. Good 
content began to be in short supply. Airweb solved this bottleneck by contracting with sport 
associations and with several sport content providers, and ‘access to other supply’ was again 
ranked medium. 
In the case of Clever.Tanken, additional content is mainly filling station related. This content 
was ranked medium-low importance in period one while it built up its databases, content 
acquisition system, and technology. In period two, Clever.Tanken scaled up its system and 
the importance of content increased. In an effort to increase its content base, additional ‘fuel 
price pilots’ could be recruited. The number grew from 10,000 to above 40,000 and 
Clever.Tanken achieved good coverage in all of Germany. There are signs that 
Clever.Tanken has built up the major part of its supply network and that sourcing will lose 
importance. This is how the CEO of Clever.Tanken, S. Block, cautiously answered the 
question of whether content would maintain its high level of importance.  
The situation is similar for e-hotel. The importance of superior supply was low in the first 
stage, when the technology had to be developed and a prototype service launched. However, 
in stage two, commercialization required access to hotel room databases and room 
contingents. Therefore, the evaluation jumped from medium low in phase one to medium 
high in phase two. There are indications that the sourcing network is in place, which may 
very likely cause it’s importance to decrease in the near future. 
In the case of Multichart, the importance of superior content follows the same pattern: Low 
in stage one, higher in stage two and medium to low in stage three. Access to financial data 
was important for Multichart directly from its foundation. The partnership with Deutsche 
Börse dates back to 1986. However, no critical further supply was needed up to 1996 and 
1997, when Multichart entered the Mobile Information business. Furthermore, the 
partnership with Deutsche Börse is fairly structured and is not exclusive. These three 
arguments explain the medium-low evaluation of the resource’s importance in stage one. 
The entry into new services triggered changes in resource needs. Multichart launched 
KISS(me) info, a mobile information service covering political, business and financial news. 
The requirement for information grew with Multichart’s reorientation as an M-finance 
service provider. Because of the return of its business focus to charts and the software tools 
to analyze securities and portfolios (i.e., Webchart and Aktiensignale), the requirement for 
content resources again decreased to medium-low importance. 
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Human resources are the second alternating evaluated resource category. All case study 
companies ranked its importance in the first period medium or medium low. The companies 
grew by only a few employees, most of whom were related to the company founders. 
Recruiting became more difficult in stage two (three out of four evaluations went up). This 
shift is based on two factors: increase in quantity and selectivity. More employees were 
sought out in absolute terms, because almost all companies grew from approximately 10 
employees to their maximum size of 20 to 35 employees. In addition, the search became 
more structured and selective. Search profiles became more clear as the industry matured 
and the companies structured themselves to according functions. As Airweb’s CEO said: 
 
‘In the beginning we selected people according the motto: “This is a good man, we can use 
him somewhere.” In the meanwhile, we recruit people specifically for well-defined 
positions.’ (Claudius Bertheau, CEO of Airweb, 2002) 
 
In stage three, the requirement dropped back to a medium evaluation. Although the search 
selectivity continued to grow, cutbacks in the size of the organization reduced the need for 
additional human resources. 
The next group comprises resource categories, which gained importance along with the 
development stages. The requirements of market access and organizational skills grew over 
time. Both resources received the lowest evaluation in stage one and the highest in stage 
three. In the case of market access, the need to sell products and services grew steadily. In 
the prototype stage (stage one), the technology-based start-ups focused on their development 
work. In addition, VC money was easy to acquire, which lowered the burden to survive. 
Trends in the VC industry are important for understanding the shift in stage two. In addition 
to the regular development that the case study companies planned to break even in stage 
two, the VC industry drastically cut its investment in this industry. This increased the 
pressure to increase sales to provide internal financing. Therefore, all four case study 
companies rank access to markets as the most required resource in their last stage. 
A similar pattern can be seen in the category organizational skills. The evaluation increases 
from medium-low in stage one to medium-high in the case studies’ last stage. This increase 
is driven by two effects: a growing need for structure as organizations grew and diversified 
into different services, and a growing need for efficiency as external financing dried up and 
cost cutting became an important strategy to break even. An example of this trend is 
provided by the CEO of Clever.Tanken: 
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‘We have an administration tool, with which we manage our data. It is built up very 
intelligently, so that it delivers on one hand information very reliably, on the other hand we 
save manpower. This system is very efficient and we start to benefit from these effects. 
…These organizational skills were not that important in the beginning, but meanwhile these 
skills are crucial.’ (Steffen Bock, CEO Clever.Tanken, 2002) 
 
All case study companies introduced functional organizations to clearly assign 
responsibilities and sophisticated evaluation systems to improve measuring and monitoring 
of skills. 
Other resources: This group of resources is not directly linked to development steps and 
applies to only one category: financial resources. The need for financial resources is the 
difference between the need to finance growth and survival and the available funds. This 
availability depends mainly on already closed VC financing rounds. As mentioned above, 
VC financing is very cyclical. Therefore, VC industry trends, which can be labeled 
exogenous to the company development, play a significant role in the evaluation of the 
importance of external financing. 
Looking at the case study data: in stage one, e-hotel ranks its requirements of financial 
resources only medium because it went through its first financing round very early. Clever-
Tanken and Airweb went through their first VC round late and therefore rated financial 
resources higher. In stage two, the picture has changed. E-hotel had to find a partner for its 
second VC-round. After a long search, tbg bought an 18% share in January 2002. This 
explains its higher evaluation of financial resources. Airweb is a different case; it required 
external funds to finance its growth in stage one. Yet after realizing that the ‘Internet-
business-logic’ based on subscriber growth was no longer credible or supported by the 
financial community, it shifted its strategy to organic growth in stage two and the resource 
requirement dropped from very high to medium. Different growth expectations lowered the 
requirement for external financing. The evaluation of financial resources went down to 
medium. Also, since stage two, Clever.Tanken has focused on organic growth and lowered 
its evaluation to medium. Interestingly, these two companies lowered their evaluation to the 
same level as Multichart, which has grown organically since its foundation. 
After demonstrating and describing how resource requirements change, it is interesting to 
see if these changes influence the structural changes of alliance portfolios. 
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Alliance portfolio
Airweb
Clever.Tanken
e-hotel
Multichart
Alliance networks 
The alliance portfolios are analyzed in the same order as in the MLS segment. The 
development of each case portfolio is broken down stage-by-stage and graphed subsequently 
using Pajek (see figure 40). The rationale for this procedure, a detailed description of the 
network documentation and analysis, is provided in the research methodology (sub-section 
2.2.5 ‘Analyzing data’) and in the first segment analysis (sub-segment 3.2.3 ‘Alliance 
networks’). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 40   Alliance portfolios in the Mobile Content Services segment 
Stage one: All companies have fairly exploratory network structures in their start-up stage 
with approximately 9 partners. Only Airweb’s network is twice the size, which can be 
attributed to its operations in two markets, France and Germany. Multiple weak ties for 
every resource category characterize the exploratory network structure. Only financial 
resources are accessed through stronger ties. 
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The case study companies closed their first VC round: Airweb with Viventures, 
Clever.Tanken and e-hotel with Fortknox Ventures and tbg as co-investor. Multichart was 
the only company that accessed external financing. Its organic growth is based on two 
factors: a less developed VC-industry in the 1980s when Multichart was founded, and a 
more conservative company philosophy. 
Content-wise, all four case studies established links to critical markets. Many links were 
based on weak ties, and the companies proceeded in an exploratory fashion by contracting 
with different types of partners. Airweb’s management linked their company to different 
sport associations and companies such as the Societé de Tour de France and the ATP Tour. 
Clever.Tanken closed a partnership with Map&Guide to access maps and set up a 
partnership with Webmiles58 to incentivize its ‘Fuel Price Pilots’ to submit fuel prices. E-
hotel created partnerships with Radius, Lufthansa, and Sixt to source hotel rooms, flights and 
rental cars for its portal. Multichart partnered with Deutsche Börse, who generated financial 
content through its trading activities, and B.I.S. Börseninformationssysteme, who transported 
and delivered this content. 
Technology partnerships were rarely established. Most of the technology for the case study 
firms was developed in-house. Clever.Tanken and Multichart had one or fewer technology 
partnerships. E-hotel had three⎯one partnership with Nokia for reputation and PR purposes, 
and two partnerships for pure technology purposes. I:FAO assisted in building e-hotel’s 
booking technology and iobox with SMS technology. Airweb’s technology partners can also 
be grouped into these categories. Siemens, Ericsson, Nokia, and Alcatel were important for 
Airweb’s reputation; Openwave’s development program primarily provided technological 
support for emerging industry standards, but also contributed to Airweb’s reputation. 
The companies’ sales approaches differed. Multichart had almost pure client relationships 
and offered its applications in market similar transactions to financial service companies 
such as banks (Volksbank, Raiffeisenbank), independent financial agencies such as Selco59, 
and to system integrators that provide turnkey financial software solutions for banks. 
Airweb, Clever.Tanken and e-hotel offered their services for free to obtain access to mobile 
service subscribers and increase their client base. Therefore, their sales ties were very weak 
                                                 
58  Together with Webmiles, Clever.Tanken developed  an incentive system for its ‘Fuel Price 
Pilots’ to report current fuel prices. Webmiles is not a content supplier, but it enables the 
exchange of content through its incentive system. 
59  Independent agent selling financial services, similar to MLP 
CASE STUDIES 115 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
in the beginning. Partnerships were established to access mobile portals of MNOs revenue 
sharing agreements or other financial sales deals were rare. 
Stage two: The alliance portfolio grew significantly with the professionalization of the case 
study companies. Airweb’s, Clever.Tanken’s, and Multichart’s portfolios comprised, on 
average, 32 partnerships. E-hotel’s portfolio was smaller with 16 partners. Within all four 
cases, similar patterns concerning supply, technology and sales partnerships could be 
discovered. Supply partnerships were focused on a few important players to whom stronger 
ties were built. Technology partnerships continued to be rare. There were stronger links to 
only three or fewer younger technology providers with complementary technologies. Sales 
partnerships began to gain importance. Only links to financial partners developed 
differently.  
Three out of four companies did not close new alliances to access financial resources. 
Airweb and Clever.Tanken shifted their aggressive growth strategy from period one towards 
profitability targets and organic growth, similar to Multichart’s approach, without additional 
financing partners. Only e-hotel closed an additional deal with the VC tbg to attain external 
financing. Each partner group is subsequently discussed in greater detail. 
On the supply side, stronger partners emerged in all four cases combined with additional 
partners that provided less crucial content. Airweb began an intense alliance with L’equipe, 
consolidating its diverse content web with more than ten smaller content partners. 
Clever.Tanken continued cooperating with Map&Guide and Webmiles to access maps and to 
incentivize the reporting of fuel prices. Additionally it built up weaker ties with state-wide 
and regional radio stations to access further traffic relevant content such as news on traffic 
jams60 and features of roadside restaurants. The development of Multichart’s portfolio was 
very similar. It continued its crucial partnership with Deutsche Börse and B.I.S., and built up 
links to VDW61 and DPA62 to access second tier information such as daily news. E-hotel 
streamlined its business from a mobile travel portal to a multi-access hotel booking 
platform. In parallel it consolidated its supply partner portfolio on hotel partners such as 
INNXS, Trust International and Radius. A weaker tie was set up to the VDR63. 
Only a few strong technology partnerships were built in period two. Airweb kept most of its 
reputation partnerships as with Siemens and began a cooperation with Dialogic to voice 
                                                 
60  The radio stations were used for marketing purposes as well. 
61  Verband Deutscher Wirtschaft (German chamber of commerce) 
62  Deutsche Presse Agentur (Germany’s biggest news agency) 
63  Verband Deutscher Raststätten (Association of Germany’s road-side restaurants) 
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enable its platform⎯a significant add-on. Clever.Tanken closely interacted with Materna to 
enhance its SMS technology capability, which was required to handle the growing data 
volume initiated by over 40,000 fuel price pilots. In addition, it cooperated with different In-
Car-PC companies and telematic service providers to position its service in representative 
and innovative traffic solutions. Multichart’s technology alliance strategy was similar to 
Clever.Tanken’s. Partnerships with IC3S and Distefora were built to deliver SMS. Together 
with CompuTel fax and voice services were developed. Partnerships with incumbents were 
used for reputation purposes such as presentations at trade fairs like CeBIT. E-hotel did not 
change its technology partnerships significantly. 
All case study companies intensified their distribution partnerships or accessed new groups 
of distribution partners. Airweb intensified its partnership through increasing its service 
level, service width, and prices. Its partnership with Orange was a particularly promising 
development. Simultaneously, numerous weak ties were cut off when MNOs were not 
willing to pay for Airweb’s services. This was the case for MNOs such as T-mobile and 
Mobistar. 
 
‘After 18 months our activities achieved enough publicity in our sport information segment. 
We changed our strategy and terminated all contracts with portals. One part of these 
contracts we migrated to contracts with clear revenue sharing deals or other compensation 
structures; the rest got the chop.  
This led to a reduction in partnerships with portals, but it was a crucial step towards a 
consolidating strategy focused on profitability.’ (Claudius Bertheau, CEO Airweb, 2002) 
 
E-hotel also started to focus on strong ties. Its major distribution partners are e-sixt and 
Lufthansa for whom its service was customized. Client specific product development 
projects build a solid basis for these cooperations. E-hotel’s links to mobile portals became 
second tier.  
Clever.Tanken and Multichart added new groups of distribution partners. Clever.Tanken 
started to cooperate with numerous portals, MNOs (e.g., T-mobile), mobile portals (e.g., 
Jamba!), general-purpose online portals (e.g., Lycos), and specialized car portals (e.g., 
Autonews). Multichart partners with business content providers (e.g., 3SAT Börse and Focus 
Money), banks (e.g., Bank24 and Dresdner Bank), their software providers (e.g., ITZ and 
DVG Hannover), and MNOs (e.g., e-plus and T-mobile). 
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Stage three: Only Airweb and Multichart entered stage three; thus, their alliance portfolios 
in this stage can only be analyzed preliminary. Both companies had just entered this stage 
when the data were collected. This stage was far from being over. Therefore, the alliance 
portfolios are very similar to the portfolios at the end of period two. However, a few trends 
are worth mentioning. Specifically, sales partnerships became even more important, content 
partnerships were consolidated, and finance and technology partnerships lost importance. 
Neither Multichart nor Airweb closed any new partnership to access financial or exchange 
technological resources. Multichart even kept its content network as it was, whereas Airweb 
continued consolidating. With Rheinische Post it gained its first strong German content 
player and with Le Figaro and additional strong French content player. 
On the sales side, both companies worked on increasing sales and reducing dependencies on 
distribution partners that were too strong. Airweb started to build stronger ties to SFR in 
France and Jamba! and T-mobile in Germany to reduce its dependency on Orange. 
Multichart began to cooperate with publicly listed companies (e.g., Gardena and Karstadt) 
as a new group of clients. It supported their investor relations’ activities by providing stock 
quotes, tickers, and charts. The structures of the alliance portfolios are summarized in table 
16. 
In the first stage, the firms managed to build up small alliance portfolios. Weak ties 
dominate theses early portfolios, which are mainly focused on content. All firms started to 
consistently build alliances with information providers to fill their prototypes with content. 
Only a few technology and very weak distribution partnerships existed.  
In stage two, the alliance portfolios grew and the first more intense partnerships were 
formed. The portfolios started to shift toward the distribution side. On the content side, the 
firms intensified their existing content partnerships and added a few new partners. In terms 
of technology, the portfolios were only medium strong. All firms had formed technology 
partnerships but in three out of four cases only 5 to 7 weak ties. On the distribution side, the 
case studies either built up strong ties with a few partners or they formed many partnerships 
(15+) in different distribution segments. The alliance strategy thereby depended on how 
easily the service could be adapted and packaged. In stage three, the focus is clearly on 
distribution partnerships. Alliance portfolios grew by additional distribution partnerships 
and both firms managed to build up additional medium and strong ties. Whereas technology 
partnerships lost importance and content partnerships were decentralized to reduce 
dependencies, Airweb and Multichart intensified and built up additional distribution 
partnerships. 
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  Airweb Clever.Tanken e-hotel Multichart 
 Alliance 
category 
Alliance 
Portfolio 
Reasoning Alliance 
Portfolio
Reasoning Alliance 
Portfolio
Reasoning Alliance 
Portfolio
Reasoning 
Techno-
logy 
• 5 weak ties ↓↓ No ties ↑ 1 medium, 
2weak ties 
↓↓ No ties  
Supply • 6 weak ties • 2 medium 
ties 
↑ 1 medium, 
2 weak ties 
• 1 medium, 
1 weak tie St
ag
e 
1 
Markets ↓ 9 very 
weak ties 
• 5 weak ties ↓ 2 weak ties ↓ 3 weak ties 
Techno-
logy 
• 1 medium, 
5 weak ties 
• 7 weak ties • 5 weak ties ↑ 3 medium, 
8 weak ties 
Supply ↑ 1 medium, 
12 weak 
ties 
↑ 2 medium, 
5 weak ties 
↑ 2 medium, 
3 weak ties 
• 1 medium, 
4 weak ties 
St
ag
e 
2 
Markets ↑ 1 strong, 1 
medium, 5 
weak ties 
↑ 20 weak 
ties in 5 
groups 
↑↑ 2 strong, 3 
weak ties 
↑ 2 medium 15 
weak ties in 4 
groups 
Techno-
logy 
↓ 4 weak ties     • 1 medium, 
5 weak ties 
medium 
Supply ↑ 2 strong, 1 
medium, 3 
weak ties 
    • 1 medium, 
4 weak ties 
St
ag
e 
3 
Markets ↑ 1 strong, 2 
medium 3 
weak ties 
    ↑↑ 5 groups, 3 
medium, 21 
weak ties 
  
Legend 
↑↑ 
Strong 
↑ 
Medium 
strong 
• 
Medium
↓ 
Medium 
weak 
↓↓  
Weak 
   
Table 16   Alliance portfolio structure (MLS) 
Now that the significant changes in firms’ alliance network structure have been presented, 
the next part examines how case study firms manage this change and how underlying 
alliance processes support the adjustment of the alliance portfolio. 
Alliance process 
All case studies consistently report of an allying process, which is started by revising 
corporate strategy and which ends with the realignment or termination of partnerships. The 
overall allying process has three phases: a strategic pre-phase, in which the alliance concept 
is worked out; an alliance formation phase, in which partners are sought and screened, 
contacted, and the partnership negotiated and contracted; and an alliance management phase, 
in which partnerships are operated and embedded, their performance monitored, and when 
required, their structure realigned or terminated as needed. This process is identical to the 
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allying process in the MLS segment, which is depicted in figure 26. Its steps are described 
subsequently. 
Strategy pre-phase: In the strategic pre-phase, alliance needs are derived from the 
corporate strategy. The steps for deriving an alliance need are best formulated from the 
marketing manager of Multichart: 
 
‘The allying process starts with the consideration, how do we get new services in the market. 
For every new business, we analyze what we need to do to deliver this service and how we 
can get support. Therefore, we break the whole service apart and think about who is already 
working on similar problems, which type of company could be supportive in every sub-
problem. Then we work out the benefits of such an alliance. Hence, we accordingly 
formulate an alliance concept. Thereby, from our perspective a win-win situation for all 
participants is very important. When we have completed these conceptual considerations, 
we start to search, screen, and contact potential partners.’ (Anja Dönke-Bartling, marketing 
manager Multichart, 2002) 
 
In this phase, it is important to develop a clear picture of, how the alliance should be 
structured and what benefits should be achieved. On this point, Clever.Tanken went through 
a learning process. Its CEO realized: 
 
‘The better and more precise we developed our vision of an alliance⎯the alliance concept, 
in which we specified what we want to achieve and how we want to do it⎯the more 
successful our alliances activities became.’ (Steffen Bock, CEO Clever.Tanken, 2002) 
 
The finalization of the alliance concept starts off the alliance formation phase. 
Formation phase: The formation phase comprises three steps, searching and screening, 
contacting, and contracting. In the searching and screening step, to search for content and 
technology providers as well as for distribution partners, all case study firms use in-house 
industry expertise.  
In the contacting step, reputation is very important. The partner industries are often 
oligopolistic. Therefore, the contacting is very competitive, as the CEO of Airweb reports: 
 
CASE STUDIES 120 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
‘Contacting potential partners is not easy, because especially at our content partner it is 
always the case, that our competitors aim as well to form alliances with these companies.’ 
(Claudius Bertheau, CEO Airweb, 2002)  
 
Reputation is the best selling argument in the case of competition. 
In the contracting stage it is important to negotiate fair and flexible alliance structures. This 
point was previously mentioned in a quote of Mrs. Dönke Bartling. The CEO of e-hotel also 
stressed this point: 
 
‘It is crucial to find a fair model from which both companies benefit. This is especially the 
case when we negotiate revenue sharing deals. They have to be maintainable und flexible, 
when underlying assumptions don’t come true. Otherwise, one partner feels diddled and the 
partnership is short-lived.’ (Matthias Kose, CEO e-hotel, 2002) 
 
With the execution of the partnership contract the allying process enters the management 
phase. 
Management phase: In this last phase, partners cooperate and benefit from the formed 
alliance. In the operating phase, it is important to create efficient and stable cooperation by 
intensifying and embedding the relationship. While operating an alliance, it is important to 
control the efficiency of alliances and when the efficiency is not achieved, alliances have to 
be restructured or terminated as needed. 
While operating alliances it is important to embed the relationship, as the CEO of e-hotel 
reported: 
 
‘It is very important to build up a personal relationship with your counterpart. This helps 
you to warrant the stability of the partnership. That is, your relationship is able to handle a 
crisis in the case it arises. Directness, mutual trust, and honesty are important parts to 
operate alliances efficiently.’ (Matthias Kose, CEO e-hotel, 2002) 
 
Besides embedding relationships and building up trust to intensify the cooperation, it is 
important to monitor the efficiency of the alliance. Partners behave opportunistically like in 
the case of Airweb, in which Jamba! stole Airweb’s mobile content by mirroring its 
information service without permission. However, even in the case of no misbehavior, it is 
important to monitor alliance efficiency to assure efficient allocation of resources. Alliances 
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that do not meet their targets absorb too much management time and other resources. That is 
why the case study companies measure and monitor the alliance targets, which are specified 
in the alliance concept and partly in the alliance contract. Thereby the most important 
monitoring criteria are revenue targets, as the CEO of e-hotel reports: 
 
‘The most important criteria is meeting revenue targets. When we are disappointed with the 
revenue development of our joint activities we only keep alliances with highly regarded 
firms, because we benefit from their reputation. But in fact, only revenues are important, 
when we decide on which alliance to keep and which to terminate.’ (Matthias Kose, CEO e-
hotel, 2002) 
 
Even if all four case study firms report of this three step allying process, they differ in the 
degree to which they have institutionalized the process. Companies with extensive alliance 
activities like Clever.Tanken (34 alliances) have a more structured approach than e-hotel (15 
alliances), as reported by their respective CEOs. E-hotel’s CEO stated: 
 
‘We do not have a documented process with several steps, where it is specified what to do in 
every step. We are not that structured. We pass through that process more or less 
informally.’ (Matthias Kose, CEO e-hotel, 2002) 
 
At the other extreme, the CEO of Clever.Tanken, who has formed more than twice as many 
alliances as e-hotel, reports: 
 
‘Concerning the required skills to successfully manage the allying process, it is important to 
have a tight process. You have to identify opportunities, evaluate them, and handle and 
process them consequently. We have seen many companies that fail even though they have 
excellent ideas, but they are not capable of pushing the whole allying process through and 
implementing the ideas.’ (Steffen Bock, CEO Clever.Tanken, 2002) 
 
Considerung this statement, it is interesting to see how alliance portfolios and their 
management influence firm’s performance, which will be analyzed in the next paragraphs. 
CASE STUDIES 122 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Case study performance
0,00
0,50
1,00
1,50
2,00
2,50
3,00
3,50
Airweb Clever
tanken
ehotel Multichart
Case studies
G
ra
de
s
Revenues Employees Profitability Innovation
Performance 
Comparing the case study on the basis of performance, Multichart scores highest. The 
performance benchmark is based on the dimensions, criteria and scales explained in section 
3.3.3 ‘Within Case Study Analyses – Performance’ and takes into account the growth of the 
companies (revenue-wise and in terms of organization size), their profitability and their 
innovation. The total scale ranges from 1 – very poor performance to 5 – very high 
performance with a mean of 2.4 calculated over all case studies. The performance of mobile 
content providers is exhibited in figure 41. 
Multichart scores best according to 
three dimensions: revenue growth, 
profitability and innovation. It is 
the only company with annual 
sales above € 1 million It even 
appro-ached the € 2 million level 
in 2000 and 2002. The other 
ventures have annual sales ranging 
from close to € 200,000 to € 
850,000. However, in comparison 
to Multichart, their sales grow 
faster which offsets the score to a 
certain degree. 
Figure 41   Case study performance in the Mobile Content segment 
Multichart is also highly rated in terms of profitability. It reached its break even shortly after 
foundation in the late 80s. Except for 2001, Multichart was always profitable in the past 
years. The other companies have partly significant losses ranging from € 100,000 to more 
than € 500,000. If their sales develop as planned, Clever.Tanken will have reached break 
even at the end of 2002; e-hotel and Airweb will have reached break even in mid 2003. 
Finally in terms of innovation, Clever.Tanken and Multichart are the only MCS companies 
that won awards (Sonderpreis der hessischen Kreditwirtschaft for new media in the case of 
Multichart, the WAP developer award 2000 in the case of Clever.Tanken). Neither Airweb 
nor e-hotel received an award for their technologies or service innovations. 
Organizational growth is the only category, in which two other companies perform better 
than Multichart. E-hotel and Airweb, with approximately 20 employees, employ more 
people and grew faster than Multichart. In addition, Airweb did not resize its organization 
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like the other ventures did by cutting back 2 to 3 positions in the case of Multichart and 
Clever.Tanken, and more than 15 in the case of e-hotel. 
This evaluation is partly distorted because it compares Multichart, which was founded in 
1985 and entered the mobile content business in 1996, with other companies founded in 
1999. The cross-segment analysis accounts for this difference. 
3.3.4 Segment conclusion 
In conclusion of the cross-case analysis, the case study companies develop stage-wise; 
thereby, the stage duration differs as a function of the case study company. From step to step 
the organizations add complexity and develop fairly parallel from an entrepreneurial team to 
a mid-term focused functional organization that already started to formalize its procedures 
and its communication.  
Along with the organizational change, resource requirements shift according new challenges 
in every step. Out of the seven measured resource categories, six change consistently to the 
stage grid. Thereby technological know-how and reputation lose importance, access to 
content and human resources first gain and later lose importance, and distributional 
resources and organizational skills steadily gain importance. 
Alliance portfolios shift as well. They grow from a set of fewer than 10, reputation seeking, 
exploratory, loosely tied partnerships to an intensification of content partnerships and to a 
market focused alliance portfolio with 30+ partners. Thereby, technology partnership never 
exceeded their reputation or exploratory status and in later stages lost almost all importance. 
This changing alliance portfolio structure reflects the shifts in resource requirements⎯in 
particular the fading importance of technological know-how, the growing importance of 
having access to markets, and the alternating importance of access to content. 
The development of an alliance portfolio and its changes are facilitated through a three-step 
alliance process comprised of a strategic pre-phase, a formation phase and an alliance 
management phase. The better the case study firms have institutionalized this process, the 
bigger their alliance portfolio and the higher the alliance efficiency. The efficiency leads to 
sales increase and to cost-saving sourcing alliances. Both effects have a positive impact on 
company growth and profitability. 
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3.4 Mobile marketing services 
In this section, alliance portfolios and organizational change are analyzed in the mobile 
marketing industry. The analysis is structured as in previous two sections. A segment 
overview is followed by a brief introduction of the three case profiles of 12snap, 
ApollisInteractive, and Mindmatics. Their organizational developments and alliances are 
thoroughly analyzed in part three⎯the cross-case analysis. The section closes by 
summarizing the findings of the whole within-segment analysis. 
3.4.1 Segment overview 
The mobile marketing industry comprises companies that create marketing campaigns 
suitable for mobile devices or deliver these advertisements. These companies are referred to 
as mobile marketing agencies. Their business model is similar to that of regular marketing 
companies (such as Saatchi&Saatchi, BBDO, or Scholz & Friends). The business model has 
two important value generation steps: creation of marketing campaigns and media selling. 
This section, first, defines the segment mobile marketing, second, provides a revenue 
forecast, third, discusses barriers to mass introduction and, fourth, summarizes the status quo 
and the outlook for this industry. 
Definition 
Mobile marketing is a special kind of direct marketing, which until now has heavily relied 
on traditional mail. Despite its limitations (i.e., small display sizes, limited communication 
bandwidth, and monochrome displays), mobile marketing has four decisive advantages: 
1. Low transportation cost 
2. Advanced segmentation capabilities, due to existing databases 
3. Location sensitivity 
4. Interactivity 
(1) The transportation costs for mobile mass messages are only 10% of direct mailings. A 
mass SMS costs between € 0.05 and 0.06 (and even the expensive MMS64 decrease in 
price); in contrast, the delivery of mass letters costs, on average, € 0.30 on average, not 
taken into account the costs for paper, printing and envelopes. 
                                                 
64  Multi-media massage, a format capable to send pictures 
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(2) Marketing-relevant recipient data already exists in databases. MNOs have data on 
gender, age, residence, and communication habits, which can be used to segment social 
milieus and target advertisements. Therefore, in alliances or joint projects between MNOs 
and mobile marketing agencies, the address collection effort can be significantly lowered in 
comparison to traditional direct marketing. 
While the first two reasons are efficiency arguments, the last two arguments are probably the 
most important. They pinpoint very valuable features that no other marketing approach has, 
so far, been able to offer.  
(3) Modern GSM networks can provide location information with an accuracy of 
approximately 50-200m, which is close to the quality of commercial GPS systems, which 
have an accuracy of approximately 3-10m. This feature allows sending out context specific 
advertisements. Context specific refers to messages that are dependent upon time, social-
demographic characteristics of the recipient, and location. These advertisements can reduce 
marketing costs significantly, because the divergence losses can be reduced and the response 
rate can be increased. In addition, context specific advertisements can help to significantly 
reduce spam messages. 
(4) Interactivity. Mobile marketing is an ideal response medium rather than just a broadcast 
channel. By offering it on a multi-access platform, marketing agencies will be able to 
enhance other marketing channels and increase efficiency of the total marketing mix.  
Both features are a step toward an interactive one-to-one marketing approach. 
Revenue forecast 
Due to the advantages of mobile marketing, business analysts estimate the industry will 
grow by more than 50% a year (CAGR) from 2002 to 2006 (detailed data is provided in 
figure 43). In 2005 and 2006 revenues are forecast to account for € 0.4-1.4 billion 
(Durlacher; Ovum; The Kelsey Group, et al.).  
The growth is mainly driven by user penetration. In 2001, mobile marketing campaigns 
could reach only 3% of mobile communication users by directed, customized campaigns.65 
The low penetration is expected to rise to up to 65% by 2006. This very positive scenario is 
supported by multiple surveys (Berlecon Research, 2001; Nokia, 2002), which consistently 
report high mobile advertising acceptance. Nokia’s HPI study states a short advertisement’s 
acceptance rate of 76%, and a revolving study done by A.T. Kearney and the University of 
                                                 
65  Spam-SMS had a higher reach. But they drastically lost their attractiveness, due to a 150% 
increase in mass SMS prices in the middle of 2001. In addition, they provoked privacy concerns 
of operators. 
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Western Europe (2005): € 1 billion
Cambridge (2002) showed that penetration rates were already increasing. In Europe, 40% of 
users received advertising messages from companies (permitted and non-permitted) by the 
end of 2002. This ratio has increased from 1% a year ago, which is consistent with the 
industry insiders’ forecast, including the CEO from Mindmatics, who projected: 
 
‘The market size will grow up to 5% of all media spendings’ (Huber, 2002) 
 
Several marketers are expected to deploy mobile marketing. A current study of Frank N. 
Magid Associates (2002) rates financial service 
providers and the entertainment industry as the 
highest users of mobile marketing. However, 
the producers of other consumer products and 
services such as Internet service, alcoholic 
drinks, and cars will have shares above 10% in 
this market. Travel services such as airlines and 
hotels and fast food restaurants still have more 
than 5%. 
Figure 42   Mobile marketing sales forecast 2005 
Barriers to mass marketing 
In spite of its clear advantages and excellent growth prospects, the mobile marketing 
industry must cope with a number of critical issues. In addition to common standardization 
issues (e.g., the industry suffers from proprietary operation systems and different screen 
sizes to name a few), privacy concerns are most frequently stated, and have been realized 
and faced. The industry has defined its own ethics, to avoid the negative regulatory effects 
that will be potentially induced as a result of spam SMS. Different associations have 
formulated these ethics as axioms. One of the most condensed versions is provided by the 
DDV (the German direct marketing association) and is shown in the “mobile marketing 
axiom” in figure 43. The permission to send advertisements and the focus on short messages 
are the key points that distinguish mobile marketing from other forms of marketing such as 
traditional TV and print advertising and online marketing. The industry analyst Gartner 
(2002d) summarized the key requirement in a similar way: 
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• Advertising delivered to mobile-communication devices must be relevant, requested, 
and interactive. End-user opt-in is essential. Unsolicited mobile advertising is 
damaging and will result in end-user ambivalence to this new medium. 
• It is essential to respect end-user privacy on a personal device such as a mobile 
phone. Standards and regulations for mobile advertising need to be defined quickly. 
Many companies are encouraging users to submit text messages, thus obtaining their 
mobile-device numbers, which can then be used by marketers to send content, offers, or 
advertising messages. However, there is some doubt as to whether sending one such opt-in 
message constitutes permission to send "related" or subsequent material. Standard bodies, 
such as the worldwide active MMA66, must formulate opt-in regulation quickly and in 
accordance with existing data protection acts, before users' privacy is further infringed. 
Further mobile spam will drastically lower subscribers’ acceptance of mobile marketing. In 
addition, it might provoke either MNOs or governmental limitations for this industry. 
Additional growth barriers are the availability of devices and poor economic conditions in 
the overall advertising market: 
• Unavailability of color display terminals with high bandwidth technology: Although 
many services can be offered using monochrome displays and limited bandwidth, 
more elaborated campaigns and applications will require color displays and much 
higher bandwidth. Industry experts believe that EDGE technology phones with color 
displays will not become available in commercial quantities until the end of 2003. 
• Poor economic conditions: Scaled down marketing budgets lower the likelihood of 
mobile marketing trial campaigns. Marketers stick to traditional communication 
forms and reduce the risk of their marketing mix. Less money is spent on innovative 
campaigns and new media, which slows down the penetration of mobile marketing. 
Status quo and outlook 
In Western Europe, wireless advertising generated revenues of € 20-30 million in 2001. 
Much of this activity is via SMS, which constitutes an inexpensive but direct advertising 
medium in comparison with direct mail. Although advertising based on WAP is available, it 
relies on users actually browsing a WAP site, and is less effective at present because of low 
WAP user levels compared with those of SMS. WAP advertising has also taken on a similar 
                                                 
66  Mobile Marketing Association 
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appearance to mainstream Internet advertising by using banners and interstitial 
advertisements that are more irritating than stimulating and do not have the personal 
communication advantages of mobile advertising. 
Marketing agencies offer two services: the elaboration of the marketing campaign and the 
delivery of messages to a specific group of recipients. In 2001, a small to medium sized 
mobile marketing campaign in Germany did cost roughly € 10,000. A basic campaign 
concept accounted for € 3,000 and the delivery of 20,000 SMS cost € 7,000 (a detailed 
calculation is provided in the graph “Campaign structure and price” in figure 43). 
Crucial for the media selling business are sufficient client profiles; as the CEO of the mobile 
marketing agency Mindmatics, Ingo Lippert, stated: 
 
‘Marketers are not interested in agencies with less than 1 million opt-in users. Many start-
ups cannot overcome this hurdle.’ (Spiller, 2002) 
 
Dirk Kraus, the CEO from Mindmatics’ competitor YOC, made similar comments in 
summer 2002 (Spiller, 2002). 
The design of marketing campaigns requires different skills. As for classic marketing 
agencies, creativity plays a major role as Cyriac Roeding, CMO 12snap, stated: 
 
‘Good creativity is key. If you can get that close to the consumer, than you must do it right.’ 
(Borzo, 2002) 
 
Business analysts such as Gartner Dataquest expect mobile marketing to become an 
important consumer-marketing channel in the next three years because the mobile device 
provides the perfect direct-marketing channel for marketers to retain and acquire customers. 
It offers one-to-one marketing opportunities anytime, anywhere. (Gartner, 2001) 
The following two main forms of mobile advertising are expected to be most effective. For 
each form, different solutions are described, accompanied by examples: 
• Mobile advertising included with information requested by the end user:  
− Sponsored messages: For example, Worldpop piloted a text message 
marketing campaign in Ibiza, Spain, during the period of May to July 2000. 
Those that signed up received messages offering reduced entry to nightclubs 
in return for receiving advertisements from companies such as Durex at the 
end of the messages.  
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− Location-based advertising: ((!))SpotFlash developed a campaign called 
((!))ZagMe that sends SMS messages to users in the Lakeside Shopping 
Centre in Thurrock, United Kingdom, that contained information on 
discounted products in the shops at that center. At present, users have to 
inform the service that they are in the center, and say approximately how 
long they expect to stay. They then receive one or two messages per hour. 
Users are offered an incentive to sign up for the ((!))ZagMe service: 500 
points (each point equating to £0.01), which are exchangeable for prepaid 
vouchers.  
− Incentive advertising: Mywapworld.com offers discounts on taxis, beer and 
nightclub "queue jumpers" via SMS. Users show the SMS token at 
participating venues to receive their discounts.  
• Interactive mobile advertising that enhances other marketing channels: Mobile 
communications can play a key role in a multi-channel strategy because they provide 
the opportunity for immediate response and broadcasting. Broadcasting channels in 
particular are already using SMS to market directly to interested users, thus aiding 
customer retention and acquisition. The following are examples of "action adverts":  
− Flytxt is running a wireless advertising campaign for Channel 5 in the United 
Kingdom to promote its Tuesday-night movie. Channel 5 asks a question at 
the end of the film that viewers can answer via SMS for a chance to win 
£1,000. Users are then sent a reminder via SMS on a Tuesday afternoon 
stating which film is being shown that evening. The aim is to boost television 
ratings, increase viewer loyalty and strengthen sponsor recognition.  
− Boltblue has created a wireless campaign around a popular television 
program called ‘Popstars’. Users are able to vote for their favorite would-be 
pop star. Such interaction helps to build a relationship with the customer.  
Both end-user-pulled and interactive mobile advertising can manage in successfully 
targeting a user with advertising relating to information specifically requested by that user.  
Push services are not as positively evaluated. Some business analysts have even expressed 
the belief that push marketing will only lead to irritating end users. Even with a customer's 
opt-in, which is essential for all wireless advertising, push advertising sent at the wrong time 
will do more harm than good for a company's brand. Despite developing user-profile and 
location technologies, companies cannot know what a person really wants at a given time. 
For example, users may state that they like Italian food, but it will only be useful to receive 
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an advertisement for an Italian restaurant they happen to be walking past if they feel like 
eating an Italian meal at that time. The majority of industry players recognize that this type 
of information will only be useful when requested by a user. It is only when this has 
occurred that advertising can be pushed to the customer for an agreed period of time.  
For mobile advertising to succeed, marketers will need to have a good understanding of each 
target customer, making the reality of ‘perfecting’ one-to-one marketing complex. However, 
the interactive nature of mobile communications facilitates successful wireless advertising. 
Through pull services, marketers can target consumers effectively using their known interest 
areas. Subsequently, mobile communications may be used to strike up a direct relationship 
with the end user. No profile software will offer sufficient details about an individual for 
opt-in push advertising to be effective. 
Figure 43 summarizes the key issues in the mobile marketing segment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43   Segment overview Mobile Marketing 
3.4.2 Case history 
After providing a general overview of the Mobile Marketing segment, the following section 
briefly introduces the three case study histories in this segment. Moreover, the developments 
and the business models of 12snap, ApollisInteractive, and Mindmatics are sketched. 
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12SNAP – COMPANY DEVELOPMENT
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12snap’s development 
12snap was founded in Munich, Germany, in September 1999. The five founders were 
management consultants formerly employed by McKinsey and A.T. Kearney, who focused 
on developing a mobile auctioning solution. The business model was similar to a mobile 
adaptation of eBay67, based on GSM technology. 12snap’s development is summarized in 
figure 44. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 44   Company development: 12snap 
In spring 2000, 12snap added an m-commerce application, with which it offered fixed price 
shopping for consumer products. Shortly after the first step of its service diversification, 
12snap started to internationalize its business. Operations were opened in Milan (Italy) and 
London (UK). In spring 2001, 12snap further diversified its services by offering common 
entertainment services such as, for example, ring-tones, games, and mobile betting. These 
entertainment services helped 12snap to broaden its customer base. 
In summer 2001, 12snap refocused its business on the interface between consumer product 
producers and its target audience, the mobile communication community between 14-35 
years old. It started to offer mobile marketing services. Six months later, 12snap split this 
                                                 
67 eBay is the worldwide biggest online auctioneer. Further information at:   
pages.ebay.de/community/aboutebay/overview/index 
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service up into an agency business that develops creative marketing campaigns and a media 
selling operation. 
From a technology and bearer service point of view, 12snap heavily uses SMS technology. 
Starting in 2000, its mobile auctioning operation on cell broadcast, a GSM data-channel, 
12snap soon started to adapt its service to SMS technology. By the end of 2000, 12snap 
designed a few applications for WAP and GPRS technology, but SMS persisted to be the 
most important bearer service. In 2002, 12snap updated its SMS technology to new SMS 
derivatives such as Big Text SMS, EMS and MMS, which are particularly useful for 
advertising campaigns. 
12snap received extensive external financing, which provided the required funds to diversify 
and internationalize so quickly. In three financing rounds, close to € 50 million was raised. 
After the founders’ seed investment in summer 1999, Viventures invested in this new start-
up in October 1999. The second VC round was closed in March 2000. Nokia Ventures, 
Apax, Viventures, Goldman Sachs, tbg, and Bayernkapital invested € 6.6 million. In 
September 2000, the third round was closed with Apax and Argo Global Capital in the lead 
with additional € 37 million of funding. In summer 2001, 12snap revised its strategy to grow 
through external funds. The cooling down offinancial markets forced 12snap to consolidate 
its operations and to focus on internally financed organic growth. 
To develop and sell its services, 12snap partnered with different companies. For its 
auctioning service, an alliance with D2 Vodafone was formed. 12snap’s service was 
marketed toward D2 Vodafone users. In addition, 12snap established links to consumer good 
producers and retailers like Quelle, MediaMarkt, and MCC Smart, which started to market 
consumer products on 12snap’s retail channel. In a next step, 12snap targeted additional 
customers for its services. It partnered with other MNOs such as T-mobile in Germany and 
Vodafone in the UK, BT genie, Omnitel, and Vodafone (I) in its new British and Italian 
markets. M- entertainment services, as well as m- auctioning, were distributed through these 
channels.  
In 2001, 12snap started to approach a new group of partners, when it started to build up its 
mobile marketing operation. Target groups were entertainment companies such as 20th 
Century Fox, Sony and UIP; consumer good producers such as Nestlé and McDonalds, and 
traditional marketing agencies such as BBH and Grey, which manage marketing budgets for 
large incumbents (as BBH does for Microsoft). 
Together with a few of these partners (e.g., McDonalds) and 30 additional customer 
acquisition partners, 12snap could build up its customer base, which grew from 15,000 – 
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17,000 mobile auction clients to a mobile marketing community of 16 million permission 
based subscribers (i.e., 4.5 mill. in Germany, 8.5 mill. in UK and 3 mill. in Italy). 
The founding management team has lead 12snap since its foundation. Only the structure of 
its supervisory board and its organization size have changed over time. New VC rounds and 
new strategic alignments have triggered these changes. Viventures, Nokia Ventures, Apax, 
and Argo Global Capital each got a seat in the supervisory board, as did B. Michael, 
manager of the marketing agency Grey. The organization grew from 15 employees in 2000 
to more than 120 in 2001. The focus on mobile marketing, made a few operations obsolete 
such as the SnapLab in Praha⎯a mobile application development center. SnapLab was sold 
to another Apax venture. In 2002, the organization size stabilized at 70-75 employees. 
12snap’s business model 
Since the middle of 2001, 12snap has exclusively offered mobile marketing services. 
Consumers receive marketing advertisements or are involved in more interactive forms of 
marketing such as games. As mentioned above, 12snap has access to 16 million subscribers 
of mobile services in Germany, the UK, and Italy. Its business model is summarized in 
figure 45. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 45   Business model: 12snap 
Heavy marketers, such as producers of consumer electronics, branded goods and 
entertainment services, use this marketing channel. 12snap has already successfully 
CASE STUDIES 134 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
supported film-launches for UIP and 20th Century Fox. For McDonalds, coupon programs 
were sent to its loyal customer base that had signed up for its McSMS service. The 
campaigns are either directly designed and distributed to these marketers or via marketing 
agencies. In the case of McDonalds, 12snap developed a campaign that is fairly removed 
from McDonalds’s traditional marketing mix; therefore, it is not integrated into 
McDonalds’s agreement with its marketing agencies. However, in many cases, mobile 
marketing has begun to be a part of the overall marketing mix that many companies buy 
from one general marketing agency. To capture this trend, 12snaps cooperates with 
established marketing agencies. It offers its services as a specialized provider for mobile 
media campaigns, which these agency source to cover the whole media mix. For example 
BBH did this for its Microsoft account. To strengthen its position in this market, 12snap 
invited a manager of the marketing agency Grey to join its supervisory board (as mentioned 
above). 
12snap’s core activities are media selling and creating campaign concepts. In its media 
selling business, it sells access to its mobile community. Due to its client database, 12snap 
can segment target groups according, for example, gender, age, and location. This 
segmentation is used to target its own campaigns, but is also sold to other marketing 
agencies. In its creative department, 12snap designs marketing campaigns for mobile 
devices that can take various forms, such as dialog campaigns, small games, and lotteries. 
12snap cooperates with three additional partner groups: technology providers, MNOs, and 
client acquisition partners. Technology providers support 12snap to further develop its 
services by supplying SMS and MMS technology. MNOs are important for message 
delivery and to allow for dialogues between customers and 12snap. Client acquisition 
partners support 12snap by growing its opt-in client base. These companies have already 
established their own user bases, which they are allowed to contact via mobile devices. 
12snap competes directly with a number of German and European mobile marketing 
agencies such as YOC, Mindmatics, and ApollisInteractive. Indirectly it competes with 
traditional marketing agencies for a share in the total media and campaign selling market. 
ApollisInteractive’s development 
ApollisInteractive was founded in fall of 1999 under the company name C-Com-One. Its 
three founders had engineering backgrounds from the RWTH Aachen and two of them had 
worked for the management consulting company A.T. Kearney for a couple of years. The 
company’s development is summarized in figure 46. 
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APOLLISINTERACTIVE – COMPANY DEVELOPMENT
C-Com-One ApollisInteractiveCompany name
Business model
/ revenues
Technology
Financing
Important
Cooperations
Board
Employees
Users (opt-in
permission)
Awards
Jul Oct Jan AprApr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul
kompazz.de
1999 20022000 2001
WAP
Mobile Marketing
Mobile Business
Solutions
2. VC Financing
> €10 Mio (Apollis + GAP)
+ Stock Options Program
Anthony S. Park (CEO)
Markus Langner (CFO)
Pai Sang Woo (CTO)
Roberto 
Blickhan (CEO)
1. VC Financing
€ 2 Mio (Apollis)
8-9 25 45 38
Seed- Start-Up
Financing
SMS
Oracle
Cisco
Cable&Wireless
D2 Vodafone
DDV
DMMV
Marketing Club
35
Anthony Park (CEO)
Anja Winter (CSO)
Marc Wilhelm (CTO)
EMS, MMS
Entertainment
(ring tones, astro
service, quiz SMS)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 46   Company development: ApollisInteractive 
ApollisInteractive started to develop a mobile shopping guide kompazz.de, which provided 
location information depending on the type of product, brand label, and location 
information. In 2001, the company focus shifted toward the sales interface of branded 
consumer good producers and the mobile community. ApollisInteractive developed and sold 
mobile marketing campaigns and location sensitive proximity marketing. In addition, it 
developed software applications for sales forces (Mobile Sales Manager and Mobile Field 
Service). In November 2001, when the company name changed from C-Com-One to 
ApollisInteractive68, the company focus was clearly on mobile marketing.  
 
‘… location-based shopping information could be requested via WAP. This was in 2000. But 
it was still too early. The mobile Internet did not run as stable, as it had been envisioned; 
accordingly the service was barely used. For this reason, we changed our business model 
and focussed on Mobile Marketing.’ (Thorsten Rehfus, Marketing Manager 
ApollisInteractive, 2002) 
 
                                                 
68  The name change took place when C-Com-One was integrated into the Apollis Group. General 
Atlantic Partners and McKinsey founded Apollis as a technology VC. In 2000, Apollis changed 
its business model and became involved in the mobile application service market. Since 2002 
Apollis has integrated three operations, ApollisMediaServices, ApollisInteractive, and 
Convisual. 
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In 2002, ApollisInteractive added ordinary entertainment services such as ring tones, SMS 
astro service and mobile quizzes to its product portfolio to enrich the creative variety of its 
campaigns.  
ApollisInteractive’s technology is based primarily on WAP and SMS. Its kompazz service 
was designed as a WAP application. Additionally, an html-based Internet front end was 
developed to increase its usage. The other mobile software applications, like its business 
solutions (Mobile Sales Manager and Mobile Field Service) are also WAP based. In 
contrast, mobile marketing services are based on SMS technology that is step by step 
upgraded through EMS and MMS technology. 
The development and growth was financed mostly with external capital. After its seed and 
start-up financing in winter 1999 to 2000, ApollisInteractive closed two VC rounds. Apollis 
invested € 2 million in September 2000 and a consortium built by GAP69 and Apollis 
invested more than € 10 million in September 2001. 
To develop and commercialize its technology, ApollisInteractive partnered with different 
groups of partners: technology providers, MNOs, and marketing associations. It created 
partnerships with Oracle, Cisco, and Cable&Wireless to establish a solid technology 
platform. Its first services were launched together with D2 Vodafone, and platforms such as 
the Marketing Club Munich and the German direct marketing association (DDV) were 
actively used to network with marketers. 
During its development, the organization size and the management team changed several 
times. The organization grew from 8-9 employees at the end of 2000 to 25 in summer 2001. 
By the end of 2001 ApollisInteractive had 45 employees. The number was reduced in 2002 
to 35. The first restructuring of the management team took place in early summer 2001. A 
new CEO, Roberto Blickhan, joined ApollisInteractive after the business model became 
focused on mobile marketing. Mr. Blickhan was an experienced salesman who had 
previously worked as manager for Motorola’s German mobile business and as head of sales 
for Premiere World. Consequently two founders, Markus Langner and Pai Sang Woo, left 
the company. In 2002, the management team was restructured a second time. Mr. Blickhan 
left ApollisInteractive. Together with a new sales officer, Anja Winter, the remaining 
founder Anthony Park took over the management of the company.  
ApollisInteractive did not win any start-up, new economy or multimedia awards. 
                                                 
69  General Atlantic Partners 
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ApollisInteractive’s business model 
ApollisInteractive enables and develops mobile applications and services. It provides tailor-
made solutions and concepts for communication to customers, one-to-one or one-to-many 
communication as well as uni- or bi-directional dialogs. It also develops mobile sales 
software solutions. Its business model is summarized in figure 47. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 47   Business model: ApollisInteractive 
Heavy marketers such as producers of consumer electronics, branded goods and 
entertainment services, use ApollisInteractive’s mobile marketing services. 
ApollisInteractive successfully launched marketing campaigns for MCC Smart, Premiere 
World, and Wrigleys. 
As in the case of 12snap, the campaigns are either directly designed and distributed to 
marketers or arranged by traditional marketing agencies. To network with marketers and 
marketing agencies, ApollisInteractive is a member of different marketing associations such 
as the Marketing Club Munich and the German direct marketing association (DDV). 
ApollisInteractive had not yet attained a marketing agency as partner, but it brought in a new 
chief sales officer, Anja Winter, who had worked in the agencies BBDO and Bates Germany 
for 8 years. 
ApollisInteractive’s core activities are the creation of campaign concepts and the 
development of mobile sales support software. Its media selling business is very limited. 
ApollisInteractive uses only subscriber bases, which are built up with marketers. It does not 
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have a user base on its own. In its creative department, ApollisInteractive designs marketing 
campaigns for mobile devices. It designs dialog campaigns, small games and lotteries. Its in-
house technology provides sophisticated WAP and J2ME capabilities for designing very 
sophisticated campaigns. In addition, ApollisInteractive designs business solutions for sales 
organizations. Its technology department develops WAP applications such as the Mobile 
Sales Manager and Mobile Field Service, to improve the efficiency of sales forces and 
technical field services with mobile data communication. 
ApollisInteractive cooperates with two additional partner groups: technology providers and 
MNOs. Technology partners support ApollisInteractive by developing applications such as 
its Sales Manager. They provide solid database and Internet technology. Together with 
MNOs, ApollisInteractive launches its new services; and through their networks it 
distributes advertisements and connects to its user base. 
ApollisInteractive competes directly with a number of German and European mobile 
marketing agencies such as YOC, Mindmatics, and 12snap. In addition, it competes with the 
developers of mobile business applications like Bemobile. Indirectly, it competes with 
traditional marketing agencies for a share in the total media and campaign selling market. 
Mindmatics’ company development 
Mindmatics was founded in Munich, Germany, in the beginning of 2000. The two founders 
were project leaders in Roland Berger’s telecommunication and e-commerce practice group.  
Mindmatics started to develop SMS and WAP services for B2C communication: ‘SMS-me-
up’ and ‘WAP-me-up’. In January 2001 these services were combined into an integrated 
mobile marketing platform called: Mr.AdGood. Additionally, Mindmatics started to 
commercialize its SMS technology in October 2000. It started an SMS gateway provider 
business, sending and receiving mass messages. While building up its product portfolio, 
Mindmatics also internationalized. In October 2000, it opened operations in London (UK). 
In September 2001, it entered the Austrian market. Its development is summarized in figure 
48.  
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MINDMATICS – COMPANY DEVELOPMENT
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Figure 48   Company development: Mindmatics 
Mindmatics technology is based mainly on SMS. Starting simultaneously with WAP and 
SMS services in the beginning of 2000, Mindmatics quickly focused on SMS services. In 
addition to selling SMS based marketing campaigns, it designed and developed its above-
mentioned SMS gateway technology. Finally it developed Internet based front-ends that 
marketers could develop and trigger their own marketing campaigns, using Mindmatics as a 
back-end service provider. 
Mindmatics received approximately € 6 million external funds to finance its expansion. 
After the seed financing in March 2000, its start-up financing took place in July 2000, when 
it raised € 0.8 million from business angels. Its first VC round was closed in November 
2000. Best Practice Venture bought a 10% stake for  € 2 million. Additional funds were 
received, when Mindmatics went to its second VC round. T-Ventures, Holtzbrinck networXs, 
and WestLB invested € 3 million. 
Since March 2001, Mindmatics has started a couple of important cooperative relationships 
with MNOs and mobile portals on the one hand and marketing partners on the other hand. 
The most important mobile communication partners are T-mobile and Sonera Zed, with 
whom it started to cooperate in March and June 2000. Its most important marketing partner 
is the Internet agency AdLink and the marketing agency BBDO; these alliances were closed 
in April 2001 and May 2002. 
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Together with a few of these partners, Mindmatics was able to build up its customer base, 
which grew from 60,000 in January 2001 to over 550.000 in Germany and to 160.000 in the 
UK in summer 2001 and to more than 1 million permission based subscribers in February 
2002. During that time, Mindmatics realized more than 200 marketing campaigns. 
From the middle of 2000 on, Mindmatics’ management team did not change. Soon after its 
foundation, three additional members completed the managing board; two were former 
colleagues at Roland Berger Strategy Consultants and the CTO, Armin Barbalata, was 
formerly employed by a MNO. Only the structure of its supervisory board and its 
organization size changed over time. New VC rounds and new strategic alignments triggered 
these changes. Holtzbrinck NetworXs, T-Ventures, and Best Practice Venture Capital all got 
seats in the supervisory board as did R. Zimmermann, CEO of the marketing agency BBDO 
Germany. The organization grew from 14-15 employees in 2000 to 30 in the beginning of 
2001.  
Mindmatics won two awards: the Multimedia Award 200170 and the New Media Award71 in 
March 2002. 
Mindmatic’s business model 
Like the two previous case study firms, Mindmatics offers mobile marketing services. 
Consumers receive marketing advertisements or are involved in more interactive forms of 
marketing like, for example, games. As mentioned above, Mindmatics has access to 1 
million subscribers of mobile services in Germany, the UK, and Austria. Its business model 
is summarized in figure 49. 
Heavy marketers such as producers of consumer electronics, branded goods and 
entertainment services use this marketing channel. For its cooperation with Warner 
Brothers, Mindmatics won the New Media Award 2002. Since that time more than 150 
consumer product and service companies have used Mindmatics’ service. Coca-Cola, 
L’Oreal, Allianz, and Douglas are prominent examples. 
 
                                                 
70  The German multimedia award is given every year to excellent mobile, online, and offline 
application, which demonstrate the innovative and powerful strength of multimedia solutions. 
The award is issued by the German Multimedia Congress and the German multimedia 
association (DMMV) and sponsored by Deutsche Bank, Macromedia and J-points. Additional 
information at: www.deutscher-multimedia-award.de. 
71  Mindmatics won this award with its campaign for Warner Brothers. The New Media Award is 
issued annually. Marketers and marketing agencies award excellent ad campaigns using 
electronic media. The award is initiated and financed by Interactive Media, HORIZONT and T-
Online. 
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Figure 49   Business model: Mindmatics 
The campaigns are either directly designed and distributed to these marketers or marketing 
agencies are used as intermediaries. In addition to its own sales activities, Mindmatics 
formed alliances with AdLink and BBDO to offer its services to their clients. 
Mindmatics’ core activities are media selling and the creation of campaign concepts. In its 
media selling business, it sells access to its mobile subscriber community. As an SMS 
gateway provider, it offers to take care of the SMS traffic. Due to its well-developed client 
database, Mindmatics can segment target groups according variables such as gender, age, 
and location. This segmentation is used to target their own campaigns but can also be sold to 
other marketing agencies and offered to marketers, who can design their own simple 
marketing campaigns by using Mindmatics front-end (Wireless Interactive Box). In its 
creative department (Media Creation), Mindmatics develops marketing campaigns for 
mobile devices. It designs dialog campaigns, which integrate small games. These campaigns 
are often based on several media technologies such as SMS, WAP, and e-mail. 
In addition, Mindmatics cooperates with MNOs to connect its services to their mobile 
communication networks and to terminate its SMS traffic. Its most intense partnership is 
with T-mobile. 
A unique feature in Mindmatics’ business model is its approach to getting opt-in 
permissions. It has developed an innovative approach for acquiring new users and increasin 
its community. The Mr.AdGood service has an integrated Internet portal where users can 
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sign up for the service and get incentive points for every advertising message received. 
These incentive points can be either traded against logos and ring tones, or used to get cash 
back. The system is similar to Webmiles, which Clever.Tanken uses as an incentive system 
for its Fuel Price Pilots. 
Like the other case study firms, Mindmatics competes directly with a number of German and 
European mobile marketing agencies. Indirectly it competes with traditional marketing 
agencies for a share in the total media and campaign selling market.  
3.4.3 Within segment analysis 
The alliance portfolios of the Mobile Marketing companies and their organizational change 
are analyzed according the structure applied in the segment analyses of MLS and MCS. To 
understand the longitudinal dynamics of these portfolios and their implication for firm 
performance and development, the company development is analyzed whether stages exist 
and how they can be characterized. In a second step, its resource requirements are evaluated 
for every stage. The third part of this section describes the alliance portfolio structure across 
the company’s developments; followed by the analysis of relevant alliance skills and 
processes. The section ends with the description of the portfolios’ performance implications 
and a concluding summary. 
Company development 
All firms developed stage-wise. The different development stages are named and their 
durations are determined in the first part of this section. The next section characterizes the 
case study organizations in each development stage. 
Development stages 
All three organizations have gone through at least three development stages. 12snap went 
through four, the other two through three development stages. The reason for 12snap’s 
additional development step is due to more money raised and its older age. In contrast to the 
other companies, 12snap received € 50 million in funding. That is 3-6 times more VC 
funding than the other case study companies. In addition, 12snap has already been founded 
in summer 1999, whereas the two other companies were founded at least half a year later at 
the end of 1999 and in the beginning of 2000. Table 17 lists all stages. The interviewed 
managers specified and named these stages. For this reason, these stages are not 
characterized using a consistent criterion. A few managers used strategic growth targets, 
while others used changes in the product portfolio to characterize the company’s 
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development. ApollisInteractive could even attach office locations to its development steps. 
The development stages are specified in table 17. 
Company 12snap ApollisInteractive Mindmatics 
Phase 1 Start-up, focus on mobile 
auctioning 
 
9.1999 – 1.2000 
Start-up, focus on Mobile 
Location services  
(McKinsey Incubator) 
9.1999 – 2.2001 
Start-up, stamped by the 
founding team, focus on 
innovative WAP service 
3.2000 – 8.2000 
Phase 2 Internationalization and 
growth phase 
 
2.2000 – 6.2000 
Build up of organization, 
focus on mobile marketing 
(Center Munich) 
3.2001- 12.2001 
Build up of sales 
organization, and focus on 
mobile marketing 
9.2000 – 3.2001 
Phase 3 Professionalization of 
processes 
 
7.2000 – 6.2001 
Professionalization of 
processes 
(Munich Riem) 
From 1.2002 on 
Professionalization 
 
 
From 4.2001 on 
Phase 4 Consolidation and mobile 
marketing phase 
From 7.2001 on 
 
 
Not yet 
 
 
Not Yet 
Table 17   Stage description of companies in the mobile marketing segment 
In the first stage, all three companies started with a typical start-up period. A founding team 
focused its work on developing innovative mobile services. 12snap built a mobile auctioning 
service based on cell broadcast technology, ApollisInteractive developed a mobile shopping 
guide (kompazz) and Mindmatics launched a WAP service⎯paid by advertisments. All 
ventures explored technological feasibilities and market opportunities in the emerging 
mobile Internet industry.  
The second stage can be characterized with growth and the revision of the product and 
service portfolio. 12snap shifted its product portfolio towards entertainment products, while 
the other two started to develop mobile marketing services. 12snap’s diverging focus can be 
explained by its earlier development. 12snap entered its second stage in February 2000, 
when wireless advertisements were not yet known in Germany. The other’s second stage 
took place in winter and spring 2001. All three ventures grew significantly during the second 
stage and 12snap and Mindmatics internationalized by opening operations in the UK and 
Italy. 
In the third stage, the ventures started to professionalize their operations in their internal and 
external processes. These changes were reactions to developments in the capital market. 
From 2001 on, VC funding became more restrictive. The case study companies were forced 
to improve their profitability to internally finance further expansion. To improve sales, the 
companies invested in their sales skills. ApollisInteractive even hired a new sales-oriented 
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CEO to get access to a sales network and to improve its bargaining power. To enhance their 
cost effectiveness, the organizations streamlined their processes and set up sophisticated 
controlling, project management, and HR systems.  
 
‘In the third phase, we established and professionalized our processes. We put a lot of effort 
into controlling and analyzing our business model. We streamlined processes to increase 
efficiency in all company parts: core activities as well as support processes.’ (Ingo Griebel, 
MD 12snap, 2002)  
 
Only 12snap entered the fourth stage. In summer 2001 it drastically changed its product 
portfolio. 12snap focused on mobile marketing, where they earned the highest margins and 
faced the biggest potential. Its mobile auctioning and mobile entertainment businesses were 
dropped. In addition, it reorganized its mobile marketing business. Media selling services 
were separated from the design and creation of marketing campaigns. The stages are 
analyzed in a more structured way in the next section.  
Stage characteristics 
In every stage, the characteristics of the organization are described such as the organization 
structure, its strategic focus, and flexibility. Five dimensions are applied for this analysis. 
Descriptions of these five dimensions and the rationale for their selection have been 
previously described in the methodology chapter (sub-section 2.2.4). 
First stage: All three companies show typical start-up characteristics in their first stage. The 
team-based organizations were led by an entrepreneurial management team. Their in-house 
communication was very frequent and informal. In their exploration phase, the companies 
reacted quickly to market feedback by adjusting products and services. Long hours of work 
were compensated with modest salaries and key employees had ownership. The CEO of 
Mindmatics described this stage as follows: 
 
‘Our first period was stamped by the founders, Mindmatics was a small start-up, we worked 
as a team in one big office.’ (Ingo Lippert, CEO Mindmatics, 2002) 
 
The characteristics of this stage and subsequent stages are graphed in figure 50. 
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Figure 50   Company development in the mobile marketing segment 
Second stage: In this stage the companies grew and adjusted their product portfolio. The 
companies’ management focus shifted from an entrepreneurial and technical approach to 
leadership through business managers who focused more on selling these products and 
establishing internal processes, to enable the cooperation of its growing staff. Only 12snap 
stuck to its entrepreneurial and technical management focus, as it was still in an exploration 
period, during which it tested different product approaches.  
However, all organizations grew and larger organizations led to the introduction of 
functional organization structures. As 12snap’s German managing director reports: 
 
‘In the foundation phase, we had a hands-on team structure. In the next step, we created 
departments for technology, marketing, developing our operator business, and operations. 
This was a purely functional organization.’ (Ingo Griebl, MD 12snap, 2002) 
 
The other characteristics did not change. The companies kept their informal communication 
style. Their limited size of 15 or fewer employees did not force them to develop more 
formalized communication forms. In addition, the companies had ‘communication friendly’ 
locations; ApollisInteractive moved from McKinsey’s Munich incubator into a new 200 
square meter one-room office; 12snap had, and still has, a loft style office, where over 15 
employees share one room and meetings take place just behind curtains rather than in 
separate meeting rooms. 
The company’s strategies also kept their flexibility. The markets were still emerging. 
Uncertain revenue sources required fast adjustments of business models. As an example, 
ApollisInteractive shifted its product focus from developing a mobile shopping guide to 
mobile marketing in the transition from stage one to stage two. Soon thereafter, it started to 
develop a mobile sales manager to offer mobile business services. 
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The biggest differences between the cases occurred in their incentive and reward systems. 
Early on, 12snap and ApollisInteractive set up stock option programs for their employees. 
Mindmatics still stuck to their old incentive structure of modest salaries and ownership only 
for key employees. However, in stage three, Mindmatics also incorporated a stock options 
program. 
Third stage: In the third stage, the companies developed again fairly similarly. In all three 
case studies, business managers tried to professionalize their organizations. The companies 
changed along two dimensions, the communication style and the flexibility of their business 
model. 
All three case studies formalized their communication style. The size and internationality of 
the organizations were the key drivers. By stage three, all organization had grown to a size 
of 30 or more employees. Purely informal communication was no longer practical, this was 
particularly the case for 12snap and Mindmatics, who had opened businesses in the UK, 
Austria, and Italy. However, even in the case of ApollisInteractive, the communication 
became more formalized due to a new office, a new CEO, and a larger organization size. Its 
new office in Munich-Riem had individual offices and over 40 employees, and its new CEO 
introduced a more ‘Old Economy’-type working style, as described by Thorsten Rehfus: 
 
‘Also our culture changed through Mr. Blickhan. He wanted to get away from the ‘Start-Up’ 
image more towards an Old Economy type of organization. Rules were introduced to 
structure processes.’ (Thorsten Rehfus, Marketing Manager ApollisInteractive, 2002) 
 
Confidence in the business model grew. The firms shifted from their very flexible short term 
planning mode with strategic reviews every 3 month, to a more mid-term perspective and 
developed 2-3 year scenarios, which were slightly adjusted every 6 months. Only 
ApollisInteractive kept its short-term flexible approach, which can be attributed to two 
factors. ApollisInteractive had better technological skills and more experience in developing 
mobile applications, and it was lagging behind in the Mobile Marketing industry, with less 
opt-in users and less campaigns sold. Therefore, in contrast to its competitors, a shift in its 
business model would have been more reasonable. The fact that ApollisInteractive has not 
found a stable business model and changed its management team a second time in 
September 2002 are additional indicators. 
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Fourth stage: As described above, only 12snap entered a forth stage. In this stage, almost 
all characteristics took the next level. 12snap introduced a holding structure, which managed 
and controlled its fairly independent national businesses in Germany, the UK, and Italy; in 
addition, it opened up its fourth operation in Scandinavia, thus covering the Swedish, 
Finnish, and Danish markets.  
In parallel to its new management focus, 12snap introduced a business unit organization. Its 
national units, and within these units its media creation and media selling units, received 
P&L responsibility. The fact that the organizational units became more international and 
more independent also had an impact on the communication style. Communication between 
the holding and the business units was formalized and employees started to rely more on e-
mails and memos.  
In terms of flexibility and compensation structures, the characteristics of 12snap remained 
unchanged. 
After showing a stage-wise development of NTBF in the Mobile Marketing segment with 
significant changes in organizational structure and characteristics, the question of whether 
resource requirements also shifted that drastically as a response to different organizational 
problems arises. This question will be analyzed in the next part. 
Resource requirements 
The resource requirements have been assessed for every case study according to the seven 
categories that were previously applied in the other segment analyses, ranging from 
reputation and technology, through access to distribution and sourcing markets, and internal 
factors such as human resources and organizational skills to financial resources. The 
managers who were interviewed ranked the resource importance on a scale from 1 (not 
important) to 5 (very important). 
In analyzing the development of the requirements, the resources can be grouped into two 
categories: resources that changed according the development steps, and resources whose 
requirements depended mainly on other factors. In the first category, certain resources 
became more important in the companies’ life cycles, such as the access to markets, human 
resources and organizational skills. In contrast, the importance of other resources faded 
stage-wise, such as technological know-how. These resource developments are graphed in 
figure 51: 
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Figure 51   Resource requirements in the mobile marketing segment 
Development-dependent resources: The importance of reputation resources and 
technological know-how faded stage-wise.  
With respect to technological know-how, all three ventures started in a high-tech industry 
with innovative services and product. The development of these services was the core 
activity in stage one. The technological know-how was crucial for all case studies. 12snap 
established resources for its cell broadcast capabilities to develop its mobile auction 
application. ApollisInteractive invested in WAP technology to develop its mobile shopping 
guide, one of the first MLS in Germany and Mindmatics focused on its WAP and SMS 
services, which also required significant technological know-how. 
In the second stage the importance of technology began to decrease. ApollisInteractive and 
Mindmatics focused on mobile marketing, which was purely SMS based at that time. 
Furthermore, SMS technology was not particular complex. The maintenance of a high 
evaluation with ‘medium high’ is justified with activities that were linked to the company’s 
core activities. ApollisInteractive started to develop mobile business applications such as its 
Mobile Sales Manager, which was targeted towards the same client base, and Mindmatics 
built up its SMS gateway to integrate its business model into sending and receiving mass 
SMS. Only 12snap continued to evaluate technological know-how as very important. 
Because it was not yet focusing on mobile marketing, it launched new entertainment 
solutions such as mobile betting, ring-tones, and others. The fast development of new 
applications was key for 12snap’s strategy. 
In step three, the importance of technological know-how dropped to medium. As the 
business models matured, the innovation speed dropped. The companies focused only on 
enabling mobile marketing campaigns with their technology. In addition, the mobile Internet 
industry had grown and services that formerly had to be developed in-house, could be 
sourced from out-side vendors. The technological scope declined, as 12snap’s managing 
director reported: 
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‘Interestingly, technological know-how had been very important in the beginning, when we 
had our transaction-based business model – mobile auctioning. Its importance faded, as we 
focused more on mobile marketing. In addition our industry developed. There are core 
competencies we always want to keep in-house; but there are services for which an 
infrastructure is already in place. Over time, a market established and we try to leverage 
know-how others have built up. 
In the beginning, we pioneered a new market. We had to develop everything in-house, 
because nothing could be sourced from outside.’ (Ingo Griebl, MD 12snap, 2002) 
 
Only ApollisInteractive continued to put more emphasis on its technology. Because it was 
not especially successful with its mobile marketing business, it hedged its strategy by also 
providing mobile business applications, which requires more sophisticated technological 
skills. 
In the fourth development step, the technological skills further declined. 12snap continued 
with its model of developing a platform to create and configure SMS campaigns on basic 
SMS and WAP technology, and of sourcing supporting technology and services from 
outside vendors such as the SMS Empowerment Group. 
Stage-wise weight gaining resources: Market access capabilities grew in importance from 
medium to low in the start-up phase, to medium-high in the middle phase, and to very high 
in the last stage. In their start-up phase, the ventures had almost no contact to end-users. 
They were only interested in getting feedback on their innovative solutions, and were not 
depending on external revenues. The importance of connecting its operations to end-user 
markets grew in stage two, when the ventures stabilized their business models. In addition, 
the importance of market revenues grew, as all three ventures started talks with VCs 
concerning their second financing round. In their last stage, all companies rated access to 
markets as one of their most important resources. The generation of revenues had turned out 
to be the only way to finance additional growth after financial markets had turned bad in 
2001. All ventures had changed their fast growth strategy into a consolidation and base line 
improvement strategy. 
Organizational skills developed accordingly; medium-low ratings in the start-up stage 
increased over time. The team organizations had limited organizational capabilities. The 
development of prototypes did not require sophisticated controlling procedures, and limited 
organizational sizes (<10 employees) did not require an efficient communication and 
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meeting culture. Requirements changed when the organizations grew in number of 
employees and complexity (various functions and international operations). The staff growth 
is the most significant driver for organizational skills. The organizational growth of up to 
more than 100 employees forced 12snap to heavily developed and streamline its processes. 
The internationalization had a less significant influence, as can be seen in the case of 
Mindmatics, which rated the organizational capabilities over its development stages 
consistently as highly as ApollisInteractive, which grew somewhat faster in terms of 
employees, but did not internationalize. Ingo Griebel (MD of 12snap) described this 
development as follows. 
 
„In the third phase... we spent a lot of time building up our controlling systems and 
monitoring our business model. ... We streamlined processes, to make the organization more 
efficient – in our core activities as well as in our support processes.” (Ingo Griebel, MD 
12snap, 2002) 
 
The discussion of human resource requirements is similar to the broader organizational 
skills. Over the life-cycle steps, the selectivity with which new co-workers weressought, 
selected, and employed grew. The development was driven by a growing confidence in their 
own business model. In comparison with the organizational skills, the development does not 
appear so obvious in the ratings because all companies lowered their recruiting targets as 
they switched to a consolidation strategy⎯12snap and ApollisInteractive even laid off staff. 
Other resources: The second group of resource categories does not directly depend on the 
organizations’ life cycles. A company’s business model determines the importance of 
reputation and access to supply. Wireless advertising companies such as traditional 
marketing agencies depend heavily on their reputation and branding. Legitimacy 
considerations might have prevailed in the first stage. However, with entry in the mobile 
marketing business, reputation was important to position the company’s brand. 
In contrast, supply such as content has never been a crucial issue. The business model of 
mobile marketing companies does not rely on content like news, maps, business directories 
or financial data. ApollisInteractive was the only case that once rated access to supply as 
medium important. Its broader diversified approach (with its shopping guide) required 
content such as shop locations and their product range. 
The requirements for financial resources were influenced by external events like in the other 
two segments. The need for financial resources is the difference between the need to finance 
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growth and survival and the available funds. This availability depends mainly on VC 
financing rounds. VC industry trends, which can be labeled exogenous to the company 
development, play a significant role in the evaluation of the importance of external 
financing. This issue can be seen in the case study data. In stage one, Mindmatics ranked its 
requirements for financial resources only medium, because it developed its organization 
slowly and had already been through its first financing round in stage one. 12snap and 
ApollisInteractive started to expand faster and required more external financing in their start-
up period. Two factors lowered their requirement for financial resources later on: significant 
VC financing rounds and their consolidation and professionalization strategy in the last 
stage.  
In summary, consistent changes as a function of life cycles can be seen in four out of seven 
categories. Access to markets, human resources and organizational skills gain importance in 
a stepwise fashion. Technological know-how loses importance. In three resource categories, 
no direct dependencies to life cycle changes could be found. These resources depended 
mainly on other factors, such as the companies’ respective business models and the 
development of financial markets. 
Alliance networks 
The alliance portfolios are analyzed according to the proceeding segments. The portfolios 
are graphed for every segment (figure 52) and analyzed stage by stage for all three case 
studies. The rationale for this procedure and a detailed description of the network 
documentation and analysis are provided in sub-section 3.2.3 ‘Alliance networks’.  
Stage one: All three case studies started with small exploratory networks with less than five 
partners. All three case studies worked on setting up their organization; neither content 
partnerships nor distribution partnerships were established. 12snap and ApollisInteractive 
contracted early with VCs (Viventures and Apollis). In addition, 12snap worked together 
with the agencies Vero Partners to develop its customer interface. ApollisInteractive worked 
with large technology providers such as Cisco, Oracle and Cable&Wireless to set up its 
basic systems for its mobile platform. 
Stage two: In the second stage, the networks grew significantly to a size of 11-15 
partnerships. With the exception of financial partnerships, most alliances were still based on 
weak ties. Content wise, distribution partnerships were set up. The case studies developed 
their alliance portfolios similarly with respect to three partnership types: financial links, 
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significantly different strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 52   Alliance portfolios in the mobile marketing segment 
All three companies went through a VC financing round. 12snap closed its second round 
with Viventures, Nokia Ventures, Apax, Goldman Sachs, Bayernkapital, and tbg. 
ApollisInteractive attained financing from Apollis and General Atlantic Partners72. 
Mindmatics closed its first round with Best Practice Ventures. 
Partner activities accessing technological resources were very modest whereas distribution 
partnerships grew significantly. Only 12snap and Mindmatics closed a connection with one 
additional technology partner⎯Equant in the case of 12snap and Dialing in the case of 
Mindmatics. However, on the distribution side, ApollisInteractive realized its first mobile 
marketing deals with different marketers (i.e., Premiere World, MCC Smart, Wrigleys) and 
joined different associations such as the German direct marketing association (DDV), the 
German multi-media association (DMMV), and the Marketing Club Munich for PR, 
reputation, and networking purposes. Mindmatics started to cooperate with marketing 
agencies such as BBDO, AdLink, and Doubleklick, marketers such as Allianz, Aegon, and 
                                                 
72  General Atlantic Partners also hold stakes in Apollis 
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Direktanlagebank, and communication companies such as O2, Yahoo!, and Freenet. 12snap 
started to interact closely with D2 Vodafone.  
12snap’s sales approach differs from the other two because it built up one strong tie instead 
of multiple weaker ties. This discrepancy is based on its different business model. In period 
two, 12snap still offered mobile auctioning and fixed-price mobile commerce. Its auction 
and shop-portal was co-developed and marketed exclusively with D2 Vodafone, which 
contributed access to its subscriber base to this partnership.  
The different business model also explains 12snap’s sourcing partnership with retailers and 
consumer goods producers such as Quelle, MediaMarkt, and MCC Smart. 12snap offered 
their products in its mobile distribution chains. 
Stage three: All three networks grew by approximately 10 partners to between 20 and 27 
partnerships in stage three. Most new ties were oriented toward the distribution side of the 
case studies. In addition, a few supply partnerships were formed and two of three case 
studies could attract new financial partners. 
The three case studies intensified their sales activities by building up new distribution 
partnerships. The partnership networks have similar patterns. Their key focus is on 
marketing agencies and marketers of consumer products, with and for whom the case study 
companies develop campaigns. In addition, they cooperate with communication companies 
such as MNOs to deliver their campaigns, and they participate in association to develop 
standards, lobby, and get to know potential clients.  
Mindmatics has the most elaborate network. Its close partnerships with AdLink, Doubleklick 
and BBDO allowed it to sell 180 campaigns in 2001. ApollisInteractive is lacking 
partnerships to agencies and 12snap was in a transition phase from a mobile entertainment 
portal (with m-commerce, ring tones, and mobile betting) to a mobile marketing agency. 
On the supply side, all three companies added a few content partners through weak ties. 
Their content was required to offer broader and more interactive marketing services. 
ApollisInteractive partners with wissen.de to develop quizzes. A similar motivation 
underlies ApollisInteractive’s links to airMOTION (for sport news), Noé Astro (for 
horoscopes), and Wharf Media (for event news), and Mindmatics’ links to Tomorrow.Focus 
(for broad online content73), and Schober (for market and business news). 
12snap and Mindmatics entered new financial partnerships. 12snap closed its third round of 
financing (€37 million); Apax and Argo Global Partners were the lead investors. 
                                                 
73  Tomorrow.Focus is a holding bundling different media activities such as focus.de, 
tvspielfilm.de, and max.de)  
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Mindmatics attained funds from T-Ventures, Holtzbrinck networXs, and WestLB in its 
second VC round. 
Partner activities to access technological resources, were again very modest. Neither 12snap 
nor Mindmatics added a new technology partner. Only ApollisInteractive made new ties, 
most of which were passive. Its VC⎯Apollis⎯integrated itself into the operations of its 
investments, ApollisInteractive and ApollisMediaservice, and acquired Convisual. Through 
the new holding structure, ApollisInteractive is linked to the other subsidiaries. 
Stage four: Only 12snap entered a fourth stage. This fourth stage was not concluded at the 
time that the data were collected. Hence, the data provided only indicates how 12snap 
started to develop in stage four. 12snap added over 10 new partners to its portfolio, which 
grew to approximately 35 firms. The portfolio is increasingly balanced toward distribution 
partnerships. 
In the transition period between stage three and stage four in summer 2001, 12snap started 
to focus purely on mobile marketing. Consequently, it broke up all supply partnerships with 
retailers and consumer good manufacturers. Instead it established partnerships with 
marketing agencies such as Brainwash, Pilot Media, and BBH, and with marketers such as 
McDonalds, Sony, and Nestlé. In addition, it intensified the development of its opt-in user 
base, where it cooperated with over 10 customer acquisition firms74. On the technology side, 
12snap partnered with new technology providers. They supported 12snap in managing its 
growing data traffic. Empowerment Interactive Group provided an SMS gateway through 
which 12snap could connect to all operator networks in Germany, the UK, and Italy. 
The alliance portfolio structures are summarized in table 18. 
  12snap ApollisInteractive Mindmatics 
 Alliance 
category 
Alliance 
Portfolio 
Reasoning Alliance 
Portfolio
Reasoning Alliance 
Portfolio 
Reasoning 
Technology ↓↓ No ties ↓ 3 very weak ties  ↓↓ No ties 
Supply ↓↓ No ties ↓↓ No ties ↓↓ No ties 
St
ag
e 
1 
Markets ↓↓ 1 weak tie ↓↓ No ties ↓↓ No ties 
Technology ↓↓ 1 weak tie ↓ 3 very weak ties ↓ 1 medium tie 
Supply ↓ 6 weak ties ↓↓ No ties ↓↓ No ties 
St
ag
e 
2 
Markets • 1 strong tie ↓ 3 (+3) weak ties ↑ 3 medium, 6 weak 
ties 
                                                 
74  How new opt-in clients and cooperation partners are acquired is a corporate secret; therefore, 
the partner firms are not specified 
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  12snap ApollisInteractive Mindmatics 
Technology ↓↓ 1 weak tie • 1 medium, 5 weak 
ties 
↓ 1 medium tie 
Supply • 8 weak ties + a few 
customer acquisition 
firms 
↓ 4 weak ties ↓↓ 2 weak ties 
St
ag
e 
3 
Markets ↑ 3 medium, 6 weak 
ties 
↓ 1 medium, 3 (+3) 
weak ties 
↑ 3 medium, >15 (+3) 
weak ties  
Technology ↓ 1 medium 4 weak 
ties 
    
Supply • 30 customer 
acquisition firms 
    
St
ag
e 
4 
Markets ↑↑ 3 medium, >20 weak 
ties to three groups
    
  
Legend 
↑↑ 
Strong 
↑ 
Medium strong 
• 
Medium
↓ 
Medium weak 
↓↓  
Weak 
 
Table 18   Alliance portfolio structure (MLS) 
In conclusion, the alliance portfolios grow steadily through the stages. Their centers of 
gravity change from early to later stages, in which the portfolios consistently lean toward 
distribution partnerships. In addition, the limited requirements for the resources content and 
technological know-how can be seen in the alliance portfolio structure. Mobile Marketing 
agencies establish relatively few content and technology partnerships; these partnerships 
continue to play a less important role. 
Finally, the firms differ significantly in terms of portfolio size and intensity. Whereas 
Multichart and 12snap were capable of developing distribution biased alliance portfolios 
with more than 30 partners, ApollisInteractive could only build a smaller alliance portfolio 
(with approximately 20 partnerships), which was weaker on the distribution side. 
It will be interesting to see, whether differences in underlying allying processes lead to the 
different portfolio sizes and whether differences in structure and process lead to 
discrepancies in firm performance. These two questions will be analyzed and discussed in 
the next two sections. 
Alliance process 
Also in the mobile marketing segment, the case studies report of a three-step allying process. 
The process begins with strategic considerations, defining alliance needs, passes through an 
alliance formation stage, in which partnerships are built up, and ends with the alliance 
management phase, in which partnerships are operated and terminated as necessary. This 
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process is identical to the allying process in the MLS segment, which is depicted in figure 
26. Its steps are described subsequently. 
Strategy pre-phase: In the first phase, alliance needs were derived from corporate strategy. 
All case studies review their strategy every three to six months. The strategic targets are 
broken down into market segments and projects. For these projects, resource requirements 
were worked out. In a last step, the management teams decide how to source required 
resources. This last step defines the alliance needs. 
Formation phase: In the formation phase alliances are realized. This procedure can be 
broken down into three steps. First, potential partners are sought out, screened, and selected; 
second, partners are contacted; third, the alliance contract is negotiated and signed. 
All three case studies report that searching and selecting partners is not a crucial step. The 
partnership relevant industries comprise MNOs, marketing agencies, and consumer and 
branded goods producer, all of which are mature and well documented. 
In the contacting step, social relations are very important, as the CFO of 12snap reports: 
 
‘Our business is relationship driven; you need good contacts. Old personal contacts, and 
good board members can help you a lot.’ (Bernd Mühlfriedel, CFO 12snap, 2002) 
 
Besides the active search and contacting, alliances can be created through alliance 
opportunities that arise when other companies approach the case study firms with alliance 
concepts. These alliance opportunities exist to a significant extent, especially in the later 
stages, as the 12snap’s MD Ingo Griebel reports: 
 
‘In addition, this straightforward alliance process is superposed by alliance opportunities, 
which arise by other companies contacting us. These opportunities rose with us getting 
better known in the industry and with the increasing number of people we already worked 
together with.’ (Ingo Griebel, MD 12snap, 2002) 
 
In the contracting step, Mindmatics in particular stressed the importance of negotiating 
flexible contracts. The high uncertainty in this still young industry casts fix contracts into 
doubt. The CEO of Mindmatics reported its experience with exclusive contracts, that were 
signed and fixed too early: 
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‘In our first stage we preferred to form exclusive partnerships. But almost all these 
partnerships did not live up to expectations and a few even hampered our development. That 
is why we nowadays prefer flexible contracts and we do not grant exclusivity. …  
In addition, we adjusted our contracting procedure. When we decide to cooperate with a 
partner, we do not set up and sign a binding contract, but we set up a joint project. During 
that trial phase we examine how we work together. When the project was successful, we 
intensify the cooperation and set up an outline contract.’ (Ingo Lippert, CEO Mindmatics, 
2002) 
 
By setting up a trial project or signing the partnership contract, the management phase starts. 
Management phase: The management phase is by far the longest phase in the allying 
process. It comprises the operating and embedding of partnerships, the monitoring of the 
partnerships, and the restructuring of alliances (realignment or termination). 
During the operation of partnerships, all three case study firms try to embed the relationships 
by connecting to additional contact persons on the partners’ side and by intensifying the 
projects as previously mentioned by Ingo Lippert. However, the intensification is not 
feasiblet in all cases. In developing industry, markets establish slowly, which challenges the 
forms of cooperation, as the CEO of Mindmatics reports: 
 
‘The intensity of our distribution partnerships decreases. This comes along with the 
establishment of our industry and distribution markets. After the first stages [2000 to mid-
2001], it became obvious which players are important in our market and which revenue 
models are used. Thus the uncertainty in the industry decreased and, thereby, the need for 
very close partnerships.’ (Ingo Lippert, CEO Mindmatics, 2002) 
 
Concerning alliance controlling, all companies consistently stated that meeting revenue 
targets was the most important target monitored with respect to distribution partnerships. 
Technological reliability is another criteria that is controlled for in technology partnerships. 
When the alliance controlling detects that a partnership is not efficient concerning resources 
employed, partnership contracts are usually cancelled. In some cases, contracts are 
renegotiated before the cooperation is terminated. 
Although all three case study firms report this three-step allying process, they differ by the 
degree to which the process is institutionalized. Companies with extensive alliance activities 
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such as 12snap and Mindmatics have a more structured approach than ApollisInteractive. 
ApollisInteractive’s marketing manager reports: 
 
‘The alliance process does not go on formally. The three stages exist and the underlying 
steps as well. But only in a few of them we slowly start to set out results in writing. …There 
is nothing formalized. This might be caused by the fact that most of our partnerships result 
from unplanned opportunities.’ (Thorsten Rehfus, Marketing Manager ApollisInteractive, 
2002) 
 
In contrast the CFO of 12snap reports of a very formalizated allying process: 
 
‘Starting with stage two, the partnership process was more and more institutionalized over 
time.’ (Bernd Mühlfriedel, CFO 12snap, 2002) 
 
Given the differences in alliance portfolio size and institutionalization of allying procedures, 
it is interesting to analyze whether these two phenomena impact firm performance. This 
issue is analyzed in the next section. 
Performance 
Comparing the case studies on the basis of performance, 12snap scores the highest. The 
performance benchmark is based on the dimensions, criteria, and scales applied in sub-
section 3.3.3 ‘Performance’ and takes into account the growth of the companies, revenue- 
and employee-wise, profitability, and innovation. The scale ranges from 1⎯very poor 
performance to 5⎯very high performance with a mean of 2.4 calculated on all case studies. 
The performance of mobile content providers is exhibited in figure 53. 
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Case study performance
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12snap scores highest on two 
dimensions: revenue and organiza-
tional growth. In terms of 
profitability and innovation, 
Mindmatics outperforms 12snap and 
ApollisInter-active. 12snap is the 
only company with annual sales 
significantly greater than € 2 
million. In addition, its growth rate 
has been between 300% and 400% 
the past years and was expected to 
maintain that growth rate in 2002.  
Figure 53   Case study performance in the mobile marketing segment 
ApollisInteractive sales were considerably lower, at the lower end of the range of € 500,000 
to € 1 million, slow growing. Mindmatics’ sales were estimated to approach € 1.5 million75. 
In terms of organization size, 12snap grew the fastest of all the case study companies. In the 
beginning of 2001 it had considerable more than 100 employees. It separated itself from a 
few activities, such as its technology development center in Praha (SnapLab) in summer 
2001 due to its reorganization and concentration on mobile marketing. However, 12snap is 
still the biggest organization, with between 70 and 75 employees. ApollisInteractive and 
Mindmatics grew more slowly and approached organization sizes of 40 and 30 employees 
without having significant cutbacks. 
Mindmatics is rated highest in terms of profitability. Its losses were only in the lower € 
100,000s in comparison with losses above € 1 million in the cases of 12snap and 
ApollisInteractive. In addition, its break even point was planned to be reached by the end of 
2002, similar to 12snap but before ApollisInteractive (beginning of 2003). 
12snap and Mindmatics also outperformed ApollisInteractive in terms of innovation. 
Mindmatics received two awards for its MrAdGood-service and its campaigns (Multimedia 
Award 2001 and the New Media Award 2002 (mobile)). 12snap attained the Mobile 
Marketing Creative Award 2001. ApollisInteractive did not receive any awards, neither for 
its technology or service, nor for its campaigns.  
                                                 
75  The estimation is based on the published number of campaigns and their revenue structure. 
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3.4.4 Segment conclusion 
Concluding the within-segment analysis, the case study companies develop stage-wise. 
Between the stages, organizational characteristics changed significantly. The ventures add 
complexity when they develop from very informal working entrepreneurial teams to 
business unit organizations with sophisticated controlling and incentive systems and 
formalized internal processes. Comparing the case study firms, 12snap and Mindmatics 
developed more quickly than ApollisInteractive.  
Resource requirements shift, in parallel with organizational changes. Reputation and 
technological know-how lose importance, whereas access to markets and organizational 
skills, that allow for efficiency gain in importance. Access to supply such as content never 
plays a significant role in this industry segment.  
The resource changes are reflected in the case studies’ alliance portfolios. Their structures 
are consistently small and exploratory in the beginning and grow to a significant size (>30 
partners), with heavy bias toward the distribution side. Neither technology nor sourcing 
partnerships play a significant role. Weak ties dominate the alliance portfolios because in the 
later stages the distribution market matures and selling mobile marketing campaigns 
becomes more standardized. 12snap and Mindmatics manage to adjust their alliance 
portfolios more efficiently than ApollisInteractive. They build up more alliances and focus 
more on the distribution side. 
Furthermore, in terms of alliance processes, 12snap and Mindmatics implement their allying 
procedures more thoroughly. All three case studies report of the same three-step allying 
process, but ApollisInteractive did not institutionalize and formalize the procedure and, 
therefore, heavily depends on alliance opportunities in contrast to strategically planned 
alliances. Thus, it is not surprising that 12snap and Mindmatics outperform ApollisInterative 
in terms of growth, profitability, and innovation. 
After analyzing the nine cases segment-by-segment, the following section outlines the 
similarities and differences across the segments. Next, a co-evolution model between 
NTBF’s alliance portfolio and organization is derived and broken down into hypotheses. 
3.5 Cross-segment analysis - building a set of tentative hypotheses 
This final section of the case study chapter deals with the comparative analyses of the three 
industry segments and the nine case study firms. In the first part, the case study results are 
analyzed across the three mobile service segments. The analytical focus is on the detection 
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of commonalities or differences concerning company developments, resource requirements, 
alliance portfolios, their management, and the firm performances. To understand the 
dynamic setting of the case studies, a longitudinal analysis framework is applied to structure 
the development of the case studies. According to this development framework, the alliance 
portfolios are analyzed and alliance acquisition and management skills examined. In the 
second part, a co-evolution model between NTBF’s organization and network is developed. 
This model is based on a set of tentative hypotheses, that describe correlations and causal 
relations within the model. These tentative hypotheses constitute the basis for a detailed 
unfolding of the literature in the next chapter that leads to an extension of the theory of 
network dynamics. 
3.5.1 Cross segment analysis 
The structure of the cross-segment analysis is structurally related to the within segment 
analyses. It begins with an assessment of the firm developments and shows their different 
growth rates, and, second, presents a comparison of their stage characteristics, to control for 
a comparability of development stages and, thereby, the validity of results concerning the 
firms’ growth rate. In the third part, resource requirements are compared, followed by the 
forth part, which analyzes the different alliance portfolios. After checking the resource 
dependency of alliance portfolio structures, performance implications of efficient alliance 
portfolios are assessed. The last part analyzes how underlying processes assure and support 
the efficiency of alliance portfolios. 
Company development 
All nine case studies pass through a stage-wise development. The case studies differ 
significantly with respect to the time spent in each phase and in the number of phases they 
passed through. Table 19 lists the case studies according their development speed. 
Table 19   Case study development stages 
Case studies 12snap Airweb ApollisInteractive
Clever
Tanken ehotel Gate5
mind-
matics
Multi-
chart
Yellow-
Map Average
Industry 
segment
Mobile 
Marketing MCS
Mobile 
Marketing MCS MCS MLS
Mobile 
Marketing MCS MLS
Number of 
stages 4 3 3 2 2 4 4 3 4 3,2
Average stage
duration 
[months]
7 15 14 21 20 10 7 95 10 22,3
Segment 
average 
[months]
10 38 (19) 10
38 
(19)
38 
(19) 10 10
38 
(19) 10
(exclud. 
Multi-
chart)
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Company developments
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In analyzing the number of stages and the average stage duration, differences between 
companies and segments can be observed. On average, mobile marketing and MLS 
companies developed faster (10 months/stage) than MCS companies (38 months/stage, 
respectively 19 months/stage excluding Multichart). Different reasons for this may apply, 
such as better-defined market niches with higher entry barriers or higher investments from 
VCs. However, there are still significant differences in development speed within every 
segment ranging from seven months per stage in the case of 12snap to 14 months per stage 
in the case of ApollisInteractive, or 15 months per stage in the case of Airweb, and to 
roughly 20 month per stage in the case of e-hotel and Clever.Tanken. These significantly 
different stage durations suggest two questions: Are the stages similar in terms of their 
characteristics, and therefore comparable? What impact do efficient alliance networks have 
on the stage duration? These questions are discussed next. 
Stage characteristics 
From an organizational perspective, the stages are comparable across industry segments. 
The case characteristics follow similar patterns along the development stages. Figure 54 
depicts the organizational characteristics of all case study firms on the following 
dimensions: management focus, organizational structure, communication style, and 
flexibility to market changes (descriptions of these dimensions are presented in chapter 3.2.3 
‘Organizational dimensions’). The dimension ‘compensation structure‘ is not included in the 
figure, because the segments differ as a function of this dimension. All MLS and mobile 
marketing companies have complex compensation programs such as stock options or 
individual bonuses. Apart from Airweb, all MCS companies kept simple compensation 
systems based on monthly fixed payments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 54   Company developments 
Figure 54 shows that all case studies gradually added complexity to their organization. Their 
organizational structure developed from a team-based organization to a functional 
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organization. After the companies diversified their product portfolios, in the last phase, they 
introduced business unit organizations. The developments according to the other 
organizational dimensions are similar; an exemplary development is listed in table 20. The 
characteristics correspond to the median of all case studies, which is included in figure 54 
(bold line). 
Organizational 
dimension 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
Management focus Entrepreneurial / 
technical 
Business manager Business manager Business managers 
but managing by 
exception 
Organizational 
structure 
Team organization Functional 
organization 
Functional 
organization 
Business unit 
organization 
Communication 
style 
Informal, company 
wide meetings 
Informal, company 
wide meetings 
Slowly formalized, 
meetings are more 
exclusive 
More formal 
communication, 
memos exist 
Strategic focus / 
flexibility on 
market changes 
Short-term planning 
and strategies. Time 
horizon 3 months 
Shot-term planning 
and strategies. 
Time horizon 3 
months 
Mid-term planning 
and strategies. 
Time horizon 2 
years. Reviews 
every 6 months 
Mid-term planning 
and strategies. Time 
horizon 2 years. 
Reviews every 6 
months 
Table 20   Exemplary organizational development 
Not all case studies developed in the same fashion. Yet the differences are small. No case 
study differs more than one complexity degree or longer than one period from the median. 
Within boundaries, the development characteristics of all case studies are comparable. 
Except for shorter durations, no difference between segments could be found. 
Now that the comparability of stages has been assessed, the question of the impact of 
efficient alliance portfolios is tackled. To answer this question, the structure of the alliance 
portfolio is compared stage-wise with resource requirements. 
Resource requirements 
As analyzed in the within-segment analyses, the need for most resources shift over time. In 
all three industry segments, the resource categories could be divided according to what 
drives their requirements. The resources can be clustered into three groups: dependence on 
life cycle, dependence on business model, and dependence on other events. Table 21 lists the 
resource categories according to their dependency. 
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Category dependency  MLS MCS Mobile Marketing 
Life cycle dependent 
    - fading 
 Technological know-how, 
reputation 
Technological know-how, 
reputation 
    - changing Human resources, access 
to supply 
Human resources, access 
to supply 
 
    - growing Market access, 
organizational skills 
Market access, 
organizational skills 
Market access, 
organizational skills, 
human resources 
Business model 
dependent 
Technological know-how, 
reputation 
 Access to supply 
Dependent on other 
events 
Financial resources Financial resources Financial resources 
Table 21   Resource categories 
When comparing the segments, similar pattern can be seen according to most resource 
categories. The assessment of financial resources, market access, and organizational skill 
coincide over all segments. The evaluation of technological know-how, reputation, and 
access to supply are also identical as long as segment business models either did not put an 
extremely high importance on these resources (as in the case of MLS companies on 
technological know-how and reputation) or put an extraordinary low importance on these 
resources (as in the case of Mobile Marketing companies on access to supply). 
Besides these business-model-induced differences, only one resource category is non 
comparable. MLS and MCS companies report of initial growth and later decline in 
requirements for human resources; in the mobile marketing segments the requirements grew 
constantly. This difference can be explained by splitting up this category into the number of 
employees required and the specificity of human resources sought. In all cases, the 
specificity with which human resources were searched grew, as reported by 12snaps 
managing director: 
 
‘We started to boost our team with people, ... who have experience in our industry sector, 
who have worked for a couple of years and who probably bring a few clients with them. This 
has completely changed over the last two years.’ (Ingo Griebl, MD 12snap Germany, 2002) 
 
However, most companies scaled down their organization in the last period. E-hotel scaled 
its organization down from 35 to 18 employees, and YellowMap from 40 to 19. Only the 
mobile marketing companies 12snap76 and Mindmatics grew uniformly. Therefore, 
                                                 
76  12snap’s organization size declined as well, when they sold their SnapLab. On the other hand 
their core business – Mobile Marketing – grew and marketing professionals were needed. 
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companies with growing staff sizes evaluated human resource requirements increasingly 
high. For the other companies, human resource was rated important in the beginning, and 
lost some of its importance in the later stages. 
These similar evaluation patterns concerning resource requirements can also be seen in a 
cross-case analysis depicted in figure 55. This figure maps the resources stage-by-stage 
according to their importance (5 – very important to 1 – not important at all). Only financial 
resources are excluded, because no stage dependency pattern could be found in the within-
segment analyses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 55   Resource requirements 
All case studies shifted their resource requirements. Their center of gravity shifted from 
reputation and technological know-how in the first stage, to a supply side focus, to market 
access and organizational skills. The case studies shifted their resource requirements in very 
similar ways. An exemplary development is listed in table 22. The evaluations correspond to 
the median of all case studies, which is graphed in figure 55 with the thick gray line. 
Organizational 
dimension 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
Reputation High 
 
High 
 
Medium-high 
(MLS companies 
excluded) 
Medium-high 
(MLS companies 
excluded) 
Technological 
know-how 
High 
 
Medium-high 
(MLS companies 
excluded) 
Medium 
(MLS companies 
excluded) 
Medium-low 
(MLS companies 
excluded) 
Access to supply Medium 
(Mobile Marketing 
companies 
excluded) 
Medium-high 
(Mobile Marketing 
companies 
excluded) 
Medium-low 
(Mobile Marketing 
companies 
excluded) 
Low 
 
Market access Medium-low Medium-high Medium-high High 
Human resources Medium Medium Medium-high High 
Organizational 
skills 
Medium-low Medium Medium-high High 
Table 22   Exemplary organizational development 
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Not all case studies evaluate their resource requirements equally. The above-mentioned 
influence of the segment specific business models has an especially important impact on the 
evaluation spread. This can be drastically seen in the assessment of access to supply such as 
content and maps. Furthermore, the evaluation of human resources starts to diverge in the 
later stages and differs by more than two units on the importance scale by the end. 
However, in terms of reputation, market access, and organizational skills, the differences are 
very small. No case study differs more than one importance step or longer than one period 
from the median. Within boundaries, the resource requirement characteristics of all case 
studies are comparable concerning these categories. These findings further emphasize the 
existence of comparable stages.  
Because alliances are suitable primarily for accessing reputation, technological know-how, 
supply, financial resources, and distribution channels and are less capable of providing 
human resources and organizational skills, the following discussion will focus on these four 
resource categories. 
Whether the alliance portfolios reflect these partly different and partly similar resource 
requirements is analyzed in the following section. 
Alliance portfolios 
The case study companies in all three segments have been building up significant alliance 
portfolios (>20 partners). They access five different types of resources: financial resources, 
technological know-how (often linked with reputation), access to supply, and access to 
markets. Reputation is often not an isolated reason to form an alliance, but an additional 
motivator to form an alliance with a specific partner. 
In the three segments, all these underlying alliance motivation patterns exist. The firms 
establish alliances to access funds and to improve the company performance through five 
different levers, which are listed and explained in table 23: 
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Background Lever Example Explanation 
Finance oriented Access financial 
funds 
Mindmatics – T-
Ventures 
Mindmatics received funds from T-Ventures 
in its second VC round to finance its further 
expansion. 
Access to superior 
distribution 
channels 
E-hotel – e-sixt E-hotel cooperates with e-sixt and supplies 
hotel rooms for their travel portal, which is 
one of the biggest and fastest growing travel 
portals in Germany 
Output oriented: 
Increase revenues 
Leveraging 
resources 
Gate5 - ESRI Gate5 cooperates with ESRI to integrate its 
mobile location platform into governmental 
software. Thereby, it aims to leverage the 
usage of resources through the distribution 
power of ESRI. 
Access to external 
technology 
12snap – 
Empowerment 
Interactive Group 
12snap cooperates with Empowerment 
Interactive Group to access and use their 
SMS, EMS, and MMS technology for 
terminating their message traffic. 
Input oriented: 
Improve USP and 
cut costs 
Access to superior 
supply 
Airweb – L’équipe Airweb cooperates with L’équipe to access 
partially proprietary or right restricted sport 
content. 
Table 23   Alliance types 
The partnership types can be found in all segments. Financial ties exist as well in the MLS 
(e.g., YellowMap – SAP Ventures) and in the MCS segment (e.g., e-hotel – Fortknox 
Venture). Sales ties in the MCS segment link Multichart to system integrator STS, the MLS 
company YellowMap cooperates with Jamba!, and Mindmatics has joint projects with the 
marketing agency AdLink. Similar to 12snaps technological partnership with Empowerment 
Interactive Group, Gate5 works with Location.net, and Airweb with Dialogic. Furthermore 
constellations such as Airweb – L’équipe can be found in the other segments with 
YellowMap – Schober and ApollisInteractive – wissen.de. 
However the alliance portfolios have different points of gravity and developed somewhat 
distinctly. Table 24 shows which types of links declined, remained stable, or grew in 
importance and how these links changed. 
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MLS MCS Mobile Marketing Segment  
\ 
Alliance portfolio develop.  1 -> 2 2 -> 3 3 -> 4 1 -> 2 2 -> 3 1 -> 2 2 -> 3 3 -> 4 
Declining Fading focus   Finance  Finance, 
Techno-
logy 
 Techno-
logy 
Finance 
Boundary span.  
(few weak ties, 
low importance) 
    Techno-
logy 
 Supply  
Diversification 
focus 
 Supply Supply  Supply    
Stagnant, 
Stable 
Select. cooperat. 
(few strong ties) 
  Techno-
logy 
Finance     
Intensification 
(strengthen ties) 
Finance Markets Markets Supply Markets Finance Finance  Growing 
Portfolio growth 
(new weak ties) 
Markets Markets Markets Supply, 
Markets 
  Markets Markets 
Table 24   Alliance portfolio development 
As the resource developments in the within-segment analyses already indicated, the 
importance of financial partnerships does not develop stage-wise. The cross-segment 
analysis supports this finding. There are no detailed coherent patterns in the development of 
financial resources across the segments. Overall, financial resources gained importance in 
the early stages when the financial markets were good. They then lost importance, when the 
companies matured and the financial markets cooled down. Despite their relevance for the 
development of organizations, financial resources are excluded from analyzing the co-
evolution of organizations and alliance portfolios, because they cannot be integrated into the 
stage-development-grid on which the rest of the analysis is based. Further research is 
required to integrate the financial aspects. 
Concerning the other resource and alliance categories, the portfolio shifts are analyzed on 
two levels. On a segment level, the relationship and causality is assessed if resource 
requirements influence alliance portfolio structures. On a firm level, the alliance portfolio 
efficiency is examined by analyzing its size, intensity, and adaptability. Efficiency 
differences are confronted with differences in firm performance and organizational 
development dynamics. 
Segment level analysis 
Resource requirements influence the shape of networks. Growing requirements lead to shifts 
in the alliance portfolio. Depending on the complexity of exchanged resources and the 
sophistication of the markets, either more partnerships are established or existing 
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partnerships are intensified. In a cross-segment analysis, table 25 contrasts resource 
requirements and the structure of alliance portfolios. For every segment evaluation, the 
median value for the case studies is calculated. 
  MLS MCS Mobile Marketing 
 Resource 
category 
Resource 
requirements 
Alliance 
portfolio 
Resource 
requirements 
Alliance 
portfolio 
Resource 
requirements 
Alliance 
portfolio 
Technology ↑↑ ↑ ↑ • ↑↑ ↓ 
Supply • • ↓ • ↓ ↓↓ Stage 1 
Markets ↓ ↓↓ • ↓ • ↓↓ 
Technology ↑↑ ↑ ↑ • ↑ ↓ 
Supply ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ Stage 2 
Markets ↑ • ↑↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Technology ↑↑ ↑ • ↓ • ↓ 
Supply • • ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ Stage 3 
Markets ↑ ↑ ↑↑ ↑↑ ↑↑ ↑↑ 
Technology ↑↑ ↑   ↓ ↓ 
Supply • ↓   ↓↓ ↓↓ Stage 4 
Markets ↑↑ ↑↑   ↑↑ ↑↑ 
Legend ↑↑ 
High / strong 
↑ 
Medium 
high / strong 
• 
Medium 
↓ 
Medium low 
/ weak 
↓↓  
Low / 
weak 
Tolerate 
(1 degree 
deviation) 
Conflict 
(> 1 
degree) 
Table 25   Resource dependency of alliance networks 
When assessing these evaluations, the correlation is evident. 14 pairs are identical and an 
additional 14 are similar, diverging by only one degree. Evaluations controvert in only 5 
cases (15%). 
In particular supply resources and partnerships and⎯in the later stages⎯the distribution 
side highly correlate. Only the technology side is not very highly correlated. Out of the 11 
technology pairs, only one is identical (at medium low), and 8 are similar with the alliance 
portfolio structure always weaker than the resource requirement. This indicates that 
technology partnerships are more difficult to form. The CEO of Gate5 attributes this to the 
habits of technologists: 
 
‘Technologists do not form partnerships. Technologists try to develop everything by 
themselves. They do not know how to sell technology. That’s why they develop 100% of the 
product in-house instead of leaving 90% out, which should be better sourced from the 
outside, because the internal expertise is missing. … 
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So far we did not experience successful technology partnerships. But this is our mistake.’ 
(Michael Halbherr, CEO Gate5, 2002) 
 
However, in general resource requirements influence alliance portfolio structures. Resource 
requirements and alliance portfolios shift from reputation and technological know-how, to 
supply as content, and towards a market based focus in the later stages. The next step is to 
examine how efficiently each case study firm established and structured its alliance 
portfolio.  
Firm level analysis 
The firm level analysis compares the nine case study companies, assesses which one has the 
most efficient alliance portfolio, and compares portfolio efficiency with the performance 
evaluation and the speed of development of each firm. 
The portfolio efficiency is influenced by three drivers: the portfolio size, the intensity of its 
ties, and its adaptability concerning resource shifts (i.e., how strong and fast the portfolio 
shifts as a function of resource requirements?). The more new partners can be acquired, the 
better firms can intensify links, and the better the portfolio structure is adjusted according 
resource requirements, the more efficient alliance portfolios will be. For the evaluation, the 
underlying data have been presented in the tables summarizing the within-segment alliance 
portfolio analyses. The evaluations are depicted in table 26. 
Case 
studies 
12snap Airweb Apollis 
Inter. 
Clever 
Tanken 
e-hotel Gate5 Mind-
matics 
Multi-
chart 
Yellow
Map 
Portfolio 
size 
Large Medium Small Medium Small Medium Medium Medium Large 
Intensity of 
ties 
Medium Medium Low Medium Medium 
high 
High High Medium Medium 
Portfolio 
adaptability 
High High Low Low Low Medium Medium Low High 
Portfolio 
efficiency 
High Medium 
High 
Low Medium Medium 
low 
Medium 
High 
Medium 
high 
Medium Medium 
high 
Company 
performance 
High Medium 
high 
Medium 
low 
Medium Low Medium 
low 
High High Medium 
high 
Develop-
ment speed 
High Medium Medium Slow Slow Medium High Low Medium 
high 
Table 26   Impact of alliance efficiency on organizational change 
By analyzing the data, it becomes obvious that improved resource access via efficient 
alliances leads to improved firm performance. In addition, better alliance portfolios and, 
therefore higher performance, accelerate firm’s organizational development and shortens 
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Correlations between portfolio efficiency, performance, and organizational development
Correlation Portfolio Efficiency/Performance
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development stages. This correlation between alliance portfolio efficiency, performance and 
organizational development is depicted in figure 56. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 56   Coevolution correlations 
The correlation between performance and organizational change is the strongest. This is not 
surprising because entrepreneurial performance as measured in this study comprises growth, 
and growing structures trigger organizational conflicts, which mark the transition from one 
stage to the next. In addition, profitability and innovation⎯the other performance 
components⎯usually accelerate growth. 
Yet interestingly the correlations between portfolio efficiency and performance and between 
portfolio efficiency and organizational development are almost as strong, each explaining up 
to 50%. Therefore, alliance portfolio efficiency plays a mayor strategic role and heavily 
influences the development of NTBFs. Fast adaptation of networks according to the 
underlying resource requirements leads to improved entrepreneurial performance. On the 
other hand, organizational change defines resource requirements in a stepwise fashion. 
Therefore, alliance portfolio and organizational change are interdependent. Co-evolution 
between partnership networks and NTBF’s organization exist. 
In summary, organizational steps define overall requirements. Alliance networks help to 
fulfill these requirements. The faster the partnership adjusts to the requirements, the faster 
the organization develops. 
Different skills support the firms in establishing and maintaining efficient alliance 
portfolios. These skills comprise capabilities for acquiring partners, and capabilities for to 
managing the portfolio. The structure of this allying process is presented in the next section. 
Processes 
Alliance portfolios are facilitated by an underlying allying process. This process supports 
shifts in the alliance portfolio structure and the resource exchange between the participating 
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partners. As consistently assessed in the within-segment analyses, the allying process 
consists of three phases, a strategic pre-phase (with most steps not part of the allying 
process), an alliance formation phase, and an alliance management phase. Every phase can 
be split up into steps. The phases, the steps, and crucial capabilities for each step are 
depicted in table 27. 
 
Phases Steps Crucial capabilities 
Strategy review • Developing strategic concepts • Breaking them down into products and projects 
Deriving resource require. • Developing a sourcing strategy for every project 
Strategy pre-
phase 
Defining alliance needs • Working out alliance concepts with a clear vision, 
specifying 
− What to achieve 
− How the corporation should be structured  
− With which type of company to partner 
Search & screening • Drawing market portfolios of partner industries, thereby 
using market data as research and broker reports 
• Evaluating strategic fit in an overlap matrix, excluding 
direct and indirect competitors, and overlap in business 
units or markets 
Contacting • Attracting a good supervisory board (with extensive 
personal contacts) 
• Reputation created through previous projects is crucial is 
particularly important in competitive situations 
• Unplanned alliance opportunities are an additional source 
of alliances. They depend on: 
− Reputation  
− Prior alliances and projects 
Formation 
phase 
Contracting • Finding a fair alliance model, assuring win-win situations, 
especially when negotiating revenue sharing deals 
• Flexible contracts, no exclusivity, including trial phases 
• Setting precise alliance targets 
Operating • Building personal contacts to counterparts: − Directness 
− Trust 
− Honesty 
• Communication 
− Clear 
− In partnership 
− Strategic 
Controlling • Measuring alliance targets, revenues in particular, every 3 
to 6 months 
• Reputation is also important but plays a minor role 
Management 
phase 
Realignment or 
termination 
• If alliance targets are not met, it is important to signal the 
deviation and start renegotiating the contract early. A 
long misfit almost surely leads to termination of the 
partnership 
Table 27   Allying process - steps and capabilities 
Despite the fact that overall structure of the process is fairly similar for all case study firms, 
the underlying capabilities are cultivated in different ways and the implementation and 
formalization also differ quite significantly. The within-segment analyses show that 
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companies that have implemented the allying process very thoroughly, formed more 
alliances and are better capable of restructuring the alliance portfolio. 
With these process level findings, the cross-segment analysis is completed. In the next 
section, a conceptual model is built based on the results acquired. It covers alliance portfolio 
dynamics and organizational change. 
3.5.2 Tentative hypotheses 
Based on the contextual case descriptions, this section now closes by summarizing the 
findings of this cross-segment analysis. The summary is presented by providing first an 
overall co-evolution argument, which is subsequently broken down into a set of tentative 
hypotheses. The hypotheses are tentative because they will be evaluated in the context of the 
existing literature for further refinement and because the extension of theory that will build 
on the tentative hypotheses, will eventually be subject to large-sample quantitative testing 
(Zaby, 1999).  
Co-evolution aspects between alliance portfolio and organization 
The alliance portfolio influences organizational development and vice versa. An alliance 
portfolio makes required resources accessible. The efficient ‘delivery’ of required resources 
increases firm’s performance, which drives organizational growth and change. The 
efficiency of the alliance portfolio depends on the firm’s partner acquisition capabilities and 
its alliance management capabilities.  
The organizational growth and change that often takes place stepwise, creates new 
organizational problems that determine⎯also often step-wise⎯shifts in resource 
requirements. These new requirements induce shifts in the alliance portfolio structure. The 
better the alliance portfolio is adjusted according to the resource needs, the more efficient 
the organization is, and the earlier the next development stage is reached. This co-evolution 
circle is depicted in figure 57. 
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Figure 57   Coevolution of alliance portfolio and organization 
In the following paragraphs, this comprehensive model is broken down into a set of 
hypotheses. The overall co-evolution hypothesis is broken down into three parts:  
1. Alliance portfolio’s impact on performance 
2. Performance impact on organizational change and adjunct resource requirements 
3. Resource requirements’ impact on alliance portfolio shifts 
Subsequently, the relationships in each part are described and broken down into hypotheses. 
The overall co-evolution hypothesis is phrased as follows: 
 
Tentative hypothesis 1: The better an alliance portfolio is adjusted to the step-wise 
changing resource requirements, the faster the firm develops. (Alliance Darwinism) 
 
The underlying hypotheses are presented separately. 
Alliance portfolio’s impact on performance 
NTBF’s performance, measured in growth, profitability, and technological distinctiveness, is 
improved through the alliance portfolio. These performance improvements depend on the 
efficiency of the alliance portfolio, which can act through different levers. These levers are 
depicted in figure 58. 
The relationship between alliance efficiency and firm performance is formulated in 
hypothesis 2. 
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firm 
performance
Survival
Growth
Profitability
....
firm's technology
....
market structure
potential partners
Higher leverage 
of resources 
Superior distri-
bution channels 
Superior 
technology 
Superior 
components 
Portfolio mgt.
capabilities
alliance portfolio 
firmfir
environmentir t
Partner 
acquisition 
capabilities
3
2
Hypothesist i1Performance impact of alliance portfolio
4
Tentative hypothesis 2: The better the firm can (1) leverage its resources, (2) access superior 
distribution channels, (3) access external product and service technologies, and (4) access 
superior supply via alliances, the better the companies perform in terms of (a) growth, (b) 
profitability and (c) technological innovation. 
 
   
  
   
   
   
   
  
   
  
   
   
   
Figure 58   Hypothesis 2, 3, and 4 
Therefore, the alliance portfolio efficiency depends on, first, how well the alliance portfolio 
structure can be adjusted according to resource needs by partner acquisition and, second, by 
partner management activities. These relations are formulated in the next two hypotheses. 
 
Tentative hypothesis 3: The better the partner acquisition capabilities, the faster alliance 
portfolio structures can be established and adjusted; thereby its efficiency is increased. 
Tentative hypothesis 4: The better the portfolio management capabilities, the better the 
alliance portfolio efficiency because they (1) allow for intensified resource exchange and (2) 
eliminate alliance portfolio inefficiencies. 
 
The following ten hypotheses describe alliance formation and alliance management 
capabilities in greater detail. 
CASE STUDIES 176 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
potential partners
alliance portfolio 
Partner acquisition capabilitiesrt r i iti  iliti
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(strategic skills)
Reputation
Supervisory board
(agents)
Project skills
(Realization speed)
firmfir
environmentir t
3
5
6
7
8
Hypothesist i1Partner acquisition capabilities
9
Partner acquisition skills 
The quality of partner acquisition skills depend on the strategic skills to select the best 
partner, the networking skills to contact the relevant partner, and the contracting skills to 
structure partnership deals. The important factors are depicted in figure 59. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 59   Hypothesis 5 to 9 
The specific drivers influencing alliance formation skills are subsequently formulated in 
hypotheses 5 through 9.  
 
Tentative hypothesis 5: The better the ability to develop alliance concepts and select 
appropriate partners, the better the partner acquisition capabilities. 
Tentative hypothesis 6: The better the firm’s reputation, the better the partner acquisition 
capabilities. 
Tentative hypothesis 7: The better the directorates (i.e., higher profile) and closely related 
agents, the better the partner acquisition capabilities.  
Tentative hypothesis 8: The better the alliance project skills that are dependent on the 
alliance portfolio, the better the partner acquisition capabilities  (reinforcing mechanism). 
 
Tentative hypothesis 9: The better the existing alliance portfolio and the more diverse the 
alliance history, the better the partner acquisition capabilities due to (1) better alliance 
opportunities, (2) better reputation (outside effects), and (3) better project skills (interior 
effect). 
Alliance portfolio management 
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The quality of alliance portfolio management depends on how good resources can be 
exchanged, how effectively abuse of management capacities can be reduced, and how fast 
inefficient alliances are terminated. The important factors are depicted in figure 60. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 60   Hypothesis 10 to 14 
The specific drivers influencing alliance management capabilities are subsequently 
formulated in hypotheses 10 through 14. 
 
Tentative hypothesis 10: The better the ability to adjust partnerships to maintain win-win 
situations, which requires flexible alliance contracts, the better the partner management 
capabilities.  
 
Tentative hypothesis 11: The better the ability to embed partnership ties, the better 
resources can be exchanged and the more stable partnership links will be. Therefore, the 
better the ability to embed partnership ties as part of alliance management capabilities, the 
better the alliance portfolio efficiency. 
 
Tentative hypothesis 12: The better the ability to communicate, the better the ability to 
embed partnership ties. 
 
Tentative hypothesis 13: The better the ability to build trust, the better the ability to embed 
partnership ties. 
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Tentative hypothesis 14: The more tightly the ability to control partnerships according 
dynamic corporate goals, the better the portfolio management capabilities. 
 
These 13 hypotheses (2 through 14) describe and cover the influence of alliance portfolios 
on firm performance. The next set of hypotheses takes up the relationships between 
performance, organizational change, and resource requirements. 
Performance impact on resource requirements 
Resources are important for competitive advantage and performance. Thereby, it is not only 
the firm’s controlled resources that are important, but also the resources accessed through 
alliances. Efficient access particularly to these external resources leads to higher 
performance of NTBFs. Sustainable high performance leads to competitive advantage, 
which is formulated in hypotheses 15 and 16. 
 
Tentative hypothesis 15: The more effectively a NTBF accesses rare sustainable inimitable 
non-substitutable resources through the alliance portfolio, the better the company’s 
performance and, therefore, the higher its competitive advantage. 
 
Tentative hypothesis 16: The better a NTBF is capable of rearranging its alliance portfolio 
according changing resource requirements (dynamic capability), the better the company’s 
performance and, therefore, the higher its competitive advantage. 
 
Competitive advantage leads to faster growth. This growth runs smoothly for longer periods 
of time, but then creates organizational problems that then have to be resolved by changing 
the organizational system. New organizational structures define new organizational 
development stages. Hypotheses 17 and 18 cover this issue. 
 
Tentative hypothesis 17: The higher the competitive advantage the faster the 
organizational growth, which happens step-wise. 
 
Tentative hypothesis 18: New development stages are characterized by new challenges and 
problems that create additional resource requirements. The problems shift from reputation 
and technology issues in the beginning, to supply questions, and to distribution and market 
access problems. 
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Therefore, the step-wise organizational changes create new strategic problems and changing 
resource requirements, which must be managed and abided by. The impact of changing 
resource requirements on alliance portfolios and the required capabilities to manage those 
are covered by the last set of hypotheses. 
Resource requirements’ impact on alliance portfolio shifts 
Shifts in resource requirements lead to shifts in alliance portfolio structure and thus 
influence the network dynamic. Dynamic capabilities are required to facilitate the structural 
alliance portfolio shifts. 
 
Tentative hypothesis 19: Shifts in resource requirements lead to changes in alliance 
portfolios. This is facilitated and enabled through allying capabilities, which is a dynamic 
skill. 
 
These hypotheses are the result of exploratory case-based research. At this point, the 
hypotheses are interrelated and specific to the emerging Mobile Internet industry. Therefore, 
they are not yet applicable for large-sample empirical testing. They are in need of further 
refinement. This refinement is achieved by examining the relevant literature. In the 
following chapter the case study findings are examined in the context of the literature on 
network dynamics, organizational development, and network management with the aim to 
develop a extension of the theory on network dynamics. 
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4. Theoretical perspectives on alliance portfolios and organizational 
coevolution 
This chapter aims to refine the findings from the case studies. It does not constitute a break 
from the previous chapter but rather represents a continuation of the process of the case 
study research and corresponds to the step ‘enfolding literature’ in Eisenhardt’s approach 
(1989). As pointed out in the discussion of the methodological foundations of this study 
(chapter 2.2), case descriptions and analyses should ideally be theory free, allowing the 
researcher to capture the richness of the cases without bias77. Only after tentative hypotheses 
have been derived from cases, should theory be enfolded (Eisenhardt, 1989). It is an 
essential component of case-based hypothesis formation and theory extension that the 
tentative hypothesis be juxtaposed with conflicting and similar theoretical findings. Thus, 
the tentative hypotheses can be challenged, corroborated, and eventually refined in such a 
way that together they serve as an extension to theory (Zaby, 1999)⎯that is, in this study, an 
extension of the dynamics of networks and their interplay with organizational change. 
The literature to be incorporated and considered in the context of the case study results 
consists of a broad body of theoretical writings in (1) the field of alliance and network 
theory, (2) resource-, skill- and capability-based concepts of strategic management, and (3) 
organizational change theory. The latter two are well-established fields. In contrast, in 
network theory, much is still unknown about the dynamics of network changes (Gulati, 
1998). In addition, studies rarely associated all three fields with each other. This study 
addresses an argument that links these fields by assessing the impact of strategic alliances on 
competitive advantage and organizational change and the implication of this change on 
alliance portfolio dynamics (see figure 61). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 61   Relavant theories 
                                                 
77  Thereby, theory-free refers to having no theoretical framework or pre-formulated hypotheses in 
mind. 
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Section 4.1 analyzes the case findings in the context of alliance and network theories. In a 
first step, NTBFs’ motives to build alliance networks and their performance implications are 
highlighted. Consequently, several of the most interesting aspects of network theory are 
discussed, including approaches that focus on the process of alliance formation and alliance 
management. A discussion of the dynamic aspects of alliance networks concludes this 
section. 
Section 4.2 addresses how and why resources and capabilities are important factors for 
determining strategic competitive advantages. This section will be concluded by an outlook 
on how these resources and capabilities are affected by dynamic changes in the industry 
setting.  
Finally, section 4.3 presents views on how life cycle models capture and frame the idea of 
organizational change and how they may likewise offer support for the constant reallocation 
and reconfiguration of resources, which will again force the organization to adapt to its 
environment through adjusted network structures. In all three sections, the discussion is 
restricted to the most prominent theoretical approaches due to the broadness of the 
disciplines.  
This thesis culminates in chapter 5⎯the conclusion on co-evolution relationship between an 
NTBF’s alliance portfolio and organization⎯toward which the entire fourth chapter works. 
The final chapter of this study ties together the case study results and the discussion of the 
three theoretical areas. In doing so, a model is proposed that attempts to explain the dynamic 
of networks and organizations and their reciprocal interferences. The model thus suggests an 
extension of the theory on network dynamics. In Yin’s (1984, p.21) terminology, this 
inductively generated model, which is the result of case-based ‘analytical generalization’, 
will serve as a basis for future large sample ‘statistical generalization’ of the co-evolution 
aspects of NTBFs organization and network. 
4.1 Alliance networks 
The field of alliance and network theory has become increasingly popular in the last 15 
years. The growing intensity of alliances in many industries (see Hagedoorn, 1993), which 
Doz and Hamel (1998) explain as a logical and timely response to intense and rapid changes 
in economic activity, technology, and globalization, has attracted many scholars. Both 
Auster (1994) and Gulati (1998) gave comprehensive summaries of the current status of 
research in this field. In the current literature, six different topics can be identified, four of 
which are concerned with the sequence of events in alliances and networks (their formation, 
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governance, management, and dynamics) and two of which are concerned with performance 
outcomes (for the alliance or network itself and for the participating firms). All six topics 
can be analyzed on an alliance level (dyad or tryad) or on a network level. The structure of 
these different lines of research is depicted in figure 62. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 62   Alliance and network theory 
Out of these twelve research areas, five are relevant to this study. The literature on 
performance consequences for firms entering those networks is important for discussing the 
impact of alliance portfolios on the performance of the case study firms and to understand 
firms’ motives to enter those alliances (tentative hypothesis 2). The performance depends on 
alliance portfolio effectiveness78, which is influenced by two factors: partner acquisition 
skills and alliance portfolio management skills. Therefore, the literature on alliance 
formation is required to discuss hypotheses concerned with partner acquisition (tentative 
hypotheses 3 and 5 to 9); the literature on alliance and network management is relevant for 
discussing the hypotheses on management skills (tentative hypotheses 4 and 10 to 14). The 
impact of shifts in resource requirements on the structure of alliance portfolios will be 
discussed in the context of the literature on network dynamics (tentative hypothesis 19). 
To organize the discussion according the sequence of the hypotheses, this chapter has the 
following structure. After defining the relevant terminology and listing basic theoretical 
concepts, the first part discusses the implications of alliance networks on performance. The 
two subsequent sections cover alliance formation and network and alliance management 
topics including their dynamics. This chapter closes with a conclusion on the applicability of 
current alliance and network literature. 
                                                 
78  An efficient alliance portfolio isone that provides access to more diverse information and 
capabilities per alliance, and thus produce desired benefits with minimum costs of redundancy, 
conflict, and complexity (Baum, et al., 2000) 
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4.1.1 Terminology and basic theoretical concepts 
The rich line of research addressing alliances and network has created a plurality of 
definitions and theories. For the purpose of this study, a broad definition of alliances 
provided, for example, by Gomes-Casseres (1997) and Gulati (1998) is very useful, as it 
encompasses the diverse variety of alliances79 that is present in the Mobile Internet industry. 
According to this definition80: 
 
‘… an alliance is an administrative arrangement to govern an incomplete contract between 
separate firms in which each partner has limited control. These arrangements can take 
different forms⎯from joint ventures, to joint R&D programs, to cooperative marketing 
arrangements⎯but each aims to govern joint decision making among partners’ (Gomes-
Casseres, 1997).  
 
Alliances blur the boundaries of firms, making it difficult to discern where one firm ends 
and where another⎯or the market⎯begins. Alliances do this because they are 
organizational structures that combine features of both firms (hierarchies) and markets. 
An inter-firm (alliance) network is conceived and defined as a set of firms, generally 
characterized by different preferences and resources, coordinated through a mix of 
mechanisms not limited to price, exit, and background regulation (Grandori, 1999). 
Therefore, a network is a set of alliances linking together more than two companies. 
In this study, the case study firms did not establish tightly knit networks, but either 
participated through links in different networks or had dyadic alliances to different firms. 
Therefore, terms such as a ‘set of alliances’ or an ‘alliance portfolio’ best characterize the 
kind of low-density81 alliance network with many structural holes82 that are analyzed in this 
study. Furthermore, other scholars such as Bamford (2002) and Stuart (2000) also used the 
                                                 
79  The term ‘strategic alliance’ subsumes different collaboration forms, ranging from joint 
ventures, and cooperations with minority stakes, to arm’s length distribution partnerships 
(compare Mowery, et al., 1996, p. 80). 
80  Gulati’s (1998) definition is very similar. He defines strategic alliances as voluntary 
arrangements between firms involving exchange, sharing, or co-development of products, 
technologies, or services. They can occur as a result of a wide range of motives and goals, take a 
variety of forms, and occur across vertical and horizontal boundaries. 
81  Density of a network refers to the extensiveness of ties between organizations, and is measured 
by comparing the total number of ties present to the potential number that would occur if every 
unit in the network were connected to every other unit (Dubini, et al., 1991) 
82  For structural holes see Burt (1992) 
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term alliance portfolio to describe this kind of alliance network found especially in high 
technology industries. 
 
Of the proposed theories concerning alliances and networks, three basic approaches 
constitute its theoretical foundation (Ireland, et al., 2002): (1) transaction cost economics 
(TCE), (2) social network theory, and (3) the resource-based view on alliances or the 
resource dependency theory. 
(1) The TCE argument suggests that alliances are more efficient than markets or hierarchies 
when they minimize the firm’s transaction costs (Jarillo, 1989). Thus, successful alliances 
are a product of the organization of a firm’s boundary-spanning activities to minimize the 
sum of its transaction and production costs (Williamson, 1981). 
(1) Social network theory suggests that the firm’s strategic actions are affected by the 
social context in which the actions and the firm are embedded (Burt, 1997). The firm’s 
social context includes both direct and indirect ties with network actors. The context 
includes both inter-organizational and intra-organizational resource relationships (Madhok, 
et al., 1998). 
(3) The resource-based perspective suggests that the firm is a collection of heterogeneous 
resources (tangible and intangible assets that are semi-permanently tied to the company). 
Sustained resource heterogeneity is a potential source of competitive advantage (Das, et al., 
2000). The resource-based alliance argument suggests that firms use alliances to locate the 
optimal resource configuration in which the value of their resources is maximized relative to 
other possible combinations (Das, et al., 2000). Thus, alliances are used to develop a 
collection of value-creating resources⎯often complementary ones⎯that a firm cannot 
create independently.  
Closely linked to the resource-based view on alliances is resource dependency theory 
(Pfeffer, et al., 1978), which builds on the exchange perspective. It suggests that 
organizations enter partnerships when they perceive critical strategic interdependence with 
other organizations in their environment, in which one organization has resources or 
capabilities that are beneficial to but not possessed by others. Applied to the dyadic context, 
these arguments suggest that firms sought out ties with partners who could help them 
manage such strategic interdependencies. This proposes the necessity for complementary 
recourses as a key driver of inter-organizational cooperation. The strategic interdependence 
perspective on alliance formation suggests that firms ally with those with whom they share 
the greatest interdependence (Nohria, et al., 1991).  
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 185 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
The firm's context specific and context independent resources
Source: Author, based on Rizzoni (1993), Yli-Renko and Autio (1998)
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These theories will be used to analyze and understand the impact of an alliance portfolio on 
performance, its formation, its management, and its dynamics in the next sections. This 
alliance perspective is important because the traditional body of entrepreneurship research 
has considered NTBFs in relative isolation from their environment (Roberts, 1991; Slatter, 
1992). In this tradition the interrelatedness of NTBFs and the other actors in their 
environment tended to be overlooked. Research has focused extensively on the direct 
organic growth of the firm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 63   Relevant resource scope 
The catalyzing impact for NTBFs, delivered through technology interactions in innovation 
networks or co-development partnership with large clients, has not received the attention it 
deserves (Yli-Renko, et al., 1998). Many entrepreneurship models are too narrow because 
they enclose only a subset of a firm’s relevant resources⎯namely its own. However, for its 
strategic development, its shared environment (external resources) plays a significant role. 
Recent empirical papers (i.e., Baum, et al., 2000) and industry reports (Booz Allen 
Hamilton, 2001b) clearly show evidence of the impact of strategic alliances on NTBFs’ 
performance. 
4.1.2 Alliance motives and network performance consequences  
A common characteristic of NTBFs is fast growth. A common problem for their managers is 
obtaining enough resources to accommodate that growth. Gaining access to those resources 
becomes the ‘first’ entrepreneurial problem (Jarillo, 1989). Networking is a way to 
overcome this problem. Networking is a system by which NTBFs can tap resources that are 
external to them⎯that is, resources that they do not control. Networking consists of the use 
of relationships to obtain financing, access to distribution channels, and know-how, as 
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examples. (Birley, 1986). The ability to exploit resources that are outside the entrepreneur’s 
control is a constant of entrepreneurial, high-growth management. Many scholars such as 
Jarillo (1989) view the essence of entrepreneurship precisely in the ability and willingness to 
use external resources. NTBFs use external resources when they try to grow faster than the 
limits set by resources they currently control. 
On its own initiative, a firm identifies the need for an alliance, identifies the best partner 
available, and chooses an appropriate contract to formalize the alliance. Strategic alliances 
arise when firms in vulnerable strategic positions need resources that alliances can provide 
(Eisenhardt, et al., 1996). This highlights the importance of vulnerable strategic positions 
(i.e., new markets, many competitors, and pioneering technology) in analyzing alliances, 
especially in an entrepreneurial context. This is precisely the motivating issues for this 
study, which asks in an industry specific, entrepreneurial context: what is the effect of 
alliances and networks on the performance of firms entering into them?  
Analyzing case study results in context of the relevant literature 
As seen in the case studies, firm performance, as measured in terms of growth, profitability, 
and technological innovation, is affected by alliance activities in four ways. As formulated 
in tentative hypothesis #2: The better the firm can (1) leverage its resources, (2) access 
superior distribution channels, (3) access external product and service technologies, and (4) 
access superior supply via alliances, the better the company performs in terms of (a) 
growth, (b) profitability, and (c) technological innovation. 
Performance outcomes and the relevant levers, the two aspects of this hypothesis, will now 
be discussed. 
Performance outcomes 
Different scholars have contributed to the body of literature on performance outcomes of 
alliances and networks (i.e., Baum, et al., 2000; Jarillo, 1989; Stuart, 2000). Various 
dependent variables have been applied as measures of performance. The most commonly 
applied are also measured in this study: (a) growth, (b) profitability, and (c) technological 
innovation. The relevant empirical findings are discussed subsequently. 
Growth: As one of the earliest studies on alliances, Jarillo’s (1989) work showed statistical 
support that entrepreneurial firms that engaged in especially intensive alliance activities 
show significantly higher growth rates. In his sample of 1902 publicly-traded US 
companies, the group with intensive alliance activities accounted for a 64% higher sales 
growth (Jarillo, 1989, p. 145).  
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Other scholars have found similar connections, such as Powell and colleagues (1996), who 
studied a sample of young firms in the biotechnology industry. In their sample, the 
companies that formed many alliances experienced accelerated growth rates. Stuart (2000) 
in an analysis of 1600 alliances of 150 semiconductor firms found that sales growth rates 
were linked to the quality of the alliance portfolio. In contrast, the simple count of the 
number of alliances formed was not a significant predictor in his model, which supports this 
study in accounting for different alliance intensities. 
All these studies are consistent in that alliances accelerate ventures’ growth in terms of sales. 
Therefore, growth is a viable performance outcome of alliances. 
Profitability: P&L profitability is an often mentioned performance outcome. Unfortunately 
it is rarely measured and has only been supported by an early study by Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven (1990). They examined 96 newly-founded US semiconductor firms. Past 
experience of the top management team and their associated networks impacted not only 
growth but also long-term profitability. 
There are different potential reasons why there is only limited evidence for the implications 
of alliance networks on profitability. The three most obvious are (1) limited data 
accessibility, (2) measurement problems, and (3) limited suitability as performance 
measures through their short-term focus. (1) P&L data from entrepreneurial firms is often 
hard to access because these often privately held organizations are reluctant to report these 
figures. (2) Measurement problems exist due to the fact that it is nearly impossible to 
measure, whether ceteris paribus the formation of an alliance or a change in the portfolio 
makes the portfolio more efficient and, thereby, creates competitive advantage for an 
individual firm. There are three major problems, which have not yet been addressed:  
- How to measure alliance portfolio effectiveness. 
- How to compare alliance portfolio effectiveness of different organizations. 
- How to account for the fact, that low performers often lack more resources, which 
force them to build additional alliances. Therefore, alliance intensity of weak 
performers might be higher than of high performers due to their resource 
configuration, which distorts many statistical results. 
More case-based research is needed to completely understand the relationship between 
alliances and profitability, and to statistically demonstrate this effect. This study is an 
attempt to shed light on this relationship. 
Finally, (3) P&L profitability is often not suitable because it is a short-term measure. It is 
not capable of indicating the mid-term perspective of growing NTBFs. In Biotechnology in 
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particular, where the first revenues are earned years after the foundation, P&L profitability is 
not applicable for measuring performance.  
On the other hand, recent years have shown that even NTBFs have to focus on the bottom 
line, which is clearly the case for all of the case study firms. Therefore, this study tries to 
provide additional insight into the link between alliance portfolio effectiveness and P&L. 
Technological innovation: Relatively more is known about the impact of alliance networks 
on technological innovation. Shan and his colleagues (1994) showed that cumulative 
cooperative ties with commercial firms that were established by 85 US biopharmaceutical 
startups between their foundation and 1989 positively influenced their cumulated output 
(patents issued) over the same period. Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman (1996) and 
Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994) had similar findings. They explained high patenting 
activities and performance were a consequence of technology alliances and demonstrated a 
positive relationship between entry into these technology alliances and innovation rates. 
Baum and colleagues (2000) examined the performance implications of 142 biotechnology 
firms founded in Canada during the six-year period from January 1991 to December 1996. 
He found that innovative performance, reflected in startup’s patenting and R&D spending 
growth, was most clearly and strongly influenced by their alliances. The stronger impact on 
innovation-related performance is consistent with the widely-held belief that alliance 
networks form a locus of innovation in high-technology fields (Powell, et al., 1996). 
Stuart (2000) in an analysis of the alliances of 150 semiconductor companies asked whether 
alliance partners have an impact on firm’s rate of innovation in general. In his study, he 
offered additional evidence to confirm the prevalent assumption that strategic alliances can 
improve the innovation rate. In his patent rate analysis, the results demonstrated that the 
important determinants of the strength of the alliance-performance link are the attribute 
profiles of the firms and the intensity of the link, not the count of alliances or the 
accumulated number of previous alliances. 
These studies show consistently that alliance networks⎯and specifically their 
effectiveness⎯strongly influence technological innovation. 
In conclusion, all three dependent variables used as performance measures in chapters 3.2 
through 3.4 have been previously applied and their use supported in the literature. In 
contrast, the impact of alliances on venture’s profitability requires further case study 
research to better understand this relationship. In addition, Baum and Oliver (1991) and 
others discussed survival as another performance outcome. They examined the relationship 
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between the extent to which firms are embedded83 in alliances and the likelihood of their 
survival. The results of these studies suggest that alliance network ties are generally 
beneficial in enhancing survival chances (Baum, et al., 1991; Uzzi, 1996). However, 
because the firms in this study cannot be discriminated according this criterion⎯all have 
survived so far⎯it is not discussed further.  
Alliance and network levers on performance 
Several scholars have focused on the question of what precisely are the levers of alliances 
and networks on performance (i.e., Eisenhardt, et al., 1996; Hagedoorn, 1993; Williamson, 
1981). The principal theoretical approach for understanding these implications is transaction 
cost economics (Williamson, 1981). However, the logic of transaction cost minimization 
does not capture all of the strategic advantages of alliances, such as creation of legitimacy 
and fast market entry (Eisenhardt, et al., 1996). It is too specific to explain the whole variety 
of alliance levers, especially the non-financial ones. A broader and more recent body of 
literature has shown that alliances⎯besides their (4) sourcing advantages⎯can also lead to 
advantages concerning access to (1+2) superior distribution as well as (3) technological 
know-how and legitimacy: 
Distribution: Alliances can help firms to gain market power (Hagedoorn, 1993), move 
quickly into new markets, and create options for future investments (Kogut, 1991). Market 
power can be improved either because (1) the alliance partner is a customer for the product 
or because (2) the distribution channel and selling power of the partners can be used or 
combined (Eisenhardt, et al., 1996). 
Almost all case study firms pursue both approaches. An example of a close customer 
relationship is Multicharts’ cooperation with Sparda Bank, in which it developed a web-
based prototype Aktiensignale from its DOS-based brokerage tool Multichart 2000. A good 
case example for accessing external distribution channels and selling power is Gate5’s 
project, in which it aims to integrate its technology into a module of SAP’s ERP system to 
benefit from SAP’s marketing and distribution power. 
The literature summarizes firm’ motives for forming distribution alliances into two clusters: 
(a) internationalization, globalization, and entry into foreign markets and (b) new products 
and markets, market entry, and expansion of product range. The second category (b) is 
critical for the NTBFs in this study (see Hagedoorn (1993, p. 373) for a list of recent 
studies). 
                                                 
83 A detailed discussion on embeddedness follows after the next section 
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Both TCE and resource dependency arguments can explain case study behavior. As in the 
case of Gate5, the distribution partnerships with SAP is cost efficient. Its products, which are 
based on new technology, are not ready for standardized mass-markets and establishing a 
big sales force to distribute them to corporate clients is too time consuming and expensive. 
Using SAP’s sales and marketing power is therefore explained by the TCE framework. 
However, Gate5’s behavior can also be explained by resource dependency theory. Being 
strong in technological development, Gate5 contracted with SAP because it has excellent 
complementary distribution skills to sell its technology. 
Know-how and legitimacy: Alliances can also serve as opportunities for gaining new 
competencies (Hagedoorn, 1993) and as signals of enhanced legitimacy for firms (Baum, et 
al., 1991). The close interfirm relationships within alliances can provide specific technology 
and know-how-based resources (Shan, 1990). In addition, cooperating with another 
organization can give a firm visibility and signal enhanced status to would-be buyers, 
suppliers, and employees (Baum, et al., 1991).  
In the case of new high technology industries, these two factors are often difficult to 
separate, because established technology leaders are usually widely reputed and capable of 
transferring legitimacy. A case example is Nokia’s developer program, which was joined by 
a number of case study, firms such as Yellowmap and e-hotel. On the one hand, firms access 
know-how of new technological standards; on the other hand, the partnership with Nokia 
signals legitimacy to network operators in particular.  
However, not all technology or know-how partnerships have this legitimacy aspect. Gate5’s 
cooperation with Location.net84 and Airweb’s partnership with Dialogic85 are purely driven 
by the desire to access technology. These partnerships are often formed later in the lifecycle, 
whereas partnerships formed for primarily reputational purposes, such as those with 
Siemens, Nokia, and Alcatel, were created in the first two stages. 
The literature summarizes companies’ motives for forming technology alliances, in two 
clusters: (1) shortening the product life cycle by reducing the period between invention and 
market introduction, and (2) technology transfer and technological leapfrogging. The focus 
of the case study firms is mainly on the first category (see, Hagedoorn, 1993, p. 373) for a 
list of relevant studies). Through the support of technology partners, they try to focus on 
their core technology, a phenomenon Nakamura (1996) called ‘complementary 
                                                 
84  Location.net offers mapping technology 
85  Dialogic offers text to speech software 
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specialization’. Thereby the firms close the gap between whole product and product86 with 
the help of alliance partners. 
Social network theory offers a good explanation for how alliance partners can provide 
legitimacy. The close embeddedness with the partner enables the transfer of trust from the 
well-regarded partner to the NTBF. Such partnerships correspond to a quality certificate 
(Stuart, 2000). 
Resource dependency theory offers an explanation for the motivation behind pure 
technology partnerships. Required complementary resources motivate these alliances, such 
as in the case of Airweb. Airweb requires the complementary resource ‘text to speech 
software’. Aside from its content base and its multi-access mobile platform, this software is 
a critical element for offering the whole product: mobile speech services. This requirement 
drove the above-mentioned partnership with Dialogic. 
Sourcing: Establishing strategic alliances is a central strategy for NTBFs for sourcing 
resources and sharing risks. This risk and cost sharing eases profit pressures and gives 
partners the slack they need to ride out difficult times and to learn better ways to compete 
(Baum, et al., 1991). Kogut (1991) further refined the importance of these resource 
considerations by suggesting that many alliances and joint ventures occur as options for 
future expansion and are interim mechanisms by which firms both buffer and explore 
uncertainty.  
The work of Baum and Kogut has two common denominators with respect to when: 
sourcing partnerships are formed when they are (1) cost efficient or (2) risk reducing. The 
second aspect is especially important in industries such as pharmaceuticals, 
telecommunications and commercial aircraft, where capital requirements for development 
projects are so high that firms need to spread the costs and risks of innovation (Mowery, et 
al., 1996).  
Both of these aspects can be found in the case data. An example of cost effectiveness is e-
hotel’s access to discounted hotel room contingents through its alliance with INNXS. This 
cooperation reduces dramatically its costs to access cheaper hotel fares. An example of risk 
reduction is Airweb’s joint mobile content activities with L’équipe and Rheinische Post, 
which reduce its own editorial costs as well as its market risks, because the partnership 
contracts enclose minimum fixed payments for its co-branded information services.  
                                                 
86  The distinction between product (firm’s own value creation) and whole product (sold product 
bundle) is explained in chapter 3.2 Gate5 
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In addition to these two reasons, the case study data show a third sourcing alliance motive. 
Certain resources can only be obtained through a partnership agreement. For this kind of 
resource, no markets exist, and developing these resources in-house would either financially 
overstrain the firms or would be simply impossible. Good examples of this third aspect is 
the sourcing alliance for access to stock quote data from Deutsche Börse in the case of 
Multichart, and for access to Schober’s business address database including regularly 
updates in the case of YellowMap.  
All of these sourcing alliances are vehicles for accessing resources rather than for acquiring 
capabilities; learning is not crucial. 
As in the case of distribution motivation, TCE as well as resource dependency argument can 
explain case study behavior. Cost advantages are best explained with transaction cost 
economics arguments, yet the sourcing from otherwise not available resources is accounted 
for by resource dependency theory. 
Despite studies that contradict certain performance and motivation aspects, such as 
Hagedoorn’s (1993, p. 381) denial of the relevance of sourcing partnerships for NTBFs, 
hypothesis #2 is strongly supported by the literature. The resource dependency theory 
(Pfeffer, et al., 1978) is particularly helpful for understanding the underlying motivation 
behind the case study alliances (i.e., by answering the question why these alliances exist). 
This finding is in line with the results of Stuart and colleagues (1999), which suggest that 
NTBFs should actively seek exchange partners. In their articles, they concluded with the 
following relevant remark: 
 
‘…the interesting question is the conditions under which they [NTBFs] will succeed at 
recruiting such partners. It would greatly improve our knowledge of the organization-
building process to understand these relationships’ (Stuart, et al., 1999, p. 347) 
 
This is precisely the question that is tackled in the next section, which discusses the 
following questions: How these alliances are formed? Which factors and skills facilitate and 
ease their formation? How do firm attract and acquire partners? 
4.1.3 Partner acquisition 
Partner acquisition is discussed in literature under the description of alliance formation, for 
which different scholars have discussed reasons. Kogut (1988) mentions three motivations: 
transaction costs resulting from small numbers bargaining, strategic behavior that lead firms 
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to try to enhance their competitive positioning or market power, and a quest for 
organizational knowledge or learning. These points have been discussed in the preceding 
section in the discussion of the question of why firms form alliances, and what their 
performance implications are. 
A set of studies on alliance formation focused on the question of how firms build alliances. 
Scholars examined some additional factors linked with alliance formation. Industry-level 
aspects included development stages of markets and competitive uncertainty (Eisenhardt, et 
al., 1996; Shan, 1990). Social network aspects included the importance of social capital 
(Burt, 1997). Although industry-level aspects cannot be tested with this single industry 
study, the impact of social capital is of particular relevance. 
Ireland, Hitt, and Vaidyanath (2002) summarized the recent stream of research and 
organized 49 empirical papers according their theoretical rationales. A subset explains how 
alliance portfolio effectiveness depends on how well the alliance portfolio structure can be 
adjusted according to resource needs. Different scholars (i.e., Chung, et al., 2000; Gulati, 
1999; Hitt, et al., 2000) have suggested partner acquisition skills as an important factor for 
the effectiveness of alliance portfolios. 
Analyzing case study results in the context of the relevant literature 
In the case studies, alliance portfolio effectiveness, described as the cost efficient 
compliance of resources provided by alliance partners with the time and stage dependent 
resource requirements, is affected by partner acquisition skills. These skills enable the firm 
to adjust the portfolio by acquiring new partners with critical resources. This context is 
formulated in tentative hypothesis #3 and the sub-hypotheses #5 through #9. Tentative 
hypothesis #3 proposes: The better the partner acquisition capabilities, the faster alliance 
portfolio structures can be established and adjusted; thereby its effectiveness is increased. 
This is in line with the above-mentioned literature (Chung, et al., 2000; Gulati, 1999; Hitt, et 
al., 2000). 
As argued in the case study conclusion (chapter 3.5), partner acquisition skills depend on (1) 
the strategic skills to select the best partner, (2) the networking skills to contact and win 
relevant partners (influenced by reputation and interlocking directorates), (3) the project 
skills to structure partnership and to realize the deals, and (4) the alliance history, which 
influences alliance opportunities, the company’s reputation, and its project realization skills. 
These points are discussed subsequently. 
Partner selection 
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As formulated in tentative hypothesis #5, the case study results suggest that: The better the 
ability to select fitting partners, the better the partner acquisition capabilities. 
This finding is in line with results of other scholars (i.e., Johannisson, 1987; MacMillan, 
1983; Reuer, 1999). Reuer (1999) pointed out that deriving value from alliances requires 
companies to select the right partners and develop a suitable alliance design. Johannisson 
(1987) showed that effective entrepreneurs are able to chart their present network and to 
discriminate between production and symbolic ties, both of which demand selection skills. 
MacMillan (1983) found evidence that effective entrepreneurs were able to view effective 
networks as a crucial aspect for ensuring the success of their company. This implies that 
partner selection (an aspect of networking) is a strategic capability that consists of different 
dimensions⎯considered at present⎯relevant for success: some examples are attention to 
customers, understanding of the business, and market orientation. 
From a theoretical perspective, partner selection skills are an important aspect of the 
resource dependency theory, which attends to the circumstances surrounding alliance 
formation (Pfeffer, et al., 1978). According this theory, organizations enter partnerships 
when they perceive critical strategic interdependence with other organizations in their 
environment, in which one organization has resources or capabilities beneficial to but not 
possessed by the other. The resource dependency arguments suggest that firms sought out 
ties with partners who could help them manage such strategic interdependencies (Oliver, 
1990). The assessment of strategic interdependence is a critical predecessor to alliance 
formation. Therefore, strategic partner selection skills are crucial for the resource 
dependency theory. This hypothesis was empirically supported by Hitt and colleagues 
(2000), who found that complementary capabilities represented one of the most important 
criteria used to select strategic alliance partners. In particular, firms search for partners who 
have specialized resources that are not readily available from others (Stuart, 2000). 
A good example of strategic selection capability is Gate5’s alliance strategy process, as 
formulated by its CEO: 
 
‘Our alliance strategy is directly derived form our corporate strategy. We have three 
partnership types, and all partnerships are concerned with delivering the “whole product”. 
We form content partnerships, distribution and co-development partnerships and technology 
partnerships. We do this, because we cannot cover the whole value chain and the whole 
technology stack. We have picked critical steps we will always cover in-house. …  
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We use selective technology partnerships to reduce our real net output ratio under the 
condition to protect our product differentiation. Analyzing core technologies, our platform 
comprises location, mapping, routing, navigation, billing, communicating, messaging, and 
content management. Billing and messaging is technologically not challenging and clearly 
not our core competency that we could use to differentiate our product. For both 
technologies, we have built up partnerships … 
When we have found companies capable of providing this technology, we work out an 
overlap matrix concerning functions, applications, and clients. This matrix tells if the firm is 
complementary to us, or if we overlap too much.’ (Michael Halbherr, CEO Gate5, 2002) 
 
Improper partner selection, the failure of the emergence of anticipated synergies, and 
variances in expectations about the value that can be created make alliance management 
difficult later on as do asymmetric alliance objectives and an expectation of learning through 
private benefits. This becomes obvious in the case of ApollisInteractive, which does not 
work out clear alliance concepts and is very opportunistic in their alliance formation. Its 
alliance activities are clearly less successful compared to its competition. 
In conclusion, other research studies, conceptual considerations of the resource dependency 
theory, and the case study findings underscore the importance of strategic partner selection 
for efficient alliance portfolios. 
Once specific partners are selected, the next step in the alliance formation process is to find 
ways to approach them. 
Partner access 
The case studies’ results suggest that two factors primarily influence the accessibility of 
potential partners: the firm’s reputation and the quality of its directorates (agents). The 
reputation aspect has been formulated in tentative hypothesis #6: The better the firm’s 
reputation, the better the partner acquisition capabilities. 
Reputation effects have been studied by different scholars in the field of sociology and 
economics (i.e., Podolny, 1994; Spence, 1974). A corporate reputation is a set of attributes 
that observers perceive to characterize a firm (Stuart, 2000). Podolny (1994) found evidence 
that the better this reputation, the wider the organization’s access to a variety of sources of 
knowledge, and the higher its collaborative attractiveness. Strong social positions lead to 
alliance formation because high status and reputation signal the quality of the firm and 
attract partners who want to associate with high-status others (Podolny, 1994).  
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The signaling properties of status are particularly important in uncertain environments, 
where the attractiveness of a potential partner can be gauged from its status. That is why 
these signaling effects are so important for NTBFs in young industries. These effects are 
summarized and discussed in the signaling literature in economics (Spence, 1974). 
Evidence for reputation effects can be found in almost all case studies, as exemplified by a 
statement from e-hotel’s CEO:  
 
‘Meanwhile we are established. When we call and ask for an appointment we get it, and 
more and more companies call and ask, if we want to do a project together. This was 
completely different in the beginning, but we reliably realized our projects and that pays off 
in the long run.’ (Matthias Kose, CEO e-hotel, 2002) 
 
Podolny’s (1994) work in particular, which adds to the body of social network theory, 
strongly supports the case study findings. It is mainly social capital, here in the form of 
reputation, that eases the accessibility of potential partners. 
In addition to a firm’s reputation, that case study data suggest that directorates and closely 
linked agents have a positive impact on partner accessibility, as formulated in tentative 
hypothesis #7: The better the directorates (higher profile) and closely related agents, the 
better the partner acquisition capabilities. 
Interlocking directorates (or agents) occur when a person affiliated with one organization 
sits on the board of directors of another organization. Alternatively, as in the case of agents, 
they are closely related to the organization. Mizurchi (1996) gave an overview of the 
research conducted in this field. He described several explicit and inadvertent reasons for the 
formation of interlocks such as collusion, cooptation and monitoring, legitimacy, and social 
reasons. Applied to NTBFs, the most relevant reasons are: (1) cooptation and monitoring, 
and (2) legitimacy. 
Cooptation and monitoring: Directorates reflect attempts by organizations to coopt 
sources of environmental uncertainty. This idea has spawned a considerable amount of 
research and continues to influence organizational theory (Mizruchi, 1996). Pfeffer (1978) 
and Pennings (1980) examined the extent to which interfirm dependence contributed to the 
existence of interlocks. Their findings support the view that interlocks are associated with 
interfirm resource dependence. 
Does cooptation work? Do firms that have coopted sources of environmental uncertainty 
report higher levels of performance than firms that have not coopted? Studies of the relation 
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between interlocking and profitability have found a generally positive, but minor association 
between interlocking and profitability (Pennings, 1980). 
This study offers two characteristic case examples of cooptation; Mindmatics and 12Snap 
recruited board members who manage established marketing agencies. Through close 
interaction with these marketing agencies the case study firms try to reduce market risks. 
Given the fact that well-established marketing agencies have distribution resources (i.e., 
excellent client access and, to smaller extent, client media budgets), and mobile marketing 
firms have the know-how and mobile subscribers to launch marketing campaigns, there 
exists a resource dependence that may have been the motivation for the creation of these 
interlocking directorates.  
However. in all the other case studies, cooptation appears to play a minor role. No other 
directorate or agent with the clear focus to reduce (market) uncertainty could be found. 
Cooptation is a motivator only for investors to judge and reduce the risk of their investment. 
Almost all VCs have directorates in their portfolio companies. Therefore, cooptation is of 
minor importance to the NTBFs in this industry. 
Legitimacy: Boards of directors perform an important function regarding the reputation of a 
firm (Selznick, 1957). By appointing individuals with ties to important organizations, the 
firm signals that it is a legitimate enterprise. 
The concept of legitimacy has always played a prominent role in organizational theory 
(Scott, 1992) and the existing literature on board appointments distinctly implies that the 
quest for legitimacy underlies the formation of many interlocks (Mizruchi, 1996). Host 
organizations not only want board members who are capable of providing input and advice 
to the corporate strategies and have contacts to important costumers or suppliers, but choose 
based on the prestige they will add to the organization (Mace, 1971). 
By the early 1980’s, interlock researchers had become increasingly aware of the behavioral 
consequences of interlocks. This realization coincided with the publication of Granovetter’s 
(1985) important report on network embeddedness. Granovetter argued that economic 
behavior, like human behavior in general, is socially embedded; that is, economic actors are 
affected by their relations with other actors. This influence has moved the emphasis on 
interlocks increasingly towards their value as a communication mechanism rather than as a 
mechanism of control and cooptation. Davis (1991) found evidence that interlocking 
directorates is a form of social capital that provides access to information that flows through 
their ties. 
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Although interlocking directorates are indirectly important for accessing information, 
researchers tried to link interlocking directorates to performance directly. Using a cross-
lagged panel model on 204 leading Canadian firms, Richardson (1987) examined 
simultaneously the effect of interlocks in 1963 on profits in 1968. He found virtually no 
effect of interlocks on subsequent profitability. Other scholars such as Lang and Lockhart 
(1990) have had similar findings. 
Various scholars have criticized the existing body of purely statistical interlock research, 
because it fails to capture the richness and complexity of broad dynamics and interfirm 
relations (Davis, et al., 1992; Pettigrew, 1992; Stinchcombe, 1990). Stinchcombe’s (1990) 
primary criticism involves concern about what interlock ties actually represent. Because so 
little is known about the actual operation of interlocks, he suggests that: 
 
‘… we should study what flows across the links, who decides on those flows in the light of 
what interests, and what collective or corporate action flows from the organization of links, 
in order to make sense of intercorporate relations.’ (Stinchcombe, 1990) 
 
This point is also made by Pettigrew (1992), whose critique is as much a commentary on 
quantitative research in general as on interlock research in particular. Criticisms of the 
failure of quantitative work to capture the complexity of human behavior have been around 
for decades, and it is not surprising that interlock would also be subjected to them. 
This study, which clearly shows that interlocking directors act very differently, can support 
this critique. In the case of Gate5, the CEO reports of almost daily e-mail contact with the 
director Hagen Hultzsch (former CTO of Deutsche Telekom) and of other helpful 
directorates: 
 
‘These directorates are extremely important. Our board members are today Hagen 
Hultzsch, ex-CTO of Deutsche Telekom; Charles Franklin, head of M-Commerce from 
Vodafone; Hans Huber, CEO of Lucent Europe; Greg Papdopoulos, CTO of Sun; Knut 
Voeckler from Microsoft Networks; and Prodomschef from Sat1. This is an excellent board. 
We try to recruit two additional members, a top manager from the automobile industry and 
someone from the media industry in the UK.  
You can imagine how helpful these people are. Hagen Hultzsch opens us any door at 
Deutsche Telekom. I have to say, Hagen Hultzsch is extremely good. He helps me a lot. We 
e-mail almost every day …’ (Michael Halbherr, CEO Gate5, 2002) 
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In contrast to Gate5, Airweb’s board consists of three people, only one of them being an 
industry expert and not in a particular high position. The CEO talks to him on a monthly 
basis and exchanges industry news. Airweb receives far less benefits from its board 
concerning relevant market information and contacts to potential clients and suppliers. 
Therefore, both literature and case study data provide evidence, that directorates can be 
extremely helpful for accessing potential partners when they are an industry insider, 
involved in the company, and have a high level position. A simple count of the number of 
interlocks is not sufficient for understanding their value for partner acquisition. 
In conclusion, reputation and interlocking directorates (agents) have the potential to 
facilitate partner access. Both factors have been discussed regarding their potential influence 
on social capital. This and other studies suggest that concern for an entrepreneurial venture’s 
reputation and interlocking agents with their personal contacts are the two most important 
sources of social capital for facilitating partner access.  
From a theoretical point of view, social network theory is applicable and helpful for 
understanding the impact of social capital on the accessibility of partners. 
After potential partners have been accessed, the next step in the alliance formation process is 
the contracting and realization of partnerships. 
Partnership realization 
Alliances have to be negotiated, and the cooperation has to be structured and contracted. 
These operative process steps require specific skills – alliance project skills. The case study 
data suggest, that these alliance project skills affect the partners acquisition capabilities as 
formulated in tentative hypothesis 8: The better the alliance project skills, the better the 
partner acquisition capabilities. 
Incorporating the literature concerning this hypothesis is not an easy task. Despite an 
extensive literature review, only a few studies contained interesting aspects concerning 
alliance negotiation, structuring cooperation, and alliance contracting. This lack of 
information supports a point previously made by Gulati (1998): 
 
‘We still do not know enough about the underlying processes concerning alliances.’ (Gulati, 
1998) 
 
One could argue that alliance project skills are the underlying operational enabler of 
absorptive capacities (Cohen, et al., 1990). Therefore, following the absorptive capacity 
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argument, one can assume that alliance project skills result from a prolonged process of 
investment and knowledge accumulation within the firm, and that its development is path-
dependent. 
As with other process learning, one can assume that a learning curve effects take place, 
improving alliance project skills and, therefore, enhancing the partner acquisition 
capabilities. Case study interviews hint strongly to this relationship. As the CEO of Airweb 
phrased it: 
 
‘We got continuously better in forming, negotiating, and operating partnerships. We learned 
the process how to do it. Meanwhile our expertise to quickly realize projects is one of our 
key selling points, which the partners pretty much appreciate.’ (Claudius Bertheau, CEO 
Airweb, 2002) 
 
Further alliance process research is needed to thoroughly understand and prove these effects 
of learning about the alliance formation process. Neither social network theory, nor TCE or 
resource dependency theory is capable of providing concepts for this connection. 
After a discussion of the alliance formation process from start to finish, the last part in the 
alliance formation discussion focuses on feedback effects of prior alliance formation. 
Alliance history 
The effects of the existing alliance portfolio and the cumulative history of prior alliances is 
summarized in tentative hypothesis 9: The better the existing alliance portfolio and the more 
diverse the alliance history the better the partner acquisition capabilities due to (1) better 
alliance opportunities and (2) better reputation (outside effects), as well as (3) better project 
skills (interior effect). 
Different researchers have examined the effect of prior alliances and explained these effects 
with social network theory (i.e., Burt, 1992; Gulati, et al., 1997; Podolny, 1994). Gulati 
(1997) found evidence that firms with more prior alliances were more likely to enter into 
new alliances and did so with greater frequency. Other sociologists have argued that when 
there is uncertainty about the quality of someone or something, evaluations of it are strongly 
influenced by its affiliations (Podolny, 1994).  
Burt (1997) stressed the informal advantages of social networks for firms, which can enable 
the creation of new alliances by three distinct means: (1) access and referrals (opportunities), 
(2) timing (Burt, 1992), and (3) process skills. Access refers to information about the 
capabilities and trustworthiness of current or potential partners with other partner firms, and 
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referrals can be particularly important in alliance formation, as a firm’s existing partners 
may refer other firms to it for alliances. Timing entails having informational benefits about 
potential partners at the right time. Process skill refers to the above-mentioned learning 
effects. These three effects are subsequently discussed in greater detail. 
Impact on alliance opportunities: Aside from the strategic need, the underlying logic of 
alliance formation is social opportunities. These opportunities are greatly influenced by past 
alliance relationships (Eisenhardt, et al., 1996; Gulati, 1995; Kogut, et al., 1992a). Prior 
alliances, both direct and indirect, create a social network in which most firms are 
embedded, and this embeddedness becomes an important source of information for firms 
about the reliability and capabilities of their current and potential partners. Such information 
helps firms to learn about new alliance opportunities and also enhances their trust in current 
and potential partners. Information can be a salient catalyst for alliances that may have 
significant risks associated with them. By providing conduits for valuable information, the 
social networks of prior alliances play an important role in shaping future alliance formation 
(Gulati, 1995). 
Discovering new alliance opportunities and finding an appropriate partner that desires an 
alliance requires very good access to market information. Firms need to know about the 
reliability of potential partners as well. Information thus serves two purposes. It makes firms 
aware of viable partners and it serves as a basis for trust between partners. Firms can learn 
about potential alliance opportunities from many sources, and one important source is their 
network of prior alliances (Kogut, et al., 1992a).  
The social structural model from Burt (1982) points to the important role of social networks 
in guiding firms’ actions. The social network of prior alliances is an active network of 
information exchange in which firms learn about the reliability and specific capabilities of 
current and potential partners. This exchange reveals to firms alliance opportunities about 
which they would otherwise be unaware. The common theme throughout this body of 
research is that the social networks of ties in which actors are embedded shapes the flow of 
information between them (Granovetter, 1985). 
The relational component of social structure creates closer ties between firms by providing 
firms with information about each other. This firsthand information is particularly effective 
because (1) it is cheap, (2) individual firm members have a cognitive bias toward trusting 
firsthand information, (3) partnering organizations have an economic incentive to be honest, 
to prevent jeopardizing future ties, and (4) close inter-firm ties become suffused with social 
elements that enhance the likelihood of trustworthy behavior (Granovetter, 1985). These 
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aspects can be found one-to-one in the case study data, as two managers in the Mobile 
Marketing segment reported. In the interview, Ingo Griebel, MD of 12snap, twice 
mentioned the importance of alliance opportunities that were created through contacts from 
prior joint projects. Thorsten Rehfuss, marketing manager of ApollisInteractive, explained 
that his activities in industry associations such as the DDV (German direct marketing 
association) and the Marketing Club Munich were directly responsible for the social ties that 
he formed. 
Thus, case study data and literature are quite consistent. The impact of networks is a key 
element in social network theory, and is confirmed by the case study findings. 
Impact on reputation: Alliances can elevate the reputation of participant firms in the eyes 
of existing and potential customers and the financial community (Rao, 1994). Therefore, 
interfirm affiliations convey social status (Stuart, 2000) and relationships have reciprocal 
effects on the reputation of those involved (Stuart, et al., 1999). 
The status of an organization in the network affects its reputation and visibility in the 
system. The greater this reputation, the wider the organization’s access to a variety of 
sources of knowledge. The signaling properties of status are particularly important in 
uncertain environments, where the attractiveness of a potential partner can be gauged from 
its status, which in turn depends on the organizations with which it is already tied (Podolny, 
1994). 
The characteristics of affiliates serving as discernible guides for resolving uncertainty about 
the quality of a young or unknown entity follows directly from the notion that actors’ 
reputation is constructed in part from the identities of their associates (Blau, 1964). 
Prominent associates augment the reputation of young companies more than do run-of-the-
mill partners because the signal of reliability and trustworthiness implicit in exchange 
relations is most widely disseminated when a new venture’s associates are particularly well 
known (Stuart, et al., 1999). The social structure of business relationships is a primary 
consideration in the market’s assessment of the quality of the new venture (Stuart, et al., 
1999). However, the impact of interorganizational relations is driven more by who a 
company associates with than by the volume of its relations (Stuart, et al., 1999). 
This explains why it was a strategic target for Airweb to cooperate with Nokia and become a 
member of its developer program. This alliance served as a door-opener in the 
communication industries, because it was known that Nokia thoroughly screened NTBFs 
before it formed an alliance. This underscores that fact that, concerning reputational effects 
of prior alliance,s the case study results are quite consistent with the existing literature. 
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Impact on project skills: The literature discussing the impact of alliance history on project 
skills is weaker still in comparison to the literature discussing the impact of project skills on 
alliance formation. Studies that specifically examined the process of learning in strategic 
alliances could not be found. However, Podolny (1994) found evidence that a broad variety 
of prior alliances improve the collaborative experience, which in turn makes firms more 
attractive as a potential partner. Case study data indicate that project skill learning heavily 
depends on the accumulated alliances formed. This would also be consistent with findings 
on absorptive capacities. Therefore, one could assume that firm’s current alliance project 
skills⎯following absorptive capacities⎯are influenced by its historic participation in 
specific product markets and former alliances (Cohen, et al., 1990). 
However, specific literature concerning operative alliance processes is lacking. Further 
research is required to examine the effects of learning in alliance project skills. 
Conclusion on alliance acquisition skills 
The associated literature and the case study results support strongly that alliance acquisition 
skills improve alliance portfolio effectiveness. Three underlying capabilities comprise the 
alliance acquisition skill: Selection, access, and realization capabilities. Whereas selection 
and partner access are well-discovered and described contexts, the alliance realization and 
the required project skill have received almost no research attention and offer an interesting 
field for further analysis.  
In addition, former alliances have an impact on alliance opportunities and the firm’s social 
capital (reputation), which both positively influence alliance formation. 
From a theoretical point of view, social network theory is the best applicable theory to 
explain the impact of social capital (reputation and adjunct agents as directorates) on the 
formation of alliances. Resource dependency theory explains why selection skills are 
important and that interlocking directorates reduce uncertainty concerning dependent 
resources. 
However, partner acquisition is only one driver influencing alliance portfolio effectiveness. 
The management of alliances assures the exchange of resources, which have been made 
available through the acquisition of relevant partners. The necessary management 
capabilities are addressed next. 
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4.1.4 Alliance management 
While strategic alliances have the potential to enhance firm performance, doing so is 
challenging because of the difficulty in managing them. Thus, for various reasons, managing 
strategic alliances to achieve or maintain firm performance is an important issue warranting 
further research (Arino, 2001). Effective alliance management is a significant challenge and 
an under-investigated phenomenon (Hutt, et al., 2000). This study attemps to contribute to 
the underdeveloped body of alliance management literature. 
Analyzing case study results in the context of the relevant literature 
The case study data suggest that alliance portfolio management has a significant impact on 
portfolio effectiveness. It influences how good resources can be exchanged and how abuse 
and ineffectiveness of management time and other firm resources can be reduced. This 
occurs either through inefficient alliance portfolio structures or through opportunistic 
behavior.  
As formulated in tentative hypothesis 4: The better the portfolio management capabilities, 
the better the alliance portfolio effectiveness because they (1) allow for intensified resource 
exchange and (2) eliminate alliance portfolio inefficiencies. Subsequently, these two aspects 
are discussed in detail. 
Managing the resource exchange 
Case study data suggest that resource exchange depends on two factors. The overall alliance 
structure must be perceived fairly, and the exchange relationship must be embedded – 
thereby communication skills and trust are important aspects. These two factors can be 
divided using Herzberg’s (1959) motivation theory. (a) A fair alliance structure is a ‘hygiene 
factor’; superior resource exchange depends on the ‘motivating’ ability to (b) embed 
relations. 
 
Structural aspects: The impact of the hygiene factor – ability to structure alliance fairly 
and to maintain a fair tradeoff – is formulated in tentative hypothesis 10: The better the 
ability to adjust partnerships to maintain win / win situations the better the partner 
management capabilities. 
Various scholars (i.e., Douma, et al., 2000; Reuer, 1999) have analyzed the impact of 
alliance structure on its performance. They found evidence for the impact of as fair 
perceived alliance structures and the flexibility to adjust alliance structures, which is closely 
linked to perceived fairness. Reuer (1999) suggested that deriving value from alliances 
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requires companies to adjust the relationship as necessary, and manage the cooperation 
appropriately. Douma (2000) stressed the importance of maintaining alignment or fit 
between alliance partners. This fit should be formed in three contexts: strategic, relational, 
and operational. The alliance manager is expected to verify that resources are allocated in a 
manner that satisfies all three fit requirements (Douma, et al., 2000).  
The case studies provide numerous examples that show that alliance relationships have to be 
adjusted to remain efficient over time and so that alliances that are perceived as unfair will 
be terminated. A good example for a structural adjusted partnership is e-hotel’s cooperation 
with Sixt and Lufthansa. E-hotel first sourced rental cars and flights from Sixt and Lufthansa 
when it built up its mobile travel portal. Later when focusing on hotels, the alliances were 
rearranged and e-hotel started to supply its hotel-room booking service to the travel portals 
of Sixt and Lufthansa. The two companies are still two of e-hotel’s most important partners. 
A good example of alliances that were terminated because of perceived unfairness is 
Airweb’s realignment of contracts with network operators in the beginning of 2001. After 
offering its sport content service in the first 18 months for free, the penetration rose and 
operators started to earn money with Airweb’s service. At that point, Airweb switched its 
policy, renegotiated the alliance contracts and introduced revenue sharing clauses. Several 
MNOs such as T-mobile and Mobistar rejected the new contracts, and as a result Airweb 
terminated the cooperation. 
These examples show that the case study results are largely in line with the recent literature 
discussion on structural aspects of alliances. Structural rearrangements are a necessary for 
maintaining alliance portfolio effectiveness. 
Relational aspects: In addition to the structural aspects, relationship-level variables such as 
the degree of trust between alliance partners are another set of factors that influence alliance 
portfolio effectiveness. This relational perspective is covered by tentative hypothesis 11: The 
better the ability to embed partnership ties, the better resources can be exchanged and the 
more stable partnership links are. Therefore, the better the ability to embed partnership ties, 
as part of alliance management capabilities, the better the alliance portfolio effectiveness. 
The concept of embeddedness is a core element in social network theory (Burt, 1992). 
Embeddedness refers to the fact that exchanges and discussions within a group typically 
have a history, and that this history results in the routinization and stabilization of linkages 
among members. As elements of ongoing social structures, actors do not respond solely to 
individualistically determined interests. A structure of relations affects the action taken by 
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individual actors. It does so by constraining the set of actions available to the individual 
actors and by changing the dispositions of those actors toward the actions they may take.  
One way to understand the performance consequences of social networks for alliances and 
for the firms entering them is to think of social networks as bestowing firms with ‘social 
capital’, which can become an important basis for competitive advantage (Burt, 1997). 
Embedded ties facilitate the exchange of resources because they have fundamentally 
different characteristics and life courses than those that are not. Embedded ties promote 
greater frequency of information exchange between partners, which can affect the success of 
the alliance as well as the performance of firms entering them. 
The notion of embeddedness has previously been used to refer to the social and cultural 
context of economic action. Polanyi (1966) used the concept to describe the social structure 
of modern markets. Granovetter (1985), in a critique of Williamson’s (1983) transaction cost 
approach, argued that most behavior of individuals is closely embedded in networks of 
interpersonal relations. Understanding economic behavior requires consideration of the 
social, cultural, and institutional structures in which the economic actors are embedded. 
More recently, Uzzi (1997) has used the embeddedness concept to characterize the level of 
social interaction in interfirm relationships. 
Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) have classified embeddedness into four forms: structural, 
cognitive, political, and cultural. The last three forms mainly reflect the sociological 
perspectives of embeddedness. Structural embeddedness focuses on how much the quality 
and the network architecture of exchange relationships influence economic activity (Uzzi, 
1997), which is the form of embeddedness that is most relevant for this study. 
In the context of NTBFs, the concept of structural embeddedness has been proposed as ‘the 
strength, intensity, and permanence of the links between a new, technology-based firm and 
its environment’ (Autio, 1995). Structural embeddedness is the quest for information to 
reduce uncertainty, a quest that has been identified as one of the main drivers of 
organizational action (Granovetter, 1985). 
While the original focus of network research was on understanding how embeddedness of 
individuals influences their behavior, a similar argument has been extended to organizations 
(Gulati, 1995). Firms can be interconnected with other firms through a wide array of social 
and economic relationships, each of which can constitute a social network. These include, 
for example, supplier relationships, resource flows, trade association memberships, and 
interlocking directorates (previously discussed in section 4.1.3 alliance formation). 
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Scholars have begun only recently to explore the implications of the social structure 
resulting from intercorporate networks on strategic alliances. Strategic alliances are 
distinctive in that entering one constitutes a strategic action, and their accumulation can also 
become a social network. 
Social capital increases the probability of the success of strategic alliances because of the 
trust and willingness to share resources among partners. The willingness to share resources 
may be necessary to ensure that both partners gain from the alliance. Communication skills 
are important for establishing embeddedness, and trust is one of the most important results 
of embeddedness. These two aspects are discussed subsequently. 
The impact of communication skills on embedding relationships has been formulated in the 
tentative hypothesis 12: The better the ability to communicate, the better the ability to embed 
partnership ties. 
In a recent study, Sivadas and Dwyer (2000) analyzed the impact of communication skills 
on embeddedness, trust, and the resource exchange. By studying cooperative new product 
development projects of 95 semiconductor companies, they found evidence that alliance 
managers who were able to facilitate effective communication (appropriate and timely 
sharing of meaning) embed alliances in ways that foster trust and accelerate the resource 
exchange. 
Other researchers (i.e., Anderson, et al., 1990; Mohr, et al., 1994) had similar results after 
analyzing effective communication on alliance success. Anderson and Narus (1990) found 
that communication – the formal as well as informal sharing of meaningful and timely 
information between firms – enables goal adjustment, task coordination, and interfirm 
learning. Mohr and Spekman (1994) found that successful partnerships exhibit better 
communication quality and information sharing. 
Therefore, tentative hypotheses 12 is consistent with the recent literature. Communication 
skills that help to embed links and thereby foster trust have a positive impact on resource 
exchange and alliance success.  
This thereby implicit relationship between trust, resource exchange and alliance success, 
which has also been found in the cross case analyses, is formulated in tentative hypothesis 
13: The better the ability to build trust, the better the ability to accelerate the resource 
exchange.  
Trust is a willingness to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of partner 
behavior (Hutt, et al., 2000). Predictability, dependability, and faith are three key 
components of trust (Sivadas, et al., 2000). Developing trust between partners is a challenge 
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in many alliances. Cultural, economic, and institutional differences across organizations 
increase the difficulty of developing trust between partners.  
Developing trust is necessary to gain full cooperation and for resource transfer between 
partners or to the joint venture to occur. Managing alliances in ways that create trust can 
lead to an competitive advantage (Barney, et al., 1994). When trust exists, the firm does not 
fear its partner’s action, because the partners can depend on each other to achieve a common 
purpose. In an alliance context, trust suggests that a partner’s action will meet expectations, 
including the absence of opportunistic behavior. Thus, trust empowers partners to accept 
risks and positively affects the quality of their relationships. Moreover, trust facilitates 
strategic flexibility, an important outcome of effective alliances (this finding underscores the 
structural aspects of efficient alliances formulated in hypotheses 10). Trust strongly 
influences alliance performance. Kanter (1994) reported trust to be a key element of alliance 
success in his study of 40 international companies.  
In addition to its relevance in social network theory, trust is a common element in 
transaction cost economics (Young-Ybarra, et al., 1999). It reduces controlling costs, 
because social control makes direct control of transaction obsolete, thereby lowering 
transaction cost. As the CEO of e-hotel reports: 
 
‘…[trust] helps you to warrant the stability of the partnership. That is, your relationship is 
able to handle a crisis, in the case it arises. … mutual trust and honesty are important parts 
to operate alliances efficiently.’ (Matthias Kose, CEO e-hotel, 2002) 
 
In conclusion, embeddedness or cohesion perspectives on networks stress the role of direct 
cohesive ties as a mechanism for gaining fine-grained information. Relational embeddedness 
typically suggests that actors who are strongly tied to each other are likely to develop a 
shared understanding of the utility of certain behavior as a result of discussing opinions in 
strong, socializing relations, which in turn influence their actions. Cohesively tied actors are 
likely to emulate each other’s behavior. Cohesion can also be viewed as the capacity for 
social ties to carry information while at the same time diminishing uncertainty and 
promoting trust between actors (Granovetter, 1973). Therefore, NTBFs that are able to 
stabilize and maintain networks increase their effectiveness and their effectiveness. Shared 
interest in a prolonged relationship motivates the involved parties to solve potential conflicts 
with “voice”, rather than with “exit”, and results in superior performance outcomes 
(Johannisson, 1987). 
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Thus, sociologists have suggested that economic actors address concerns of opportunism in 
economic transactions by embedding transactions in the social context in which those 
transactions occur. Faced with uncertainty about a partner, actors adopt a more social 
orientation and resort to existing networks to discover information that lowers search costs 
and alleviates the risk of opportunism. Thereby they embed their network ties. 
However, embedding alone is not sufficient. Opportunistic behavior exists even in 
embedded relationships. In addition, alliance benefits can diminish over time. Therefore 
alliance controlling is necessary. 
Eliminating alliance portfolio inefficiencies 
Firms entering alliances face considerable moral hazard concerns because of the 
unpredictability of partners’ behavior and the likely costs from opportunistic behavior 
incurred by a partner if it occurs. A partner may either be a “free rider” by limiting its 
contributions to an alliance or by simply behaving opportunistically. In addition, partnership 
benefits, such as learning or the availability of accessed resources, might decrease over time. 
Thus, the management effort and other resource inputs might loose their effectiveness.  
 
‘Strategic alliances are inherently incomplete contracts in which the property rights 
associated to alliance output and profits may not be well defined or not measured. As a 
result, collaborators risk opportunistic exploitation by their partners, including leaking 
proprietary knowledge to partners or otherwise losing control of important assets’ (Hamel, 
1991).  
 
Therefore alliance portfolio controlling is crucial for assure its effectiveness as formulated in 
tentative hypothesis 14: The tighter the ability to control partnerships according dynamic 
corporate goals, the better the portfolio management capabilities 
To get the maximum value out of all alliances and to be able to intervene when their 
performance veers off track, managers should learn to measure alliance fitness on several 
levels. As Bamford (2002, p. 5) suggests, alliance controlling should measure four aspects: 
financial, strategic, operational, and relationship fitness. 
Very few companies systematically track their alliance performance. Alliances are often run 
on intuition and incomplete information. One study found that 51% percent of the alliances 
reviewed had virtually no performance metrics and that only 11% had sufficient metrics 
(Dyer, et al., 2001). Bamford (2002) reports of an European industrial gas company that 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 210 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
found that 40% of its alliances no longer reflected its current strategic priorities but still 
received a large amount of senior management’s time. 
The controlling process – like an annual review of capital spending – should ensure, that the 
company has a coherent portfolio and is allocating resources among current ventures and 
potential new deals to maximum effect. This review comprises three considerations: an 
assessment of the performance of the portfolio as a whole, an assessment of the portfolio 
configuration, and the strategic review to rank future initiatives in order of priority 
(Bamford, et al., 2002). 
Case study data provide various examples of opportunistic behavior. Jamba! copied and 
distributed Airweb’s content without authorization and Clever.Tanken reported that several 
alliances, in which the partners did not fulfill their obligations were subsequently 
terminated. Facing these alliance hazards, YellowMap introduced periodic workshops in 
which alliance managers are required to report the development of each alliance and the 
overall alliance strategy is revised.  
In conclusion alliance controlling is a crucial part of alliance management. However, 
relatively little is known about successful alliance controlling processes, key controlling 
measures, and performance indicators. Process-oriented research on alliance controlling 
offers a relevant and challenging field for further research. 
Conclusion 
Literature and case study data provide evidence, that alliance portfolio management skills 
have a positive impact on alliance performance. Management skills improve the 
effectiveness of alliance portfolios, by extending the duration of alliance portfolios through 
flexible adjustment of alliance structures and by the improvement of the exchange of 
resources because they help to embed alliance links. This embeddedness established through 
intensive communication (both formal and informal) creates trust, which on one hand is 
important for the exchange of resources, and on the other hand, important for the reduction 
of opportunistic behavior. In addition to trust, firms require alliance controlling skills to 
limit alliance inefficiencies. 
From a theoretical point of view, social network theory is very powerful for explain the 
importance and creation of embeddedness. Structural aspects and their dynamics can be 
explained through resource dependency theory, when including exogenous shifts in resource 
requirements. Concerning alliance controlling, theoretical concepts are lacking. Alliance 
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controlling requires further research to understand the detailed processes of alliance 
controlling and to derive efficient performance measures and indicators. 
4.1.5 Conclusion on alliances and networks 
By and large, the associated literature supports the case study results concerning(1)  
performance outcomes of efficient alliance portfolios, and the impact of (2) partner 
acquisition skills as well as (3) alliance management skills on alliance portfolio 
effectiveness. 
Efficient alliance configurations – that is, configurations that provide access to the diverse 
resources and information depending on their required timing and thus produce desired 
benefits with minimum costs of acquisition, management, conflict, and complexity – prove 
to be very beneficial to technology based startups. This is consistent with the studies of 
Baum et al. (2000) and Powell et al. (1996) in particular.  
The underlying processes of alliance formation (alliance project skills) and alliance 
management (in particular alliance controlling) are yet not well researched and documented 
so far. On this operational level, additional research is required to understand the underlying 
processes of alliances. 
From a theoretical point of view, social network theory is very powerful for explain alliance 
opportunities, legitimacy, embeddedness and trust, which can be subsumed under the 
following question: How do alliance portfolios work efficiently? Resource dependency 
theory is helpful for assessing alliance portfolio structure and for addressing why companies 
ally with different partners. 
Now that it has been clarified, that efficient alliance portfolios provide required resources, 
and the process by which efficient alliance portfolios can be established and maintained has 
been discussed, there are two questions that emerge: The first is whether the resources 
acquired through alliances create a competitive advantage. This question will be discussed in 
section 4.2. The second question is, what drives the resource requirements that are 
exogenous input variables to the resource dependency theory? This question will be 
discussed in section 4.3. 
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SWOT analysis: 
Andrews (1971), Ansoff (1965), Hofer & Schendel (1978)
Basic models in strategic management
Source: Author, based on Barney (1991) 
Strengths
Weaknesses
Opportunities
Threats
Resource
based models
Penrose (1959)
Rumelt (1984)
Wernerfelt (1984)
Environmental models
of competitive advantage
Lamb (1984)
Porter (1980)
Internal
analysis
External
analysis
4.2 Resources and their strategic importance 
Section 4.1 showed how resources are acquired through alliance networks and how this 
improved NTBF’s performance. This raises the question of whether this form of accessing 
resources is capable of creating a sustainable competitive advantage. Case data indicate this 
causal relation, which is formulated in the latter part of hypotheses 15: The more effective a 
firm accesses … rare sustainable inimitable non-substitutable resources, the better the 
company’s performance and, therefore, its competitive advantage.  
Understanding sources of firms’ sustained competitive advantage has become a major area 
of research in the field of strategic management. Since the 1960s, a single organizing 
framework has been used to structure much of this research, which is depicted in figure 64. 
Early strategy scholars in the sixties and seventies (i.e., Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965; 
Hofer, et al., 1978) developed the SWOT analysis framework, which combines firm internal 
analysis of strength and weaknesses with the external analysis of opportunities and threats.  
In the beginning of the eighties the research 
focus shifted more towards external analysis. 
Scholars such as Porter (1980) and Lamb 
(1984) developed environmental models of 
competitive advantage with the primary focus 
on analyzing firm’s opportunities and threats 
(Barney, 1991), which placed little emphasis 
on the impact of idiosyncratic firm attributes 
on its competitive position.  
Figure 64   Research fields in strategic management 
This type of strategic research is based on two simplifying assumptions. First, firms within 
an industry are identical in terms of the strategically relevant resources they control and the 
strategies they pursue. Second, should resource heterogeneity develop in an industry or 
group, this heterogeneity will be very short lived because the resources that firms use to 
implement their strategies are highly mobile.  
Both assumptions do not hold true in this study. Firms differ significantly according to 
strategically relevant resources. In the Mobile Marketing segment, 12snap has access to 15 
million subscribers and Mindmatics to more than 2 million, whereas ApollisInteractive has 
no opt-in subscriber base. Furthermore, this heterogeneity is not short lived. It took 12snap 
two years to establish its subscriber base. Thereby, it partnered with several key players such 
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as MNOs and consumer good companies with their own SMS-communities. These partners 
are no longer accessible for competitors such as ApollisInteractive. Therefore, 
environmental concepts in strategic management are not suitable to explain competitive 
advantage in the Mobile Internet industry. 
In the later eighties, a group of strategy researchers shifted their focus from external factors 
of competitive advantage to the internal analysis, and developed resource-based models. 
This shift was motivated and supported through the work of Lippman and Rumelt (1982), 
Hansen and Wernerfelt (1989) and Rumelt (1991). They showed that intra-industry 
differences in profits were greater than inter-industry differences in profits, strongly 
suggesting the importance of firm-specific factors and the relative unimportance of industry 
effects. Jacobsen (1988) had similar findings. 
The resource-based concepts of competitive advantage are most relevant to this study. They 
examine the link between a firm’s internal characteristics and performance. It is the only 
concept in strategic management capable of tackling the question raised at the close of the 
last section. According to this approach, resource heterogeneity and immobility are key 
sources of competitive advantage.  
To discuss the applicability of the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) and its 
derivatives, this section is structured as follows: The first part introduces the basic premises 
of the RBV, states the critique, and discusses its applicability. Based on the critiques and 
limitations of its applicability, two advanced resource-based theories are discussed in parts 
two and three. In part two, the relational view integrates in its analysis a broader view of 
relevant resources, and the dynamic capability approach (in part three) stresses the 
requirement of dynamic skills for adjusting the firm’s setup to changing environments, 
which is definitely highly relevant to NTBFs. A summarizing conclusion closes this section. 
4.2.1 The Resource-Based View of the firm 
Various reasons led to the assessment of the above-mentioned RBV⎯in contrast to 
environmental models⎯as a suitable concept for explaining competitive advantage. 
Environmental models are particularly irrelevant because the rationale of market power is 
not suitable: (1) all case studies face similar industry settings, (2) they all interact with the 
same industry players such as MNOs, equipment manufacturers and VCs, (3) they all have 
almost no market power due to their size and exchangeability, and (4) their industry 
segments are still characterized through low entry barriers. Powerful incumbents can easily 
attack market positions. Whereas, the importance of resources, which has been mentioned 
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often in interviews and is furthermore underscored by firms’ intense alliance activities to 
access resources, strongly hint as to the relevance of the RBV to explaining competitive 
advantage. This concept can be characterized as follows: 
 
‘This approach focuses on the rents accruing to the owners of scarce firm-specific resources 
rather than economic profits from product market positioning. Competitive advantage lies 
‘upstream’ of product markets and rests on the firm’s idiosyncratic and difficult-to-imitate 
resources.’ Teece (1997, p. 513) 
 
To incorporate the relevant literature on the RBV and discuss its applicability, this section 
first defines the term resources and provides examples for different resource categories to 
foster a clear and consistent understanding of the fuzzy term ‘resource’. Part two introduces 
the RBV concept, followed by its critique in part three. Part four considers the case study 
findings in context of the model and its critique; thereby it assesses its potential 
applicability. In the last part, the section is summarized and connected to relational and 
dynamic aspects in the discussion of resources. 
Resource definition 
According to the basic literature on the resource-based view of the firm (i.e., Barney, 1991; 
Dierickx, et al., 1989; Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984), firm resources 
include all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information, and 
knowledge controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies 
that improve its efficiency and effectiveness (Daft, 1983). Resources are anything that could 
be thought of as a strength or a weakness of a given firm; more formally, resources are those 
tangible and intangible assets that are tied semi-permanently to the firm (Caves, 1980). 
Examples of resources are brand names, in-house knowledge of technology, employment of 
skilled personnel, trade contracts, machinery, efficient procedures, and capital (Wernerfelt, 
1984, p.172). 
A number of authors have generated lists of firm attributes that may enable firms to 
conceive of and implement value-creating strategies. Barney (1991) classified these 
numerous resources into three categories: physical capital, human capital, and organizational 
capital resources.  
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Resource group Physical capital Human capital Organizational capital 
Resources types Physical technology 
Firm’s plant and 
equipment 
Geographic locations 
Access to raw material 
Training 
Experience 
Judgment 
Intelligence 
Relationships 
Insight of individual 
managers and workers 
Formal reporting 
structure 
Formal and informal 
planning 
Controlling and 
coordinating systems 
Informal relations 
Table 28   Resource types 
Impact of resources on sustained competitive advantage 
According to the RBV, competitive advantage is achieved, when a firm implements a value 
creating strategy that is not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential 
competitor and when other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of this strategy 
(Barney, 1991). As an underlying assumption, the RBV assumes resource heterogeneity. 
When resources are evenly distributed across all competing firms and highly mobile, firms 
cannot expect to obtain sustained competitive advantages.  
The conception and implementation of strategies employ various firm resources (Wernerfelt, 
1984). That one firm, in an industry populated by identical firms, has the resources to 
conceive of and implement a strategy means that these other firms, because they possess the 
same resources, can also conceive of and implement this strategy. Thus, in this kind of 
industry, it is not possible for firms to enjoy a sustained competitive advantage. For 
example, (1) first mover advantages and (2) entry or mobility barriers could not exist, 
because they require resource heterogeneity to function. 
First mover advantage: In some circumstances, the first firm in an industry to implement a 
strategy can obtain a sustained competitive advantage over other firms. This firm may gain 
access to distribution channels, develop goodwill with customers, or develop a positive 
reputation, all before firms that implement their strategies later. Information about an 
opportunity⎯such as a unique resource⎯makes it possible for the better-informed firm to 
implement its strategy before others. In order to attain a first-mover advantage, firms in an 
industry must be heterogeneous in terms of the resources they control. 
Mobility and entry/mobility barriers: Barriers of entry are only possible if current and 
potentially competing firms are heterogeneous in terms of the resources they control and if 
these resources are not perfectly mobile. The heterogeneity requirement is self-evident. For a 
barrier to entry or mobility to exist, firms protected by these barriers must implement 
different strategies from firms seeking to enter these protected areas of competition. Firms 
restricted from entry are unable to implement the same strategies as firms within the 
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industry. Because the implementation of strategies requires the application of firm resources, 
the inability of firms seeking to enter an industry or group to implement the same strategies 
as firms within that industry or group suggests that firms seeking to enter must not have the 
same strategically relevant resources as firms within the industry or group. 
Both effects are based on resource heterogeneity, which, therefore, seems to be a reasonable 
expectation, because most industries will be characterized by at least some degree of 
resource heterogeneity. The search for sources of sustained competitive advantage must 
focus on firm resource heterogeneity and immobility. Both seem to be the case in the Mobile 
Internet industry, which is illustrated using two characteristic examples: 
Source of competitive 
advantage 
Example Explanation 
Heterogeneity Opt-in user-base of 12snap 
compared to that of 
ApollisInteractive 
In 2002, 12snap had 16 million opt-in mobile phone users 
and ApollisInteractive had no proprietary user base. 
Immobility ‘Fuel price pilots’ of 
Clever.Tanken 
The approximately 45,000 fuel price pilots are tied to 
Clever.Tanken. They report their prices to Clever.Tanken, 
check fuel prices on its portal and get their incentive 
through Clever.Tanken’s bonus system. This resource is 
very difficult to transfer. 
Table 29   Exemplary sources of competitive advantage 
To understand sources of competitive advantage, Barney (1991) has built a theoretical 
model. He assumes, that firm resources are heterogeneous and immobile. However, not all 
resources hold the potential for sustained competitive advantages. To have this potential, a 
firm resource must have four attributes: 
Valuable: Resources are valuable when they enable a firm to conceive of or implement 
strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness. 
Rare: Valuable firm resources possessed by a large number of competing or potentially 
competing firms cannot be the source of either a competitive or a sustained competitive 
advantage. A firm enjoys a competitive advantage when it implements a value creating 
strategy that is at the same time not implemented by a large number of other firms. The 
same applies to bundles of valuable firm resources used to conceive of and implement 
strategies. Some strategies require a particular mix of physical capital, human capital, and 
organizational capital resources to be implemented. 
Imperfectly imitable: Valuable and rare organizational resources can only be sources of 
sustainable competitive advantage if firms that do not possess these resources cannot obtain 
them. In the language developed by Lippmann and Rumelt (1982), these firm resources are 
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imperfectly imitable. Firm resources can be imperfectly imitable for one or a combination of 
the following three reasons: 
(a) History dependency: Firms vary in terms of unique histories and their 
performance relies heavily on unique historical events as determents of subsequent 
actions (Arthur, et al., 1987). Path dependency enables a firm to exploit resources 
that it has acquired on its path by implementing value-creating strategies that cannot 
be duplicated by other firms without that path through history. 
(b) Causal ambiguity: Causal ambiguity exists when the link between resources 
controlled by a firm and a firm’s sustained competitive advantage is not understood 
or only imperfectly understood (Lippmann, et al., 1982). As Demsetz (1973) once 
observed, sometimes it is difficult to understand why one firm consistently 
outperforms other firms. Causal ambiguity is at the heart of this difficulty. In the face 
of such causal ambiguity, imitating firms cannot know the actions they should take in 
order to duplicate the strategies of firms with a sustained competitive advantage. 
However, even if a firm with a competitive advantage understands the link between 
the resources it controls and its advantages, other firms can also learn about that link, 
acquire the necessary resources, and implement the relevant strategies. Therefore, 
ironically, in order for causal ambiguity to be a source of sustained competitive 
advantage, all competing firms must have an imperfect understanding of the link 
between the resources controlled by a firm and a firm’s competitive advantage. This 
incomplete understanding is not implausible. The resources controlled by a firm are 
very complex and interdependent (Nelson, et al., 1982). 
(c) Social complexity: A wide variety of resources may be socially complex. 
Examples include interpersonal relations among managers in a firm, a firm’s culture, 
its reputation among suppliers and customers (Porter, 1980), and the exploitation of 
complex physical technology. Because understanding that, for example, an 
organizational culture with certain attributes or quality relations among managers can 
improve a firm’s efficiency and effectiveness does not necessarily imply that firms 
without these attributes can engage in systematic efforts to create them (Dierickx, et 
al., 1989). 
Substitutability: There must be no strategically equivalent valuable resources that are 
themselves either not rare or imitable. Resources or bundles of firm resources are equivalent, 
when they each can be exploited separately to implement the same strategy. Substitutability 
can take at least two forms. First, though it may not be possible for a firm to imitate another 
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Value
Rareness
Imperfect imitability
- History dependency
- Causal ambiguity
- Social complexity
Non-substitutability
Relationship between resources and competitive advantage
Source: Author, based on Barney (1991) 
Firm resource
heterogeneity
Firm resource
immobility
Sustained 
competitive 
advantage
firm’s resources exactly, it may be possible to substitute a similar resource that enables it to 
conceive of and implement the same strategies. Second, very different firm resources can be 
strategic substitutes. Of course, the strategic substitutability of firm resources is always a 
matter of degree. It is the case, however, that substitute firm resources need not have exactly 
the same implications for an organization in order for those resources to be equivalent from 
the point of view of the strategies that firms can conceive of and implement. 
These aspects are summarized in the RBV framework (Barney, 1991) in figure 65. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 65   RBV framework 
Critique of the RBV 
Although there has been little critical evaluation of the RBV as a theoretical system, Priem 
and Butler (2001) pose two elemental questions: (1) Is the foundational and unembellished 
RBV actually a theory? (2) Is the RBV likely to be useful for building understanding in 
strategic management? Other scholars (i.e., Mosakowski, et al., 1997; Williamson, 1999) 
posed similar questions and concluded that: 
• Important factors such as factors determining resource value are exogenous 
• Context specificity is not yet described 
− No industry insight is linked to the model, thus a context black box (when, 
why, how) exists 
− Resources are often defined too broadly and are not operationalizable 
• Overly static process black box 
Another shortcoming that should be added to this list is: 
• Its overly narrow focus concerning resources. The RBV focuses only on resources 
controlled by the firm and not on all resources that can be accessed by the firm.  
These comments are subsequently discussed in greater detail. 
Exogenous independent variables 
The value of resources is determined by demand-side characteristics that are exogenous to 
the RBV model. Resources are said to be valuable when they exploit opportunities or 
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neutralize threats in a firm’s environment, or when they enable a firm to conceive of or 
implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness. As the competitive 
environment changes, resource values may change. Thus, resource values are determined 
from a source exogenous to the RBV. This concept, in effect, holds product and customer 
factors constant, because if product and customer factors would vary, resource values would 
also vary, and unpredictable resource value changes would lead to unpredictable outcomes 
in the resource-based analysis. 
One must be aware of this simplifying assumption when drawing conclusions from RBV 
based analyses. Although partial equilibrium models of factor markets alone or product 
markets alone can produce considerable insight, these approaches might carry particular 
risks for conceptualizing complex strategy issues. In this study, the RBV concept is used 
very carefully because the detailed case studies in chapter 3 have provided numerous 
examples for changing resource requirements. 
Limited context specificity 
Relative to other strategy theories, however, little effort to establish appropriate contexts for 
the RBV has been apparent (Priem, et al., 2001). Two exceptions are the work of Miller and 
Shamsie (1996) on seven studios in the Hollywood movie industry and the work of Brush 
and Artz (1999) on services in the veterinary industry. In most other studies, the manner in 
which strategically important resources lead to competitive advantage is a process black box 
and resources are often not specified on a detailed level but rather stated very broadly and 
are overly inclusive. 
Process black box: As Miller and Shamsie (1996) asserted, the strategy literature contains 
numerous references to resources being useful without careful attention to when, where, and 
how they may be useful. Only a few scholars have started to answer important when, where 
and how questions about the RBV and firm performance (Priem, et al., 2001). 
All inclusive resources: The RBV tendency toward resource classifications that are all 
inclusive might have made it more difficult to establish contextual boundaries. Several 
definitions are too broad, such as the one provided by in Wernerfelt (1984), who claims that:  
 
‘by a resource anything is meant, which could be thought of as a strength or weakness of a 
given firm. More formally, a firm’s resources at a given time could be defined as those 
(tangible and intangible) assets, which are tied semi-permanently to the firm.’ (Wernerfelt, 
1984, p. 172) 
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According to this definition, virtually anything associated with the firm can be a resource. 
Prescriptions for dealing in certain ways with certain categories of resources might be 
operationally valid. Whereas other categories of resources might be inherently difficult for 
practitioners to measure and manipulate. One good of a resource that might be difficult to 
measure and manipulate is Polanyi’s (1966) notion of tacit knowledge. 
This study has categorized the relevant resources into seven groups and provided suitable 
examples. Concerning measurability, Priem’s (2001) critique also applies to this study. 
Complex or qualitative resources such as reputation could not be measured using a 
deterministic scale. More detailed research on resources is needed to solve this measurement 
problem. 
Static approach 
Although the RBV began as a dynamic approach emphasizing change over time (Dierickx, 
et al., 1989; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984), much of the subsequent literature has been 
static in concept. However, this static RBV argument has notable potential limitations for 
strategic management research: 
(1) The static argument is descriptive: it identifies generic characteristics of regenerating 
resources without much attention to differing situations or resource comparisons. 
(2) The process through which particular resources generate sustainable rents remains a 
black box. We do not know, for example, how the resources generate sustainable rents, other 
than through their heterogeneity. 
(3) In static RBV studies, researchers sometimes take a frequently researched strategy 
subject area, relabel the independent variables as resources and the dependent variables as 
competitive advantage and use measures common to much cross-sectional strategy research 
as operationalizations. 
(4) The static RBV argument suffers from the “In Search of Excellence” problem in that it is 
quite easy to identify, many valuable resources in high performing firms a posteriori, but not 
a priori. 
Together these issues suggest that the current high level of abstraction found in the static 
RBV approach might be one aspect that could limit its usefulness for strategy researchers, 
which is clearly the case when analyzing high velocity industries. 
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Examining case study results in the context of the literature on RBV 
When considering the case study findings in the context of the RBV, the importance of 
resources is obvious. Two characteristic examples clearly show evidence for the usefulness 
of the RBV, and are depicted in table 30: 
 12snap’s opt-in subscriber base Gate5’s MLS platform technology 
Valuable Yes:   The subscriber base is an 
important USP to sell mobile 
marketing campaigns and the only 
crucial resource for media selling 
Yes:   The technology platform is the 
core component of Gate5’s services 
and applications 
Rare Yes:   Biggest client base, only 
Mindmatics has >1 million users, 
ApollisInteractive lacks a proprietary 
subscriber-base 
Yes:   Unique technology 
Imperfectly imitable 
History dependency 
Causal ambiguity 
Social complexity 
Yes 
Partly 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Substitutability No Difficult 
Table 30   RBV explanation of competitve advantage 
There are additional case examples for strategic resources or resource bundles such as 
Mindmatics’ MrAdGood service and the 45,000 Benzin Preis Piloten of Clever.Tanken.  
The RBV can also explain why most of the MCS companies do not perform particular well, 
namely because they are not that distinctive (limited resource heterogeneity). In addition, the 
critique of the general RBV is only partly applicable, as shown in table 31: 
Critique Validity Explanation / examples 
Exogenous determination of 
resource value 
Applicable  
Industries develop rapidly, thereby 
the importance of resources shift 
For example, in the MCS segment, 
technological know-how is very important 
in the beginning and looses its importance 
later on. 
Missing context specificity Not applicable 
This study is very context specific 
This study thoroughly analyzes the 
structure in the Mobile internet industry 
and the settings in each of the three market 
segments  
Overly static process black 
box 
Applicable  
⇒ Resource based theory is 
enriched by the concept of 
dynamic capabilities 
As shown in chapter 3, the case study 
companies have to rearrange their 
resources from development step to 
development step. It is crucial to 
understand the change processes. 
Overly narrow resource 
definition 
Applicable  
⇒  Resource based theory is 
enriched by the concept of the 
relational view 
Almost all case studies do not control a 
subset of their crucial resources. Multichart 
needs content on financial markets from 
Deutsche Börse and Gate5 mapping 
technology from Location.net. 
Table 31   Validity of critique of the RBV 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 222 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Conclusion on the RBV 
Despite the fact that the value of specific resources is determined exogenous, the RBV is 
generally helpful for analyzing internal sources of competitive advantage. Concerning this 
study, the classic RBV has two limitations. The approach is too static to explain competitive 
advantage for NTBFs in fast changing environments, and its resource focus is too narrow to 
explain competitive advantage in these barely integrated industries. 
The RBV is not particularly helpful in explaining, why, when and how the resource 
requirements shift. In particular, Priem’s (2001) argument of a process black box describes 
this serious problem. The significant shifts in resource needs, as shown in section ‘3.5 
resource requirement’ cannot be captured by this theory. Scholars such as Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen (1997) addressed this problem when they expanded on the resource-based theory with 
the concept of ‘dynamic capabilities’, which is discussed following the next section. 
In addition, the RBV is concerned with resources controlled by the firm. However, most of 
the case study companies directly control only a subset of their required resources. Many 
resources are accessed through alliances. Therefore, one characteristic of alliances is, 
precisely, that no straight controlling rights are connected to the cooperations. Therefore, the 
resources are accessed for a period of time without having strict control. Scholars such as 
Dyer and Singh (1998) addressed this problem when they expanded on the resource-based 
theory with the concept of ‘the relational view’, which is discussed in the following section. 
4.2.2 Relational view  
As mentioned above, the RBV overlooks the important fact that the advantages of an 
individual firm are often linked to the network of relationships in which the firm is 
embedded. Proponents of the RBV have emphasized that competitive advantage results from 
those resources and capabilities that are owned and controlled by a single firm. 
Consequently, the search for competitive advantage has focused on those resources that are 
housed within the firm.  
Competing firms purchase standardized (non-unique) factors that cannot be sources of 
advantages, either because these factors are readily available to all competing firms or 
because the cost of acquiring them is approximately equal to the economic value they create 
(Barney, 1986). However, a firm’s critical resources may extend beyond firm boundaries. 
Since the seventies, the net output ratio has declined constantly. Recent studies suggest that 
productivity gains in the value chain are possible when trading partners are willing to make 
relation-specific investments and combine resources in unique ways (Asanuma, 1989). This 
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Determinants of interorganizational competitive advantage
Source: Author, based on Dyer and Singh (1998) 
Determinants of
relational rent
Subprocesses facilitating 
relational rent
1. Relation specific assets
2. Knowledge sharing routines
3. Complementary 
resources and capabilities
4. Effective governance
1a. Duration of safeguards
1b. Volume of inter-firm transactions 
2a. Partner-specific absorptive capacity
2b. Incentives to encourage transparency
and discourage free riding
3a. Ability to identify and evaluate potential complementarities
3b. Role of organizational complementarities to access 
benefits of strategic resources complementarily
4a. Ability to employ self-enforcement rather than third 
party enforcement governance mechanisms
4b. Ability to employ informal versus formal 
self-enforcement mechanisms
indicates that firms who combine resources in unique ways may realize an advantage over 
competing firms who are unable or unwilling to do so. Thus, idiosyncratic inter-firm 
linkages may be a source of relational rents and competitive advantage, as formulated in the 
first part of hypothesis 15: The more effectively a firm⎯through its alliance 
portfolio⎯accesses rare sustainable inimitable non-substitutable resources, the better the 
company’s performance and, therefore, its competitive advantage. Indeed the “explosion in 
alliances” during the past decade suggests that a pair or network of firms is an increasingly 
important unit of analysis that deserves more study (Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Smith, et al., 
1995). 
To introduce the relational view concept and discuss its applicability for analyzing the case 
study developments, this section is structured in the following way. Literature on (1) sources 
of relational rents and (2) mechanisms to preserve relational rents is incorporated and 
analyzed in the context of the case study data to assess for its relevance. The third part 
compares the relational view with the RBV to clearly detail its differences before discussing 
its critique in part four. The section is summarized in part five. 
Sources of relational rents 
Market-like arms-length partnerships are incapable of generating relational rents because 
there is nothing idiosyncratic about the exchange relationship that enables the two parties to 
generate profits above and beyond that which other seller-buyer combinations can generate. 
The relationships are not rare or difficult to imitate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 66   Determinants of relational rents 
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Alliances generate competitive advantages only as they move the relationship away from the 
attributes of market relationships. The competitive advantage falls into four categories: (1) 
investment in relation-specific assets; (2) substantial knowledge exchange, including the 
exchange of knowledge that results in joint learning; (3) combining of complementary but 
scarce resources or capabilities (typically through multiple functional interfaces), which 
results in the joint creation of unique new products, services, or technologies; or (4) lower 
transaction costs than competitor alliances, owing to more effective governance 
mechanisms. These categories and its sub-processes are depicted in figure 66 and will be 
described in the following paragraphs. 
Interfirm relation-specific assets 
Specialization of assets is a necessary condition for rent. Strategic assets are specialized by 
their very nature (Amit, et al., 1993, p.39). A firm may choose to seek advantages by 
creating assets that are specialized in conjunction with the assets of an alliance partner 
(Teece, 1987). Productivity gains in the value chain are possible when firms are willing to 
make relation/transaction-specific investments (Williamson, 1985).  
Williamson (1985) identified three types of asset specificity: (1) site specificity (successive 
production stages that are immobile in nature are located close to one another), (2) physical 
asset specificity (transaction-specific capital investments such as customized machinery and 
tools), and (3) human asset specificity (know-how accumulated by transactors through 
longstanding relationships such as dedicated supplier engineers).  
Case study data indicate that site specificity is unimportant. No firm collocated its office 
close to an important supplier or client. Important is the combination of know-how and 
human asset specificity. For example, the partnership between Airweb and L’equipe and 
Gate5’s cooperation with DaimlerChrysler are based on complementary competences and 
know-how as well as on a long and trustworthy working relationship87. 
Inter-firm knowledge sharing routines 
                                                 
87  Subprocesses are the duration of safeguards (given the fixed-cost nature of some investments 
that alliance partners need to assess whether or not they will make the necessary return on 
the investment during the payback period or length of the governance agreement) and the 
volume of interfirm transactions (the ability to substitute special-purpose assets for general 
purpose assets is influenced by the total volume [scale] and breadth [scope] of transaction 
between the alliance partners. Just as firms that achieve production economies of scale are 
able to increase productivity by substituting special purpose assets for general purpose 
assets, alliance partners are also able to increase the efficiency associated with interfirm 
exchanges (compare Williamson, 1985)). 
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Various scholars have argued that interorganizational learning is critical to competitive 
success, noting that organizations often learn by collaborating with other organizations 
(Powell, et al., 1996). Von Hippel (1988) argues that a production network with superior 
knowledge-transfer mechanisms among users, suppliers, and manufacturers will be able to 
“cut innovate". Powell and colleagues (1996) argue that biotech firms who are unable to 
create (or position themselves in) learning networks are at a competitive disadvantage. 
Therefore, alliance partners can generate rents by developing knowledge-sharing routines, 
which are defined as a regular pattern of interfirm interactions that permits the transfer, 
recombination, or creation of specialized knowledge (Grant, 1996). These are 
institutionalized interfirm processes that are purposefully designed to facilitate knowledge 
exchanges between alliance partners. 
No strong learning effects have been found in the case study data. Learning could take place 
in two areas, organizational skills and technological know-how. Organizationally, most 
partners are considerably older and are either mid-caps or large incumbents; therefore, 
learning cannot really take place, because the partners are too different (question of 
absorptive capacities). Technological learning effects are limited as well. All case study 
firms had severe problems in establishing intense technology partnerships88, because 
cooperation incentives are hard to align (compare table 25 resource dependency of alliance 
networks and the subsequent paragraphs). These two issues – absorptive capacities and 
cooperation incentives – are now discussed in greater detail. 
Partner specific absorptive capacity: Many scholars divide knowledge into two types: (1) 
information and (2) know-how (Kogut, et al., 1992b). Information is defined as easily 
codifiable knowledge that can be transmitted without loss of integrity once the syntactical 
rules required for deciphering are known. Information includes facts, axiomatic proposition, 
and symbols (Kogut, et al., 1992b, p. 386). By comparison, know-how involves knowledge 
that is tacit, sticky, complex, and difficult to codify (Kogut, et al., 1992b; Nelson, et al., 
1982). Compared to information, know-how is more likely to result in advantages that are 
sustainable. As a result, alliance partners that are particularly effective at transferring know-
how are likely to outperform competitors who are not. 
The ability to exploit outside sources of knowledge is largely a function of prior related 
knowledge or the absorptive capacity of the recipient, where absorptive capacity is defined 
as the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new external information, to assimilate it, 
                                                 
88  Intensive technology cooperations exist only in the case of partnerships with equity stake, such 
as in the case of YellowMap with CAS Software 
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and to apply it to commercial ends (Cohen, et al., 1990). Alliance partners can increase 
partner-specific absorptive capacity by designing interfirm routines that facilitate 
information-sharing and increase socio-technical interactions (Dyer, et al., 1998). 
The case study data indicate the importance of partner specific absorptive capacities, as 
reported by the CEO of Airweb:  
 
‘It took us over a year to learn the structure of Deutschen Telekom. To do business with 
large incumbents, you first have to learn their organization: who is responsible, who has to 
agree on the deal, etc.’ (Claudius Bertheau, CEO Airweb, 2002) 
 
Cooperation incentives: The ability of alliance partners to generate rents through 
knowledge sharing is dependent on an alignment of incentives that encourages the partners 
to be transparent to transfer knowledge, and not to free-ride on the knowledge acquired from 
partners. Various scholars have found that equity arrangements are particularly effective at 
aligning partner incentives and, therefore, promote greater interfirm knowledge transfers 
than contractual arrangements (Kogut, 1988). 
Case study data show almost no equity arrangement, which is consistent with the findings of 
a study by Booz Allen Hamilton (2001b). Equity investments are too numb to cope with the 
challenges of high-velocity industries. Other cooperation incentives exist, such as social 
embeddedness and trust (compare chapter 4.1.4 Alliance management / embeddedness); 
however for highly sensitive technology alliances, they might not be strong enough. 
In conclusion, in the current status of the Mobile Internet industry, knowledge sharing 
routines play a role of only medium importance. 
Complementary resource endowments 
Another way firms can generate relational rents is by leveraging the complementary 
resource endowments of an alliance partner. In some instances a firm’s ability to generate 
rents from its resources may require that these resources be utilized in conjunction with the 
complementary resources of another firm. Formation and management of alliances have 
been discussed widely as a key factor driving returns from alliances (Hamel, 1991; Harrigan, 
1985; Hill, et al., 1994; Shan, et al., 1994; Teece, 1987). 
Resource endowments are defined as “distinctive resources of alliance partners that 
collectively generate greater rents than the sum of those obtained from the individual 
endowments of each partner” (Dyer, et al., 1998, p. 666-667). It is necessary that neither 
firm in the partnership be able to purchase the relevant resources in a secondary market. 
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Strategic alliances allow firms to procure assets, competencies, or capabilities not readily 
available in competitive factor markets. 
This is the main driver for relational rent in the Mobile Internet industry. As discussed in 
section 4.1, the case study firms cooperated with partners to produce and deliver their whole 
product or service, whereas they produce only a part thereof. Resource dependency theory 
explains why these forms of cooperations exist. Furthermore,⎯as discussed in sub-sections 
4.1.3 and 4.1.4⎯alliance formation and alliance management skills determine the alliance 
portfolio effectiveness and thereby the magnitude of relational rent.  
Ability to identify and evaluate potential complementarities: There are several 
challenges faced by firms attempting to generate relational rents with complementary 
resources. In particular, they must find each other and recognize the potential value of 
combining resources. Firms vary in their ability to identify potential partners and value 
complementary resources for the following primary reasons: (1) differences in prior alliance 
experience (i.e., Gulati, 1995; Mitchell, et al., 1996; Walker, et al., 1997), (2) differences in 
internal search and evaluation capability (i.e., Singh, et al., 1997), and (3) differences in 
their ability to acquire information about potential partners owing to different positions in 
their social and economic network(s) (i.e., Burt, 1992; Gulati, 1995; Walker, et al., 1997). 
All three points been discussed previously in section 4.1.3 ‘Partner acquisition’. 
Organizational complementarities to access benefits of strategic resources complemen-
tarily: Once a firm has identified a potential partner with the requisite complementary 
strategic resources, another challenge is developing organizational complementarity, which 
comprises compatibility in decision processes, information and control systems, and culture 
(Doz, 1996). These points are discussed and confirmed in the analysis on alliance 
management capabilities in section 4.1.4 ‘Alliance management’. 
In summary, both⎯strategic selectivity and organizational complementarities⎯are critical 
for realizing the potential benefits of combining complementary strategic resources. 
Effective governance 
Governance plays an important role in the creation of relational rents because it influences 
transaction costs and the willingness of alliance partners to engage in value-creation 
initiatives. Therefore, it is important for transactors to choose a governance structure that 
minimizes transaction costs thereby enhancing efficiency (Williamson, 1985). 
Governance used by alliance partners can be distinguished in the following ways: 
• third party enforcement (Williamson, 1991) versus self enforcement (Telser, 
1980), and 
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• formal (financial and investment hostages (Klein, 1980)) versus informal 
(goodwill trust, embeddedness (Uzzi, 1997), and reputation (Larson, 1992)) 
Transactors who are effective at aligning transactions with governance structures, will have 
an advantage over competing transactors. Effective governance can generate relational rents 
either by lowering transaction costs or by providing incentives for value-creation initiatives. 
Due to the scope of this study, governance issues are not included, therefore, the relevant 
sub-processes are only described and not analyzed. 
Ability to employ self-enforcement governance mechanisms: Self-enforcing mechanisms 
are more effective than third-party enforcement mechanisms at both minimizing transaction 
costs and maximizing value-creation initiatives for four primary reasons: (1) contracting 
costs are avoided, (2) monitoring costs are lower, (3) costs associated with complex 
adaptation are lowered, and (4) superiority at minimizing transaction costs is achieved 
because they are not subject to the time limitations of contracts. Self-enforcing agreements 
also call for greater value-creation initiatives on the part of the exchange partners. 
Ability to employ informal self-enforcement mechanisms: Informal safeguards have the 
greater potential to generate relational rents, and they are subject to two key liabilities: (1) 
they require substantial time to develop because they require a history of interactions and 
personal ties, and (2) they are subject to the “paradox of trust”.  
Conclusion on sources of relational rent 
Theory and case study results are consistent in explaining sources of relational rent. Not all 
theoretical drivers are particularly important in the Mobile Internet industry. Complementary 
resources are most likely to generate relational rents. Relation specific assets and knowledge 
sharing routines are of medium importance. Case study data do not provide evidence that 
governance mechanisms are of very high importance. 
After establishing relational rent, the next strategic challenge is to maintain strong strategic 
positions, which is discussed next. 
Mechanisms to preserve relational rent 
An explanation of how firms generate relational rents necessarily requires an explanation of 
why competing firms do not simply imitate the partnering behavior, thereby eliminating any 
competitive advantages that might be gained through collaboration. There are a variety of 
isolating mechanisms that preserve the rents generated by alliance partners such as causal 
ambiguity, time compression diseconomies, inter-organizational asset interconnectedness, 
partner scarcity (rareness), resource indivisibility (co-evolution of capabilities), or a socially 
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complex institutional environment. The first two mechanisms have been discussed 
previously and demonstrated in chapter 4.2.1 ‘Impact of resources on competitive 
advantage’. The other mechanisms are discussed now. 
Interorganizational asset interconnectedness 
The premise of this mechanism is that interorganizational asset interconnectedness occurs in 
cumulative increments on an existing stock of assets held by a firm or its alliance partner. 
There is a cumulative effect that is due to the interconnectedness of current relation-specific 
investments with previous relation-specific investments. 
This point has been demonstrated and discussed in the analysis of social capital and the 
value of prior alliances (compare to section 4.1.3 Partner acquisition / Alliance history). 
Partner scarcity 
Relational rents are contingent on a firm’s ability to find a partner with (1) complementary 
resources and (2) a relational capability (i.e., firm’s willingness and ability to partner). In 
some cases, a late-comer to the partner scene may find that all potential partners with the 
necessary complementary resources have already entered into alliances with other firms. 
In other instances potential partners may simply lack the relational capability or relation-
building skills and process skills necessary to employ effective governance mechanisms to 
make relation-specific investments or to develop knowledge-sharing routines (Eisenhardt, et 
al., 1996; Larson, 1992). Firms with collaborative experience have been found to be more 
desirable as partners and more likely to generate value through partnerships (Gulati, 1995). 
The key strategic implication of this isolating mechanism is that there are strong first mover 
advantages for those firms that develop a capability of quickly identifying and allying with 
partners possessing complementary strategic resources and a relational capability. These 
capabilities in this study are termed partnership acquisition capabilities.  
Due to the fact that most companies have already established over 30 alliances, the complete 
lack of relational capabilities might not be an issue. However, the impact of advanced 
partner acquisition capabilities on the alliance portfolio effectiveness becomes obvious in 
this study. A comparison of Gate5 with ehotel with respect to the different degrees to which 
an allying process is implemented and how this influences their alliance portfolio 
effectiveness constitutes an illustrative example. 
Resource indivisibility 
Partners may combine resources or jointly develop capabilities in such a way that the 
resulting resources are both idiosyncratic and indivisible. A key strategic implication is that 
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the partners’ resources and capabilities may coevolve and change over time, thereby 
restricting each firm’s ability to control and redeploy the resources. Although value may be 
generated through the partnership, there is the potential for a loss of flexibility, which should 
be considered at the outset. 
The case study data do not provide many characteristic examples for resource indivisibility. 
One reason for this could be the barely existing co-development agreements or other forms 
of intense technology partnering. 
Institutional environments 
An institutional environment that encourages or fosters trust among trading partners (e.g., 
has effective institutional “rules” or social controls for enforcing agreements) may facilitate 
the creation of relational rents (North, 1990). In addition, national or regional “rules” can 
foster trust among partners; the Japanese automobile industry is a good example (Sako, 
1991). 
Case study data do not provide characteristic examples of the impact of the institutional 
environments. Given the fact that all case studies are part of the same industry, cooperate 
with the same or similar firms, and have the same national background, this is not really 
surprising. 
In conclusion of this argument, relational rents generated by alliance partners are preserved 
because competing firms: 
• Face difficulties when interconnecting their organization with relevant industry 
partners. Competitors have previously embedded ties to most industry players and 
established social capital. For newcomers it is hard to imitate practices or 
investments because of asset stock interconnectedness and because the costs 
associated with making previous investments are prohibitive. 
• Have problems in partnering with important industry players with the required 
complementary strategic resources or relational capability. Partners are scarce due to 
oligopolistic structures in the operator and content business. 
Case study data show that the other mechanisms listed above are not particularly relevant. 
Comparing the relational view with the RBV 
The relational view extends the existing literature on resources and their impact on 
competitive advantage in a number of ways. First, it attempts to integrate what is known 
regarding the benefits of collaboration by examining the inter-organizational rent generating 
process. It argues that collaborating firms can generate relational rents through relation-
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specific assets, knowledge-sharing routines, complementary resource endowments, and 
effective governance. Second, it identifies the isolating mechanisms that preserve the 
relational rents generated through effective inter-firm collaboration (compare table 32). 
Dimensions Resource-Based View Relational View 
Unit of analysis Firm Pair or network of firms 
Primary source of 
supernormal profit returns 
Scarce physical resources (e.g., raw 
material inputs) 
Human resources/know-how (e.g., 
managerial talent) 
Technological resources (e.g., process 
technology) 
Financial resources 
Intangible resources (e.g., reputation) 
Inter-firm knowledge-sharing routines 
Complementary resource endowments 
Effective governance 
Mechanisms that preserve 
profits 
Firm-level barriers to imitation 
• Resource scarcity / property 
rights 
• Causal ambiguity 
• Time compression 
diseconomies 
• Asset stock interconnectedness 
Dyadic / network barriers to imitation 
• Causal ambiguity 
• Time compression 
diseconomies 
• Inter-organizational assets 
stock interconnectedness 
• Partner scarcity 
• Resource indivisibility 
• Institutional environment 
Ownership/control of 
rent-generating resources 
Individual firm Collective (with trading partner) 
Table 32   Differences between the RBV and the relational view  
This study shows⎯consistent with Dyer and Singh (1998)⎯ that relationships between 
firms are an increasingly important unit of analysis for explaining supernormal profit 
returns. The relational view offers a useful theoretical lens through which value-creating 
linkages between organizations can be examined and explored. One key aspect to 
organizational survival is the ability to acquire and maintain resources.  
Critique of the relational view 
As it is closely related to the RBV, the relational view has been criticized for some of the 
same reasons. The value of the exchanged resources and knowledge is determined 
exogenous to the model; the relational view is too static, because it does not address the 
dynamics in relationships and the value of the exchanged resources. In addition, authors 
(e.g., Molina, 1999) have stated two additional points: (1) the detachment of the relational 
view from closely related views such as the RBV is not especially helpful, because the 
competitive advantage does not depend solely on inter-firm knowledge-sharing routines and 
complementary resource endowments, but also from the value of resources and the skills 
residing inside the company. Moreover, (2) it requires more work to clarify for which kind 
of networks the relational view is especially useful. 
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Conclusion on the relational view 
Aside from the critique mentioned above, the relational view takes the resource-based 
concepts of strategic management a step further and expands them up to the firm’s shared 
environment (Rizzoni, 1993). It is a powerful approach that explains explicitly the 
circumstances in which relational rent can be generated and instances of how it can be 
protected. 
In the context of this study, the relational view is applicable to the understanding and 
structure the importance of strategic alliances on competitive advantage  
Its shortcoming of being too static is the same as with the RBV, and has been discussed in 
detail at the end of section 4.2.1. As pointed out in that section, the concept of dynamic 
capabilities deals with this critique with the aim to enlarge the resource-based theories. 
Dynamic capabilities are discussed in the following section. 
4.2.3 Dynamic capabilities 
Strategic theory, including the RBV and the relational view, is replete with analyses of firm-
level strategies for sustaining and safeguarding extant competitive advantage, but has 
performed less well with respect to assisting in the understanding of how and why certain 
firms build competitive advantage in regimes of rapid change (Teece, et al., 1997). The 
RBV in particular has not explained adequately how and why certain firms have competitive 
advantage in situations of rapid and unpredictable change. It breaks down in high-velocity 
markets in which the strategic challenge is to maintain competitive advantage when the 
duration of that advantage is inherently unpredictable and when time is an essential aspect of 
strategy (Eisenhardt, et al., 2000). In particular the  
 
‘…battles in high-technology industries such as semiconductors, information services, and 
software have demonstrated the need for an expanded [dynamic] paradigm to understand 
how competitive advantage is achieved.’ (Teece, et al., 1997, p.516) 
 
High-velocity markets are a boundary condition for the RBV, which is a necessary addition 
to the theory. The classic RBV overlooks the strategic role of time. Understanding the flow 
of strategy from leveraging the past to probing the future and the rhythm of when, where, 
and how often to change is central to strategy in high-velocity markets (Aragon-Correa, et 
al., 2003; Deeds, et al., 2000; Galunic, et al., 2001; Griffith, et al., 2001; Helfat, 1997; King, 
et al., 2002; Rindova, et al., 2001; Zollo, et al., 2002), and is captured in hypothesis 16: The 
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better a NTBF is capable of rearranging its alliance portfolio according to changing 
resource requirements (dynamic capability), the better the company’s performance and, 
therefore, the higher its competitive advantage. 
In high velocity markets, dynamic capabilities by which firm managers integrate, build, and 
reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing environments 
become important (Teece, et al., 1997). The terminology ‘dynamic capabilities’ emphasizes 
two key aspects that were not the main focus of attention in previous strategy perspectives. 
The term dynamic refers to the capacity to renew competencies so as to achieve congruence 
with the changing business environment; certain innovative responses are required when 
time-to-market and timing are critical, when the rate of technological change is rapid, and 
when the nature of future competition and markets are difficult to determine. The term 
capabilities emphasizes the key role of strategic management in appropriately adapting, 
integrating, and reconfiguring internal and external organizational skills, resources, and 
functional competences to match the requirements of a changing environment. Dynamic 
capabilities are best conceptualized as tools that manipulate resource configurations. 
Elements of the approach can be found in Schumpeter (1942), Penrose (1959), Nelson and 
Winter (1982), and Prahalad and Hamel (1990). 
The work of these various scholars has led to a flood of different definitions for terms such 
as ‘resources’, ‘capabilities’, ‘routines’, and ‘factors’. Thus, following the introduction, this 
section will provide definitions for the relevant terms used in this study. In the second part, 
the dynamic capability concept is described in detail, followed by its limitations and 
critique. Thereby the key statements are analyzed in the context of case study findings. Part 
four concludes the section with a summary. 
Definitions 
To differentiate basic factors of production from resources and activities from core 
competencies and dynamic capabilities clear definitions are required. This section 
distinguishes the terms from each other.  
Factor of production: These are undifferentiated inputs available in disaggregate form in 
factor markets. Undifferentiated means that they lack firm-specific components. Land, 
unskilled labor, and capital are typical examples. Some factors may be freely available, such 
as public knowledge. In the language of Arrow (1996), such resources must be ‘non-
fugitive’. Property rights are usually well-defined for factors of production. 
Resources: Resources are firm-specific assets that are difficult to impossible to imitate. 
Trade secrets and certain specialized production facilities and engineering are examples. 
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Such assets are difficult to transfer among firms because of transaction costs and because the 
assets may contain tacit knowledge. This definition is much narrower than the definition 
provided in section ‘4.2.1 – Resource definition’, because it excludes skills, routines, and 
competencies. 
Organizational routines / competences: When firm-specific assets are assembled in 
integrated clusters spanning individuals and groups so that they enable distinctive activities 
to be performed, these activities constitute organizational routines and processes. Examples 
include quality and systems integration. Such competences are typically viable across 
multiple product lines, and may extend to outside the firm to include alliance partners.  
Core competences: Those competences that determine a firm’s fundamental business as a 
core are defined as core competences. They must accordingly be derived by looking across 
the range of a firm’s products and services. The value of core competences can be enhanced 
by combining them with appropriate complementary assets. The degree to which a core 
competence is distinctive depends on how well-endowed the firm is relative to its 
competitors, and on how difficult it is for competitors to replicate its competences. 
Dynamic capabilities: Dynamic capabilities are defined as the firm’s ability to integrate, 
build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly-changing 
environments. Dynamic capabilities thus reflect an organization’s ability to achieve new and 
innovative forms of competitive advantage given path dependencies and market positions. 
They are: 
 
‘… the firms’ processes that use resources⎯specifically the processes to integrate, gain and 
release resources⎯to match and even create market change. Dynamic capabilities thus are 
the organizational and strategic routines by which firms achieve new resource 
configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die.’ (Eisenhardt, et al., 2000, p. 
1107) 
 
Other scholars used different terms for similar context, such as: ‘combinative capabilities’ 
(Kogut, et al., 1992b), ‘architectural capabilities’ (Henderson, et al., 1994), ‘organizational 
capabilities’ (Grant, 1996), or simple ‘capabilities’ (Amit, et al., 1993). 
 
Products: End products are the final goods and services produced by the firm based on 
utilizing the competences that it possesses. The performance (price, quality, etc.) of a firm’s 
products relative to its competitors at any point in time will depend upon its competences. 
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As defined above, dynamic capabilities consist of identifiable and specific routines that 
either integrate, transform, gain, or release resources. Integrating routines are product 
development and strategic decision-making. Reconfiguration includes transfer processes 
(routines for replication and brokering), allocation routines (distribution of scarce resources 
such as capital or manufacturing capacity), and coevolving (e.g., connection of collaboration 
webs); capabilities related to the gain and release of resources include knowledge creation 
routines (i.e., Henderson, et al., 1994), alliance and acquisition routines (i.e., Lane, et al., 
1998), and exit routines that jettison resource combinations no longer providing competitive 
advantage (Sull, 1999). In the case study companies, strategic planning, project 
management, and allying were cited as particularly critical capabilities. As the CEO of 
Airweb reports: 
 
‘… [our strengths are] the speed with which we realize and implement new projects and our 
significant experience in structuring alliances.’ (Claudius Bertheau, CEO Airweb, 2002) 
 
Yet what are the implications of dynamic capabilities? How can they be established? How 
do they create competitive advantage, and how useful is this concept for this study? To 
answer these questions, the next part describes the model Teece and his colleagues 
developed from 1991 to 1997 and analyzes the case study results in context of the key 
statements. 
Analyzing the case study results with the concept of dynamic capabilities 
What is distinctive about firms is that they are domains for organizing activity in a non-
market fashion. Accordingly, competences and capabilities are ways of organizing and 
getting things done that cannot be accomplished merely by using the price system to 
coordinate activity. The very essence of most capabilities and competences is that they 
cannot be readily assembled through markets (Zander, et al., 1995). 
The key point is that a portfolio of business units amalgamated only through formal 
contracts cannot replicate the properties of an internal organization. Many distinctive 
elements of an internal organization simply cannot be replicated in the market. That is, 
entrepreneurial activity cannot lead to the immediate replication of unique organizational 
skills simply by entering a market and piecing the parts together overnight. Replication takes 
time, and firm capabilities need to be understood in terms of organizational structures and 
the managerial processes that support productive activity (Teece, et al., 1997). 
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The degree to which dynamic capabilities generate competitive advantage depends on the 
degree to which new capabilities can be formed and existing ones can be replicated 
(generation of competitive advantage). Their sustainability depends on the degree to which 
they can be imitated or emulated (sustainability of competitive advantage). These two 
aspects are discussed subsequently. 
Generation of competitive advantage 
There are many dimensions of business firms that must be understood if one is to grasp 
firm-level distinctive competences and capabilities. Teece (1997) identified three classes of 
factors that determine firm’s distinctive competence and dynamic capabilities: (1) processes, 
(2) positions, and (3) paths. Organizational processes, shaped by the firm’s asset positions 
and molded by its evolutionary and coevolutionary paths, explain the essence of the firm’s 
dynamic capabilities and its competitive advantage. In addition, (4) a firm’s ability to 
replicate these capabilities determines the scale of its competitive advantage. 
Processes: Managerial and organizational processes are the way things are done in the firm, 
or what might be referred to as its routines, or patterns of current practice and learning. The 
essence of competences and capabilities is embedded in organizational processes of one 
kind or another. Organizational and managerial processes have three roles: coordination / 
integration, learning, and reconfiguration.  
Coordination / integration: Managers coordinate or integrate activity inside the 
firm. How efficiently and effectively internal coordination or integration is achieved 
is extremely important. Likewise for external coordination, the growing literature on 
strategic alliances supplies evidence for the importance of external integration and 
sourcing. Various scholars provided support for the notion that management’s 
internal organizing skills are the source of differences in firms’ competence in 
various domains (Clark, et al., 1991; Garvin, 1988; Henderson, et al., 1990; 
Womack, et al., 1991). 
The notion that there is a certain rationality or coherence to processes and systems is 
not the same concept as corporate culture. Corporate culture refers to the values and 
beliefs that employees hold. Rationality and coherence notions are more akin to 
Nelson and Winter’s (1982) notion of organizational routines. 
Case study data provide further evidence that coordination tasks are very important, 
particularly when firms grow older. All case studies report that the importance of 
effectiveness grew dramatically from stage two on. However, organizational 
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effectiveness was not the scope of this study, therefore internal coordination 
activities have not been analyzed in greater detail. 
Learning: Learning is the process by which repetition and experimentation enable 
tasks to be performed better and quicker. It also enables new production 
opportunities to be identified (Levitt, et al., 1988). Learning requires common codes 
of communication and coordinated search procedures. Organizational knowledge 
generated by such activity resides in new patterns of activity, in routines, or in a new 
logic of organization. Routines are patterns of interactions that represent successful 
solutions to particular problems. These patterns of interaction are present in group 
behavior. The concept of dynamic capabilities as a coordinative management process 
opens the door to the potential for inter-organizational learning. Researchers have 
pointed out that collaboration and partnerships can be vehicles for new 
organizational learning that helps firms to recognize dysfunctional routines and 
prevents strategic blind spots. 
It cannot be said that learning is unimportant. In fact, learning is important in case 
study firm’s alliances, for learning industry rules, organizational structures, and how 
to ally: however, learning was not the major focus for establishing alliances as 
discussed previously in chapter 4.1. 
Reconfiguration and transformation: In rapidly changing environments, there is 
obviously value in the ability to sense the need to reconfigure a firm’s asset structure, 
and to accomplish the necessary internal and external transformation. The capacity to 
reconfigure and transform is itself a learned organizational skill. The more frequently 
practiced, the easier it is accomplished. 
Change is costly. Therefore, firms must develop processes to minimize low pay-off 
change. The ability to scan the environment, to evaluate markets and competitors and 
to quickly accomplish reconfiguration and transformation ahead of competition 
increases the change efficiency. 
In examining the case study data, reconfiguration is clearly an issue. In an extreme 
form, companies restructured their business model, such as 12snap from mobile 
auctioning to mobile marketing, or ApollisInteractive from MLS to mobile 
marketing. However, stage-wise changing resource requirements (as discussed in the 
cross segment analysis⎯section 3.5) also force firms to rearrange assets and 
resources. The allying process (analyzed in detail in sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.4) is 
crucial for reconfiguring the firm’s boundary. In addition, reconfiguration within 
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partnership is an important element for intensifying them and maintaining their 
duration as formulated in hypothesis 10 (and discussed in section 4.1.4). 
Of the three processes, the reconfiguration and transformation processes are without any 
doubt the most important. Moreover, in support of hypothesis 16, they have the potential to 
create competitive advantage. 
Positions: Processes are shaped significantly by the assets the firm possesses. By positions, 
Teece (1997) refers to firm’s current specific endowments of technology, intellectual 
property, customer base, and its relationships with suppliers and complementors.  
Technological assets: Much technology does not enter a market, either because the 
firm is unwilling to sell it or because transaction costs are too high. Ownership 
protection and utilization of technological assets are clearly differentiators among 
firms. This is also the case with complementary assets that are additionally required 
to produce and deliver new products and services. 
Case study firms invest a great deal in technology and, particularly in MLS segment, 
technology is a clear differentiator. However, pure technology assets or positions 
have not been analyzed in this study; thus, nothing can be said about their 
implications. 
Financial assets: A firm’s cash position and the degree of leverage have strategic 
implications, because they limit what a firm can do.  
In the case of 12snap, financial assets can be seen as a competitive advantage, as its 
CFO Bernd Mühlfriedel, who raised approximately € 50 million. in VC funding in 
the year 2000, stated: 
 
“… this was not only me. I worked on this together with the CEO Michael Birkel. But 
our financial situation is clearly a competitive advantage for us. The question, who is 
the most creative, is always hard to answer, but the question, who is financially the 
most powerful, is by far more transparent and easier to answer.” (Bernd 
Mühlfriedel, CFO 12snap, 2002) 
 
Financial assets are important, but as shown in the case of ApollisInteractive, which 
was second only to 12Snap in the amount of funds received, not enough for a 
distinctive competitive advantage. In addition, as with technological assets, the 
implication of financial assets on competitive advantage has not been the focus of 
this study. 
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Reputational assets: Reputation often summarizes a good deal of information about 
firms and shapes the responses of customers, suppliers, and competitors. 
Reputational assets are best viewed as an intangible asset that enables firms to 
achieve various goals in the market. It is part of its social capital. Its main value is 
external. 
Case study data clearly indicate the importance of reputation, which is formulated in 
hypothesis 6. Reputation is gained by reliable project realization and by partnerships 
with prestigious firms. It is especially important for alliance formation. 
Structural assets: The formal and informal structure of organizations and their 
external linkages have an important bearing on the rate and direction of innovation, 
and on how competences and capabilities coevolve. The degree of hierarchy and the 
level of vertical and lateral integration are elements of firm-specific structures. 
The strategic importance of these structural assets is clearly evident in the case study 
data and has been discussed in the previous section on relational rent. 
Institutional assets: Institutions are a critical element of the business environment. 
Regulatory systems as well as intellectual property regimes, tort law, and antitrust 
laws are part of the environment. So is the system of higher education and natural 
culture. There are significant local, regional, and national differences, which is one 
of the reasons why geographic location matters (Nelson, 1994).  
Institutional assets have no strategic importance in this study. All firms face the same 
business environment; they cannot feasibly be differentiated according institutional 
assets. 
Market (structure) assets: Product market positions matter. However a market 
position is often extremely fragile in regimes of rapid technological change. While 
important, it is too often overplayed (Teece, et al., 1997). 
Market structure assets do not play a significant role in this study, at least not yet. 
The Mobile Internet industry is highly fragmented and still has low entry barriers. 
Due to limited market power, market structure assets barely exist (see discussion on 
concepts in strategic management in the introduction of section 4.2).  
Organizational boundaries: The degree of integration (vertical, lateral, and 
horizontal) is of some significance. Boundaries are important with respect to the 
nature of the coordination that can be achieved internally as compared to through 
markets. When, for example, poorly protected intellectual capital is at issue, pure 
market arrangements expose the parties to contracting hazards. In such 
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circumstances, hierarchical control structures may work better than pure arms-length 
contracts (Williamson, 1996, p. 102-103). 
Integrating steps along the value chain or consolidating the industry by merging with 
competitors to gain market power have not been issues for the case study firms. 
Limited funds and low evaluations largely prohibit the firms from buying other 
firms. In addition, integrating is the strongest form of cooperation, which seems not 
to be flexible enough for current market conditions (compare Booz Allen Hamilton, 
2001b). 
In summary of the strategic impact of position in the Mobile Internet industry, structural and 
reputational assets are very important. The processes by which they affect competitive 
advantage have been analyzed in this study and discussed in sections 3.5, 4.1, and 4.3.2. In 
addition, case study data indicate that technology and financial assets are also important, but 
the impact of these positions has not been analyzed in greater detail.  
The remaining positions, institutional, market and organizational, appear to be strategically 
unimportant for the case study companies. 
Paths: Processes are shaped significantly by the evolutionary path that a firm has 
adopted/inherited. Choices about domains of competence are influenced by past choices. At 
any given point in time, firms must follow a certain trajectory or path of competence 
development. This path not only defines which choices are open to the firm today, but it also 
puts bounds on what its internal repertoire is likely to be in the future. 
Path dependencies: Where a firm can go is a function of its current position and the 
paths ahead. Moreover, its current position is often shaped by the traveled path. A 
firm’s previous investments and its repertoire of routines constrain its future 
behavior. Opportunities for learning will be ‘close in’ to previous activities and thus 
will be transaction and production specific. 
The case study data provide several examples that clearly show how important path 
dependencies are, especially when looking at external linkages. A characteristic 
example can be taken from the MCS segment. Content providers form an oligopoly; 
therefore, only a limited amount of content partners exist. In the case of late industry 
entry, only small or unattractive partners remained, which causes clear competitive 
disadvantages. A more general example of path dependency is the impact of the 
firm’s alliance history, which is formulated in hypotheses 9 and discussed in section 
4.1.3 ‘Partner acquisition / Alliance history’. The set of prior formed alliances has a 
positive impact on alliance opportunities, reputation, and project skills. 
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The importance of path dependencies is amplified when conditions of increasing 
returns to adoption exist. New products employing different standards often appear 
with alacrity in market environments experiencing rapid technological change and 
incumbents can be readily challenged by superior products and services that yield 
switching benefits. However, these effects have not been found in the case study 
data. 
Technological opportunities: How far and how fast a particular industry activity 
can proceed is due in part to the potential future technological opportunities. 
Technological opportunities may not be completely exogenous to industry, not only 
because some firms have the capacity to engage in or at least support basic research, 
but also because technological opportunities are often fed by innovative activity 
itself. The depth and width of technological opportunities in the area of a firm’s prior 
research activities are thus likely to impact a firm’s options with respect to both the 
amount and level of R&D justified activity. 
These technological opportunities exist. They have been crucial for the whole 
industry to come into existence and they are important for its growth, chiefly in the 
technology-heavy segments like MLS. However, in the case study data, nothing 
could be found that indicated that one firm had a clear technological advantage.  
Thus, the path dependency argument is most important for understanding, how the history of 
activities influences the creation of current and future competitive advantage. The scale of 
this competitive advantage is dependent on how efficiently firms can replicate it. 
Replication: Replication involves transferring or redeploying competences from one 
concrete economic setting to another. Replication and transfer are often impossible without 
the transfer of people, although this can be overcome if investments are made to convert 
tacit knowledge to codified knowledge. Often, however, this is simply not possible. 
Competences and capabilities, and the routines upon which they rest, are usually rather 
difficult to replicate (Nelson, et al., 1982). 
At least two types of strategic value flow from replication: One strategic value is the ability 
to support geographic and product line expansion; another is that the ability to replicate also 
indicates that the firm has the foundation in place for learning and improvement because the 
understanding of processes might lead to the codification of circumstances that would allow 
scientific and engineering principles to be applied systematically. 
Case study data provide two forms of replication: internationalization and copying 
partnership deals. Concerning internationalization, 12snap opened offices in Italy and 
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Scandinavia using the same market entry strategy that had proved to be successful in the 
UK. 
Replication takes place when parallel partnerships are established, such as Clever.Tanken 
did with several regional radio stations and YellowMap did with different city portals. The 
structure of each partnership is often identical and processes are simply copied.  
Nevertheless, these partnerships also bear the risk of losing their competitive advantage. 
They are often neither exclusive nor especially intense and, therefore, easy to imitate by 
outsiders. The relevant factors that influence the sustainability of competitive advantage are 
analyzed next. 
Sustainability of competitive advantage 
Competences can provide advantages and generate rents only if they are based on a 
collection of routines, skills, and complementary assets that are difficult to imitate. A set of 
routines can lose its value if it supports a competence that is no longer of consequence in the 
marketplace, or if they can be readily replicated or emulated by competitors. Imitation 
occurs when firms discover and simply copy a firm’s organizational routines and 
procedures. Emulation occurs when firms discover easy alternatives to achieve the same 
functionality. 
Imitation is simply replication performed by a competitor. The ease of imitation determines 
the sustainability of competitive advantage. Easy imitation implies the rapid dissipation of 
rents. When the tacit component is high, imitation may well be impossible without the hiring 
away of key individual and the transfer of key organizational processes. Intellectual property 
rights, such as patents, trade secrets, and trademarks, also limit imitation. 
Case study interviews have shown that imitation is possible and not excessively difficult to 
realize, especially in the MCS segment where tacit components are limited. Services, 
suppliers, and distributors are often common knowledge and neither a strong platform 
technology nor a large opt-in subscriber base limits copying and imitating. Limitation can 
often only be blocked when services are co-developed with partners who have expensive or 
even exclusive content, such as Airweb did with L’équipe in France. 
On the other hand, in all three segments, profitable business models are rare and the causal 
ambiguity of why services are successful is high. The dominant design for most mobile 
services has not yet found. Therefore, neither imitation nor emulation are major threats in 
the industry because⎯using evolutionary theory⎯selection and not variation is the 
problem. 
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Concluding on Teece, Pisano and Shuen’s (1997) theory, the discussion has shown that 
firms can derive competitive advantage from dynamic capabilities. In particular, 
reconfiguration and transformation processes, as well as reputational and structural assets 
are key factors that have the potential to create competitive advantage from effectively 
structured alliance portfolios, which supports hypothesis 16. Replication and imitation exist, 
but both processes have no major importance. 
Limitations and critique 
Even before the final version of the paper by Teece and his colleagues was published 
various scholars (i.e., Collis, 1994; Eisenhardt, et al., 2000) took up the idea of dynamic 
capabilities and tested its applicability in different contexts. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) 
examined the nature of dynamic capabilities, how those capabilities are influenced by 
market dynamism, and their evolution over time. They found that: 
(1) Dynamic capabilities exhibit commonalities across effective firms⎯or what can be 
termed ‘best practice’. Therefore, dynamic capabilities have greater equifinality, 
homogeneity, and substitutability across firms than traditional RBV thinking would imply. 
(2) Effective patterns of dynamic capabilities vary with market dynamism. In the context of 
a stable industry structure, dynamic capabilities resemble the traditional conception of 
routines (i.e., Nelson, et al., 1982). In high-velocity markets where industry structure is 
blurred, dynamic capabilities take on a different character. They are simple, experiential, 
unstable processes that rely on quickly-created new knowledge and iterative execution to 
produce adaptive, but unpredictable, outcomes. 
Collis (1994) analyzed the source of competitive advantage in a hierarchy of resources and 
capabilities and tested the applicability of Teece’s concept for practitioners. He found that: 
(3) In the hierarchy of resources and capabilities, higher and higher hyper capabilities can 
always be found that make the competitive advantage of lower level resources and 
capabilities obsolete.  
(4) The applicability for practitioners is limited, because dynamic capabilities are often not 
well-defined and difficult to operationalize. 
The relevance of these four points is discussed subsequently. 
Limited potential for sustainable competitive advantage 
Since the functionality of dynamic capabilities, such as effective alliance management, can 
be duplicated across firms, their value for competitive advantage lies in the resource 
configurations that they create, not in the capabilities themselves (Eisenhardt, et al., 2000). 
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Dynamic capabilities can be used to enhance existing resource configurations in the pursuit 
of long-term competitive advantage.  
Commonalities across firms for effective specific capabilities exist, and were named 
equifinality by which Eisenhardt and Martin (2000). That is, managers of firms that develop 
an effective dynamic capability such as knowledge creation or allying processes very 
probably begin the development of that capability from different starting points and take 
unique paths. Since they end up with capabilities that are similar in terms of key attributes, 
this suggests that there are multiple paths to the same dynamic capabilities (equifinality). 
Routines are more substitutable and fungible across different contexts than current theory 
suggests. 
A good case study example is the basic structure of the allying process, which has a similar 
shape in all case study firms. This supports Eisenhardt and Martin’s equifinality argument. 
Dynamic capabilities are not likely to be sources of sustained competitive advantage. They 
are valuable and they might be rare, but they are not sustainable. Equifinality renders 
inimitability and immobility irrelevant to sustained advantage. Dynamic capabilities must 
have key features in common to be effective, but they can actually be different in terms of 
many details. This suggests that dynamic capabilities per se can be source of competitive, 
but not sustainable, advantage.  
Thus, dynamic capabilities are somewhat similar across case studies. For example, the case 
study firms use very similar allying processes and strategic skills to reshape their business 
models, which is necessary for the creation of competitive advantage. However, these skills 
are not sufficient to sustain the created advantage. 
Context specificity 
When markets are very dynamic⎯what is termed high velocity⎯change becomes nonlinear 
and less predictable. High-velocity markets are those in which market boundaries are 
blurred, successful business models are unclear, and market players (i.e., buyers, suppliers, 
competitors, and complementers) are ambiguous and shifting. These characteristics are 
clearly the case in the Mobile Internet industry, as described in chapter ‘3.1.1 – Industry 
overview’. 
Dynamic capabilities in high-velocity markets are simple routines that provide enough 
structure (e.g., semi-structure) so that people can focus their attention, help provide sense 
making about the situation, and be confident enough to act in these highly uncertain 
situations in which it is easy to become paralyzed by anxiety (Eisenhardt, et al., 2000). 
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In high-velocity markets, absence of detailed formal routines is not indicative of extensive 
use of tacit knowledge or complex social routines that cannot be codified, although these 
may be present. Rather dynamic capabilities strikingly involve the creation of new, situation 
specific knowledge. Finally, dynamic capabilities in these markets are characterized by 
parallel consideration and often partial implementation of multiple options. 
In high-velocity markets, dynamic capabilities take on the following character: They are 
simple (not complicated), experimental (not analytic), and iterative (not linear) processes. 
They rely on the creation of situation-specific knowledge that is applied in the context of 
simple boundary and priority-setting rules. 
In high-velocity markets, the more crucial aspect of evolution is selection, not variation. 
Variation happens rapidly in such markets as the Mobile Internet with more than 900 
companies (compare Booz Allen Hamilton, 2001b). In contrast, selection is difficult because 
it is a challenge to decide which experience should be generalized from the extensive 
situation-specific knowledge that occurs. Dynamic capabilities rely extensively on new 
knowledge created for specific situations. Routines are purposefully simple, although not 
completely unstructured, to allow for emergent adaptation. Effective routines are adaptive to 
changing circumstances. The price of that adaptability is unstable processes with 
unpredictable outcomes. In cases in which learning can be too rapid, the selection of what to 
keep from experience is more crucial, and the order of implementation can be critical in 
dynamic capabilities that are composed of several distinct capabilities. 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) found that competitive advantage lies in the resource 
configuration that managers build using dynamic capabilities, not in the capabilities 
themselves. Effective dynamic capabilities are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for 
competitive advantage. This is consistent with the case study findings; competitive 
advantage lies in the resource configuration, such as in 12snap’s opt-in subscriber base, in 
Clever.Tanken’s 40,000+ Benzin Preis Piloten or in YellowMap’s business directory and 
maps and not in efficient alliance formation and management processes. However, these 
processes are necessary to build up and configure the underlying resources. 
Superseding higher-order capabilities 
Collis (1994) argues that positions of competitive advantage based on dynamic capabilities 
are vulnerable to being superseded by a better, higher-order capability. 
Definitions have classified routines and capabilities into three categories, each of which is 
recognized as possible source of durable firm heterogeneity. (1) Routines (first order 
categories according to Collis) reflect an ability to perform basic functional activities of the 
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firm, such as plant layout, distribution logistics, and marketing campaigns more efficiently 
than competitors. (2) Dynamic capabilities (second order category of capabilities according 
to Collis) share the common theme of dynamic improvement to the activities of the firm as 
repeated process or product innovations, manufacturing flexibility, responsiveness to market 
trends, and short development cycles (Amit, et al., 1993). (3) Hyper capabilities (third order 
category of capabilities according to Collis), although closely related to dynamic 
capabilities, comprise the more metaphysical strategic insights that enable firms to recognize 
the intrinsic value of other resources or to develop novel strategies before competitors. 
There are three possible reasons why a position of competitive advantage that an 
organizational capability can generate today will not be sustained: erosion of the capability 
as the firm adapts to external or competitive changes; replacement by a different capability; 
and being surpassed by a better capability. Dynamic capabilities are vulnerable on all three 
dimensions. 
As the capability becomes more sophisticated, it still does not definitely become a source of 
sustainable competitive advantage because differences in the next-order derivative can 
always invalidate differences in the order that is the current subject of analysis.  
Higher order capabilities decrease the time taken to eliminate a competitive disadvantage 
until it becomes pointless to consider of any advantage as sustainable because competitors 
possess the ability to close a competitive gap almost instantaneously. Ironically, the ultimate 
dynamic capability is, therefore, not a sustainable competitive advantage (Collis, 1994). 
There is no clear way to approach a solution to the problem of the multi levels of 
capabilities. Collis (1994) suggests working on industry-specific solutions. He recognized 
that although the source of sustainable competitive advantage could be found in any one of 
the different levels, valuable capabilities are dependent on the context of the industry and the 
time. At any point in time in any one industry it may, therefore, be possible to identify the 
capability that currently underpins, or will possibly in the near future underpin, sustainable 
competitive advantage. 
This study is consistent with Collis’s critique. While recognizing that higher-order 
capabilities are necessary, industry specific resources whose configuration and 
reconfiguration creates competitive advantage are worked out. The focus on the underlying 
resources has a convenient side effect; these underlying resources are easier to understand, 
especially for practitioners. 
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Limited practicability for managers 
Dynamic capability are complex by nature. Capabilities such as strategic planning, business 
reorganization, allying, and network restructuring include many input variables and, partly, 
tacit knowledge. In addition, coherences are often not linear. Thus, these capabilities are not 
easy to learn or copy. For practitioners in particular, these capabilities are difficult to learn 
and implement. On the other hand, the limited codifiability reduces imitation, which has a 
positive implication on firms that have established these dynamic capabilities. 
Conclusion 
Despite the facts that dynamic capabilities are inherently difficult to understand and 
implement for practitioners, that the theory is very complex, and that only a priori limited 
indication can be derived, the notion of dynamic capabilities is powerful when analyzing 
high velocity industries. Key capabilities such as strategic planning, allying, and project 
management are necessary for establishing competitive advantage in the Mobile Internet 
industry. Hypotheses 16 and 19 could be supported with the constraint that the competitive 
advantage derived from (re)-arranging resources and factors is most likely not sustainable. 
The dynamic capabilities are necessary, but not sufficient, and capabilities and underlying 
strategic resources are highly context-specific. 
4.2.4 Conclusion on resource based theories 
The presented discussion provides evidence that specific strategic resources such as 12snaps 
opt-in subscriber base, Gate5’s platform technology, or YellowMap’s location data create 
sustainable competitive advantage. Thereby, resource based models of strategic management 
arose to be more powerful than environmental models to explain competitive advantage in 
the Mobile Internet industry. 
 
The basic considerations of the RBV concept are applicable for explaining sources of 
competitive advantage. Case study firm’s resources must be rare, valuable, imperfectly 
imitable, and not substitutable to create competitive advantage.  
The classic RBV must be criticized concerning three aspects: the value of resources is 
exogenous to the concept, the resource focus is too narrow and the approach is too static. 
Regarding the last two aspects, the relational view and dynamic capabilities provide 
interesting expansions of the original RBV concept, especially for small firms in fast-
changing industries with barely-integrated value chains. The relational view enlarges the 
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scope of resource-based theory to all resources accessible for the firm and puts weight on the 
external linkages providing partner’s resources. The dynamic capability approach confirms 
the case study finding concerning the value derived from effective resources rearrangements. 
Therefore, this section largely supports hypotheses 15, 16, and 19, which stated that external 
resources in particular can be sources of competitive advantage and that it is necessary to 
rearrange alliance portfolios to adjust the external organization to changing resource 
requirements. The next section discusses the impact of competitive advantage on 
organizational change and its consequences on resource requirements. 
4.3 Organizational evolution and change 
In discussing why and how organizations change and develop, this section incorporates the 
broad literature on organizational change and analyzes the case study findings in the context 
of the most relevant part of this body of literature. The two critical questions are how 
competitive advantage influences the frequency and speed of organizational change 
(hypothesis 17), and how this change defines new resource requirements (hypothesis 18). To 
discuss these questions, the first part introduces the different schools of organizational 
change. According two factors, unit of change and mode of change, the most relevant 
streams of research are selected: development models and stage models. In the following 
two sections, the empirical findings are compared with the assumption and logic of these 
two areas of literature to verify their applicability. A summary of the findings closes this 
section on organizational evolution and change. 
4.3.1 Different schools of organizational change 
Explaining how and why organizations change has been a central and enduring quest of 
scholars in management and many other disciplines (Van de Ven, et al., 1995). To 
understand how organizations change, management scholars have borrowed many concepts, 
metaphors, and theories from other disciplines, ranging from child development to 
evolutionary biology. These concepts include punctuated equilibrium, stages of growth, 
processes of decay and death, population ecology, functional models of change and 
development, and chaos theory. 
It is the interplay between different perspectives that helps one gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of organizational life, because any one theoretical perspective invariably 
offers only a partial account of a complex phenomenon. Moreover, the juxtaposition of 
different theoretical perspectives brings into focus contrasting views of social change and 
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development. Working out the relationships between such seemingly divergent views 
provides opportunities to develop a new theory that has stronger and broader explanatory 
power than initial perspectives (Van de Ven, et al., 1995). 
There are four basic types of process theories that explain how and why change unfolds in 
social entities: life-cycle, teleological, dialectical, and evolutionary theories. These four 
types represent fundamentally different event sequences and generative mechanisms to 
explain how and why changes unfold (Pettigrew, et al., 2001). 
For the purposes of this study, a process is defined as the progression (i.e., the order and 
sequence) of events in an organizational entity’s existence over time. Change, one type of 
event, is an empirical observation of difference in form, quality, or state over time in an 
organizational entity. Development is a change process. Process theory is an explanation of 
how and why an organizational entity changes and develops. 
Van de Ven (1995) found approximately 20 different process theories that vary in substance 
or terminology across disciplines, which can be grouped into four basic schools. Table 33 
outlines these schools in terms of their member, pioneering scholars, event progressions, 
generative mechanisms, and conditions under which they are likely to operate. 
Family Life cycle Evolution Dialectic Teleology 
Members Developmentalism 
Ontogenesis 
Metamorphosis 
Stage & cyclical 
models 
Darwinian 
evolution, 
Mendelian genetics, 
Saltationism, 
Punctuated equilibr. 
Conflict theory, 
Dialectical 
materialism, 
Pluralism, 
Collective action 
Goal setting, 
planning, 
Functionalism, Social
construction 
Symbolic interaction
Pioneerss Comte (1798 – 1857)
Spencer (1820 – 
1903) 
Piaget (1896 – 1980)
Hennan et al. (1977)
Lammarck  
(1744 – 1829) 
Darwin (1809 – 82)
Mendel (1822 – 84)
Gould et al. (1977) 
Hegel (1770 – 1831) 
Marx (1818 – 1883) 
Freud (1856 – 1939) 
Mead (1863 – 
1931), Weber  
(1864 – 1920) 
Simon (1916 - ) 
March (1958, 1976) 
Key Metaphor Organic growth Competitive survival Opposition, conflict Purposeful cooperat.
Logic Imminent program, 
prefigured sequen-
ces, compliant 
adaptation 
Natural selection 
among competitors 
in a population 
Contradictory 
forces: Thesis, 
antithesis, synthesis 
Envisioned end 
state, 
social construction,
equifinality 
Event progression Linear & irrever-
sible sequence of 
prescribed stages in 
unfolding of 
immanent potentials 
present at the 
beginning 
Recurrent, 
cumulative, and 
probabilistic 
sequence of 
variation, selection 
and retention events 
Recurrent, disconti-
nuous sequence of 
confrontation, 
conflict, and 
synthesis between 
contradictory 
values or events 
Recurrent, disconti-
nuous sequence of 
goal setting, 
implementation, 
and adaptation of 
means to reach 
desired end state. 
Generating force Prefigured program 
/ rule regulated by 
nature, logic or 
institutions 
Population scarcity,
Competition 
Commensalism 
Conflict and confron-
tation between 
opposing forces, 
interests, or classes 
Goal enactment 
consensus on 
means cooperation / 
symbiosis. 
Table 33   Basic schools of organizational change (based on Van de Ven, et al., 1995) 
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Life cycle theory 
Life cycle theories have adopted the metaphor of organic growth as a heuristic device to 
explain development in an organizational entity from its initiation to its termination. 
References to the life cycle of organizations and ventures as well as stages in the 
development of organizations are used often such as birth, maturity, or death. Life cycle 
theories include developmentalism, a number of stage theories of child development (i.e., 
Piaget, et al., 1975), organizational development (i.e., Kimberly, et al., 1980), and new 
venture development (i.e., Burgelman, et al., 1986). 
According to life cycle theory, change is imminent. External environmental events and 
processes can influence how the entity expresses itself, but they are always mediated by the 
immanent logic, rules, or programs that govern the entity’s development (Van de Ven, et al., 
1988).  
The typical progression of change events in a life-cycle model is a unitary sequence (it 
follows a single sequence of stages or phases), which is cumulative (characteristics acquired 
in earlier stages are retained in later stages) and conjunctive (the stages are related such that 
they derive from a common underlying process). Each stage of development is seen as a 
necessary precursor of succeeding stages. 
Life-cycle theories of organizational entities often explain development in terms of 
institutional rules or programs that require developmental activities to progress in a 
prescribed sequence. Others rely on logical or natural sequences in the development of 
organizational entities. 
Teleological theory 
Another school of thought explains development by relying on teleology, or the 
philosophical doctrine that purpose or goal is the final cause that guides movement of an 
entity. This approach underlies many organizational theories of change including decision 
making (March, et al., 1958), adaptive learning (March, et al., 1976), and most models of 
strategic planning and goal setting (Chakravarthy, et al., 1991). 
According to teleology, development of an organizational entity proceeds toward a goal and 
an end state. The entity is purposeful and adaptive, and it constructs an envisioned end state, 
takes action to reach it, and monitors the progress. Teleology inherently affords creativity 
because the entity has the freedom to enact whatever goals it likes. 
Unlike life-cycle theories, teleology does not prescribe a necessary sequence of events, but 
rather implies a standard for judging change; development is something that moves the 
entity toward its final state. 
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Once the entity attains its goals, this does not mean it stays in permanent equilibrium. Goals 
are socially reconstructed and enacted based on past action (Weick, 1979). Influences in the 
external environment or within the entity itself may create instabilities that push toward a 
new developmental path. However, the theories that rely on a teleological process cannot 
specify which trajectory development of an organizational entity will follow. 
Dialectical theory 
Dialectical theory bases on the Hegelian assumption that the organizational entity exists in a 
pluralistic world of colliding events, forces, or contradictory values that compete with each 
other for domination and control (Van de Ven, et al., 1995). The dialectic theory requires 
two or more distinct entities that embody these oppositions to confront and engage one 
another in conflict. 
In a dialectical process theory, stability and change are explained by reference to the balance 
of power between opposing entities. Struggles and accommodations that maintain the status 
quo between oppositions produce stability. Change occurs when these opposing values, 
forces, or events gain sufficient power to confront and engage the status quo. Over time, a 
synthesis can become the new thesis as the dialectical process continues. By its very nature, 
the synthesis is a novel construction that departs from both the thesis and antithesis. In terms 
of organizational change, maintenance of the status quo represents stability; and its 
replacement with either the antithesis or the synthesis represents a change. 
Evolutionary theory 
Evolutionary theory examines cumulative changes in structural forms of a population of 
entities across communities, industries or society at large (Aldrich, 1979; Hannan, et al., 
1977). As in biological evolution, change proceeds through a continuous cycle of variation, 
selection, and retention. Thus, evolution explains change as a recurrent, cumulative, and 
probabilistic progression. Change is prescribed in the sense that one can specify the actuarial 
probabilities of the changing demographic characteristics of the population of entities 
inhabiting a niche. However, one cannot predict which entity will survive or fail. The overall 
population persists and evolves through time according to the specific population dynamics. 
Typology of change processes 
Where and when do these theories apply to explain development in organizational entities? 
In each theory: (1) process is viewed as a different cycle of change events, (2) which is 
governed by a different generating mechanism that (3) operates on a different unit of 
analysis and (4) represents a different mode of change. The four basic schools differ along 
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Process Theories of Organizational Development and Change
Source: Author, based on Van de Ven (1995)
Evolution
Variation      Selection      Retention
Population scarcity
Environmental selection
Competition
Dialectic
Thesis                                                    
Conflict         Synthesis
Antithesis                                                
Pluralism
Confrontation
Conflict
Life-cycle
Phase 1         Phase 2          Phase 3     ...
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two analytical dimensions that are useful for classifying these developmental progressions 
into the four ideal-type process theories: the unit and mode of change (compare to figure 
67). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 67   Organizational change models 
Unit of change 
Change and developmental processes can be examined on a single organizational level or on 
the interaction between two or more entities. This classification highlights two different 
approaches for studying change at any given organizational level: (1) the internal 
development of a single entity by examining its historical processes of change, adaptation, 
and replication, and (2) the relationships between numerous entities to understand ecological 
processes of competition, conflict, and other forms of interaction (compare Baum, et al., 
1994).  
Evolutionary and dialectical theories operate on multiple entities because evolutionary 
forces are defined in terms of the impact they have on populations and because the dialectic 
requires at least two engaged entities. Conversely, life cycle and teleological theories operate 
on a single entity. Life cycle theory explains development as a function of potential 
immanent within the entity. Although environment and other entities may shape how this 
immanence is manifested, they are strictly secondary. Teleological theories, too, require 
only a single entity’s goal to explain development. 
With respect to this study, organizations undergo change as discrete identities; therefore, 
single entity models are applicable. Processes of change between several distinct 
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organizational entities are not examined; also not examined are laws, rules, or processes by 
which the entities interact. 
Mode of change 
The four schools can be distinguished in terms of whether the sequence of change events is 
prescribed a priori by either deterministic or probabilistic laws, or whether the progression is 
constructed and emerges as the change process unfolds. A prescribed mode of change 
channels the development of entities in a pre-specified direction, typically by maintaining 
and incrementally adapting their forms in a stable, predictable way. A constructive mode of 
change generates unprecedented, novel forms that, in retrospect, often are discontinuous and 
an unpredictable departure from the past. A prescribed mode evokes a sequence of change 
events in accord with a pre-established program or action routine. A constructive mode, in 
contrast, produces new action routines that may create an original formulation or a 
reformulation of the entity. Life cycle and evolutionary theories operate in a prescribed 
modality, while teleological and dialectical theories operate in a constructive modality (Van 
de Ven, et al., 1995). 
A prescribed mode tends to create first order change⎯change within an existing framework 
that produces variation on a theme (Watzlawik, et al., 1974). These variations are prescribed 
and predictable because they are patterned on the previous state. A constructive mode tends 
to generate what Watzlawick and colleagues (1974) termed second-order change, which is a 
break with the basic assumptions or framework. The process is emergent as new goals are 
enacted. It can produce highly novel features; the outcome is unpredictable because it is 
discontinuous with the past. 
The organizational changes of the case studies examined follow very similar patterns to 
those discussed in chapter 3.5.1 ‘Cross segment analysis / Stage characteristics’. Therefore, 
models with a prescribed mode of change seem to be applicable. Only the significant 
changes between a few of the periods cause a problem, because they are not in line with the 
proposed continuity of these models. 
According to Van de Ven’s (1995) process theories of organizational development and 
change framework, organizational life-cycle theories are the most applicable pure form of 
organizational theories for this study. Therefore, the case findings are considered in the 
context with the development models that have been created by different scholars starting in 
the seventies (i.e., Burgelman, et al., 1986; March, 1991; Rumelt, 1981; Utterback, et al., 
1975). 
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In addition to the pure mechanisms, hybrid models that draw on different mechanisms have 
also been developed. For coping with the significant changes between developmental 
periods, the interaction of life cycle and dialectical models is very promising. Stage models 
integrated these two mechanisms. In one of the earliest models, Greiner (1972) proposed 
five stages of the life cycle of organizational growth. Each of these stages culminates in a 
different dialectic crisis (of leadership, autonomy, control, red tape, and ‘?’) that propels the 
organization into the next stage of growth and organizational development. Given the above-
mentioned significant changes between periods in the case study data, stage models are 
promising theories in terms for this study. Therefore, in a next step, the case findings are 
confronted with these models, which have been developed by various researchers (i.e., 
Block, et al., 1985; Cameron, et al., 1981; Flynn, et al., 2001; Greiner, 1972; Kazanjian, et 
al., 1990; Walsh, et al., 1987; Whetten, 1987). 
4.3.2 Development theory 
Development models include a broad, generic range of models, whose only common 
denominator is their general concern with change (Stubbart, et al., 1999). Developmental 
models often identify phases in a process but usually regard them as milestones or 
landmarks rather than as predetermined outcomes. Developmental models are rather benign 
descriptive models that seldom make causal references to invariant evolution or to 
predestined stages. These models often focus on explaining why organizations and industry 
change, and are less precise in describing how this change happens. Scholars from different 
fields have contributed to the body of literature on development models such as Kotler and 
Porter (marketing and strategy), Rumelt and Winter (economics and strategy), and Utterback 
and March (sociology and organization theory). Table 34 lists a set of important models. 
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Field of theory Model Author Description 
Business policy Towards a strategic theory of 
the firm (Rumelt, 1981) 
Theory of rivalry under conditions of causal ambiguity 
(“uncertain imitability”). Entrepreneurship is the 
production of new production functions and generates 
firm heterogeneity as an outcome. Causal ambiguity 
inhibits that factors of production can be listed 
unambiguously, and their marginal contributions can be 
measured to a far lesser extent. Rumelt’s model explains 
industry entry and survival and challenges the 
neoclassical perspective on firms. 
Industry 
evolution89 
Industry life cycle (Kotler, 
1972; Polli, et al., 1969) 
Industries go through several periods: introduction, 
growth, maturity and decline. Generic model similar to 
the product life cycle.  
 Evolutionary processes (Porter, 
1980) 
Analysis of the underlying processes that drive industry 
evolution. Porter isolated 14 processes ranging from 
long-run changes in growth, to accumulation of 
experience and product innovation; and to changes in 
government policy.  
 A dynamic model of process 
and product innovation. 
(Utterback, et al., 1975). 
Firms pass through three different periods, which are 
characterized through fluid, transitional, specific pattern. 
Different types of innovations are crucial in these states: 
product innovation in the beginning, process innovation 
after that. After a dominant design is found, innovation 
slows down in both areas. 
Organizational 
learning 
Exploration and exploitation in 
organizational learning  
(March, 1991) 
Exploration (search, variation, risk taking, etc.) and 
exploitation (refinement, choice, production, efficiency, 
etc.) lead to different organizational learning. 
Maintaining an appropriate balance between exploration 
and exploitation is a primary factor in system survival 
and prosperity. 
Pre-adaptation Dominance by birthright: Entry 
of prior radio producers and 
competitive ramification in the 
U.S. television receiver 
industry (Klepper, et al., 2000) 
Prior experience in related products lowers the hazard 
rate in a new industry significantly, and drives product as 
well as process innovations. Therefore, prior experience 
has a profound effect on entry and performance. 
Table 34   Organizational development models 
In the following sections, the most prominent theories are assessed for their applicability. 
Industry life cycle models 
The grandfather of predicting the probable course of industry evolution is the familiar 
product life cycle (Porter, 1980). The hypothesis is that an industry passes through a number 
of phases or stages – introduction, growth, maturity, and decline. Industry growth follows an 
S-shape curve because of the process of innovation and diffusion of a new product. The flat 
introductory phase of industry growth reflects the difficulty of overcoming buyer inertia and 
                                                 
89  Two additional papers on firms evolution are: ‘Inside corporate innovation: Strategy, structure, 
and managerial skills’ (Burgelman, et al., 1986) and ‘Issues in the creation of organizations: 
Initiation, Innovation, and Institutionalization’ (Kimberly, 1979) 
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stimulating trials of the new product. Rapid growth occurs as many buyers rush into the 
market once the product has proven itself successful. Penetration of the product’s potential 
buyers is eventually reached, causing the rapid growth to stop and to level off to the 
underlying rate of growth of the relevant buyer group. Finally, growth will eventually taper 
off as new substitute products appear. As the industry goes through its life cycles, the nature 
of competition will shift.  
Life cycle models are criticized due to several reasons: 
(1) The duration of stages varies widely from industry to industry, and it is often not clear 
which stage of the life cycle an industry is in. This problem diminishes the usefulness of the 
concept as a planning tool. 
(2) Industry growth does not always proceed through the S-shaped pattern. Sometimes 
industries skip maturity, passing straight from growth to decline. Sometimes industry growth 
revitalizes after a period of decline, as has occurred in the railroad industry. 
(3) Companies can affect the shape of the growth curve through product innovation and 
repositioning, thereby extending it in a variety of ways. If a company takes the life cycle as a 
given, it becomes an undesirable self-fulfilling prophecy. 
(4) The nature of competition associated with each stage of the life cycle is different for 
different industries. For example, some industries start out highly concentrated and stay that 
way. Others are concentrated for a significant period and then become less so. Still others 
begin highly fragmented; of these, some consolidate (e.g., automobiles) and some do not 
(e.g., apparel retailing). The same patterns apply to advertising, R&D expenditures, degree 
of price competition, and most other industry characteristic. Divergent patterns such as these 
call into serious question the strategic implications ascribed to life cycles. 
Aside from this critique, the general industry life cycle literature is not particularly relevant 
for this study. In fact, the notion of change can be found in all case studies, but the model is 
too long in its scope (case study companies are far away from maturity and decline), not 
precise enough in terms of when different phases are reached, and too broad in terms of 
industry perspective. 
Porter’s evolutionary processes 
Instead of attempting to describe industry evolution generically, Porter (1980) suggests that 
it is more fruitful to look beyond the process to see what really drives it. Like any evolution, 
industries evolve because some forces are in motion that create incentives or pressure for 
change. These can be called evolutionary processes. 
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According to Porter (1980), every industry begins with an initial structure. This structure is 
usually very different from the configuration the industry will take later in its development. 
For example, even an industry like automobiles with enormous possibilities for economies 
of scale started out with labor-intensive, job-shop production operations. 
The evolutionary processes work to push the industry toward its potential structure, which is 
rarely known completely as an industry evolves. It is important to realize that the investment 
decisions by both existing firms in the industry and new entrants are instrumental in much 
industry evolution. In response to pressure or incentives created by the evolutionary process, 
firms invest to take advantage of possibilities for new marketing approaches, new 
manufacturing facilities, and the like, which shift entry barriers, alter relative power against 
supplier and buyer, and so on. Industry can potentially evolve in a variety of ways at a 
variety of different speeds (Porter, 1980). 
Although initial structure, structural potential, and a particular firm’s investment decision 
will be industry-specific, Porter generalizes about what the important evolutionary processes 
are. There are some predictable (and interacting) dynamic processes that occur in every 
industry in one form or another, although their speed and direction will differ from industry 
to industry. Porter lists 14 evolutionary processes, from which the 12 that are relevant are 
listed here: 
(1) Long-run changes in growth: Industry growth is a key variable in determining the 
intensity of rivalry in the industry, leading to structural change. Five important external 
reasons determine why long-run industry growth changes: demographics, trends in needs, 
change in relative position in substitutes and in the position of complementary products, 
penetration of the customer group, and product change. 
(2) Changes in buyer segments served: New buyer segments can be penetrated and an 
additional segmentation of existing buyer segments can take place by creating different 
products (product differentiation) and marketing techniques for them. A final possibility is 
that certain buyer segments are no longer served.  
(3) Learning by buyers: Through repeat purchasing, buyers accumulate knowledge about a 
product, its use and the characteristics of competing brands. Products have a tendency to 
become more like commodities over time as buyers become more sophisticated, and 
purchasing tends to be based on better information. Thus, there is a natural force reducing 
product differentiation over time in an industry. Learning about the product may lead to 
increasing demands by buyers for warranty protection, service, improved performance 
characteristics, and so forth. 
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(4) Reduction of uncertainty: Most new industries are initially characterized by a great deal 
of uncertainty about things such as potential size of the market, optimal product 
configuration, nature of potential buyers and how they can best be reached, and whether 
technological problems can be overcome. This uncertainty often leads firms into a high 
degree of experimentation, with many different strategies adopted that represent different 
potential scenarios about the future. Rapid growth provides slack to allow these differing 
strategies to coexist for long periods of time. Over time however, there is a continual process 
by which uncertainties are resolved. Technologies are proven or disproven, buyers are 
identified, and indications are gleaned from the industry’s growth about its potential size. 
Hand in hand with such reduction of uncertainty is a process of imitation of successful 
strategies and the abandonment of poor ones. 
(5) Diffusion of proprietary knowledge: Product and process technologies developed by 
particular firms tend to become less proprietary. Over time, a technology becomes more 
established and knowledge about it becomes widespread. Diffusion occurs through a variety 
of mechanisms. Firms can learn from physical inspection of competitor’s proprietary 
products, from suppliers, distributors, customers (each of whom are conduits for such 
information and often have strong interest in promoting diffusion for their own purposes), 
and from laterally hired personnel. 
From a strategic point of view, the diffusion of knowledge about technology means that to 
maintain position (1) existing know-how and standardized personnel must be protected, 
which is very difficult to do in practice, (2) technological development must occur to 
maintain the lead, or (3) strategic position must be shored up in other areas. 
(6) Expansion in scale: Growth is usually accomplished by increases in the absolute size of 
the leading firms in the industry, and firms gaining market share must be increasing in size 
even more rapidly. Increasing scale in industry and in a firm has a number of implications 
for industry structure. It tends to widen the set of available strategies in ways that often lead 
to increased economies of scale and capital requirements in the industry. 
(7) Changes in input costs: Every industry uses a variety of inputs to its manufacturing, 
distribution, and marketing process. Changes in the cost or quality of these inputs such as 
wage rates, material costs, cost of capital, communication costs, and transportation costs can 
affect the industry structure. 
(8) Product innovation: Product innovation can widen the market and hence promote 
industry growth and / or it can enhance product differentiation. Product innovation can also 
have indirect effects. The process of rapid product introduction may create mobility barriers. 
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Innovation may require new marketing, distribution, or manufacturing methods that change 
economies of scale or other mobility barriers. Significant product change can nullify buyer 
experience and, hence, influence purchasing behavior. 
(9) Process innovation: The capital intensity is directly dependent on process innovation, 
which can increase or decrease economies of scale, change the proportion of fixed costs, 
increase or decrease vertical integration, affect the process of accumulating experience, and 
so on. Innovation beyond the size of national markets can lead to industry globalization. 
(10) Structural changes in adjacent industries: Since the structure of suppliers’ and 
customers’ industries affects their bargaining power with an industry, changes in their 
structure have potentially important consequences for industry evolution. Although changes 
in the concentration or vertical integration of adjacent industries attract the most attention, 
more subtle changes in the methods of competition in the adjacent industries can often be as 
important in affecting evolution. 
(11) Government policies change: Government can influence industry structure through 
strict regulation of key variables such as entry into industry, competitive practices, or 
profitability. Less direct forms or government influence of industry structure occur through 
the regulation of product quality and safety, environmental quality, and tariffs or foreign 
investment. 
(12) Entries and exits: Entry by established firms from other industries particularly affects 
the industry structure. Firms enter the industry because they perceive opportunities for 
growth and profits that exceed the cost of entry. Entry follows visible indications such as 
industry growth, regulatory changes, and product innovation. 
Exit changes industry structure by reducing the number of firms and by possibly increasing 
the dominance of the leading ones. Firms exit because they no longer perceive the 
possibility of earning returns on their investment that exceed the opportunity cost of capital. 
This set of evolutionary processes is a tool for predicting industry changes (Porter, 1980).  
Porter’s work is a listing of change ‘motors’ rather than a completed theory. It does not have 
the power to explain how and when change happens. It lists reasons why change happens; 
but it does not even weigh the importance of the ‘motors’ in general nor states under which 
conditions which ‘motor’ is most relevant.  
Six of Porter’s evolutionary processes are particularly relevant. His notion on changes in 
buyer segments (motor 2) is important for analyzing the diversification strategies of the case 
studies. The processes of learning buyers (motor 3) and reduction of uncertainty (motor 4) 
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are important for understanding how markets emerge and how business models are shaped. 
As 12snap’s Managing Director Germany stated: 
 
’… in addition, our industry developed. There are core competencies we always want to 
keep in-house; but there are services, for which an infrastructure is already in place, which 
we use. Over the time a market established, and we try to leverage know-how others have 
built up. 
In the beginning, we did pioneer a new market. We had to develop everything in-house, 
because nothing could be sourced from the outside.’ (Ingo Griebl, MD 12snap, 2002) 
 
The motors ‘product and process innovation (motors 8 and 9)’ are interesting for analyzing 
which kind of innovation takes place. Utterback and Abernathy (1981; 1975) provided a 
very interesting and fruitful framework for these innovations, which will be discussed in a 
later section. 
Finally, Porter’s notion of entries and exits (motor 12) is an interesting notion for 
explaining, why so many case studies started in late 1999 and early 2000 and entry stopped 
in mid 2000. In greater detail and with a more sophisticated theoretical foundation, Rumelt 
(1981) discusses this point, which will be covered in the next part. Rumelt also provides an 
explanation for motor 3, ‘diversification of companies’. 
In summary, Porter’s evolutionary processes mention a few organizational change ‘motors’ 
that are of greater interest for this study but his work lacks the level of detail and causal 
links to explain why these changes happen. 
Rumelts strategic theory of the firm 
Rumelt (1981) analyzed organizational change from an economic perspective and occupied 
the intersection between business policy and economic theory. He aimed to challenge the 
neoclassical theory of the firm, which was created by assuming that phenomena of primary 
concern to students of business policy90 did not exist, such as: (1) transaction costs, (2) 
limits on rationality, (3) technological uncertainty, (4) constraints on factor mobility, (5) 
limits on information availability, (6) markets in which price convey quality information, (7) 
consumer or producer learning, and (8) dishonest and / or foolish behavior. 
                                                 
90  Business policy is concerned with those aspects of general management that have material 
effects on the survival and success of business enterprises.  
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In his opinion, the situation with regard to industrial organization has been only marginally 
better. Within industrial organization, there is a sub-school, which, like business policy, has 
recorded and commented on a wide variety of real-world business behavior.  
 
’However, the theoretical structure of the field has never encompassed that richness. The 
traditional model of industry in industrial organization is taken from oligopoly theory, and 
remains that of identical firms or that are homogenous but for scale. The effect of this 
modeling assumption has been to reduce the study of industrial competition to the study of 
relative scale, all other differences being ignored.’ (Rumelt, 1981) 
 
In cooperation with other scholars such as Coase, Rumelt set in motion forces that 
undermined the neoclassical theory. With Williamson (1981), Porter (1980), and others, he 
showed that economic concepts can model and describe strategic phenomena. 
In his theory of “uncertain imitability” entrepreneurship is modeled as the production of new 
production functions, and generates firm heterogeneity as an outcome rather than as a given 
(Lippmann, et al., 1982). Ambiguity generates initial heterogeneity and will block 
homogenization through imitation. Therefore, it is impossible to produce an unambiguous 
list of the factors of production, much less measure their marginal contribution. 
Rumelt modeled industry entry as follows. Any entrant into the industry obtains a cost 
function and must pay a non-recoverable “entry fee”. All entrants were facing an exogenous 
industry demand curve. This perspective provides a theory of firm size that does not depend 
upon diseconomies of scale or control loss and is only tangentially related to the notion of a 
fixed entrepreneurial factor. However, it explains why entry into the Mobile Internet 
industry stopped after a certain period quite well⎯because expected pay-offs dropped in 
2000 under the cost of the “entry fee”. In addition, it explains why diversification, which 
reduces the risk of bankruptcy, is rarely undertaken by those facing the greatest 
risk⎯entrepreneurs entering or creating new markets (Rumelt, 1981)⎯because buying two 
entry fees bears too high costs. Finally, it explains why firms that are successful in one 
endeavor will tend to seek out related activities in which their revealed special competences 
are useful. Hence, profitability and growth will be correlated even when the effects of 
demand pull are controlled. This explains the diversification of case study companies in 
period three. 
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Although Rumelt’s theory has the power to explain why industry entry stops and why and 
when diversification takes place, it gives no answer on the question of how organizations 
change. 
Utterback’s model of product and process innovation 
Historically, studies of innovation have had a linear viewpoint. That is, they have seen 
innovation as something that begins with a company possessing a certain technology and 
then investing in that technology and accompanying ideas, and implementing them in the 
market. This approach, however, assumes that all innovations occur in the same way in all 
companies and disregards the fact that organizations change throughout their lifetimes. It 
also fails to distinguish between product and process innovations, each of which may follow 
a different path. 
Utterback’s model describes how change in product innovation, process innovation, and 
organizational structure occurs in patterns that are observable across industries and sectors. 
The model allows consideration of the different conditions required for rapid innovation and 
for high levels of output and productivity. 
Utterback claims that the conditions required for rapid innovation are extremely different 
from those required for high levels of output and productivity; under demands for rapid 
innovation, organizational structure will be fluid and flexible, whereas under demands for 
high levels of output and productivity, organizational structure will be standardized and 
inflexible. Thus, a firm’s innovation attempts will vary according to its competitive 
environment and its corresponding growth strategy. It will also be affected by the state of 
development of both its production technology and that of its competitor (Abernathy, et al., 
1978). Firms that are new to a product area will exhibit a fluid pattern of innovation and 
structure. As the market develops, a transitional pattern will emerge. Finally, the market 
stabilizes, fostering a specific pattern of behavior. Figure 68 shows the different states and 
the relevant innovation rates. 
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Figure 68   Product and process innovation 
Definition of product innovation 
In the fluid phase of a firm’s evolution, the rate of product change is expected to be rapid, 
and operating profit margins are expected to be large. A firm might be expected to 
emphasize unique products and product performance in anticipation that the new capability 
will expand customer requirements. The new product technology will often be crude, 
expensive, and unreliable but will fill a function in a way that is highly desirable in some 
market niche. Prices and profit margins per unit will be high, because the product often has 
great value in a user’s application. 
Technology to meet needs will come from many sources, including customers, consultants, 
and other informal contacts, because fluid units tend to rely heavily on diverse, external 
sources of information. However, the critical input will not be state-of-the-art technology 
but new insights about needs (von Hippel, 1977). 
As both producers and users of a product gain experience, target uncertainty lessens and 
product innovation enters the transitional state. The usefulness of the new product is 
increasingly better understood, and it may take on a variety of new forms to serve other parts 
of the market. A greater degree of competition based on product differentiation usually 
develops, and dominant product designs may begin to emerge. At the same time, forces that 
reduce the rate of product change and innovation are beginning to be established. As 
obvious improvements are introduced, it becomes increasingly difficult to improve past 
performance, because users develop loyalties and preferences, and the practicalities of 
marketing, distribution, maintenance, advertising, and so forth demand greater 
standardization. Innovation leading to better product performance becomes less likely unless 
the improvement is easy for the customer to evaluate and compare.  
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The emergence of a dominant product design that enforces standardization marks the 
beginning of the specific state. White (1978) contends that dominant designs can be 
recognized in the early stages of their development. He suggests that dominant designs will 
usually display several of the following qualities: 
• Technologies that lift fundamental technical constraints on the art without imposing 
stringent new constraints 
• Designs that enhance the value of potential innovations in other elements of a 
product or process 
• Products that ensure expansion into new markets 
• Products that build on existing operations rather than replacing them 
The dominant design signals a significant transformation affecting the innovation that 
follows. Product and process design become increasingly more closely interdependent as a 
line of business develops. Production efficiency and economies of scale become 
emphasized. As competition increases, production processes become more capital-intensive. 
Because investment in process equipment is high, and product and process change are 
interdependent, both product and process innovations in the specific state are usually 
incremental. 
In considering the case study results in the context of Utterback’s findings on product 
innovation, the high profit margins cannot be confirmed, which might be a result of very 
high VC ‘subsidization’ of the case study companies. However the other characteristics can 
be reconfirmed. The rate on product innovation is slowing down from the first two periods 
to the later ones when the case study companies have found their market niche and start to 
capitalize their products and services. Furthermore, the different sources of ‘technology and 
market need’ information can be related to the intense partnerships created by these 
ventures.  
The ventures are far from reaching the dominant design in their services and products. 
Therefore, the case study data cannot be confronted with Utterback’s finding on product 
innovation in a specific state. 
Definition of process innovation 
A production process is the system of process equipment, work force, task specifications, 
material inputs, work and information flows employed by a unit to produce a product or 
service (Utterback, 1981). In the fluid state, the emphasis will be on highly skilled and 
flexible labor, and the process itself will be composed largely or will be un-standardized 
with manual operations.  
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When a considerable volume is achieved in one or more product lines to encourage 
standardization, the production process enters the transitional state. Major process change 
occurs at a rapid rate. Production systems become increasingly difficult to change. 
The production process reaches the specific state when it becomes highly developed and 
integrated around specific product designs, and as investment becomes correspondingly 
large. Process redesign typically comes in progressive steps. Unit production costs often 
decrease in proportion to the cumulative volume of production. 
Utterback’s patterns of process innovation describe the development in the case studies very 
well. In the beginning, the ventures are very flexible and processes are un-standardized. 
Process innovation and subsequent standardization takes place in later periods. As in the 
product innovation perspective, there is no data for comparing the specific state. 
Organizational structure 
During periods of high technical and strategic uncertainty (fluid state), a productive unit 
must be focused to make progress; for a group to be successful in an uncertain environment, 
individuals in the organization must act together. This type of organizational structure is 
called organic (Burns, et al., 1961). Such an organization emphasizes, among other things, 
frequent adjustment and redefinition of tasks, less hierarchy, and more lateral 
communication. An organic organization is more appropriate for uncertain environments 
because of its increased potential for gathering and processing information for decision 
makers (Utterback, 1981). 
As transition begins, and individuals and units in the organization become more sequentially 
interdependent, coordination and control will occur to a greater extent through planning, 
liaison relationships, and project and task groups. Thus, during transition, organizations are 
often structured according products, with each division replicating in some respects the 
earlier entrepreneurial form. 
As dominant design emerges and production operations expand rapidly in response to 
increased demand, the focus of rewards will shift to those who are able to expand production 
operations, marketing functions, and so forth. Ownership of the unit by this time may be 
well established, and rewards may be provided in more traditional forms of bonuses, stock 
options, and other managerial prerequisites. 
The innovative capacity of a productive unit viewed in isolation will be low. When 
production processes are highly integrated in a system, and a high degree of interdependence 
exists among sub-processes, the disruption and cost associated with major changes will be a 
primary concern. 
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In analyzing the case study finding with respect to this theory, highly flexible organic team 
structures characterize the organizations in the first period, which supports the notion of 
organic organizations in the fluid state. In addition, the increase in coordination and control 
through planning and project management can be found in every case study, which 
consistently reports increases in organizational skills, which subsumes the coordination and 
control functions.  
In summary, Utterback’s theory explains how and why organizations change, and is 
applicable to the case study data. His notion of product innovation and process innovations 
in particular explains why technological resources decline in importance and organizational 
skills and market access become more important. There is an interesting link to March’s 
work (1991) on organizational learning. Exploration activities, which can be characterized 
by terms such as search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, 
and innovation are more important in the case studies’ first two stages (fluid state). On the 
other hand, exploitation, which can be characterized by terms such as refinement, choice, 
production, efficiency, selection, implementation, and execution, proves to be more 
important in the later stages (transition state). According to March, maintaining an 
appropriate balance between exploration and exploitation is a primary factor in system 
survival and prosperity. 
Despite these facts, Utterback’s theory is not powerful enough to explain in great detail how 
young organizations change in their first years. Its model is too vague on this perspective. 
Conclusion on development models 
Development theory is not powerful enough to explain how the NTBFs in this study develop 
during their first years. As in Utterback’s model, only vague phases are determined. 
Organizational conflicts, problems, and a detailed reasoning for specific development steps 
are not discussed in detail. 
On the other hand, development theory provides interesting insight into why organizations 
change. In particular, Rumelt’s thought on entry, exit, and diversification and Utterback’s 
thoughts on product innovation, efficiency, and organizational skills are applicable for this 
study and explain the development patterns very well. 
4.3.3 Stage models 
Stage models are one specific class of development models, which includes dialectical 
mechanisms to model distinct conflicts and changes. As development, stage models are not 
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cyclical because they do not tend toward equilibrium, a dominant tendency, or return to an 
initial starting point. Stage models always describe discontinuous processes, which have 
been formulated as ‘stepwise change’ in hypothesis 17. That is why they are inappropriate 
for modeling incremental change. In a stage model, change is characterized as a fixed 
sequence of static and deterministic stages, separated by predictable, programmed, yet 
dramatic transformations. 
A stage model captures the concept of transformation much more vividly than a general 
development model. Compared to developmental models, stage models are more clear-cut, 
more powerful explanations, and therefore more attractive to theorists. However, they bear 
the risk, that: 
 
‘…too often, dynamic processes are force-fit into rigid “procrustean bed” of a series of 
prescribed stages.’ (Stubbart, et al., 1999) 
 
Stage models are only applicable, when certain conditions apply. Thus, the following part 
assesses whether underlying assumptions are fulfilled. To continue the discussion on stage 
models, the second part introduces the variety of stage models, of which – in part three – the 
most relevant is selected and compared with the case study data. The results are summarized 
in the concluding fourth part. 
Underlying assumptions of stage models 
Despite their apparent differences, stage models gravitate toward central tendencies and 
have serious limitations. When used inappropriately, stages can misdirect research and 
impede understanding by placing tight constraints on the change processes involved. 
Specifically, stage models tend toward the following: 
1. Diverting research away from the environmental context 
Stage models divert attention from the examination of interactions between the 
organization or organism and its environment. In effect, the environment is treated as 
a given factor (Stubbart, et al., 1999). As a result, stage models paint portraits of 
organizations whose life history can best be explained as a natural result of 
predetermined factors without reference to human volition, environmental forces, 
and so on 
2. Downplaying the role of human agency, initiative, originality, and innovation in 
strategic choice. 
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Strategic choices play a significant role in organizational theory (Child, 1972). 
Theories that focus on environmental or developmental forces portray managers as in 
passive, dependent roles. Such characterization is largely inconsistent with much of 
the literature of Andrews (1971), Ansoff (1965), Child, (1972), and Hofer and 
Schendel (1978) 
3. Highlighting universal experience at the expense of different experiences between 
subjects 
4. Ignoring inconvenient historical facts, contingencies, and random events (Stubbart, 
et al., 1999) 
Because of their underlying logic, stage models have important limitations. These special 
limitations affect the way that processes are represented through the models and make them 
more accommodating for some theoretical orientations than for others. Therefore, it is 
important for researchers to carefully evaluate the inherent trade-offs implied by the 
underlying tendencies of a stage model, because the attractions of the stage model are 
deceptive when the brittleness of stage models is neglected (Stubbart, et al., 1999). 
Five principal assumptions are implied when an ‘ideal’ stage model is used to characterize a 
process: 
(1) Stages and transformation represent a preprogrammed process: Change must move in 
only one direction. All subjects must begin at the first stage and move relentlessly toward 
the final stage along a predefined path. In its purest form, the stage models represent change 
as a series of periods of stability punctuated by abrupt transformations. Stage models are 
deterministic and prone toward pre-set explanations of transformation and discontinuous 
change. 
(2) Stage models specify transformational changes: Change movements are orderly and 
predictable but not smooth. For stage models to work, there must be predictable yet abrupt 
transformation between the stages (setting them off against general development models). 
Transitions are described as difficult, painful events that cannot be accomplished without a 
major expenditure of energy (Greiner, 1972). Transformations are a necessary pre-condition 
for stage models. 
(3) Stages require one-way movement along designated linear paths: Stage models depict 
change moving along fixed paths through an invariant sequence of conditions. This 
unidirectional pattern of movements is predicated on the maturational logic borrowed from 
biology. Stage models are easily undermined by empirical observations, such as regressing 
to previous stages, stalling in a particular stage, or recycling. 
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(4) Stages processes often imply progress: In stage models, change is often synonymous 
with progress. Consider the connotations of terms such as economic development. Many 
stage models expressively regard movements through the stages as the equivalent of 
progressive achievement in the sense of advancement, blossoming, or growing up. This 
tendency for stage models to equate natural movement through stages with improvement in 
the condition of the subject has attracted considerable criticism. For example, in keeping 
with scientific standards of detachment, it is now considered unwise to compare firms and 
groups on any scale of relative achievements or superiority (Granovetter, 1979). 
(5) Stage models minimize the effect of context and history: Reality occurs not as time-
bounded snapshots within which causes affect one another, but as stories, or cascades of 
events. Moreover, events, in this sense, are not single properties or simple things, but 
complex structures (Stubbart, et al., 1999). When stage models make reference to history, 
context, or environment, these factors are regarded as mainly fixed. Environmental selection 
and history hardly matter compared to the prescribed tracks that govern the stages and 
transformation. 
In analyzing the case study data with the assumptions required for stage models, no severe 
problems could be found that would hamper the application of stage models. The detailed 
analysis, by assumption, is listed in table 35. 
Assumption Appropriate for 
case study data 
Reasoning 
Preprogramed process More or less As shown in figures 51 and 52, the organizational 
characteristics of case studies shift fairly similarly with only 
limited variation. Therefore, a preprogrammed process could 
underlie the companies development 
Transformational 
changes 
Yes Between the stages, the firms’ characteristics change. 
However, not all changes are revolutionary or involving major 
crises like 12snap’s entry in its fourth stage, in which it 
terminated a couple of businesses, laid-off employees and 
refocused its business. 
One way movement 
along linear path 
Yes, but 
downsizing might 
become a problem 
As discussed in section 3.5 all companies constantly add 
complexity to their organization, Therefore, from an 
organizational perspective the case studies move linear in one 
direction. During longer periods things might change, 
especially when organizations decline. 
Implication of progress Yes Revenues, alliance portfolios, and organizational skills grow 
within the stages. Therefore, the notion of progress is justified. 
Minimization of 
context and history 
No problem (Yes) Narrow industry, and narrow company sample, a lot of context 
and history is contained in the industry stage model.  
The context determines how fast and whether the next step will 
be taken, but it has only minimal influence on how the stage 
characteristics look. Therefore, the minimization of context is 
no serious problem when analyzing narrow industries. 
Table 35   Applicability of stage models 
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After showing that stage models are generally applicable for explaining organizational 
change of the case study companies, their variety needs to be introduced and relevant 
models must be selected. 
Variety of stage models 
Many researchers developed stage models of organizational and strategic processes. Quinn 
and Cameron (1983) reviewed more than 30 stage models describing growth of 
organizations. A few of them and some interesting new approaches are listed in table 36. 
This table only contains development models; process models as Bower’s (1970) ‘process 
model of a project’ are not included. 
Field of 
theory 
Model Author Stages in the model # of 
stages 
Time 
horizon 
Industry 
focus 
Organiza-
tional science 
Motivation for growth 
(Downs, 1967) 
Struggle for autonomy, rapid 
growth, deceleration 
3 Mid 
range 
General 
 Problems lead to 
evolution & revolution 
(Greiner, 1972) 
Creativity, Direction, 
Delegation, Coordination, 
Collaboration 
5 Long 
range 
General 
 Mentality of members 
(Torbert, 1974) 
Fantasies, investment stage, 
determination, experiments, 
predefined productivity, 
openly chosen structure, 
foundational community, 
liberating disciplines 
8 Long 
range 
General 
 Organizational 
structures (Katz, et al., 
1978) 
Primitive system stage, stable 
organization stage, elaborative 
supportive structures stage 
3 Mid 
range 
General 
 Major organizational 
activities (Adizes, 
1979) 
Courtship, infant, go-go, 
adolescent, prime, maturity 
6 Mid 
range 
General 
 Internal social control, 
structure of work and 
environmental relations 
(Kimberly, 1979) 
(1) Marshalling of resources, 
etc., (2) obtaining support for 
the external environment, etc., 
(3) formation of identity, etc., 
(4) formalized structure, etc. 
4 Mid 
range 
General 
 Organizational Life 
Cycles (Quinn, et al., 
1983) 
Entrepreneurial, collectivity, 
formalization & control, 
elaboration of structure 
4 Long 
range 
General 
Strategy Critical managerial 
concerns (Lippitt, et 
al., 1967) 
Birth, youth, maturity 3 Long 
range 
General 
 Strategy & structure 
(Scott, 1971) 
Stage 1 (one man rule), stage 
2 (functional), stage 3 
(diversified-divisional) 
3 Mid 
range 
General 
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Field of 
theory 
Model Author Stages in the model # of 
stages 
Time 
horizon 
Industry 
focus 
Entrepreneur-
ship 
Milestones of 
successful venture 
planning (Block, et al., 
1985) 
Completion of concept and 
product testing, completion of 
prototype, first financing, 
completion of initial plant test, 
market testing, production start-
up, bellwether sale, first comp. 
action, first redesign or redirect.
9 Mid 
range 
High tech-
nology 
ventures 
 Relation of dominant 
problems to stages of 
growth in NTBF 
(Kazanjian, 1988) 
Conception and development, 
commercialization, growth, 
stability 
4 Mid 
range 
Manu-
facturing, 
high-tech 
ventures 
 The stages of growth 
(Galbraith, 1982) 
Proof of principle prototype, 
model shop, start-up volume 
production, natural growth, 
strategic maneuvering 
5 Mid 
range 
High tech-
nology 
ventures 
Table 36   Stage models in organizational science, strategic management, and entrepreneurship 
A number of multistage models have been proposed in which predictable patterns in the 
growth of organizations are assumed to exist and to unfold as discrete time periods best 
thought of as stages (i.e., Scott, 1971; Smith, et al., 1985). Examples range from three-stage 
models (i.e., Blake, et al., 1996; Cooper, 1979; Smith, et al., 1985), and four-stage models 
(i.e., Hosmer, et al., 1977; Rhenman, 1973) to models of five or more stages (i.e., Adizes, 
1979; Miller, et al., 1984; Van de Ven, et al., 1984). A major strength of the literature on life 
stage models is that it adds to our understanding of the rather complex phenomenon of 
growth, by describing how growth happens and the effect that it has on organizations 
(Quinn, et al., 1988). 
Selection of relevant stage models and confronting case study data 
As shown above, a number of multistage models have been proposed. To select the most 
relevant models for this study, different criteria can be applied to assure similarities 
beforehand. These criteria are listed in table 37. 
Model dimension Preferred characteristic Other characteristics 
Unit of analysis Organizational change Business processes as strategic 
planning, venture financing, etc. 
Field of theory Entrepreneurship Organizational science, strategy 
Number of stages Approximately four Three or larger than six 
Model horizon Mid-range period, the first years of 
the organization 
Total life cycle, models of decline 
and death 
Industry focus Technology based industries with 
high growth firms and substantial 
capital requirements 
Slow growth, mature, or declining 
industries  
Table 37   Selection criteria for relevant stage models 
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Relation of dominant problems to stage of growth
Source: Author, based on Kazanjian (1988) 
Resource  acquisition
and technology 
development
Stage 1:
Conception and 
development
People,  strategic 
positioning
Production related
start-up
Stage 2:
Commercialization
Production,
sales
Sales / market share
growth and 
organizational issues
Stage 3:
Growth
Sales, people,
organizational
systems
Profitability, internal
controls, and future
growth base
Stage 4:
Stability
Strategic posi-
tioning, orga.
systems
Key problems
According to these criteria, the model of Kazanjian (1988) is the most relevant model in the 
list depicted in table 36. It is the only model that fulfills all requirements. Based on two in-
depth case studies of NTBF, he proposed a four stage model that he tested later in a sample 
of 105 firms (Kazanjian, et al., 1989). This model is depicted in figure 69. It is consistent 
with several other models found elsewhere in the literature (i.e., Blake, et al., 1996; Quinn, 
et al., 1983). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 69   Kazanjian's four stage model of growth in NTBF 
The stages are characterized as follows. 
Stage 1: Conception and development 
Before their formal creation, as signified by incorporation or by having gained a major 
source of financial backing that goes beyond initial seed grants, virtually all ventures go 
through a period during which the primary focus of the entrepreneur, and possibly of several 
others, is on the invention and development of a product, service, or technology (Kazanjian, 
1988). 
Major problems for organizations at this point include construction of a product prototype 
(Block, et al., 1985) and selling the product and business idea to financial backers. 
Identical patterns can be found in the case data. Most companies named this period the 
‘start-up’ stage, in which they tried to establish their organization, developed prototypes, and 
raised funds. The companies were led by an entrepreneurial or technical manager and 
technological resources were very important (refer to chapter 3.5 ‘Cross segment analysis / 
stage characteristics and resource requirements’). 
Stage 2: Commercialization 
Given financial backing, new ventures go through a period during which their major focus is 
on developing the product or technology for commercialization. At this point, the 
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organization largely resembles a new product-development team, with its problems and 
competences being largely technical. The primary focus is on learning how to make the 
product work well and on how to produce it beyond the model shop prototype approach of 
the first stage (Galbraith, 1982). In this period, a single owner or a small number of partners 
will dominate the venture. Toward the end of this stage, the venture’s product is publicly 
announced or made available for sale. Internal problems such as human resources and 
organizational systems are minor (Kazanjian, 1988). 
In comparing the results of the cross-case and cross-segment analysis with Kazanjian’s stage 
description, the similarities are striking. All case studies, except for Gate5, began to market 
their product or service in stage two. In addition, “production topics” became relevant such 
as the scalability of services, sourcing of supply, and defining the difference between 
‘product and whole product’91. Human resources and organizational skills still play a minor 
role. Finally most companies started to transform their organization into a functional 
structure⎯a point not mentioned in Kazanjian’s description,. 
Stage 3: Growth 
If the product is technically feasible and achieves market acceptance, a period of high 
growth will typically result. The major problems of a new venture at this point are to 
produce, sell, and distribute its product in volume and avoid to being shaken out of the 
market as ineffective or inefficient (Utterback, et al., 1975). Under pressure to attain 
profitability, a venture must carefully balance profits against future growth. Most 
organizational structure and internal systems were initiated at the functional level. Again, 
each function changed from an informal, non-specialized activity, to a structured, 
specialized, and formalized organization, typically as a result of the precipitating problems 
discussed in this section (Kazanjian, 1988). Major problems lie in the areas of sales, 
marketing, and organizational growth (human resources and organizational systems). 
Most case study companies described their third phase as ‘professionalization’, and stated 
that their focus was on internal efficiency. An example is the following statement by 
12snap’s Managing Director: 
 
‘ our operations had to start to run smoothly. We wanted to get rid of this “start-up image“ 
and all these side effects. We wanted very urgently to have calm operations. We wanted to 
have standardized processes. … To set up these processes in a way that you don’t have to 
                                                 
91  Partnering along the value chain, compare with the introduction of Gate5 in section 3.2.2 
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yearly adjust them is absolutely crucial. Firms, that don’t manage this task are inefficient, 
because they spoil resources internally.’ (Ingo Griebl, MD Germany 12snap, 2002) 
 
Thereby, a stronger formalization of the organization was associated. All case study 
companies had a functional organization and had already established mid term planning 
procedures. 
The next similarities between Kasanjian’s model and the case study data are the switch to 
internal financing ‘careful balance between profits and future growth’ (Kazanjian, et al., 
1989) and growing problems (resource needs) concerning: access to markets, organizational 
skills, and human resources. 
Aside from problems that have not been measured in this study, such as strategic positioning 
and external relations, the only difference is that in Kazanjian’s model functional 
organizations are introduced from stage three on. Most companies in this study had already 
implemented a functional organization in stage two. 
Stage 4: Stability 
As the growth rate slows to a level consistent with market growth momentum and market 
position (Moore, et al., 1982), the typical focus becomes the development of a second-
generation product. A professionally experienced manager or team of managers may be 
replaced or may be supporting the original owner. 
Before analyzing the case data with Kazanjian’s model, its significance should be put into 
perspective. Only three of nine case studies entered this stage and none of them had already 
passed it. Nevertheless, a few patterns can be found in the data. In stage four, the sales 
growth is expected to decline to market growth momentum as in the case of 12snap: 
 
‘The growth rate between 2000 and 2001 has been approximately 400%. The factor for 
2002 is between three and four, closer to four. And then our growth will decline. Our 
revenue base will be too high, the market will make such growth rates impossible.’ (Bernd 
Mühlfriedel, CFO 12snap, 2002) 
 
Most ventures added professional managers on the second level as functional heads 
(marketing directors, management directors of country organizations). Some have even 
restructured their top management team such as Gate5 and ApollisInteractive, who both 
replaced their CEOs and planned further steps. 
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‘…we will execute the “Gründerbruch“ [founder break: where founders lose their influence 
and partly leave the company], and we will selectively increase the quality of our staff [on 
the top level].’ (Michael Halbherr, CEO Gate5, 2002) 
 
However, for most companies, adding managerial expertise was not particularly important. 
Their founders had strong managerial and business administration skills; a high proportion 
had formerly been management consultants. 
The last similarity between Kazanjian’s model and the case study data is the beginning 
product differentiation, which is similar to Kazanjian’s notion of second-generation product. 
In stage four, the companies broadened their scope to facilitate further growth and to reduce 
their market risks. 
Not included in Kazanjian’s model are the organizational implications of this diversification. 
In this study, all three relevant companies introduced business unit organization to cope with 
the different market requirements. 
Assessment of applicability 
Kazanjian’s model is applicable to the case study data, four stages can be found with almost 
identical characteristics. Small differences exist such as the earlier introduction of a 
functional organization in this study. The case study data are partly complementary and 
interesting relations between problems in Kazanjian’s model and case study resource 
requirements can be found. 
Kazanjian’s model 
Focusing on problems 
Author’s model 
Focusing on resource requirements 
Relation 
Sales/marketing Access to markets Direct causal link 
People Human resources Direct causal link 
Organizational systems Organizational skills Direct causal link 
Technological know-how Author’s study more precise, 
causal link only medium 
Production 
Access to supply Authors study more precise, causal 
link only medium 
External relations Reputation Overlap limited, mediocre causal 
link 
Table 38   Comparison Kazanjian’s and authors’s model 
This study can add several aspects to Kazanjian’s model; it lists all organizational 
dimensions for the stages as, for examples, organizational structure, which are only partly 
included in Kazanjian’s stage description. In addition, the authors included further 
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organizational aspects such as the communication style, planning horizon, and the 
management style.  
On the other hand, a benefit of Kazanjian’s model is that it makes precise specifications on 
the fourth stage, where this study has only preliminary data. Furthermore, Kazanjian tested 
his model statistically on a basis of 105 companies. 
Kazanjian’s model supports hypothesis 18 in its two crucial points: On an overall level, the 
development stages reached stepwise differ significantly in their prevailing problems, which 
creates new resource requirements; on a detailed level these problems shift from reputation 
and technology, to production problems, and to organizational and distribution problems. 
4.3.4 Conclusion on organizational change 
Now that the literature on organizational change has been enfolded, the following 
conclusions can be drawn. Life cycle models are most relevant for explaining organizational 
change within the case study context. Development models (including industry evolution) 
are not precise enough to specifically explain how organizations change; however, they 
provide interesting insight as to why organizations change. They have the power to explain 
developments concerning diversification, product innovation and operational effectiveness. 
Stage models are more helpful. Within the case studies sample, they explain the stepwise 
organizational change precisely and, thereby, support hypothesis 17. Despite the often-cited 
critique of stage models, they are applicable according to the applicability criteria developed 
by Stubbart and Smalley (1999). Kazanjian’s (1988, 1989, 1990) the stage model is 
particularly useful for describing and explaining change in organizational characteristics and 
resource requirements, which shift from reputational and technological resources, to supply 
and production oriented resources, and to distribution and organizational resources, which is 
consistent with hypothesis 18. His model can be partly expanded through the case study 
data. Its major benefit⎯aside from the description of shifts in resource requirements⎯is the 
periodization of continuous events.  
According to Clark (2000), this periodization is a major tool in case study research, which 
has been used extensively in this study for analyzing alliance portfolios, resource 
requirements, and organizational characteristics. The overall results of these case analyses 
and their relation to the existing literature, are now finally summarized in the last chapter, 
the conclusion. 
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5. Conclusion: the coevolution framework 
The last chapter has established a need for an extension of the theory on alliance network 
dynamics and the creation of a coevolution framework between alliance portfolio and NTBF 
organization to explain the case study data, which was summarized in a set of tentative 
hypotheses at the end of chapter 3. 
As indicated in the introduction (chapter 1), the task of this final chapter is to tie together the 
previous chapters. The organizational strategy that has been applied so far can be 
paraphrased as follows. Chapter 2 outlined the research strategy and discussed the steps that 
had to be taken until closure could be reached. Chapter 3 examined and condensed 
organizational and alliance portfolio changes in the Mobile Internet industry into a 
preliminary coevolution argument. In chapter 4, the contradicting and supporting literature 
were incorporated. When further discussion of extant literature did not produce additional 
support for the explanation of the case-based hypotheses, theoretical saturation was reached. 
This study has reached theoretical saturation concerning the discussion of strategic alliances 
and networks, resource based theories of strategic management, and models of 
organizational change.  
Finally, chapter 5 will address and apply the supportive inputs for reconciling the tentative 
status of the basic coevolution argument and the derived hypotheses to create an alliance 
portfolio - organization coevolution framework. This is the ultimate goal towards which all 
previous considerations have been directed. To reach this goal, chapter 5 is structured as 
follows: The first section constructs a theoretical coevolution framework by tying together 
aspects from five areas of literature: resource dependency theory, social network theory, 
relational view, life cycle models, and dynamic capabilities. Integrating these arguments 
represents the theoretical contribution of this research study and is, therefore, more elaborate 
than the other sections. The second section takes the developed coevolution model back to 
the level of the case study findings and revisits the tentative hypotheses. Thus, this step 
serves to ascertain the validity of the new contribution, to detect any potentially remaining 
weaknesses of the new framework, and to prepare for statistical testing of the final model. 
The third section discusses the limitations of this study and further research needs; before 
the last section discusses the implications this study on coevolution between alliance 
portfolio and NTBF’s organization has for practitioners and management. 
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5.1 Constructing a coevolution framework 
The objective is to understand the alliance portfolio phenomenon of NTBFs and to generate 
an explanation for the large and frequently restructured alliance portfolios that have been 
observed in the Mobile Internet industry. To do this, Pajek, a new software tool for social 
network analyses that visualizes multidimensional network structures has been used. In 
addition, the previous chapters provided detailed descriptions of industry settings and 
enfolded a variety of literature. Yet how can the large and quite heterogeneous body of 
information⎯discussed throughout chapter 3 and 4⎯be synthesized into an explanation of 
coevolution?  
It is warranted to begin with a short summary of the key inputs of the previous sections. 
These inputs represent the central line of thinking leading to the proposition of this study’s 
inductively grounded extension of the theory of network dynamics. In chapter 4, the set of 
tentative hypotheses concerning the alliance portfolio performance implication and 
structural and organizational change were confronted with extant theories of alliances and 
networks, resource implications on competitive advantages, and organizational change. 
Their key implications are summarized in the next section, and then the coevolution model 
is constructed. 
5.1.1 Implication of relevant theories on the alliance portfolios 
Thus far, the different analyses and conclusions drawn have come to a point, at which five 
major cornerstones could be identified determining the strategic relevance of alliance 
portfolios and their dynamics. The first determinant is resource dependencies, which 
motivate the alliance formation; the second determinant is social capital (key term in social 
network theory), which facilitates contacting potential partners and exchanging resource. 
The third cornerstone is the relational rent argument, which claims that competitve 
advantage can be created by rare and valuable resources efficiently accessed through 
interfirm linkages such as strategic alliances. The last cornerstones capture the dynamic 
aspects: life cycle models⎯as part of the literature on organizational change⎯describe how 
firms develop. This development creates different problems, which have bottom line impact 
on the alliance portfolio structure; the literature on dynamic capabilities stress the strategic 
importance of processes such as allying for competitive advantage. 
These five areas of literature, which have until now been regarded mostly separately, are 
linked together to add to the underdeveloped area of the dynamics of alliances. A summary 
of each and its impact on the coevolution argument is provided in the following paragraphs. 
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Resource dependency theory 
The resource dependency theory (Pfeffer, et al., 1978) builds on the exchange perspective. It 
suggests that organizations enter partnerships, when they perceive critical strategic 
interdependence with other organizations in their environment, in which one organization 
has resources or capabilitities benefical to but not possessed by another. Firms seek out ties 
with partners who can help them manage such strategic interdependencies. Complementary 
resources are a key driver of these inter-organizational cooperations (Nohria, et al., 1991). 
Resource dependency theory is powerful for explaining, why the NTBFs in the Mobile 
Internet industry establish alliances with different types of partner and what kind of 
resources they want to access. In addition, resource dependency theory provides the link for 
understanding that changing resource requirements lead to structural changes of the alliance 
portfolio.  
Resource dependency theory is less powerful in explaining, how alliances are formed and 
what influences the quality of an alliance link. These aspects are covered by social network 
theory. 
Social capital (social network theory) 
Social network theory suggests that the firm’s strategic actions are affected by the social 
context in which they and the firms are embedded (Burt, 1997). The firm’s social context 
includes inter-organizational resource relationships.  
Social capital is required to move within the social context. Social capital comprises the 
firm’s reputation, the history of prior alliances, and alliance process capabilities. As laid out 
in social network theory, social capital is important for contacting potential partners, 
embedding alliances, building trust, and fostering the resource exchange. Social capital is 
crucial for understanding how alliances are formed and intensified.  
However, social network theory does not provide an explanation for, how intense interfirm 
linkages can create competitive advantage. This is argued in the relational view. 
Relational view 
Alliances generate competitive advantage (relational rent) when firms access valuable, rare, 
imperfectly imitable, non-substitutable resources. This can only be the case when firms 
move the relationship away from the attributes of market relationships (i.e., by embedding 
ties, building trust) (Dyer, et al., 1998). In the case of Mobile Internet firms, competitive 
advantage can be created through combining complementary resources and capabilities, 
which results in the joint creation of unique new products, services, or technologies. Other 
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factors⎯theoretically also generating relation rent⎯such as knowledge sharing routines and 
the investment in relation-specific assets (i.e., collocation of operation) are not as relevant. 
These first three cornerstones⎯linked together⎯explain very well why NTBFs in the 
Mobile Internet industry form extensive alliance portfolios. However, the theory cannot 
explain why these alliance portfolios change rapidly. This dynamic part of the coevolution 
argument is covered by theories on organizational change, in particular life cycle models, 
and on dynamic capabilities. 
Life cycle models 
Life cycle models are very powerful for explaining organizational change of NTBFs in the 
Mobile Internet industry. These models describe change as a discontinous process that is 
characterzed by a fixed sequence. In contrast to other models of organizational change, they 
are very precise in explaining how organizations change. Despite the often-cited critique of 
being a ‘procrustean bed’, they are applicable in the study’s setting according the detailed 
applicability criteria developed by Subbart and Smalley (1999) because they are applied in a 
narrow industry segment covering a limited time-frame.  
Of the broad variety of stage models, Kazanjian’s model (Kazanjian, 1988; Kazanjian, et al., 
1989; Kazanjian, et al., 1990) is particularly useful for describing and explaining the 
changes in a NTBF’s organizational characteristics and resource requirements when NTBFs 
proceed through the conception and development, commercialization, growth, and stability 
stages. They shift from reputational and technological resources, to supply and production 
oriented resources, and to distribution and organizational resources. 
A major benefit of these models⎯aside from the illustrative description of organizational 
change⎯is the periodization of continous events. This periodization is a major tool in case 
study research (Clark, et al., 1991), which has been used in this study to melt down the 
continous streams of organizational and alliance portfolio changes into four characteristic 
snapshots of organizational characteristics, resource requirements, and alliance portfolio 
structure. Thereby, the amount of data could be compressed to a manageable amount, which 
allows for a vivid depiction of  the structural changes. 
Dynamic capabilites 
Dynamic capabilities are defined as the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure 
internal and external resources to address rapidly changing environments. Dynamic 
capabilities thus reflect an organization’s ability to achieve new and innovative forms of 
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competitive advantage through its processes, factoring in path dependencies and market 
positions (Teece, et al., 1997). 
Dynamic capabilities are important for firms in dynamic environments such as the Mobile 
Internet industry, because they are tools for manipulating resource configurations. Strategic 
planning, allying, and project management skills are key capabilities in the Mobile Internet 
industry. They are necessary for building up competitive advantage. However, they are not 
sufficient for two reasons. In the cases of strategic planning, allying, and project 
management, best practices exist and the efficient firms do not differ considerably in their 
processes. This suggests that these processes can be learned and imitated and, thus, that their 
induced advantage is not sustainable. In addition, the overall competitive advantage heavily 
depends on underlying resources such as 12snap’s opt-in subscriber base, which cannot be 
superseeded or replaced by dynamic capabilities. 
By linking these five cornerstones, one can conclude the theoretical discussion that alliances 
evolve in response to firm’s changing resource needs in and resource acquisition challenges 
as they move through the life cycle stages of conception and development, 
commercialization, growth, and stability. Overall, as firms respond to the resource 
challenges of the first four development stages, their networks evolve from small, loosely 
tied, reputation-seeking networks in the conception phase, to supply focused networks with 
a few stronger ties in the commerzialization stage, and to large, calculative, distribution-
focused networks, with a few very strong ties, from the growth stage on. The shifts 
correspond to shifts in the strategic context of the firms (Hite, et al., 2001). This evolution of 
the network thus enables the NTBF to succesffully adapt to changes in its context and to 
obtain the necessary resources for successful performance throughout the early development 
stages.  
The logic of these five perspectives helps in understanding the rational and the strategic 
importance of large and frequently changing alliance portfolios in the Mobile Internet 
industry. Thereby they contribute to the answer of the key question posed by this study: 
‘Why and how do alliance portfolios change over time and what is the strategic implication 
of this change?’ This question is now used for constructing a framework of alliance portfolio 
and NTBFs’ organization coevolution. 
5.1.2 Constructing a new approach: the coevolution framework  
This section presents a coevolution framework of alliance portfolio and NTBFs’ 
organization, explains the relations, which exist within the model, and discusses its 
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contribution. The proposed coevolution framework comprises six steps explaining the 
interdependencies between alliance portfolios and firms’ organizational development, which 
are depicted in figure 70. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 70   Coevolution framework 
In a coevolution framework it is always difficult to find a starting point, as in the chicken or 
the egg problem. Discussion of the coevolution framework begins by examining the impact 
of an NTBF’s alliance portfolio on its performance, and moves on to an analysis, how 
organizational change induced by growth impacts the alliance portfolio. The six-step 
coevolution model can be described as follows: 
a) NTBFs establish alliance portfolios to access resources that they depend on but do 
not control. No efficient markets exist for these resources, and they are either too 
expensive to produce in-house or simply not producible by NTBFs. The better 
NTBFs manage the portfolio by embedding interfirm linkage, the more intense 
resources can be accessed. Alliance portfolio controlling skills are required for 
supervising the exchange effectiveness and portfolio alignment with the overall 
strategy. 
b) Effective alliance portfolios improve the performance of NTBFs in terms of growth 
(in terms of revenue and employees), profitability, and innovation by providing 
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reputation, cost-efficient supply (such as content and technology), and access to 
superior distribution channels. 
c) Higher performance, or rather growth, leads to organizational change. Firms have to 
cope with new problems. After setting up the company and developing a prototype in 
the conception phase, setting up a production process and establishing the first 
distribution channels in the commercialization phase, installing efficient internal 
processes and establishing solid distribution channels are the major challenges in the 
professionalization and growth period and thereafter.  
d) Firms react to these new problems by changing the organizational setup in a stepwise 
fashion. They add complexity to their organization and adjust their strategic goals. 
Therefore, higher performing firms go through these development stages faster. 
e) Stage-induced new problems and strategies define new resource requirements. 
Reputational and technological resources that are very important in the beginning 
lose their importance from the commercialization phase on, and access to supply 
becomes significantly more important. Access to markets and organizational 
resources are constantly gaining importance and become relevant especially in the 
growth stage and later. 
f) These changing resource requirements trigger structural changes in the alliance 
portfolio. The better NTBFs can adjust their alliance portfolio through alliance 
formation capabilities, which heavily depend on social capital, the better the firm’s 
performance. Thereby, social capital is built through the firm’s reputation, personal 
networks of closely related people such as interlocking directorates, alliance project 
skills, and the history of prior alliances. 
The overall logic of the presented framework is similar to what Darwin (1859) describes in 
his discussion of the origin of species. Survival or, in this case, performance depends on 
how well the organism or organization can adapt itself according to boundary conditions. 
Therefore, this coevolution framework resembles ‘Alliance Darwinism’. 
The central implication of the coevolution framework is the perspective emphasizing the 
advantages of highly adaptive networks. The adaptability is supported by alliance formation 
skills and social capital that foster trust and enable firms to intensify interfirm linkages. The 
alliance portfolio strategically serves a NTBF in different strategic contexts. The final result 
of this evolution through the different life cycle stages is that a firm increases its ability to 
actively manage its external network.  
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Resource challenges on network evolution do not represent unidirectional impact, as 
network evolution, in turn, also influences the nature of the firm’s future resource 
challenges. As Koza (1998) previously stated, there is a coevolutional aspect to the way 
networks and firms evolve. The essence of coevolution is feedback⎯an action or activity 
initiated by someone or something sets in motion activities or responses by others, which 
then affect the original activity (Baum, et al., 1994, p. 387). Coevolution is set in motion 
when resource challenges require networks to adapt because network adaptation then 
ameliorates the resource requirements, which consequently increases the firm’s competitive 
advantage and its speed of progression through the development stages. A firm’s success in 
building a network with well-known incumbents in the conception stage, for example, 
allows it to acquire reputation, which is required in the commercialization stage for 
attracting production and supply partners, which in turn are crucial in this second step. Thus, 
these new resource challenges drive the evolution toward a new network configuration 
consisting of a larger network with a few very strong ties.  
More generally, as a firm strategically evaluates and adapts its network to meet the changing 
needs and challenges of each context, the firm will be better positioned to acquire additional 
requisite resources and asset stocks, thereby ensuring the continued survival and growth of 
the firm. Successful and sufficient resource acquisition, in turn, enables the firm to continue 
to progress to subsequent stages or contexts of performance (Larson, et al., 1993). Thus, 
there is an upward spiraling progression pattern in the coevolution of alliance portfolios and 
the organization⎯its resource requirements, characteristics, and challenges. 
In the next step, this final conclusion⎯formulated in the coevolution framework⎯is 
checked against the tentative hypotheses formulated in section 3.5.  
5.2 Revisiting tentative hypotheses 
This step serves two purposes. It assures the validity of the proposed framework by 
comparing it with the information extracted from the case study findings; and it revises the 
tentative hypotheses⎯when required⎯to facilitate their testing and further discussion. First, 
for any type of empirical work⎯whether it is case study work or purely quantitative 
surveys⎯the establishment of internal validity is an important factor. For the purpose of this 
study, internal validity can be paraphrased in the following way. Does the coevolution 
model of alliance portfolios and NTBFs organization interdependency actually explain why 
and how NTBFs partnership networks change dynamically over time? Second, scholarly 
processing of results, which is often done either by statistically testing the model by testing 
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its underlying hypotheses or by checking its external validity by comparing its hypotheses 
with other academic findings, requires precisely defined hypotheses that are coherent with 
its theoretical context. Thus, hypotheses are reshaped so that statistical testing can be 
simplified or so that their comprehensibility considering the theoretical context can be 
improved.  
The appropriate method for serving these two purposes is to close the feedback loop 
between empirical results and what has been published in the literature. In this iteration, the 
results of the study’s analytical generalizations are matched against the observed 
phenomena. Then the tentative hypotheses are rephrased when appropriate. The revised 
hypotheses then have the ability to identify and support what the novel approach explains in 
an unambiguous manner. Equally importantly, this comparison can show where the model 
remains unclear or where it does not hold explanatory power. The function of identifying 
weaknesses is all the more important because this study uses exploratory case-based 
methodology and is, therefore, subject to future improvement.  
Chapter 3 presented a set of 19 tentative hypotheses. For an easier examination of the 
coevolution framework of alliance portfolios and NTBF organization that adheres to the 
understanding of interdependencies of network structure and firm development, the tentative 
hypotheses are presented in the same logical order that is used in the model. Table 39 
provides a classified overview of the tentative hypotheses.  
 No. Tentative hypothesis 
Coevolution # 1 The better an alliance portfolio is adjusted to the stepwise changing 
resource requirements, the faster the firm develops. (Alliance Darwinism) 
Alliance portfo-
lio performance 
implication  
# 2 The better the firm can (1) leverage its resources, (2) access superior 
distribution channels, (3) access external product / service technologies, 
and (4) access superior supply via alliances, the better the companies 
performs in terms of (a) growth, (b) profitability and (c) technological 
innovation. 
# 3 The better the partner acquisition capabilities, the more effective the 
alliance portfolio. 
# 5 The better the ability to develop alliance concepts and select fitting 
partners, the better the partner acquisition capabilities. 
# 6 The better the firm’s reputation, the better the partner acquisition 
capabilities. 
# 7 The better the directorates (higher profile) and closely related agents, the 
better the partner acquisition capabilities. 
Portfolio 
effectiveness 
due to 
partner 
acquisition 
capabilities 
# 8 The better the alliance project skills, the better the partner acquisition 
capabilities. 
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# 9 The better the existing alliance portfolio and the more diverse the alliance 
history, the better the partner acquisition capabilities due to (1) better 
alliance opportunities and (2) better reputation (outside effects), as well as 
(3) better project skills (interior effect). 
# 4 The better the portfolio management capabilities, the better the alliance 
portfolio effectiveness because (1) resources exchange can be intensified 
and (2) alliance portfolio inefficiencies can be eliminated. 
# 10 The better the ability to adjust partnerships to maintain win/win situations, 
which requires flexible alliance contracts, the better the partner 
management capabilities. 
# 11 The better the ability to embed partnership ties, the better resources can be 
exchanged and the more stable are partnership links. Therefore, the ability 
to embed partnership ties as part of alliance management capabilities has a 
positive impact on alliance portfolio effectiveness. 
# 12 The better the ability to communicate, the better the ability to embed 
partnership ties. 
# 13 The better the ability to build trust, the better the ability to accelerate the 
resource exchange. 
Portfolio 
effectiveness 
due to 
alliance 
management 
capabilities 
# 14 The tighter the ability to control partnerships according to dynamic 
corporate goals, the better the portfolio management capabilities 
# 15 The more effective a firm accesses rare sustainable inimitable non-
substitutable resources through the alliance portfolio, the better the 
companies’ performance and, therefore, its competitive advantage. 
# 16 The better a firm is capable of rearranging its alliance portfolio according 
to changing resource requirements (dynamic capability), the better the 
companies performance and, therefore, its competitive advantage. 
Strategic impor-
tance of resources  
Relational rents 
Dynamic 
capability 
# 19 Shifts in resource requirements lead to changes in alliance portfolios. This 
is facilitated and enabled through allying capabilities, a dynamic skill. 
# 17 The higher the competitive advantage, the faster the organizational growth, 
which happens stepwise. 
Organizational 
change 
# 18 New development stages are characterized through new challenges and 
problems, which create additional resource requirements. The problems 
shift from reputation and technology issues in the beginning, to supply 
questions, and  to distribution and market access problems. 
Table 39   Tentative hypotheses 
The hypothesized coevolution relationships between alliance portfolio and NTBF 
organization do not represent a homogeneous group. The hypotheses can be grouped in four 
clusters. Aside from the overall coevolution argument formulated in hypothesis # 1, the 
different hypotheses address alliance portfolio effectiveness (influenced by alliance 
formation and management), the strategic importance of resources, organizational change, 
and alliance portfolio dynamics. 
Alliance portfolio effectiveness aspects encompass two issues: alliance formation and 
alliance portfolio management. After describing the general performance implications in 
tentative hypothesis 2, the impact of alliance formation on the effectiveness of alliance 
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portfolios is described in tentative hypotheses 3 and 5 through 9. Hypotheses 4, and 10 
through 14 focus on alliance management. Thereby, hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 describe the 
impact of alliance formation on firm performance on overall strategic level, and hypotheses 
5 through 14 describe the underlying relations on a process level. 
The proposed coevolution framework is clearly consistent with the hypotheses on the 
strategic level. Hypothesis 2 formulates the strategic importance of NTBFs’ alliance 
portfolios, and hypothesis 4 states the importance of alliance portfolio management 
capabilities for exchanging resources; both aspects are covered by ‘step a’. The last strategic 
level hypothesis⎯hypothesis 3⎯contains the importance of alliance formation capabilities 
that is reflected in ‘step f’. 
The process level hypotheses 5 through 14 support the strategic level hypothesis 3 and 4, but 
not all of them are depicted in the coevolution framework for reasons of clarity. Trust (13) 
and embeddedness (11)⎯two important arguments in the discussion on alliance 
management⎯are mentioned in ‘step a’; social capital, established by reputation (6), 
interlocking directorates (7), alliance project skills (8), and the prior alliance history (9), is 
included in ‘step f’. However, a two layer model could better integrate these process level 
hypotheses, because it would add a process layer to the developed strategic coevolution 
framework. In particular, the partner selection skills (5) that comprise tools such as overlap 
matrixes are underrepresented in this coevolution framework. However, further research is 
needed to develop a consistent lower process layer model.  
The next step in confronting the coevolution framework with the tentative hypotheses covers 
hypothesis 15, 16, and 19⎯aspects that discuss the importance of resources and how they 
are arranged. Both hypotheses support and are well represented by the coevolution 
framework. Hypothesis 15 states the core argument of the relational view, which is included 
in ‘step b’. This hypothesis was fully supported by the theory discussion and was directly 
integrated into the model. Hypotheses 16 and 19 state the necessity of capabilities that 
rearrange resources to adjust the firm’s setup according to changing boundary conditions. 
The essence of this hypothesis can be found in two steps of the coevolution model. ‘Step e’ 
explains why a firm developing in a stepwise manner is confronted with the problem of 
rearranging its resources. ‘Step f’ formulates how the dynamic capability of allying can help 
the firm to achieve a competitive advantage. 
The last group of hypotheses to be confronted with the coevolution model raises issues of 
organizational change. Hypothesis 17 states that higher performance accelerates change, 
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which happens stepwise. Hypothesis 18 attests that new development steps create new 
strategic challenges and problems, which again create new resource needs. Both hypotheses 
are included in the model. Hypotheses 17 has been split and formulated in steps c and d, 
which state that performance leads to organizational change and new strategic challenges 
and that NTBFs react to these stepwise changing conditions by adding organizational 
complexity. Hypothesis 18 is represented by ‘step e’, which describes how resource 
requirements shift from reputational and technological resources in the beginning, to 
production oriented resources (supply) in the commercialization phase, and to distribution 
and organizational resources in the growth stage and later. 
The aim of this section was to test the coevolution model against the case-based tentative 
hypotheses to increase the model’s internal validity. The comparison performed in this final 
iterative loop resulted in a substantial confirmation of the new model. It offers substantial 
explanations of almost all hypotheses. Yet, results of exploratory research are often not as 
clear-cut as one would like. This coevolution model does not cover a few process level 
hypotheses, because it would require adding an extra process layer that is not yet understood 
for all process steps. However, one of the reasons this iteration was performed was to detect 
shortcomings and to uncover needs for future refinement. The following section will deal 
with this topic in more detail.  
Despite this process level shortcoming, the coevolution model has proven its strong 
explanatory power for explaining interdependencies of NTBFs’ organizations and alliance 
portfolios. This was achieved by utilizing an inductively-grounded approach on the basis of 
cases and theoretical deliberations. The results extend extant literature on alliance dynamics 
by linking life-cycle concepts with the literature on alliance formation and management as 
well as resource based models of strategic management. The model’s implications for 
management and practitioners will be discussed after the following section. 
5.3 Limitations and directions for further research 
This study has explored interdependencies between alliance portfolios and NTBFs’ 
organizations and has found upward spiraling coevolution effects. By using the 
methodological procedure of comparative case-study research, this study has led to the 
identification of several common patterns and topics that are of crucial importance in the 
context of network dynamics. These observations were assembled to form a six-step 
coevolution framework. This proposed framework has some limitations in its applicability 
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and some of its aspects require further research. The first part of this section will discuss the 
framework’s limitations, some of which indicate the need for further research to broaden the 
model’s scope and increase its external validity. The second part takes up these needs for 
future research, adds requirements that became apparent when examining the case study data 
with the extant literature, and deduces consequent directions for further research. 
Limitations 
The proposed alliance portfolio - organization coevolution model was founded based on 
nine case studies in the high velocity Mobile Internet industry by analyzing data on alliance 
portfolio changes and their strategic importance and comparing them with the extant 
literature. Its applicability is limited for two potential reasons: the framework’s origin lies in 
one specific industry (Mobile Internet) and its status is tentative, because the framework is 
not yet statistically tested.  
The model was constructed from Mobile Internet case study data, in which two industry 
characteristics prevail: highly dynamic industry settings and significant importance on 
strategic alliances as a form of interorganizational cooperation. Thus, it is very likely that 
the framework may lose some of its applicability in less dynamic industries, in cases in 
which change does not play such an important role, and in highly integrated or in old 
established commodities-industries, in which alliances are not such a relevant form of inter-
organizational linkage.  
In steady industries, transition periods are less numerous and less frequent. Strategies and 
resource requirements shift more slowly and the ability to rearrange resources is of less 
value. Therefore, core elements of the proposed models such as alliance formation and other 
processes concerning the adaptability of alliance portfolios are less crucial and less 
important for predicting competitive advantage.  
Besides the industry’s development speed, an alliance’s strategic importance is the second 
cornerstone of the proposed coevolution framework. In highly integrated industries (i.e., law 
firms, management consulting firms) alliances are less crucial and therefore the coevolution 
model is of less value; this is also the case in established commodity industries such as basic 
materials (i.e., coal, metal, gas) and basic financial securities, where efficient markets exist. 
Efficient markets make the need for complex forms of inter-organizational cooperation, such 
as strategic alliances, obsolete. These two industry characteristics diminish the applicability 
of the proposed model. 
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In addition to industry-specific arguments, that proposed model’s preliminary status limits 
its explanatory power. Although there is always a temptation to apply research findings 
normatively, this study has tried to refrain from proposing such recommendations due to its 
exploratory nature. In order to develop normative statements from the alliance portfolio - 
organization coevolution model, it is inevitable that additional case studies in other high 
velocity industries such as semi-conductors or biotechnology are carried out and large-scale 
quantitative measurements of the model’s hypotheses are conducted. These tests to increase 
the validity of the model are one direction for further research, which is laid out in the next 
part. 
Further research 
The testing of the coevolution framework to establish ultimate validity and a normative 
status for this model clearly constitutes one path for further research. In addition, by 
incorporating the literature, this study has uncovered three weaknesses in the current 
literature that require further research to be thoroughly understood: the knowledge about 
underlying alliance processes, the influence of financial resources on organizational change, 
and the measurement of resources. The subsequent paragraphs explain these research 
requirements. 
Reaching validity: For the coevolution framework to reach normative status, its 
applicability in other high-technology industries such as multi-media, semi-conductors, 
nanotechnology and biotechnology calls for special attention. Additional case studies in 
these industries should be conducted to allow for cross-industry tests. In addition, the 
formulated hypotheses must still be proven by statistical tests with sufficiently large 
samples.  
Alliance processes: That alliance processes require further research became obvious 
through the multi-level set-up of this study. Although much is known about how alliances 
influence competitive advantage on a strategic level, very little is known about the 
underlying process level. Issues such as alliance controlling procedures are hardly explored 
despite their strategic relevance (Bamford, et al., 2002). This is also true for alliance project 
management. On an operational level, detailed research is required to understand the 
underlying activities and processes that make alliances work. In addition, this research is 
needed to close the gap between theoretical findings and implementation. Without the 
process know-how, management cannot implement strategic level results. The last section 
will focus on this implementation issue in greater detail. 
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Impact of financial resources: An additional issue that is not adequately addressed is the 
role that financial resources play in the development of NTBFs. Empirical studies and the 
case study interviews consistently underscore the importance of financial resources for 
NTBFs to prosper. However, in this research study, the requirement for financial resources 
could not be integrated into the life-cycle grid⎯which could be consistently applied for all 
other resources. In addition, many life cycle concepts such as Kazanjian’s (1988; 1989; 
1990) four stage model make no statement concerning financial resources and their 
development. Thus, a third direction for future research is the detailed analysis of financial 
resources, VC’s financing rounds, and their interdependencies with organizational change 
and life cycle stages. 
Resource measurement: On a basic level, more must be learned about specific resources 
and their operationalization. Literature (i.e., Barney, 2001) has provided a broad 
classification of resources, but studies that provide insight into how to measure resources are 
lacking. The resource ‘technological know-how’ is especially hard to operationalize; 
therefore, resource-based models are consistently hard for practitioners to understand and 
implement. 
Not all four points⎯guiding further research⎯are new or innovative. The last point in 
particular has been stated very often after the publication of internally focused models of 
strategic management, starting in the mid 1980s. It is nevertheless still valid. This is also the 
case with the problem that theoretical findings are often difficult for practitioners to 
implement when underlying processes are not yet described. The next section discusses this 
point in greater detail. 
5.4 Implications and directions for management 
The coevolution framework of alliance portfolio and NTBF organization has demonstrated 
its contribution in extending the literature on alliance dynamics. This new framework has 
thus advanced the theoretical understanding of alliance portfolios and their strategic impact 
on NTBF performance. 
Apart from contributing to the body of literature on alliance dynamics, what can the model 
offer that is of value to practitioners of management? All too often this question remains 
unresolved in academic management literature. Scholars such as MacMillan (2000) do not 
tire of emphasizing the need for ‘implementable research with real life implications.’ 
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This study makes an explicit effort to emphasize several findings that may serve as valuable 
inputs for managerial decision-making. While these findings are not intended to provide 
‘ready to use’ solutions for specific business problems, they do qualify as points of departure 
for developing such solutions. A question that quickly comes to mind in this context is 
whether a case-based study can offer any substantial input for management practice. Two 
reasons are warranted. First, the idea of deriving recommendations from closely observing 
the behavior of other companies, be it competitors or unrelated firms, has a long tradition in 
management. Activities such as competitive intelligence, reverse engineering, and 
benchmarking rest on this type of observation. Second, the contribution of this study is not 
based exclusively on the case findings. The proposed coevolution model rests on the 
observations of the case firms, several industry reports, and on an in-depth discussion of 
various lines of management literature that have been found to enhance the case findings. 
Perhaps the most ebvious implication to be drawn from the coevolution framework of 
alliance portfolio and NTBF organization is the clearly-documented fact that alliances are 
not a crucial for NTBFs in the Mobile Internet industry. They are established to copy others 
as a method for coping with uncertainty (i.e., the‘me too’-syndrome), but have the power to 
create competitive advantage.  
The next implication is that these alliance portfolios must change over time, because they 
are related to organizational characteristics of NTBFs that develop as these young firms 
grow. Therefore, alliance portfolios must change over time, and managing them proactively 
creates value. Step by step, alliance portfolios have to provide different resources⎯from 
reputation and broad technological know-how in the conception stage, to supply and 
production resources in the commercialization stage, and to distribution resources in the 
growth stage and thereafter. In the later stages, only specific, intense technology and supply 
relations maintain their strategic importance. 
In addition to these two high-level conclusions, which a few managers might perceive as too 
generic, too broad, and too abstract, this study offers additional insight on a process level by 
providing insights about what a best practice allying process looks like; which factors are 
important for alliance formation; and which factors are important for alliance management. 
These insights are depicted in figure 71. 
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Figure 71   Allying process 
The allying process consists of two major steps⎯alliance formation and alliance portfolio 
management⎯and is closely related to the overall strategy process. In a strategy pre-phase, 
NTBFs develop a corporate strategy, in which they decide on which products to develop and 
which markets to enter. They work out a mid-term tactic for how they want to reach their 
targets, which problems they will have to solve, and which resources they will require. In a 
last strategic step, NTBFs decide on which resources they source via markets, which 
resources they produce in-house, and which resources they try to access via alliances. This 
last decision on the sourcing tactic kicks off the allying process, which is made up of the 
formation and the management phase. 
Alliances are formed in a three-step phase: partner search and screening, contacting, and 
contracting and partnerships realization. First, in the search and screening step, it is 
important to select and prioritize potential partners according to clear objectives⎯derived 
from the corporate strategy. Tools such as the overlap matrix (on products and clients) help 
to evaluate the strategic fit. Second, appropriate partners must be approached. The success 
rate depends heavily on a NTBF’s social capital. Social capital consists of its reputation, its 
alliance project skills, and personal ties of interlinking agents (i.e., directorates). 
Membership in industry associations and prior alliances can foster social capital as well. The 
last step in the alliance formation process is realizing the partnership, which, in business 
terms, means: closing the deal. Alliance project skills⎯established through prior 
alliances⎯are particularly helpful for negotiating and closing partnerships deals. These 
deals should be flexible enough to cope with uncertainty in high velocity industries. 
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Flexibility in partnerships extends their duration and has a positive impact on the resource 
exchange. Both aspects are taken into consideration in the alliance management sub-process. 
The alliance management sub-process also has three steps: operating and embedding the 
partnership, controlling alliance portfolios, and realigning partnerships. The ability to embed 
alliances through intense communication and the establishment of trust opens the option to 
intensify resource exchanges in alliances and opens feedback channels. These feedback 
channels, together with flexible partnership agreements, are important for the duration of 
alliances because perceived unfairness is one of the most important reasons that alliances are 
terminated, especially between NTBFs and incumbents. Clear performance measures and 
their controlling are necessary for supervising alliance portfolio effectiveness, managing the 
deployment of resources such as management time, and terminating inefficient relationships 
that cannot be revitalized. 
As pointed out earlier, the above-mentioned managerial implications should not be 
misconstrued as representing a guide to the correct way of forming and managing alliance 
portfolios. Variations certainly apply depending upon the specific type of an emerging high-
technology industry a firm is operating in and as a function of numerous other specific 
circumstances. There is always a danger of being too quick to generate normative statements 
from a new model. This critique has rightly been raised in the context of many frameworks 
such as the discussion of diversification of pure players in the beginning of the nineties that 
caused DaimlerChrysler’s very unsuccessful entry into other transportation businesses with 
ADtrans, Dornier, etc. and the focus on core competencies and core business units in the 
late nineties that put extreme pressure on conglomerates such as GE and Siemens. This 
mistake should not be repeated here. Nevertheless, the findings of this study do show that 
firms that have acted in a way explained by the proposed coevolution framework received 
higher returns and developed faster. These findings are substantiated by an in-depth 
discussion of theoretical contribution. Hence, while the new model should not be applied as 
a blueprint for forming and managing alliance portfolios, it implies the intriguing value of 
proactively adapting alliance portfolios in emerging high-technology industries. 
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7. Appendices 
7.1 List of Interviews and Affiliations of Interviewees 
Name Company Job title Interview date/place
Bernd Mühlfriedel 12snap AG Chief Financial 
Officer 
04/22/2002 
Munich 
Ingo Griebel 12Snap AG Managing Director 
Germany 
04/22/2002 
Munich 
Claudius Bertheau Airweb AG Chief Executive 
Officer 
02/21/2002 
Bludenz 
12/23/2002 
Bludenz 
Jörg Miller Airweb AG Chief Financial 
Officer 
07/05/2002 
Mönchengladbach 
Thorsten Rehfuß Apollis Interactive Director of 
Marketing and PR 
06/19/2002 
Munich 
Stefan Block Clever.Tanken Chief Executive 
Officer 
04/03/2002 
Nuremberg 
Matthias Kose e-hotel Chief Executive 
Officer 
04/18/2002 
Berlin 
Michael Halbherr Gate 5 Chief Executive 
Officer 
05/07/2002 
Berlin 
Ingo Lippert Mindmatics Chief Executive 
Officer 
02/18/2002 
Munich 
Anja Dönrke-Bartling Multichart Director of 
Marketing 
05/10/2002 
Kassel 
Dr. Bernhard Kölmel YellowMap Head of Business 
Development 
04/04/2002 
Karlsruhe 
 
APPENDICES  318 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7.2 Alliance intensity of Mobile Internet industry segments 
 
7.3 Revenue forecast for Mobile Internet industry segments 
 
 
7.4 Interview Transcripts 
Please see separate volume 
 
 
Reaching new 
markets
Plug the 
skill gap
Building nodal 
positions
Creating new 
opportunities
Accessing su- 
perior supply Total
Mobile Internet 
segments 0,125 0,25 0,25 0,125 0,25 Weight
MCS 3 3 4 4 5 3,88
MLS 1 5 4 5 4 4,00
Mobile Marketing 4 3 5 4 1 3,25
mCommerce 2 4 2 3 3 2,88
Music and 
Entertainment 2 2 4 3 5 3,38
m-Learning 3 4 2 2 3 2,88
m-Office 3 3 3 4 1 2,63
m-Health and 
wellness services 1 2 2 3 1 1,75
m-Games 2 5 2 4 1 2,75
Personalization 1 2 4 1 1 2,00
Scale
Alliance drivers
1 = low to 5 = high
Mobile Internet segments Revenues 2001 Revenues 2006 CAGR
MLS 200,0 4066,7 83%
MCS 200,0 3200,0 74%
Mobile Marketing 20,0 1400,0 134%
mCommerce 40,8 483,4 64%
Music and Entertainment 140,1 1965,5 70%
m-Learning 16,0 288,0 78%
m-Office 80,0 1223,8 73%
m-Health and wellness services 10,7 93,6 54%
m-Games 140,1 3275,9 88%
Personalization 840,6 3275,9 31%
Total 1688,2 19272,7 63%
